diff mbox series

[v10,24/50] KVM: SEV: Add initial SEV-SNP support

Message ID 20231016132819.1002933-25-michael.roth@amd.com
State New
Headers show
Series Add AMD Secure Nested Paging (SEV-SNP) Hypervisor Support | expand

Commit Message

Michael Roth Oct. 16, 2023, 1:27 p.m. UTC
From: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>

The next generation of SEV is called SEV-SNP (Secure Nested Paging).
SEV-SNP builds upon existing SEV and SEV-ES functionality  while adding new
hardware based security protection. SEV-SNP adds strong memory encryption
integrity protection to help prevent malicious hypervisor-based attacks
such as data replay, memory re-mapping, and more, to create an isolated
execution environment.

The SNP feature is added incrementally, the later patches adds a new module
parameters that can be used to enabled SEV-SNP in the KVM.

Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Ashish Kalra <ashish.kalra@amd.com>
---
 arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c | 10 ++++++++++
 arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h |  8 ++++++++
 2 files changed, 18 insertions(+)

Comments

Borislav Petkov Dec. 18, 2023, 5:43 p.m. UTC | #1
On Mon, Oct 16, 2023 at 08:27:53AM -0500, Michael Roth wrote:
> From: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
> 
> The next generation of SEV is called SEV-SNP (Secure Nested Paging).
> SEV-SNP builds upon existing SEV and SEV-ES functionality  while adding new
> hardware based security protection. SEV-SNP adds strong memory encryption
> integrity protection to help prevent malicious hypervisor-based attacks
> such as data replay, memory re-mapping, and more, to create an isolated
> execution environment.
> 
> The SNP feature is added incrementally, the later patches adds a new module
> parameters that can be used to enabled SEV-SNP in the KVM.

This sentence can simply go to /dev/null.

> Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
> Signed-off-by: Ashish Kalra <ashish.kalra@amd.com>
> ---
>  arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c | 10 ++++++++++
>  arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h |  8 ++++++++
>  2 files changed, 18 insertions(+)
> 
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c
> index 1cfb9232fc74..4eefc168ebb3 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c
> @@ -59,10 +59,14 @@ module_param_named(sev_es, sev_es_enabled, bool, 0444);
>  /* enable/disable SEV-ES DebugSwap support */
>  static bool sev_es_debug_swap_enabled = true;
>  module_param_named(debug_swap, sev_es_debug_swap_enabled, bool, 0444);
> +
> +/* enable/disable SEV-SNP support */

Useless comment.

> +static bool sev_snp_enabled;
>  #else
>  #define sev_enabled false
>  #define sev_es_enabled false
>  #define sev_es_debug_swap_enabled false
> +#define sev_snp_enabled false
>  #endif /* CONFIG_KVM_AMD_SEV */
>  
>  #define AP_RESET_HOLD_NONE		0
> @@ -2186,6 +2190,7 @@ void __init sev_hardware_setup(void)
>  {
>  #ifdef CONFIG_KVM_AMD_SEV
>  	unsigned int eax, ebx, ecx, edx, sev_asid_count, sev_es_asid_count;
> +	bool sev_snp_supported = false;
>  	bool sev_es_supported = false;
>  	bool sev_supported = false;
>  
> @@ -2261,6 +2266,10 @@ void __init sev_hardware_setup(void)
>  	sev_es_asid_count = min_sev_asid - 1;
>  	WARN_ON_ONCE(misc_cg_set_capacity(MISC_CG_RES_SEV_ES, sev_es_asid_count));
>  	sev_es_supported = true;
> +	sev_snp_supported = sev_snp_enabled && cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_SEV_SNP);
> +
> +	pr_info("SEV-ES %ssupported: %u ASIDs\n",
> +		sev_snp_supported ? "and SEV-SNP " : "", sev_es_asid_count);

Why like this?

>  
>  out:

Here, below the "out:" label you're already dumping SEV and -ES status.
Just do SNP exactly the same.

>  	if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SEV))
> @@ -2277,6 +2286,7 @@ void __init sev_hardware_setup(void)
>  	if (!sev_es_enabled || !cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_DEBUG_SWAP) ||
>  	    !cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_NO_NESTED_DATA_BP))
>  		sev_es_debug_swap_enabled = false;
> +	sev_snp_enabled = sev_snp_supported;
>  #endif
>  }
diff mbox series

Patch

diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c
index 1cfb9232fc74..4eefc168ebb3 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c
@@ -59,10 +59,14 @@  module_param_named(sev_es, sev_es_enabled, bool, 0444);
 /* enable/disable SEV-ES DebugSwap support */
 static bool sev_es_debug_swap_enabled = true;
 module_param_named(debug_swap, sev_es_debug_swap_enabled, bool, 0444);
+
+/* enable/disable SEV-SNP support */
+static bool sev_snp_enabled;
 #else
 #define sev_enabled false
 #define sev_es_enabled false
 #define sev_es_debug_swap_enabled false
+#define sev_snp_enabled false
 #endif /* CONFIG_KVM_AMD_SEV */
 
 #define AP_RESET_HOLD_NONE		0
@@ -2186,6 +2190,7 @@  void __init sev_hardware_setup(void)
 {
 #ifdef CONFIG_KVM_AMD_SEV
 	unsigned int eax, ebx, ecx, edx, sev_asid_count, sev_es_asid_count;
+	bool sev_snp_supported = false;
 	bool sev_es_supported = false;
 	bool sev_supported = false;
 
@@ -2261,6 +2266,10 @@  void __init sev_hardware_setup(void)
 	sev_es_asid_count = min_sev_asid - 1;
 	WARN_ON_ONCE(misc_cg_set_capacity(MISC_CG_RES_SEV_ES, sev_es_asid_count));
 	sev_es_supported = true;
+	sev_snp_supported = sev_snp_enabled && cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_SEV_SNP);
+
+	pr_info("SEV-ES %ssupported: %u ASIDs\n",
+		sev_snp_supported ? "and SEV-SNP " : "", sev_es_asid_count);
 
 out:
 	if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SEV))
@@ -2277,6 +2286,7 @@  void __init sev_hardware_setup(void)
 	if (!sev_es_enabled || !cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_DEBUG_SWAP) ||
 	    !cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_NO_NESTED_DATA_BP))
 		sev_es_debug_swap_enabled = false;
+	sev_snp_enabled = sev_snp_supported;
 #endif
 }
 
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h
index b7b8bf73cbb9..635430fa641b 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h
@@ -79,6 +79,7 @@  enum {
 struct kvm_sev_info {
 	bool active;		/* SEV enabled guest */
 	bool es_active;		/* SEV-ES enabled guest */
+	bool snp_active;	/* SEV-SNP enabled guest */
 	unsigned int asid;	/* ASID used for this guest */
 	unsigned int handle;	/* SEV firmware handle */
 	int fd;			/* SEV device fd */
@@ -339,6 +340,13 @@  static __always_inline bool sev_es_guest(struct kvm *kvm)
 #endif
 }
 
+static __always_inline bool sev_snp_guest(struct kvm *kvm)
+{
+	struct kvm_sev_info *sev = &to_kvm_svm(kvm)->sev_info;
+
+	return sev_es_guest(kvm) && sev->snp_active;
+}
+
 static inline void vmcb_mark_all_dirty(struct vmcb *vmcb)
 {
 	vmcb->control.clean = 0;