| Message ID | 20210227153013.6747-6-john.wood@gmx.com |
|---|---|
| State | Superseded |
| Headers | show |
| Series | Fork brute force attack mitigation | expand |
On 2/27/21 4:30 PM, John Wood wrote: > In order to mitigate a brute force attack all the offending tasks involved > in the attack must be killed. In other words, it is necessary to kill all > the tasks that share the fork and/or exec statistical data related to the > attack. Moreover, if the attack happens through the fork system call, the > processes that have the same group_leader that the current task (the task > that has crashed) must be avoided since they are in the path to be killed. > > When the SIGKILL signal is sent to the offending tasks, the function > "brute_kill_offending_tasks" will be called in a recursive way from the > task_fatal_signal LSM hook due to a small crash period. So, to avoid kill > again the same tasks due to a recursive call of this function, it is > necessary to disable the attack detection for the involved hierarchies. Would it not be useful for forensic reasons to be able to send SIGABRT and get the a coredump? > To disable the attack detection, set to zero the last crash timestamp and > avoid to compute the application crash period in this case. > > Signed-off-by: John Wood <john.wood@gmx.com> > --- > security/brute/brute.c | 141 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--- > 1 file changed, 132 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-) > > diff --git a/security/brute/brute.c b/security/brute/brute.c > index 0a99cd4c3303..48b07d923ec7 100644 > --- a/security/brute/brute.c > +++ b/security/brute/brute.c > @@ -22,6 +22,7 @@ > #include <linux/math64.h> > #include <linux/netdevice.h> > #include <linux/path.h> > +#include <linux/pid.h> > #include <linux/printk.h> > #include <linux/refcount.h> > #include <linux/rwlock.h> > @@ -64,7 +65,7 @@ struct brute_cred { > * @lock: Lock to protect the brute_stats structure. > * @refc: Reference counter. > * @faults: Number of crashes. > - * @jiffies: Last crash timestamp. > + * @jiffies: Last crash timestamp. If zero, the attack detection is disabled. > * @period: Crash period's moving average. > * @saved_cred: Saved credentials. > * @network: Network activity flag. > @@ -566,6 +567,125 @@ static inline void print_fork_attack_running(void) > pr_warn("Fork brute force attack detected [%s]\n", current->comm); > } > > +/** > + * brute_disabled() - Test if the brute force attack detection is disabled. > + * @stats: Statistical data shared by all the fork hierarchy processes. > + * > + * The brute force attack detection enabling/disabling is based on the last > + * crash timestamp. A zero timestamp indicates that this feature is disabled. A > + * timestamp greater than zero indicates that the attack detection is enabled. > + * > + * The statistical data shared by all the fork hierarchy processes cannot be > + * NULL. > + * > + * It's mandatory to disable interrupts before acquiring the brute_stats::lock > + * since the task_free hook can be called from an IRQ context during the > + * execution of the task_fatal_signal hook. > + * > + * Context: Must be called with interrupts disabled and brute_stats_ptr_lock > + * held. > + * Return: True if the brute force attack detection is disabled. False > + * otherwise. > + */ > +static bool brute_disabled(struct brute_stats *stats) > +{ > + bool disabled; > + > + spin_lock(&stats->lock); > + disabled = !stats->jiffies; > + spin_unlock(&stats->lock); > + > + return disabled; > +} > + > +/** > + * brute_disable() - Disable the brute force attack detection. > + * @stats: Statistical data shared by all the fork hierarchy processes. > + * > + * To disable the brute force attack detection it is only necessary to set the > + * last crash timestamp to zero. A zero timestamp indicates that this feature is > + * disabled. A timestamp greater than zero indicates that the attack detection > + * is enabled. > + * > + * The statistical data shared by all the fork hierarchy processes cannot be > + * NULL. > + * > + * Context: Must be called with interrupts disabled and brute_stats_ptr_lock > + * and brute_stats::lock held. > + */ > +static inline void brute_disable(struct brute_stats *stats) > +{ > + stats->jiffies = 0; > +} > + > +/** > + * enum brute_attack_type - Brute force attack type. > + * @BRUTE_ATTACK_TYPE_FORK: Attack that happens through the fork system call. > + * @BRUTE_ATTACK_TYPE_EXEC: Attack that happens through the execve system call. > + */ > +enum brute_attack_type { > + BRUTE_ATTACK_TYPE_FORK, > + BRUTE_ATTACK_TYPE_EXEC, > +}; > + > +/** > + * brute_kill_offending_tasks() - Kill the offending tasks. > + * @attack_type: Brute force attack type. > + * @stats: Statistical data shared by all the fork hierarchy processes. > + * > + * When a brute force attack is detected all the offending tasks involved in the > + * attack must be killed. In other words, it is necessary to kill all the tasks > + * that share the same statistical data. Moreover, if the attack happens through > + * the fork system call, the processes that have the same group_leader that the > + * current task must be avoided since they are in the path to be killed. > + * > + * When the SIGKILL signal is sent to the offending tasks, this function will be > + * called again from the task_fatal_signal hook due to a small crash period. So, > + * to avoid kill again the same tasks due to a recursive call of this function, > + * it is necessary to disable the attack detection for this fork hierarchy. > + * > + * The statistical data shared by all the fork hierarchy processes cannot be > + * NULL. > + * > + * It's mandatory to disable interrupts before acquiring the brute_stats::lock > + * since the task_free hook can be called from an IRQ context during the > + * execution of the task_fatal_signal hook. > + * > + * Context: Must be called with interrupts disabled and tasklist_lock and > + * brute_stats_ptr_lock held. > + */ > +static void brute_kill_offending_tasks(enum brute_attack_type attack_type, > + struct brute_stats *stats) > +{ > + struct task_struct *p; > + struct brute_stats **p_stats; > + > + spin_lock(&stats->lock); > + > + if (attack_type == BRUTE_ATTACK_TYPE_FORK && > + refcount_read(&stats->refc) == 1) { > + spin_unlock(&stats->lock); > + return; > + } > + > + brute_disable(stats); > + spin_unlock(&stats->lock); > + > + for_each_process(p) { > + if (attack_type == BRUTE_ATTACK_TYPE_FORK && > + p->group_leader == current->group_leader) > + continue; > + > + p_stats = brute_stats_ptr(p); > + if (*p_stats != stats) > + continue; > + > + do_send_sig_info(SIGKILL, SEND_SIG_PRIV, p, PIDTYPE_PID); > + pr_warn_ratelimited("Offending process %d [%s] killed\n", > + p->pid, p->comm); > + } > +} > + > /** > * brute_manage_fork_attack() - Manage a fork brute force attack. > * @stats: Statistical data shared by all the fork hierarchy processes. > @@ -581,8 +701,8 @@ static inline void print_fork_attack_running(void) > * since the task_free hook can be called from an IRQ context during the > * execution of the task_fatal_signal hook. > * > - * Context: Must be called with interrupts disabled and brute_stats_ptr_lock > - * held. > + * Context: Must be called with interrupts disabled and tasklist_lock and > + * brute_stats_ptr_lock held. > * Return: The last crash timestamp before updating it. > */ > static u64 brute_manage_fork_attack(struct brute_stats *stats, u64 now) > @@ -590,8 +710,10 @@ static u64 brute_manage_fork_attack(struct brute_stats *stats, u64 now) > u64 last_fork_crash; > > last_fork_crash = brute_update_crash_period(stats, now); > - if (brute_attack_running(stats)) > + if (brute_attack_running(stats)) { > print_fork_attack_running(); > + brute_kill_offending_tasks(BRUTE_ATTACK_TYPE_FORK, stats); > + } > > return last_fork_crash; > } > @@ -778,8 +900,10 @@ static void brute_manage_exec_attack(struct brute_stats *stats, u64 now, > if (fork_period == exec_period) > return; > > - if (brute_attack_running(exec_stats)) > + if (brute_attack_running(exec_stats)) { > print_exec_attack_running(exec_stats); > + brute_kill_offending_tasks(BRUTE_ATTACK_TYPE_EXEC, exec_stats); > + } > } > > /** > @@ -895,10 +1019,9 @@ static void brute_task_fatal_signal(const kernel_siginfo_t *siginfo) > read_lock(&tasklist_lock); > read_lock_irqsave(&brute_stats_ptr_lock, flags); > > - if (WARN(!*stats, "No statistical data\n")) > - goto unlock; > - > - if (!brute_threat_model_supported(siginfo, *stats)) > + if (WARN(!*stats, "No statistical data\n") || > + brute_disabled(*stats) || > + !brute_threat_model_supported(siginfo, *stats)) > goto unlock; > > last_fork_crash = brute_manage_fork_attack(*stats, now); > -- > 2.25.1 >
Hi, On Thu, Mar 11, 2021 at 09:32:47PM +0100, peter enderborg wrote: > On 2/27/21 4:30 PM, John Wood wrote: > > In order to mitigate a brute force attack all the offending tasks involved > > in the attack must be killed. In other words, it is necessary to kill all > > the tasks that share the fork and/or exec statistical data related to the > > attack. Moreover, if the attack happens through the fork system call, the > > processes that have the same group_leader that the current task (the task > > that has crashed) must be avoided since they are in the path to be killed. > > > > When the SIGKILL signal is sent to the offending tasks, the function > > "brute_kill_offending_tasks" will be called in a recursive way from the > > task_fatal_signal LSM hook due to a small crash period. So, to avoid kill > > again the same tasks due to a recursive call of this function, it is > > necessary to disable the attack detection for the involved hierarchies. > > Would it not be useful for forensic reasons to be able to send SIGABRT and get the a coredump? If there are many tasks involved in the attack we will generate a big number of coredumps (one per task aborted). This can be solved if we send the SIGABRT to terminate the first process found and send SIGKILL to terminate the remaining processes. But I don't know if under this scenario we will get a core dump with lack of information (the info related to the other processes). Another scenario: The process that crashes is the last in the fork hierarchy and triggers a brute force attack mitigation. In this case it it not necessary to kill the process that crashes since it is in the path to be killed. So, under this situation we will not get a coredump (we don't send any signal). Lack of information again. Currently, we show the name of the task that triggers the mitigation, the attack type (fork or exec) and the name and pid of all the offending tasks involved in the attack (the tasks that we kill). If it's necessary we can show more info. What info do you think would be necessary? Thanks, John Wood
diff --git a/security/brute/brute.c b/security/brute/brute.c index 0a99cd4c3303..48b07d923ec7 100644 --- a/security/brute/brute.c +++ b/security/brute/brute.c @@ -22,6 +22,7 @@ #include <linux/math64.h> #include <linux/netdevice.h> #include <linux/path.h> +#include <linux/pid.h> #include <linux/printk.h> #include <linux/refcount.h> #include <linux/rwlock.h> @@ -64,7 +65,7 @@ struct brute_cred { * @lock: Lock to protect the brute_stats structure. * @refc: Reference counter. * @faults: Number of crashes. - * @jiffies: Last crash timestamp. + * @jiffies: Last crash timestamp. If zero, the attack detection is disabled. * @period: Crash period's moving average. * @saved_cred: Saved credentials. * @network: Network activity flag. @@ -566,6 +567,125 @@ static inline void print_fork_attack_running(void) pr_warn("Fork brute force attack detected [%s]\n", current->comm); } +/** + * brute_disabled() - Test if the brute force attack detection is disabled. + * @stats: Statistical data shared by all the fork hierarchy processes. + * + * The brute force attack detection enabling/disabling is based on the last + * crash timestamp. A zero timestamp indicates that this feature is disabled. A + * timestamp greater than zero indicates that the attack detection is enabled. + * + * The statistical data shared by all the fork hierarchy processes cannot be + * NULL. + * + * It's mandatory to disable interrupts before acquiring the brute_stats::lock + * since the task_free hook can be called from an IRQ context during the + * execution of the task_fatal_signal hook. + * + * Context: Must be called with interrupts disabled and brute_stats_ptr_lock + * held. + * Return: True if the brute force attack detection is disabled. False + * otherwise. + */ +static bool brute_disabled(struct brute_stats *stats) +{ + bool disabled; + + spin_lock(&stats->lock); + disabled = !stats->jiffies; + spin_unlock(&stats->lock); + + return disabled; +} + +/** + * brute_disable() - Disable the brute force attack detection. + * @stats: Statistical data shared by all the fork hierarchy processes. + * + * To disable the brute force attack detection it is only necessary to set the + * last crash timestamp to zero. A zero timestamp indicates that this feature is + * disabled. A timestamp greater than zero indicates that the attack detection + * is enabled. + * + * The statistical data shared by all the fork hierarchy processes cannot be + * NULL. + * + * Context: Must be called with interrupts disabled and brute_stats_ptr_lock + * and brute_stats::lock held. + */ +static inline void brute_disable(struct brute_stats *stats) +{ + stats->jiffies = 0; +} + +/** + * enum brute_attack_type - Brute force attack type. + * @BRUTE_ATTACK_TYPE_FORK: Attack that happens through the fork system call. + * @BRUTE_ATTACK_TYPE_EXEC: Attack that happens through the execve system call. + */ +enum brute_attack_type { + BRUTE_ATTACK_TYPE_FORK, + BRUTE_ATTACK_TYPE_EXEC, +}; + +/** + * brute_kill_offending_tasks() - Kill the offending tasks. + * @attack_type: Brute force attack type. + * @stats: Statistical data shared by all the fork hierarchy processes. + * + * When a brute force attack is detected all the offending tasks involved in the + * attack must be killed. In other words, it is necessary to kill all the tasks + * that share the same statistical data. Moreover, if the attack happens through + * the fork system call, the processes that have the same group_leader that the + * current task must be avoided since they are in the path to be killed. + * + * When the SIGKILL signal is sent to the offending tasks, this function will be + * called again from the task_fatal_signal hook due to a small crash period. So, + * to avoid kill again the same tasks due to a recursive call of this function, + * it is necessary to disable the attack detection for this fork hierarchy. + * + * The statistical data shared by all the fork hierarchy processes cannot be + * NULL. + * + * It's mandatory to disable interrupts before acquiring the brute_stats::lock + * since the task_free hook can be called from an IRQ context during the + * execution of the task_fatal_signal hook. + * + * Context: Must be called with interrupts disabled and tasklist_lock and + * brute_stats_ptr_lock held. + */ +static void brute_kill_offending_tasks(enum brute_attack_type attack_type, + struct brute_stats *stats) +{ + struct task_struct *p; + struct brute_stats **p_stats; + + spin_lock(&stats->lock); + + if (attack_type == BRUTE_ATTACK_TYPE_FORK && + refcount_read(&stats->refc) == 1) { + spin_unlock(&stats->lock); + return; + } + + brute_disable(stats); + spin_unlock(&stats->lock); + + for_each_process(p) { + if (attack_type == BRUTE_ATTACK_TYPE_FORK && + p->group_leader == current->group_leader) + continue; + + p_stats = brute_stats_ptr(p); + if (*p_stats != stats) + continue; + + do_send_sig_info(SIGKILL, SEND_SIG_PRIV, p, PIDTYPE_PID); + pr_warn_ratelimited("Offending process %d [%s] killed\n", + p->pid, p->comm); + } +} + /** * brute_manage_fork_attack() - Manage a fork brute force attack. * @stats: Statistical data shared by all the fork hierarchy processes. @@ -581,8 +701,8 @@ static inline void print_fork_attack_running(void) * since the task_free hook can be called from an IRQ context during the * execution of the task_fatal_signal hook. * - * Context: Must be called with interrupts disabled and brute_stats_ptr_lock - * held. + * Context: Must be called with interrupts disabled and tasklist_lock and + * brute_stats_ptr_lock held. * Return: The last crash timestamp before updating it. */ static u64 brute_manage_fork_attack(struct brute_stats *stats, u64 now) @@ -590,8 +710,10 @@ static u64 brute_manage_fork_attack(struct brute_stats *stats, u64 now) u64 last_fork_crash; last_fork_crash = brute_update_crash_period(stats, now); - if (brute_attack_running(stats)) + if (brute_attack_running(stats)) { print_fork_attack_running(); + brute_kill_offending_tasks(BRUTE_ATTACK_TYPE_FORK, stats); + } return last_fork_crash; } @@ -778,8 +900,10 @@ static void brute_manage_exec_attack(struct brute_stats *stats, u64 now, if (fork_period == exec_period) return; - if (brute_attack_running(exec_stats)) + if (brute_attack_running(exec_stats)) { print_exec_attack_running(exec_stats); + brute_kill_offending_tasks(BRUTE_ATTACK_TYPE_EXEC, exec_stats); + } } /** @@ -895,10 +1019,9 @@ static void brute_task_fatal_signal(const kernel_siginfo_t *siginfo) read_lock(&tasklist_lock); read_lock_irqsave(&brute_stats_ptr_lock, flags); - if (WARN(!*stats, "No statistical data\n")) - goto unlock; - - if (!brute_threat_model_supported(siginfo, *stats)) + if (WARN(!*stats, "No statistical data\n") || + brute_disabled(*stats) || + !brute_threat_model_supported(siginfo, *stats)) goto unlock; last_fork_crash = brute_manage_fork_attack(*stats, now);
In order to mitigate a brute force attack all the offending tasks involved in the attack must be killed. In other words, it is necessary to kill all the tasks that share the fork and/or exec statistical data related to the attack. Moreover, if the attack happens through the fork system call, the processes that have the same group_leader that the current task (the task that has crashed) must be avoided since they are in the path to be killed. When the SIGKILL signal is sent to the offending tasks, the function "brute_kill_offending_tasks" will be called in a recursive way from the task_fatal_signal LSM hook due to a small crash period. So, to avoid kill again the same tasks due to a recursive call of this function, it is necessary to disable the attack detection for the involved hierarchies. To disable the attack detection, set to zero the last crash timestamp and avoid to compute the application crash period in this case. Signed-off-by: John Wood <john.wood@gmx.com> --- security/brute/brute.c | 141 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--- 1 file changed, 132 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-) -- 2.25.1