diff mbox series

[v5,1/3] efi_loader: expose efi_image_parse() even if UEFI Secure Boot is disabled

Message ID 20210512113228.29354-2-masahisa.kojima@linaro.org
State Superseded
Headers show
Series PE/COFF measurement support | expand

Commit Message

Masahisa Kojima May 12, 2021, 11:32 a.m. UTC
This is preparation for PE/COFF measurement support.
PE/COFF image hash calculation is same in both
UEFI Secure Boot image verification and measurement in
measured boot. PE/COFF image parsing functions are
gathered into efi_image_loader.c, and exposed even if
UEFI Secure Boot is not enabled.

This commit also adds the EFI_SIGNATURE_SUPPORT option
to decide if efi_signature.c shall be compiled.

Signed-off-by: Masahisa Kojima <masahisa.kojima@linaro.org>

---

(no changes since v4)

Changes in v4:
- revert #ifdef instead of using "if (!IS_ENABLED())" statement,
  not to rely on the compiler optimization.

Changes in v3:
- hide EFI_SIGNATURE_SUPPORT option

Changes in v2:
- Remove all #ifdef from efi_image_loader.c and efi_signature.c
- Add EFI_SIGNATURE_SUPPORT option
- Explicitly include <u-boot/hash-checksum.h>
- Gather PE/COFF parsing functions into efi_image_loader.c
- Move efi_guid_t efi_guid_image_security_database in efi_var_common.c

 lib/efi_loader/Kconfig            |  6 +++
 lib/efi_loader/Makefile           |  2 +-
 lib/efi_loader/efi_image_loader.c | 64 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
 lib/efi_loader/efi_signature.c    | 67 +------------------------------
 lib/efi_loader/efi_var_common.c   |  3 ++
 5 files changed, 74 insertions(+), 68 deletions(-)

-- 
2.17.1

Comments

Heinrich Schuchardt May 13, 2021, 4:35 a.m. UTC | #1
On 5/12/21 1:32 PM, Masahisa Kojima wrote:
> This is preparation for PE/COFF measurement support.

> PE/COFF image hash calculation is same in both

> UEFI Secure Boot image verification and measurement in

> measured boot. PE/COFF image parsing functions are

> gathered into efi_image_loader.c, and exposed even if

> UEFI Secure Boot is not enabled.

>

> This commit also adds the EFI_SIGNATURE_SUPPORT option

> to decide if efi_signature.c shall be compiled.

>

> Signed-off-by: Masahisa Kojima <masahisa.kojima@linaro.org>


This patch leads to an error:

lib/crypto/x509_public_key.c:85: more undefined references to
`hash_calculate' follow
collect2: error: ld returned 1 exit status
make: *** [Makefile:1726: u-boot] Error 1

Applying the patches in the given sequence will break git bisect.

Please, correct the sequence of the patches in the series.

Best regards

Heinrich

> ---

>

> (no changes since v4)

>

> Changes in v4:

> - revert #ifdef instead of using "if (!IS_ENABLED())" statement,

>    not to rely on the compiler optimization.

>

> Changes in v3:

> - hide EFI_SIGNATURE_SUPPORT option

>

> Changes in v2:

> - Remove all #ifdef from efi_image_loader.c and efi_signature.c

> - Add EFI_SIGNATURE_SUPPORT option

> - Explicitly include <u-boot/hash-checksum.h>

> - Gather PE/COFF parsing functions into efi_image_loader.c

> - Move efi_guid_t efi_guid_image_security_database in efi_var_common.c

>

>   lib/efi_loader/Kconfig            |  6 +++

>   lib/efi_loader/Makefile           |  2 +-

>   lib/efi_loader/efi_image_loader.c | 64 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-

>   lib/efi_loader/efi_signature.c    | 67 +------------------------------

>   lib/efi_loader/efi_var_common.c   |  3 ++

>   5 files changed, 74 insertions(+), 68 deletions(-)

>

> diff --git a/lib/efi_loader/Kconfig b/lib/efi_loader/Kconfig

> index c259abe033..385a81d7d9 100644

> --- a/lib/efi_loader/Kconfig

> +++ b/lib/efi_loader/Kconfig

> @@ -174,6 +174,7 @@ config EFI_CAPSULE_AUTHENTICATE

>   	select PKCS7_MESSAGE_PARSER

>   	select PKCS7_VERIFY

>   	select IMAGE_SIGN_INFO

> +	select EFI_SIGNATURE_SUPPORT

>   	default n

>   	help

>   	  Select this option if you want to enable capsule

> @@ -342,6 +343,7 @@ config EFI_SECURE_BOOT

>   	select X509_CERTIFICATE_PARSER

>   	select PKCS7_MESSAGE_PARSER

>   	select PKCS7_VERIFY

> +	select EFI_SIGNATURE_SUPPORT

>   	default n

>   	help

>   	  Select this option to enable EFI secure boot support.

> @@ -349,6 +351,10 @@ config EFI_SECURE_BOOT

>   	  it is signed with a trusted key. To do that, you need to install,

>   	  at least, PK, KEK and db.

>

> +config EFI_SIGNATURE_SUPPORT

> +	bool

> +	depends on EFI_SECURE_BOOT || EFI_CAPSULE_AUTHENTICATE

> +

>   config EFI_ESRT

>   	bool "Enable the UEFI ESRT generation"

>   	depends on EFI_CAPSULE_FIRMWARE_MANAGEMENT

> diff --git a/lib/efi_loader/Makefile b/lib/efi_loader/Makefile

> index 8bd343e258..fd344cea29 100644

> --- a/lib/efi_loader/Makefile

> +++ b/lib/efi_loader/Makefile

> @@ -63,7 +63,7 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_GENERATE_SMBIOS_TABLE) += efi_smbios.o

>   obj-$(CONFIG_EFI_RNG_PROTOCOL) += efi_rng.o

>   obj-$(CONFIG_EFI_TCG2_PROTOCOL) += efi_tcg2.o

>   obj-$(CONFIG_EFI_LOAD_FILE2_INITRD) += efi_load_initrd.o

> -obj-y += efi_signature.o

> +obj-$(CONFIG_EFI_SIGNATURE_SUPPORT) += efi_signature.o

>

>   EFI_VAR_SEED_FILE := $(subst $\",,$(CONFIG_EFI_VAR_SEED_FILE))

>   $(obj)/efi_var_seed.o: $(srctree)/$(EFI_VAR_SEED_FILE)

> diff --git a/lib/efi_loader/efi_image_loader.c b/lib/efi_loader/efi_image_loader.c

> index f53ef367ec..fe1ee198e2 100644

> --- a/lib/efi_loader/efi_image_loader.c

> +++ b/lib/efi_loader/efi_image_loader.c

> @@ -213,7 +213,68 @@ static void efi_set_code_and_data_type(

>   	}

>   }

>

> -#ifdef CONFIG_EFI_SECURE_BOOT

> +/**

> + * efi_image_region_add() - add an entry of region

> + * @regs:	Pointer to array of regions

> + * @start:	Start address of region (included)

> + * @end:	End address of region (excluded)

> + * @nocheck:	flag against overlapped regions

> + *

> + * Take one entry of region [@start, @end[ and insert it into the list.

> + *

> + * * If @nocheck is false, the list will be sorted ascending by address.

> + *   Overlapping entries will not be allowed.

> + *

> + * * If @nocheck is true, the list will be sorted ascending by sequence

> + *   of adding the entries. Overlapping is allowed.

> + *

> + * Return:	status code

> + */

> +efi_status_t efi_image_region_add(struct efi_image_regions *regs,

> +				  const void *start, const void *end,

> +				  int nocheck)

> +{

> +	struct image_region *reg;

> +	int i, j;

> +

> +	if (regs->num >= regs->max) {

> +		EFI_PRINT("%s: no more room for regions\n", __func__);

> +		return EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES;

> +	}

> +

> +	if (end < start)

> +		return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;

> +

> +	for (i = 0; i < regs->num; i++) {

> +		reg = &regs->reg[i];

> +		if (nocheck)

> +			continue;

> +

> +		/* new data after registered region */

> +		if (start >= reg->data + reg->size)

> +			continue;

> +

> +		/* new data preceding registered region */

> +		if (end <= reg->data) {

> +			for (j = regs->num - 1; j >= i; j--)

> +				memcpy(&regs->reg[j + 1], &regs->reg[j],

> +				       sizeof(*reg));

> +			break;

> +		}

> +

> +		/* new data overlapping registered region */

> +		EFI_PRINT("%s: new region already part of another\n", __func__);

> +		return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;

> +	}

> +

> +	reg = &regs->reg[i];

> +	reg->data = start;

> +	reg->size = end - start;

> +	regs->num++;

> +

> +	return EFI_SUCCESS;

> +}

> +

>   /**

>    * cmp_pe_section() - compare virtual addresses of two PE image sections

>    * @arg1:	pointer to pointer to first section header

> @@ -422,6 +483,7 @@ err:

>   	return false;

>   }

>

> +#ifdef CONFIG_EFI_SECURE_BOOT

>   /**

>    * efi_image_unsigned_authenticate() - authenticate unsigned image with

>    * SHA256 hash

> diff --git a/lib/efi_loader/efi_signature.c b/lib/efi_loader/efi_signature.c

> index c7ec275414..bdd09881fc 100644

> --- a/lib/efi_loader/efi_signature.c

> +++ b/lib/efi_loader/efi_signature.c

> @@ -15,18 +15,16 @@

>   #include <crypto/public_key.h>

>   #include <linux/compat.h>

>   #include <linux/oid_registry.h>

> +#include <u-boot/hash-checksum.h>

>   #include <u-boot/rsa.h>

>   #include <u-boot/sha256.h>

>

> -const efi_guid_t efi_guid_image_security_database =

> -		EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE_GUID;

>   const efi_guid_t efi_guid_sha256 = EFI_CERT_SHA256_GUID;

>   const efi_guid_t efi_guid_cert_rsa2048 = EFI_CERT_RSA2048_GUID;

>   const efi_guid_t efi_guid_cert_x509 = EFI_CERT_X509_GUID;

>   const efi_guid_t efi_guid_cert_x509_sha256 = EFI_CERT_X509_SHA256_GUID;

>   const efi_guid_t efi_guid_cert_type_pkcs7 = EFI_CERT_TYPE_PKCS7_GUID;

>

> -#if defined(CONFIG_EFI_SECURE_BOOT) || defined(CONFIG_EFI_CAPSULE_AUTHENTICATE)

>   static u8 pkcs7_hdr[] = {

>   	/* SEQUENCE */

>   	0x30, 0x82, 0x05, 0xc7,

> @@ -539,68 +537,6 @@ out:

>   	return !revoked;

>   }

>

> -/**

> - * efi_image_region_add() - add an entry of region

> - * @regs:	Pointer to array of regions

> - * @start:	Start address of region (included)

> - * @end:	End address of region (excluded)

> - * @nocheck:	flag against overlapped regions

> - *

> - * Take one entry of region [@start, @end[ and insert it into the list.

> - *

> - * * If @nocheck is false, the list will be sorted ascending by address.

> - *   Overlapping entries will not be allowed.

> - *

> - * * If @nocheck is true, the list will be sorted ascending by sequence

> - *   of adding the entries. Overlapping is allowed.

> - *

> - * Return:	status code

> - */

> -efi_status_t efi_image_region_add(struct efi_image_regions *regs,

> -				  const void *start, const void *end,

> -				  int nocheck)

> -{

> -	struct image_region *reg;

> -	int i, j;

> -

> -	if (regs->num >= regs->max) {

> -		EFI_PRINT("%s: no more room for regions\n", __func__);

> -		return EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES;

> -	}

> -

> -	if (end < start)

> -		return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;

> -

> -	for (i = 0; i < regs->num; i++) {

> -		reg = &regs->reg[i];

> -		if (nocheck)

> -			continue;

> -

> -		/* new data after registered region */

> -		if (start >= reg->data + reg->size)

> -			continue;

> -

> -		/* new data preceding registered region */

> -		if (end <= reg->data) {

> -			for (j = regs->num - 1; j >= i; j--)

> -				memcpy(&regs->reg[j + 1], &regs->reg[j],

> -				       sizeof(*reg));

> -			break;

> -		}

> -

> -		/* new data overlapping registered region */

> -		EFI_PRINT("%s: new region already part of another\n", __func__);

> -		return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;

> -	}

> -

> -	reg = &regs->reg[i];

> -	reg->data = start;

> -	reg->size = end - start;

> -	regs->num++;

> -

> -	return EFI_SUCCESS;

> -}

> -

>   /**

>    * efi_sigstore_free - free signature store

>    * @sigstore:	Pointer to signature store structure

> @@ -846,4 +782,3 @@ struct efi_signature_store *efi_sigstore_parse_sigdb(u16 *name)

>

>   	return efi_build_signature_store(db, db_size);

>   }

> -#endif /* CONFIG_EFI_SECURE_BOOT || CONFIG_EFI_CAPSULE_AUTHENTICATE */

> diff --git a/lib/efi_loader/efi_var_common.c b/lib/efi_loader/efi_var_common.c

> index b11ed91a74..83479dd142 100644

> --- a/lib/efi_loader/efi_var_common.c

> +++ b/lib/efi_loader/efi_var_common.c

> @@ -24,6 +24,9 @@ struct efi_auth_var_name_type {

>   	const enum efi_auth_var_type type;

>   };

>

> +const efi_guid_t efi_guid_image_security_database =

> +		EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE_GUID;

> +

>   static const struct efi_auth_var_name_type name_type[] = {

>   	{u"PK", &efi_global_variable_guid, EFI_AUTH_VAR_PK},

>   	{u"KEK", &efi_global_variable_guid, EFI_AUTH_VAR_KEK},

>
Masahisa Kojima May 13, 2021, 5:10 a.m. UTC | #2
On Thu, 13 May 2021 at 13:35, Heinrich Schuchardt <xypron.glpk@gmx.de> wrote:
>

> On 5/12/21 1:32 PM, Masahisa Kojima wrote:

> > This is preparation for PE/COFF measurement support.

> > PE/COFF image hash calculation is same in both

> > UEFI Secure Boot image verification and measurement in

> > measured boot. PE/COFF image parsing functions are

> > gathered into efi_image_loader.c, and exposed even if

> > UEFI Secure Boot is not enabled.

> >

> > This commit also adds the EFI_SIGNATURE_SUPPORT option

> > to decide if efi_signature.c shall be compiled.

> >

> > Signed-off-by: Masahisa Kojima <masahisa.kojima@linaro.org>

>

> This patch leads to an error:

>

> lib/crypto/x509_public_key.c:85: more undefined references to

> `hash_calculate' follow

> collect2: error: ld returned 1 exit status

> make: *** [Makefile:1726: u-boot] Error 1

>

> Applying the patches in the given sequence will break git bisect.

>

> Please, correct the sequence of the patches in the series.


Sorry, my patch sequence is wrong.
Modification to include hash-checksum.o  as compilation target must be
the first patch.



>

> Best regards

>

> Heinrich

>

> > ---

> >

> > (no changes since v4)

> >

> > Changes in v4:

> > - revert #ifdef instead of using "if (!IS_ENABLED())" statement,

> >    not to rely on the compiler optimization.

> >

> > Changes in v3:

> > - hide EFI_SIGNATURE_SUPPORT option

> >

> > Changes in v2:

> > - Remove all #ifdef from efi_image_loader.c and efi_signature.c

> > - Add EFI_SIGNATURE_SUPPORT option

> > - Explicitly include <u-boot/hash-checksum.h>

> > - Gather PE/COFF parsing functions into efi_image_loader.c

> > - Move efi_guid_t efi_guid_image_security_database in efi_var_common.c

> >

> >   lib/efi_loader/Kconfig            |  6 +++

> >   lib/efi_loader/Makefile           |  2 +-

> >   lib/efi_loader/efi_image_loader.c | 64 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-

> >   lib/efi_loader/efi_signature.c    | 67 +------------------------------

> >   lib/efi_loader/efi_var_common.c   |  3 ++

> >   5 files changed, 74 insertions(+), 68 deletions(-)

> >

> > diff --git a/lib/efi_loader/Kconfig b/lib/efi_loader/Kconfig

> > index c259abe033..385a81d7d9 100644

> > --- a/lib/efi_loader/Kconfig

> > +++ b/lib/efi_loader/Kconfig

> > @@ -174,6 +174,7 @@ config EFI_CAPSULE_AUTHENTICATE

> >       select PKCS7_MESSAGE_PARSER

> >       select PKCS7_VERIFY

> >       select IMAGE_SIGN_INFO

> > +     select EFI_SIGNATURE_SUPPORT

> >       default n

> >       help

> >         Select this option if you want to enable capsule

> > @@ -342,6 +343,7 @@ config EFI_SECURE_BOOT

> >       select X509_CERTIFICATE_PARSER

> >       select PKCS7_MESSAGE_PARSER

> >       select PKCS7_VERIFY

> > +     select EFI_SIGNATURE_SUPPORT

> >       default n

> >       help

> >         Select this option to enable EFI secure boot support.

> > @@ -349,6 +351,10 @@ config EFI_SECURE_BOOT

> >         it is signed with a trusted key. To do that, you need to install,

> >         at least, PK, KEK and db.

> >

> > +config EFI_SIGNATURE_SUPPORT

> > +     bool

> > +     depends on EFI_SECURE_BOOT || EFI_CAPSULE_AUTHENTICATE

> > +

> >   config EFI_ESRT

> >       bool "Enable the UEFI ESRT generation"

> >       depends on EFI_CAPSULE_FIRMWARE_MANAGEMENT

> > diff --git a/lib/efi_loader/Makefile b/lib/efi_loader/Makefile

> > index 8bd343e258..fd344cea29 100644

> > --- a/lib/efi_loader/Makefile

> > +++ b/lib/efi_loader/Makefile

> > @@ -63,7 +63,7 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_GENERATE_SMBIOS_TABLE) += efi_smbios.o

> >   obj-$(CONFIG_EFI_RNG_PROTOCOL) += efi_rng.o

> >   obj-$(CONFIG_EFI_TCG2_PROTOCOL) += efi_tcg2.o

> >   obj-$(CONFIG_EFI_LOAD_FILE2_INITRD) += efi_load_initrd.o

> > -obj-y += efi_signature.o

> > +obj-$(CONFIG_EFI_SIGNATURE_SUPPORT) += efi_signature.o

> >

> >   EFI_VAR_SEED_FILE := $(subst $\",,$(CONFIG_EFI_VAR_SEED_FILE))

> >   $(obj)/efi_var_seed.o: $(srctree)/$(EFI_VAR_SEED_FILE)

> > diff --git a/lib/efi_loader/efi_image_loader.c b/lib/efi_loader/efi_image_loader.c

> > index f53ef367ec..fe1ee198e2 100644

> > --- a/lib/efi_loader/efi_image_loader.c

> > +++ b/lib/efi_loader/efi_image_loader.c

> > @@ -213,7 +213,68 @@ static void efi_set_code_and_data_type(

> >       }

> >   }

> >

> > -#ifdef CONFIG_EFI_SECURE_BOOT

> > +/**

> > + * efi_image_region_add() - add an entry of region

> > + * @regs:    Pointer to array of regions

> > + * @start:   Start address of region (included)

> > + * @end:     End address of region (excluded)

> > + * @nocheck: flag against overlapped regions

> > + *

> > + * Take one entry of region [@start, @end[ and insert it into the list.

> > + *

> > + * * If @nocheck is false, the list will be sorted ascending by address.

> > + *   Overlapping entries will not be allowed.

> > + *

> > + * * If @nocheck is true, the list will be sorted ascending by sequence

> > + *   of adding the entries. Overlapping is allowed.

> > + *

> > + * Return:   status code

> > + */

> > +efi_status_t efi_image_region_add(struct efi_image_regions *regs,

> > +                               const void *start, const void *end,

> > +                               int nocheck)

> > +{

> > +     struct image_region *reg;

> > +     int i, j;

> > +

> > +     if (regs->num >= regs->max) {

> > +             EFI_PRINT("%s: no more room for regions\n", __func__);

> > +             return EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES;

> > +     }

> > +

> > +     if (end < start)

> > +             return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;

> > +

> > +     for (i = 0; i < regs->num; i++) {

> > +             reg = &regs->reg[i];

> > +             if (nocheck)

> > +                     continue;

> > +

> > +             /* new data after registered region */

> > +             if (start >= reg->data + reg->size)

> > +                     continue;

> > +

> > +             /* new data preceding registered region */

> > +             if (end <= reg->data) {

> > +                     for (j = regs->num - 1; j >= i; j--)

> > +                             memcpy(&regs->reg[j + 1], &regs->reg[j],

> > +                                    sizeof(*reg));

> > +                     break;

> > +             }

> > +

> > +             /* new data overlapping registered region */

> > +             EFI_PRINT("%s: new region already part of another\n", __func__);

> > +             return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;

> > +     }

> > +

> > +     reg = &regs->reg[i];

> > +     reg->data = start;

> > +     reg->size = end - start;

> > +     regs->num++;

> > +

> > +     return EFI_SUCCESS;

> > +}

> > +

> >   /**

> >    * cmp_pe_section() - compare virtual addresses of two PE image sections

> >    * @arg1:   pointer to pointer to first section header

> > @@ -422,6 +483,7 @@ err:

> >       return false;

> >   }

> >

> > +#ifdef CONFIG_EFI_SECURE_BOOT

> >   /**

> >    * efi_image_unsigned_authenticate() - authenticate unsigned image with

> >    * SHA256 hash

> > diff --git a/lib/efi_loader/efi_signature.c b/lib/efi_loader/efi_signature.c

> > index c7ec275414..bdd09881fc 100644

> > --- a/lib/efi_loader/efi_signature.c

> > +++ b/lib/efi_loader/efi_signature.c

> > @@ -15,18 +15,16 @@

> >   #include <crypto/public_key.h>

> >   #include <linux/compat.h>

> >   #include <linux/oid_registry.h>

> > +#include <u-boot/hash-checksum.h>

> >   #include <u-boot/rsa.h>

> >   #include <u-boot/sha256.h>

> >

> > -const efi_guid_t efi_guid_image_security_database =

> > -             EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE_GUID;

> >   const efi_guid_t efi_guid_sha256 = EFI_CERT_SHA256_GUID;

> >   const efi_guid_t efi_guid_cert_rsa2048 = EFI_CERT_RSA2048_GUID;

> >   const efi_guid_t efi_guid_cert_x509 = EFI_CERT_X509_GUID;

> >   const efi_guid_t efi_guid_cert_x509_sha256 = EFI_CERT_X509_SHA256_GUID;

> >   const efi_guid_t efi_guid_cert_type_pkcs7 = EFI_CERT_TYPE_PKCS7_GUID;

> >

> > -#if defined(CONFIG_EFI_SECURE_BOOT) || defined(CONFIG_EFI_CAPSULE_AUTHENTICATE)

> >   static u8 pkcs7_hdr[] = {

> >       /* SEQUENCE */

> >       0x30, 0x82, 0x05, 0xc7,

> > @@ -539,68 +537,6 @@ out:

> >       return !revoked;

> >   }

> >

> > -/**

> > - * efi_image_region_add() - add an entry of region

> > - * @regs:    Pointer to array of regions

> > - * @start:   Start address of region (included)

> > - * @end:     End address of region (excluded)

> > - * @nocheck: flag against overlapped regions

> > - *

> > - * Take one entry of region [@start, @end[ and insert it into the list.

> > - *

> > - * * If @nocheck is false, the list will be sorted ascending by address.

> > - *   Overlapping entries will not be allowed.

> > - *

> > - * * If @nocheck is true, the list will be sorted ascending by sequence

> > - *   of adding the entries. Overlapping is allowed.

> > - *

> > - * Return:   status code

> > - */

> > -efi_status_t efi_image_region_add(struct efi_image_regions *regs,

> > -                               const void *start, const void *end,

> > -                               int nocheck)

> > -{

> > -     struct image_region *reg;

> > -     int i, j;

> > -

> > -     if (regs->num >= regs->max) {

> > -             EFI_PRINT("%s: no more room for regions\n", __func__);

> > -             return EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES;

> > -     }

> > -

> > -     if (end < start)

> > -             return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;

> > -

> > -     for (i = 0; i < regs->num; i++) {

> > -             reg = &regs->reg[i];

> > -             if (nocheck)

> > -                     continue;

> > -

> > -             /* new data after registered region */

> > -             if (start >= reg->data + reg->size)

> > -                     continue;

> > -

> > -             /* new data preceding registered region */

> > -             if (end <= reg->data) {

> > -                     for (j = regs->num - 1; j >= i; j--)

> > -                             memcpy(&regs->reg[j + 1], &regs->reg[j],

> > -                                    sizeof(*reg));

> > -                     break;

> > -             }

> > -

> > -             /* new data overlapping registered region */

> > -             EFI_PRINT("%s: new region already part of another\n", __func__);

> > -             return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;

> > -     }

> > -

> > -     reg = &regs->reg[i];

> > -     reg->data = start;

> > -     reg->size = end - start;

> > -     regs->num++;

> > -

> > -     return EFI_SUCCESS;

> > -}

> > -

> >   /**

> >    * efi_sigstore_free - free signature store

> >    * @sigstore:       Pointer to signature store structure

> > @@ -846,4 +782,3 @@ struct efi_signature_store *efi_sigstore_parse_sigdb(u16 *name)

> >

> >       return efi_build_signature_store(db, db_size);

> >   }

> > -#endif /* CONFIG_EFI_SECURE_BOOT || CONFIG_EFI_CAPSULE_AUTHENTICATE */

> > diff --git a/lib/efi_loader/efi_var_common.c b/lib/efi_loader/efi_var_common.c

> > index b11ed91a74..83479dd142 100644

> > --- a/lib/efi_loader/efi_var_common.c

> > +++ b/lib/efi_loader/efi_var_common.c

> > @@ -24,6 +24,9 @@ struct efi_auth_var_name_type {

> >       const enum efi_auth_var_type type;

> >   };

> >

> > +const efi_guid_t efi_guid_image_security_database =

> > +             EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE_GUID;

> > +

> >   static const struct efi_auth_var_name_type name_type[] = {

> >       {u"PK", &efi_global_variable_guid, EFI_AUTH_VAR_PK},

> >       {u"KEK", &efi_global_variable_guid, EFI_AUTH_VAR_KEK},

> >

>
diff mbox series

Patch

diff --git a/lib/efi_loader/Kconfig b/lib/efi_loader/Kconfig
index c259abe033..385a81d7d9 100644
--- a/lib/efi_loader/Kconfig
+++ b/lib/efi_loader/Kconfig
@@ -174,6 +174,7 @@  config EFI_CAPSULE_AUTHENTICATE
 	select PKCS7_MESSAGE_PARSER
 	select PKCS7_VERIFY
 	select IMAGE_SIGN_INFO
+	select EFI_SIGNATURE_SUPPORT
 	default n
 	help
 	  Select this option if you want to enable capsule
@@ -342,6 +343,7 @@  config EFI_SECURE_BOOT
 	select X509_CERTIFICATE_PARSER
 	select PKCS7_MESSAGE_PARSER
 	select PKCS7_VERIFY
+	select EFI_SIGNATURE_SUPPORT
 	default n
 	help
 	  Select this option to enable EFI secure boot support.
@@ -349,6 +351,10 @@  config EFI_SECURE_BOOT
 	  it is signed with a trusted key. To do that, you need to install,
 	  at least, PK, KEK and db.
 
+config EFI_SIGNATURE_SUPPORT
+	bool
+	depends on EFI_SECURE_BOOT || EFI_CAPSULE_AUTHENTICATE
+
 config EFI_ESRT
 	bool "Enable the UEFI ESRT generation"
 	depends on EFI_CAPSULE_FIRMWARE_MANAGEMENT
diff --git a/lib/efi_loader/Makefile b/lib/efi_loader/Makefile
index 8bd343e258..fd344cea29 100644
--- a/lib/efi_loader/Makefile
+++ b/lib/efi_loader/Makefile
@@ -63,7 +63,7 @@  obj-$(CONFIG_GENERATE_SMBIOS_TABLE) += efi_smbios.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_EFI_RNG_PROTOCOL) += efi_rng.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_EFI_TCG2_PROTOCOL) += efi_tcg2.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_EFI_LOAD_FILE2_INITRD) += efi_load_initrd.o
-obj-y += efi_signature.o
+obj-$(CONFIG_EFI_SIGNATURE_SUPPORT) += efi_signature.o
 
 EFI_VAR_SEED_FILE := $(subst $\",,$(CONFIG_EFI_VAR_SEED_FILE))
 $(obj)/efi_var_seed.o: $(srctree)/$(EFI_VAR_SEED_FILE)
diff --git a/lib/efi_loader/efi_image_loader.c b/lib/efi_loader/efi_image_loader.c
index f53ef367ec..fe1ee198e2 100644
--- a/lib/efi_loader/efi_image_loader.c
+++ b/lib/efi_loader/efi_image_loader.c
@@ -213,7 +213,68 @@  static void efi_set_code_and_data_type(
 	}
 }
 
-#ifdef CONFIG_EFI_SECURE_BOOT
+/**
+ * efi_image_region_add() - add an entry of region
+ * @regs:	Pointer to array of regions
+ * @start:	Start address of region (included)
+ * @end:	End address of region (excluded)
+ * @nocheck:	flag against overlapped regions
+ *
+ * Take one entry of region [@start, @end[ and insert it into the list.
+ *
+ * * If @nocheck is false, the list will be sorted ascending by address.
+ *   Overlapping entries will not be allowed.
+ *
+ * * If @nocheck is true, the list will be sorted ascending by sequence
+ *   of adding the entries. Overlapping is allowed.
+ *
+ * Return:	status code
+ */
+efi_status_t efi_image_region_add(struct efi_image_regions *regs,
+				  const void *start, const void *end,
+				  int nocheck)
+{
+	struct image_region *reg;
+	int i, j;
+
+	if (regs->num >= regs->max) {
+		EFI_PRINT("%s: no more room for regions\n", __func__);
+		return EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES;
+	}
+
+	if (end < start)
+		return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < regs->num; i++) {
+		reg = &regs->reg[i];
+		if (nocheck)
+			continue;
+
+		/* new data after registered region */
+		if (start >= reg->data + reg->size)
+			continue;
+
+		/* new data preceding registered region */
+		if (end <= reg->data) {
+			for (j = regs->num - 1; j >= i; j--)
+				memcpy(&regs->reg[j + 1], &regs->reg[j],
+				       sizeof(*reg));
+			break;
+		}
+
+		/* new data overlapping registered region */
+		EFI_PRINT("%s: new region already part of another\n", __func__);
+		return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;
+	}
+
+	reg = &regs->reg[i];
+	reg->data = start;
+	reg->size = end - start;
+	regs->num++;
+
+	return EFI_SUCCESS;
+}
+
 /**
  * cmp_pe_section() - compare virtual addresses of two PE image sections
  * @arg1:	pointer to pointer to first section header
@@ -422,6 +483,7 @@  err:
 	return false;
 }
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_EFI_SECURE_BOOT
 /**
  * efi_image_unsigned_authenticate() - authenticate unsigned image with
  * SHA256 hash
diff --git a/lib/efi_loader/efi_signature.c b/lib/efi_loader/efi_signature.c
index c7ec275414..bdd09881fc 100644
--- a/lib/efi_loader/efi_signature.c
+++ b/lib/efi_loader/efi_signature.c
@@ -15,18 +15,16 @@ 
 #include <crypto/public_key.h>
 #include <linux/compat.h>
 #include <linux/oid_registry.h>
+#include <u-boot/hash-checksum.h>
 #include <u-boot/rsa.h>
 #include <u-boot/sha256.h>
 
-const efi_guid_t efi_guid_image_security_database =
-		EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE_GUID;
 const efi_guid_t efi_guid_sha256 = EFI_CERT_SHA256_GUID;
 const efi_guid_t efi_guid_cert_rsa2048 = EFI_CERT_RSA2048_GUID;
 const efi_guid_t efi_guid_cert_x509 = EFI_CERT_X509_GUID;
 const efi_guid_t efi_guid_cert_x509_sha256 = EFI_CERT_X509_SHA256_GUID;
 const efi_guid_t efi_guid_cert_type_pkcs7 = EFI_CERT_TYPE_PKCS7_GUID;
 
-#if defined(CONFIG_EFI_SECURE_BOOT) || defined(CONFIG_EFI_CAPSULE_AUTHENTICATE)
 static u8 pkcs7_hdr[] = {
 	/* SEQUENCE */
 	0x30, 0x82, 0x05, 0xc7,
@@ -539,68 +537,6 @@  out:
 	return !revoked;
 }
 
-/**
- * efi_image_region_add() - add an entry of region
- * @regs:	Pointer to array of regions
- * @start:	Start address of region (included)
- * @end:	End address of region (excluded)
- * @nocheck:	flag against overlapped regions
- *
- * Take one entry of region [@start, @end[ and insert it into the list.
- *
- * * If @nocheck is false, the list will be sorted ascending by address.
- *   Overlapping entries will not be allowed.
- *
- * * If @nocheck is true, the list will be sorted ascending by sequence
- *   of adding the entries. Overlapping is allowed.
- *
- * Return:	status code
- */
-efi_status_t efi_image_region_add(struct efi_image_regions *regs,
-				  const void *start, const void *end,
-				  int nocheck)
-{
-	struct image_region *reg;
-	int i, j;
-
-	if (regs->num >= regs->max) {
-		EFI_PRINT("%s: no more room for regions\n", __func__);
-		return EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES;
-	}
-
-	if (end < start)
-		return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;
-
-	for (i = 0; i < regs->num; i++) {
-		reg = &regs->reg[i];
-		if (nocheck)
-			continue;
-
-		/* new data after registered region */
-		if (start >= reg->data + reg->size)
-			continue;
-
-		/* new data preceding registered region */
-		if (end <= reg->data) {
-			for (j = regs->num - 1; j >= i; j--)
-				memcpy(&regs->reg[j + 1], &regs->reg[j],
-				       sizeof(*reg));
-			break;
-		}
-
-		/* new data overlapping registered region */
-		EFI_PRINT("%s: new region already part of another\n", __func__);
-		return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;
-	}
-
-	reg = &regs->reg[i];
-	reg->data = start;
-	reg->size = end - start;
-	regs->num++;
-
-	return EFI_SUCCESS;
-}
-
 /**
  * efi_sigstore_free - free signature store
  * @sigstore:	Pointer to signature store structure
@@ -846,4 +782,3 @@  struct efi_signature_store *efi_sigstore_parse_sigdb(u16 *name)
 
 	return efi_build_signature_store(db, db_size);
 }
-#endif /* CONFIG_EFI_SECURE_BOOT || CONFIG_EFI_CAPSULE_AUTHENTICATE */
diff --git a/lib/efi_loader/efi_var_common.c b/lib/efi_loader/efi_var_common.c
index b11ed91a74..83479dd142 100644
--- a/lib/efi_loader/efi_var_common.c
+++ b/lib/efi_loader/efi_var_common.c
@@ -24,6 +24,9 @@  struct efi_auth_var_name_type {
 	const enum efi_auth_var_type type;
 };
 
+const efi_guid_t efi_guid_image_security_database =
+		EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE_GUID;
+
 static const struct efi_auth_var_name_type name_type[] = {
 	{u"PK", &efi_global_variable_guid, EFI_AUTH_VAR_PK},
 	{u"KEK", &efi_global_variable_guid, EFI_AUTH_VAR_KEK},