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[net] net: icmp: zero-out cb in icmp{,v6}_ndo_send before sending

Message ID 20210218123053.2239986-1-Jason@zx2c4.com
State New
Headers show
Series [net] net: icmp: zero-out cb in icmp{,v6}_ndo_send before sending | expand

Commit Message

Jason A. Donenfeld Feb. 18, 2021, 12:30 p.m. UTC
The icmp{,v6}_send functions make all sorts of use of skb->cb, assuming
the skb to have come directly from the inet layer. But when the packet
comes from the ndo layer, especially when forwarded, there's no telling
what might be in skb->cb at that point. So, icmp{,v6}_ndo_send must zero
out its skb->cb before passing the packet off to icmp{,v6}_send.
Otherwise the icmp sending code risks reading bogus memory contents,
which can result in nasty stack overflows such as this one reported by a
user:

    panic+0x108/0x2ea
    __stack_chk_fail+0x14/0x20
    __icmp_send+0x5bd/0x5c0
    icmp_ndo_send+0x148/0x160

This is easy to simulate by doing a `memset(skb->cb, 0x41,
sizeof(skb->cb));` before calling icmp{,v6}_ndo_send, and it's only by
good fortune and the rarity of icmp sending from that context that we've
avoided reports like this until now. For example, in KASAN:

    BUG: KASAN: stack-out-of-bounds in __ip_options_echo+0xa0e/0x12b0
    Write of size 38 at addr ffff888006f1f80e by task ping/89
    CPU: 2 PID: 89 Comm: ping Not tainted 5.10.0-rc7-debug+ #5
    Call Trace:
     dump_stack+0x9a/0xcc
     print_address_description.constprop.0+0x1a/0x160
     __kasan_report.cold+0x20/0x38
     kasan_report+0x32/0x40
     check_memory_region+0x145/0x1a0
     memcpy+0x39/0x60
     __ip_options_echo+0xa0e/0x12b0
     __icmp_send+0x744/0x1700

Actually, out of the 4 drivers that do this, only gtp zeroed the cb for
the v4 case, while the rest did not. So this commit actually removes the
gtp-specific zeroing, while putting the code where it belongs in the
shared infrastructure of icmp{,v6}_ndo_send.

Fixes: a2b78e9b2cac ("sunvnet: generate ICMP PTMUD messages for smaller port MTUs")
Reported-by: SinYu <liuxyon@gmail.com>
Cc: Willem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/CAF=yD-LOF116aHub6RMe8vB8ZpnrrnoTdqhobEx+bvoA8AsP0w@mail.gmail.com/T/
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>

---
 drivers/net/gtp.c      | 1 -
 include/linux/icmpv6.h | 6 +++++-
 include/net/icmp.h     | 6 +++++-
 net/ipv4/icmp.c        | 2 ++
 net/ipv6/ip6_icmp.c    | 2 ++
 5 files changed, 14 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

-- 
2.30.1

Comments

Willem de Bruijn Feb. 18, 2021, 2:56 p.m. UTC | #1
On Thu, Feb 18, 2021 at 7:31 AM Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com> wrote:
>

> The icmp{,v6}_send functions make all sorts of use of skb->cb, assuming


Indeed that also casts skb->cb, to read IP6CB(skb)->iif, good catch.

Still, might be good to more precisely detail the relevant bug:
icmp_send casts the cb to an option struct.

        __icmp_send(skb_in, type, code, info, &IPCB(skb_in)->opt);

which is referenced to parse headers by __ip_options_echo, copying
data into stack allocated icmp_param and so overwriting the stack
frame.

> the skb to have come directly from the inet layer. But when the packet

> comes from the ndo layer, especially when forwarded, there's no telling

> what might be in skb->cb at that point. So, icmp{,v6}_ndo_send must zero

> out its skb->cb before passing the packet off to icmp{,v6}_send.

> Otherwise the icmp sending code risks reading bogus memory contents,

> which can result in nasty stack overflows such as this one reported by a

> user:

>

>     panic+0x108/0x2ea

>     __stack_chk_fail+0x14/0x20

>     __icmp_send+0x5bd/0x5c0

>     icmp_ndo_send+0x148/0x160

>

> This is easy to simulate by doing a `memset(skb->cb, 0x41,

> sizeof(skb->cb));` before calling icmp{,v6}_ndo_send, and it's only by

> good fortune and the rarity of icmp sending from that context that we've

> avoided reports like this until now. For example, in KASAN:

>

>     BUG: KASAN: stack-out-of-bounds in __ip_options_echo+0xa0e/0x12b0

>     Write of size 38 at addr ffff888006f1f80e by task ping/89

>     CPU: 2 PID: 89 Comm: ping Not tainted 5.10.0-rc7-debug+ #5

>     Call Trace:

>      dump_stack+0x9a/0xcc

>      print_address_description.constprop.0+0x1a/0x160

>      __kasan_report.cold+0x20/0x38

>      kasan_report+0x32/0x40

>      check_memory_region+0x145/0x1a0

>      memcpy+0x39/0x60

>      __ip_options_echo+0xa0e/0x12b0

>      __icmp_send+0x744/0x1700

>

> Actually, out of the 4 drivers that do this, only gtp zeroed the cb for

> the v4 case, while the rest did not. So this commit actually removes the

> gtp-specific zeroing, while putting the code where it belongs in the

> shared infrastructure of icmp{,v6}_ndo_send.

>

> Fixes: a2b78e9b2cac ("sunvnet: generate ICMP PTMUD messages for smaller port MTUs")


This is from looking at all the callers of icmp{,v6}_ndo_send.

If you look at the callers of icmp{,v6}_send there are even a couple
more. Such as ipoib_cm_skb_reap (which memsets), clip_neigh_error
(which doesn't), various tunnel devices (which live under net/ipv4,
but are called as .ndo_start_xmit downstream from, e.g., segmentation
(SKB_GSO_CB). Which are fixed (all?) in commit 5146d1f15112
("tunnel: Clear IPCB(skb)->opt before dst_link_failure called").

Might be even better to do the memset in __icmp_send/icmp6_send,
rather than in the wrapper. What do you think?

> Reported-by: SinYu <liuxyon@gmail.com>

> Cc: Willem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com>

> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/CAF=yD-LOF116aHub6RMe8vB8ZpnrrnoTdqhobEx+bvoA8AsP0w@mail.gmail.com/T/

> Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>

> ---

>  drivers/net/gtp.c      | 1 -

>  include/linux/icmpv6.h | 6 +++++-

>  include/net/icmp.h     | 6 +++++-

>  net/ipv4/icmp.c        | 2 ++

>  net/ipv6/ip6_icmp.c    | 2 ++

>  5 files changed, 14 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

>

> diff --git a/drivers/net/gtp.c b/drivers/net/gtp.c

> index 4c04e271f184..fd3c2d86e48b 100644

> --- a/drivers/net/gtp.c

> +++ b/drivers/net/gtp.c

> @@ -539,7 +539,6 @@ static int gtp_build_skb_ip4(struct sk_buff *skb, struct net_device *dev,

>         if (!skb_is_gso(skb) && (iph->frag_off & htons(IP_DF)) &&

>             mtu < ntohs(iph->tot_len)) {

>                 netdev_dbg(dev, "packet too big, fragmentation needed\n");

> -               memset(IPCB(skb), 0, sizeof(*IPCB(skb)));

>                 icmp_ndo_send(skb, ICMP_DEST_UNREACH, ICMP_FRAG_NEEDED,

>                               htonl(mtu));

>                 goto err_rt;

> diff --git a/include/linux/icmpv6.h b/include/linux/icmpv6.h

> index 1b3371ae8193..87d434fc98a3 100644

> --- a/include/linux/icmpv6.h

> +++ b/include/linux/icmpv6.h

> @@ -45,7 +45,11 @@ int ip6_err_gen_icmpv6_unreach(struct sk_buff *skb, int nhs, int type,

>  #if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_NF_NAT)

>  void icmpv6_ndo_send(struct sk_buff *skb_in, u8 type, u8 code, __u32 info);

>  #else

> -#define icmpv6_ndo_send icmpv6_send

> +static inline void icmpv6_ndo_send(struct sk_buff *skb_in, u8 type, u8 code, __u32 info)

> +{

> +       memset(skb_in->cb, 0, sizeof(skb_in->cb));

> +       icmpv6_send(skb_in, type, code, info);

> +}

>  #endif

>

>  #else

> diff --git a/include/net/icmp.h b/include/net/icmp.h

> index 9ac2d2672a93..4bb404c9abc8 100644

> --- a/include/net/icmp.h

> +++ b/include/net/icmp.h

> @@ -46,7 +46,11 @@ static inline void icmp_send(struct sk_buff *skb_in, int type, int code, __be32

>  #if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_NF_NAT)

>  void icmp_ndo_send(struct sk_buff *skb_in, int type, int code, __be32 info);

>  #else

> -#define icmp_ndo_send icmp_send

> +static inline void icmp_ndo_send(struct sk_buff *skb_in, int type, int code, __be32 info)

> +{

> +       memset(skb_in->cb, 0, sizeof(skb_in->cb));


as in the line removed in gtp_build_skb_ip4, it would be sufficient to
memset sizeof(*IPCB(skb)). I don't know if you chose to clear the full
40B on purpose.


> +       icmp_send(skb_in, type, code, info);

> +}

>  #endif

>

>  int icmp_rcv(struct sk_buff *skb);

> diff --git a/net/ipv4/icmp.c b/net/ipv4/icmp.c

> index 396b492c804f..ecf080532291 100644

> --- a/net/ipv4/icmp.c

> +++ b/net/ipv4/icmp.c

> @@ -781,6 +781,7 @@ void icmp_ndo_send(struct sk_buff *skb_in, int type, int code, __be32 info)

>

>         ct = nf_ct_get(skb_in, &ctinfo);

>         if (!ct || !(ct->status & IPS_SRC_NAT)) {

> +               memset(skb_in->cb, 0, sizeof(skb_in->cb));

>                 icmp_send(skb_in, type, code, info);

>                 return;

>         }

> @@ -796,6 +797,7 @@ void icmp_ndo_send(struct sk_buff *skb_in, int type, int code, __be32 info)

>

>         orig_ip = ip_hdr(skb_in)->saddr;

>         ip_hdr(skb_in)->saddr = ct->tuplehash[0].tuple.src.u3.ip;

> +       memset(skb_in->cb, 0, sizeof(skb_in->cb));

>         icmp_send(skb_in, type, code, info);

>         ip_hdr(skb_in)->saddr = orig_ip;

>  out:

> diff --git a/net/ipv6/ip6_icmp.c b/net/ipv6/ip6_icmp.c

> index 70c8c2f36c98..ddc28be8a65d 100644

> --- a/net/ipv6/ip6_icmp.c

> +++ b/net/ipv6/ip6_icmp.c

> @@ -57,6 +57,7 @@ void icmpv6_ndo_send(struct sk_buff *skb_in, u8 type, u8 code, __u32 info)

>

>         ct = nf_ct_get(skb_in, &ctinfo);

>         if (!ct || !(ct->status & IPS_SRC_NAT)) {

> +               memset(skb_in->cb, 0, sizeof(skb_in->cb));

>                 icmpv6_send(skb_in, type, code, info);

>                 return;

>         }

> @@ -72,6 +73,7 @@ void icmpv6_ndo_send(struct sk_buff *skb_in, u8 type, u8 code, __u32 info)

>

>         orig_ip = ipv6_hdr(skb_in)->saddr;

>         ipv6_hdr(skb_in)->saddr = ct->tuplehash[0].tuple.src.u3.in6;

> +       memset(skb_in->cb, 0, sizeof(skb_in->cb));

>         icmpv6_send(skb_in, type, code, info);

>         ipv6_hdr(skb_in)->saddr = orig_ip;

>  out:

> --

> 2.30.1

>
Jason A. Donenfeld Feb. 18, 2021, 3:40 p.m. UTC | #2
Hi Willem,

On Thu, Feb 18, 2021 at 3:57 PM Willem de Bruijn
<willemdebruijn.kernel@gmail.com> wrote:
>

> On Thu, Feb 18, 2021 at 7:31 AM Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com> wrote:

> >

> > The icmp{,v6}_send functions make all sorts of use of skb->cb, assuming

>

> Indeed that also casts skb->cb, to read IP6CB(skb)->iif, good catch.

>

> Still, might be good to more precisely detail the relevant bug:

> icmp_send casts the cb to an option struct.

>

>         __icmp_send(skb_in, type, code, info, &IPCB(skb_in)->opt);

>

> which is referenced to parse headers by __ip_options_echo, copying

> data into stack allocated icmp_param and so overwriting the stack

> frame.


The other way to fix this bug would be to just make icmp_ndo_send call
__icmp_send with an zeored stack-allocated ip_options, rather than
calling icmp_send which calls __icmp_send with the IPCB one. The
implementation of this is very easy, and that's what I did at first,
until I noticed that the v6 side would require a little bit more
plumbing to do right. But, I can go ahead and do that, if you think
that's the better strategy.

> This is from looking at all the callers of icmp{,v6}_ndo_send.

>

> If you look at the callers of icmp{,v6}_send there are even a couple

> more. Such as ipoib_cm_skb_reap (which memsets), clip_neigh_error

> (which doesn't), various tunnel devices (which live under net/ipv4,

> but are called as .ndo_start_xmit downstream from, e.g., segmentation

> (SKB_GSO_CB). Which are fixed (all?) in commit 5146d1f15112

> ("tunnel: Clear IPCB(skb)->opt before dst_link_failure called").

>

> Might be even better to do the memset in __icmp_send/icmp6_send,

> rather than in the wrapper. What do you think?


I don't think memsetting from icmp_send itself is a good idea, since
most callers of that are actually from the inet layer, where it makes
sense to look at IPCB. Other callers, from the ndo layer, should be
using the icmp_ndo_send helper instead. Or am I confused?

If there are places that are using icmp_send from ndo_start_xmit,
that's a problem that should be fixed, with those uses swapped for
icmp_ndo_send.

Jason
Willem de Bruijn Feb. 18, 2021, 5:29 p.m. UTC | #3
On Thu, Feb 18, 2021 at 10:40 AM Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com> wrote:
>

> Hi Willem,

>

> On Thu, Feb 18, 2021 at 3:57 PM Willem de Bruijn

> <willemdebruijn.kernel@gmail.com> wrote:

> >

> > On Thu, Feb 18, 2021 at 7:31 AM Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com> wrote:

> > >

> > > The icmp{,v6}_send functions make all sorts of use of skb->cb, assuming

> >

> > Indeed that also casts skb->cb, to read IP6CB(skb)->iif, good catch.

> >

> > Still, might be good to more precisely detail the relevant bug:

> > icmp_send casts the cb to an option struct.

> >

> >         __icmp_send(skb_in, type, code, info, &IPCB(skb_in)->opt);

> >

> > which is referenced to parse headers by __ip_options_echo, copying

> > data into stack allocated icmp_param and so overwriting the stack

> > frame.

>

> The other way to fix this bug would be to just make icmp_ndo_send call

> __icmp_send with an zeored stack-allocated ip_options, rather than

> calling icmp_send which calls __icmp_send with the IPCB one. The

> implementation of this is very easy, and that's what I did at first,

> until I noticed that the v6 side would require a little bit more

> plumbing to do right. But, I can go ahead and do that, if you think

> that's the better strategy.


Thanks for that. It does seem to add more code change that we'd like
for stable backports.

> > This is from looking at all the callers of icmp{,v6}_ndo_send.

> >

> > If you look at the callers of icmp{,v6}_send there are even a couple

> > more. Such as ipoib_cm_skb_reap (which memsets), clip_neigh_error

> > (which doesn't), various tunnel devices (which live under net/ipv4,

> > but are called as .ndo_start_xmit downstream from, e.g., segmentation

> > (SKB_GSO_CB). Which are fixed (all?) in commit 5146d1f15112

> > ("tunnel: Clear IPCB(skb)->opt before dst_link_failure called").

> >

> > Might be even better to do the memset in __icmp_send/icmp6_send,

> > rather than in the wrapper. What do you think?

>

> I don't think memsetting from icmp_send itself is a good idea, since

> most callers of that are actually from the inet layer, where it makes

> sense to look at IPCB. Other callers, from the ndo layer, should be

> using the icmp_ndo_send helper instead. Or am I confused?

>

> If there are places that are using icmp_send from ndo_start_xmit,

> that's a problem that should be fixed, with those uses swapped for

> icmp_ndo_send.


I missed this response earlier (two inboxes). Agreed. Sorry that I
didn't reply before your v2.
Jakub Kicinski Feb. 18, 2021, 7:08 p.m. UTC | #4
On Thu, 18 Feb 2021 13:30:53 +0100 Jason A. Donenfeld wrote:
> The icmp{,v6}_send functions make all sorts of use of skb->cb, assuming

> the skb to have come directly from the inet layer. But when the packet

> comes from the ndo layer, especially when forwarded, there's no telling

> what might be in skb->cb at that point. So, icmp{,v6}_ndo_send must zero

> out its skb->cb before passing the packet off to icmp{,v6}_send.

> Otherwise the icmp sending code risks reading bogus memory contents,

> which can result in nasty stack overflows such as this one reported by a

> user:

> 

>     panic+0x108/0x2ea

>     __stack_chk_fail+0x14/0x20

>     __icmp_send+0x5bd/0x5c0

>     icmp_ndo_send+0x148/0x160

> 

> This is easy to simulate by doing a `memset(skb->cb, 0x41,

> sizeof(skb->cb));` before calling icmp{,v6}_ndo_send, and it's only by

> good fortune and the rarity of icmp sending from that context that we've

> avoided reports like this until now. For example, in KASAN:

> 

>     BUG: KASAN: stack-out-of-bounds in __ip_options_echo+0xa0e/0x12b0

>     Write of size 38 at addr ffff888006f1f80e by task ping/89

>     CPU: 2 PID: 89 Comm: ping Not tainted 5.10.0-rc7-debug+ #5

>     Call Trace:

>      dump_stack+0x9a/0xcc

>      print_address_description.constprop.0+0x1a/0x160

>      __kasan_report.cold+0x20/0x38

>      kasan_report+0x32/0x40

>      check_memory_region+0x145/0x1a0

>      memcpy+0x39/0x60

>      __ip_options_echo+0xa0e/0x12b0

>      __icmp_send+0x744/0x1700

> 

> Actually, out of the 4 drivers that do this, only gtp zeroed the cb for

> the v4 case, while the rest did not. So this commit actually removes the

> gtp-specific zeroing, while putting the code where it belongs in the

> shared infrastructure of icmp{,v6}_ndo_send.

> 

> Fixes: a2b78e9b2cac ("sunvnet: generate ICMP PTMUD messages for smaller port MTUs")


nit: please make sure you CC the authors of the commits you're blaming.
Jason A. Donenfeld Feb. 18, 2021, 7:24 p.m. UTC | #5
On Thu, Feb 18, 2021 at 8:08 PM Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org> wrote:
>

> On Thu, 18 Feb 2021 13:30:53 +0100 Jason A. Donenfeld wrote:

> > The icmp{,v6}_send functions make all sorts of use of skb->cb, assuming

> > the skb to have come directly from the inet layer. But when the packet

> > comes from the ndo layer, especially when forwarded, there's no telling

> > what might be in skb->cb at that point. So, icmp{,v6}_ndo_send must zero

> > out its skb->cb before passing the packet off to icmp{,v6}_send.

> > Otherwise the icmp sending code risks reading bogus memory contents,

> > which can result in nasty stack overflows such as this one reported by a

> > user:

> >

> >     panic+0x108/0x2ea

> >     __stack_chk_fail+0x14/0x20

> >     __icmp_send+0x5bd/0x5c0

> >     icmp_ndo_send+0x148/0x160

> >

> > This is easy to simulate by doing a `memset(skb->cb, 0x41,

> > sizeof(skb->cb));` before calling icmp{,v6}_ndo_send, and it's only by

> > good fortune and the rarity of icmp sending from that context that we've

> > avoided reports like this until now. For example, in KASAN:

> >

> >     BUG: KASAN: stack-out-of-bounds in __ip_options_echo+0xa0e/0x12b0

> >     Write of size 38 at addr ffff888006f1f80e by task ping/89

> >     CPU: 2 PID: 89 Comm: ping Not tainted 5.10.0-rc7-debug+ #5

> >     Call Trace:

> >      dump_stack+0x9a/0xcc

> >      print_address_description.constprop.0+0x1a/0x160

> >      __kasan_report.cold+0x20/0x38

> >      kasan_report+0x32/0x40

> >      check_memory_region+0x145/0x1a0

> >      memcpy+0x39/0x60

> >      __ip_options_echo+0xa0e/0x12b0

> >      __icmp_send+0x744/0x1700

> >

> > Actually, out of the 4 drivers that do this, only gtp zeroed the cb for

> > the v4 case, while the rest did not. So this commit actually removes the

> > gtp-specific zeroing, while putting the code where it belongs in the

> > shared infrastructure of icmp{,v6}_ndo_send.

> >

> > Fixes: a2b78e9b2cac ("sunvnet: generate ICMP PTMUD messages for smaller port MTUs")

>

> nit: please make sure you CC the authors of the commits you're blaming.


Will do. Though in this case, it's behavior that's a few places, so I
put the git commit of the earliest case, to aid with backporting.

(This email is a reply to v1, but please check out v2.)

Jason
diff mbox series

Patch

diff --git a/drivers/net/gtp.c b/drivers/net/gtp.c
index 4c04e271f184..fd3c2d86e48b 100644
--- a/drivers/net/gtp.c
+++ b/drivers/net/gtp.c
@@ -539,7 +539,6 @@  static int gtp_build_skb_ip4(struct sk_buff *skb, struct net_device *dev,
 	if (!skb_is_gso(skb) && (iph->frag_off & htons(IP_DF)) &&
 	    mtu < ntohs(iph->tot_len)) {
 		netdev_dbg(dev, "packet too big, fragmentation needed\n");
-		memset(IPCB(skb), 0, sizeof(*IPCB(skb)));
 		icmp_ndo_send(skb, ICMP_DEST_UNREACH, ICMP_FRAG_NEEDED,
 			      htonl(mtu));
 		goto err_rt;
diff --git a/include/linux/icmpv6.h b/include/linux/icmpv6.h
index 1b3371ae8193..87d434fc98a3 100644
--- a/include/linux/icmpv6.h
+++ b/include/linux/icmpv6.h
@@ -45,7 +45,11 @@  int ip6_err_gen_icmpv6_unreach(struct sk_buff *skb, int nhs, int type,
 #if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_NF_NAT)
 void icmpv6_ndo_send(struct sk_buff *skb_in, u8 type, u8 code, __u32 info);
 #else
-#define icmpv6_ndo_send icmpv6_send
+static inline void icmpv6_ndo_send(struct sk_buff *skb_in, u8 type, u8 code, __u32 info)
+{
+	memset(skb_in->cb, 0, sizeof(skb_in->cb));
+	icmpv6_send(skb_in, type, code, info);
+}
 #endif
 
 #else
diff --git a/include/net/icmp.h b/include/net/icmp.h
index 9ac2d2672a93..4bb404c9abc8 100644
--- a/include/net/icmp.h
+++ b/include/net/icmp.h
@@ -46,7 +46,11 @@  static inline void icmp_send(struct sk_buff *skb_in, int type, int code, __be32
 #if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_NF_NAT)
 void icmp_ndo_send(struct sk_buff *skb_in, int type, int code, __be32 info);
 #else
-#define icmp_ndo_send icmp_send
+static inline void icmp_ndo_send(struct sk_buff *skb_in, int type, int code, __be32 info)
+{
+	memset(skb_in->cb, 0, sizeof(skb_in->cb));
+	icmp_send(skb_in, type, code, info);
+}
 #endif
 
 int icmp_rcv(struct sk_buff *skb);
diff --git a/net/ipv4/icmp.c b/net/ipv4/icmp.c
index 396b492c804f..ecf080532291 100644
--- a/net/ipv4/icmp.c
+++ b/net/ipv4/icmp.c
@@ -781,6 +781,7 @@  void icmp_ndo_send(struct sk_buff *skb_in, int type, int code, __be32 info)
 
 	ct = nf_ct_get(skb_in, &ctinfo);
 	if (!ct || !(ct->status & IPS_SRC_NAT)) {
+		memset(skb_in->cb, 0, sizeof(skb_in->cb));
 		icmp_send(skb_in, type, code, info);
 		return;
 	}
@@ -796,6 +797,7 @@  void icmp_ndo_send(struct sk_buff *skb_in, int type, int code, __be32 info)
 
 	orig_ip = ip_hdr(skb_in)->saddr;
 	ip_hdr(skb_in)->saddr = ct->tuplehash[0].tuple.src.u3.ip;
+	memset(skb_in->cb, 0, sizeof(skb_in->cb));
 	icmp_send(skb_in, type, code, info);
 	ip_hdr(skb_in)->saddr = orig_ip;
 out:
diff --git a/net/ipv6/ip6_icmp.c b/net/ipv6/ip6_icmp.c
index 70c8c2f36c98..ddc28be8a65d 100644
--- a/net/ipv6/ip6_icmp.c
+++ b/net/ipv6/ip6_icmp.c
@@ -57,6 +57,7 @@  void icmpv6_ndo_send(struct sk_buff *skb_in, u8 type, u8 code, __u32 info)
 
 	ct = nf_ct_get(skb_in, &ctinfo);
 	if (!ct || !(ct->status & IPS_SRC_NAT)) {
+		memset(skb_in->cb, 0, sizeof(skb_in->cb));
 		icmpv6_send(skb_in, type, code, info);
 		return;
 	}
@@ -72,6 +73,7 @@  void icmpv6_ndo_send(struct sk_buff *skb_in, u8 type, u8 code, __u32 info)
 
 	orig_ip = ipv6_hdr(skb_in)->saddr;
 	ipv6_hdr(skb_in)->saddr = ct->tuplehash[0].tuple.src.u3.in6;
+	memset(skb_in->cb, 0, sizeof(skb_in->cb));
 	icmpv6_send(skb_in, type, code, info);
 	ipv6_hdr(skb_in)->saddr = orig_ip;
 out: