diff mbox series

[IPV6,v3,1/1] ipv6: allocate enough headroom in ip6_finish_output2()

Message ID 1b1efd52-dd34-2023-021c-c6c6df6fec5f@virtuozzo.com
State Superseded
Headers show
Series ipv6: allocate enough headroom in ip6_finish_output2() | expand

Commit Message

Vasily Averin July 12, 2021, 6:45 a.m. UTC
When TEE target mirrors traffic to another interface, sk_buff may
not have enough headroom to be processed correctly.
ip_finish_output2() detect this situation for ipv4 and allocates
new skb with enogh headroom. However ipv6 lacks this logic in
ip_finish_output2 and it leads to skb_under_panic:

 skbuff: skb_under_panic: text:ffffffffc0866ad4 len:96 put:24
 head:ffff97be85e31800 data:ffff97be85e317f8 tail:0x58 end:0xc0 dev:gre0
 ------------[ cut here ]------------
 kernel BUG at net/core/skbuff.c:110!
 invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP PTI
 CPU: 2 PID: 393 Comm: kworker/2:2 Tainted: G           OE     5.13.0 #13
 Hardware name: Virtuozzo KVM, BIOS 1.11.0-2.vz7.4 04/01/2014
 Workqueue: ipv6_addrconf addrconf_dad_work
 RIP: 0010:skb_panic+0x48/0x4a
 Call Trace:
  skb_push.cold.111+0x10/0x10
  ipgre_header+0x24/0xf0 [ip_gre]
  neigh_connected_output+0xae/0xf0
  ip6_finish_output2+0x1a8/0x5a0
  ip6_output+0x5c/0x110
  nf_dup_ipv6+0x158/0x1000 [nf_dup_ipv6]
  tee_tg6+0x2e/0x40 [xt_TEE]
  ip6t_do_table+0x294/0x470 [ip6_tables]
  nf_hook_slow+0x44/0xc0
  nf_hook.constprop.34+0x72/0xe0
  ndisc_send_skb+0x20d/0x2e0
  ndisc_send_ns+0xd1/0x210
  addrconf_dad_work+0x3c8/0x540
  process_one_work+0x1d1/0x370
  worker_thread+0x30/0x390
  kthread+0x116/0x130
  ret_from_fork+0x22/0x30

Signed-off-by: Vasily Averin <vvs@virtuozzo.com>
---
 net/ipv6/ip6_output.c | 28 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 28 insertions(+)

Comments

Vasily Averin July 13, 2021, 7:46 a.m. UTC | #1
I've found 2 problems in this patch,
and I'm going to resend new patch version soon.

On 7/12/21 9:45 AM, Vasily Averin wrote:
> index ff4f9eb..0efcb9b 100644

> --- a/net/ipv6/ip6_output.c

> +++ b/net/ipv6/ip6_output.c

> @@ -60,10 +60,38 @@ static int ip6_finish_output2(struct net *net, struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *

>  {

>  	struct dst_entry *dst = skb_dst(skb);

>  	struct net_device *dev = dst->dev;

> +	unsigned int hh_len = LL_RESERVED_SPACE(dev);

> +	int delta = hh_len - skb_headroom(skb);

>  	const struct in6_addr *nexthop;

>  	struct neighbour *neigh;

>  	int ret;

>  

> +	/* Be paranoid, rather than too clever. */

> +	if (unlikely(delta > 0) && dev->header_ops) {

> +		/* pskb_expand_head() might crash, if skb is shared */

> +		if (skb_shared(skb)) {

> +			struct sk_buff *nskb = skb_clone(skb, GFP_ATOMIC);

> +

> +			if (likely(nskb)) {

> +				if (skb->sk)

> +					skb_set_owner_w(skb, skb->sk);


need to assign sk not to skb but to nskb 

> +				consume_skb(skb);

> +			} else {

> +				kfree_skb(skb);


It is quite strange to call consume_skb() on one case and kfree_skb() in another one.
We know that original skb was shared so we should not call kfree_skb here.

Btw I've noticed similar problem in few other cases:
in pptp_xmit, pvc_xmit, ip_vs_prepare_tunneled_skb
they call consume_skb() in case of success and kfree_skb on error path.
It looks like potential bug for me.

> +			}

> +			skb = nskb;

> +		}

> +		if (skb &&

> +		    pskb_expand_head(skb, SKB_DATA_ALIGN(delta), 0, GFP_ATOMIC)) {

> +			kfree_skb(skb);

> +			skb = NULL;

> +		}

> +		if (!skb) {

> +			IP6_INC_STATS(net, ip6_dst_idev(dst), IPSTATS_MIB_OUTDISCARDS);

> +			return -ENOMEM;

> +		}

> +	}

> +

>  	if (ipv6_addr_is_multicast(&ipv6_hdr(skb)->daddr)) {

>  		struct inet6_dev *idev = ip6_dst_idev(skb_dst(skb));

>  

>
Vasily Averin July 13, 2021, 12:31 p.m. UTC | #2
On 7/13/21 10:46 AM, Vasily Averin wrote:
>> +			if (likely(nskb)) {

>> +				if (skb->sk)

>> +					skb_set_owner_w(skb, skb->sk);

> 

> need to assign sk not to skb but to nskb 

> 

>> +				consume_skb(skb);

>> +			} else {

>> +				kfree_skb(skb);


Please disread, I was wrong here.
> It is quite strange to call consume_skb() on one case and kfree_skb() in another one.

> We know that original skb was shared so we should not call kfree_skb here.

> 

> Btw I've noticed similar problem in few other cases:

> in pptp_xmit, pvc_xmit, ip_vs_prepare_tunneled_skb

> they call consume_skb() in case of success and kfree_skb on error path.

> It looks like potential bug for me.
diff mbox series

Patch

diff --git a/net/ipv6/ip6_output.c b/net/ipv6/ip6_output.c
index ff4f9eb..0efcb9b 100644
--- a/net/ipv6/ip6_output.c
+++ b/net/ipv6/ip6_output.c
@@ -60,10 +60,38 @@  static int ip6_finish_output2(struct net *net, struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *
 {
 	struct dst_entry *dst = skb_dst(skb);
 	struct net_device *dev = dst->dev;
+	unsigned int hh_len = LL_RESERVED_SPACE(dev);
+	int delta = hh_len - skb_headroom(skb);
 	const struct in6_addr *nexthop;
 	struct neighbour *neigh;
 	int ret;
 
+	/* Be paranoid, rather than too clever. */
+	if (unlikely(delta > 0) && dev->header_ops) {
+		/* pskb_expand_head() might crash, if skb is shared */
+		if (skb_shared(skb)) {
+			struct sk_buff *nskb = skb_clone(skb, GFP_ATOMIC);
+
+			if (likely(nskb)) {
+				if (skb->sk)
+					skb_set_owner_w(skb, skb->sk);
+				consume_skb(skb);
+			} else {
+				kfree_skb(skb);
+			}
+			skb = nskb;
+		}
+		if (skb &&
+		    pskb_expand_head(skb, SKB_DATA_ALIGN(delta), 0, GFP_ATOMIC)) {
+			kfree_skb(skb);
+			skb = NULL;
+		}
+		if (!skb) {
+			IP6_INC_STATS(net, ip6_dst_idev(dst), IPSTATS_MIB_OUTDISCARDS);
+			return -ENOMEM;
+		}
+	}
+
 	if (ipv6_addr_is_multicast(&ipv6_hdr(skb)->daddr)) {
 		struct inet6_dev *idev = ip6_dst_idev(skb_dst(skb));