@@ -1641,6 +1641,7 @@ int qla4xxx_set_chap(struct scsi_qla_host *ha, char *username, char *password,
struct ql4_chap_table *chap_table;
uint32_t chap_size = 0;
dma_addr_t chap_dma;
+ ssize_t secret_len;
chap_table = dma_pool_zalloc(ha->chap_dma_pool, GFP_KERNEL, &chap_dma);
if (chap_table == NULL) {
@@ -1652,9 +1653,13 @@ int qla4xxx_set_chap(struct scsi_qla_host *ha, char *username, char *password,
chap_table->flags |= BIT_6; /* peer */
else
chap_table->flags |= BIT_7; /* local */
- chap_table->secret_len = strlen(password);
- strncpy(chap_table->secret, password, MAX_CHAP_SECRET_LEN - 1);
- strncpy(chap_table->name, username, MAX_CHAP_NAME_LEN - 1);
+
+ secret_len = strscpy(chap_table->secret, password,
+ sizeof(chap_table->secret));
+ if (secret_len < MIN_CHAP_SECRET_LEN)
+ goto cleanup_chap_table;
+ chap_table->secret_len = (uint8_t)secret_len;
+ strscpy(chap_table->name, username, sizeof(chap_table->name));
chap_table->cookie = cpu_to_le16(CHAP_VALID_COOKIE);
if (is_qla40XX(ha)) {
@@ -1679,6 +1684,8 @@ int qla4xxx_set_chap(struct scsi_qla_host *ha, char *username, char *password,
memcpy((struct ql4_chap_table *)ha->chap_list + idx,
chap_table, sizeof(struct ql4_chap_table));
}
+
+cleanup_chap_table:
dma_pool_free(ha->chap_dma_pool, chap_table, chap_dma);
if (rval != QLA_SUCCESS)
ret = -EINVAL;
@@ -2281,8 +2288,8 @@ int qla4_8xxx_set_param(struct scsi_qla_host *ha, int param)
mbox_cmd[0] = MBOX_CMD_SET_PARAM;
if (param == SET_DRVR_VERSION) {
mbox_cmd[1] = SET_DRVR_VERSION;
- strncpy((char *)&mbox_cmd[2], QLA4XXX_DRIVER_VERSION,
- MAX_DRVR_VER_LEN - 1);
+ strscpy((char *)&mbox_cmd[2], QLA4XXX_DRIVER_VERSION,
+ MAX_DRVR_VER_LEN);
} else {
ql4_printk(KERN_ERR, ha, "%s: invalid parameter 0x%x\n",
__func__, param);
@@ -799,10 +799,10 @@ static int qla4xxx_get_chap_list(struct Scsi_Host *shost, uint16_t chap_tbl_idx,
chap_rec->chap_tbl_idx = i;
strscpy(chap_rec->username, chap_table->name,
- ISCSI_CHAP_AUTH_NAME_MAX_LEN);
- strscpy(chap_rec->password, chap_table->secret,
- QL4_CHAP_MAX_SECRET_LEN);
- chap_rec->password_length = chap_table->secret_len;
+ sizeof(chap_rec->username));
+ chap_rec->password_length = strscpy(chap_rec->password,
+ chap_table->secret,
+ sizeof(chap_rec->password));
if (chap_table->flags & BIT_7) /* local */
chap_rec->chap_type = CHAP_TYPE_OUT;
@@ -6291,8 +6291,8 @@ static void qla4xxx_get_param_ddb(struct ddb_entry *ddb_entry,
tddb->tpgt = sess->tpgt;
tddb->port = conn->persistent_port;
- strscpy(tddb->iscsi_name, sess->targetname, ISCSI_NAME_SIZE);
- strscpy(tddb->ip_addr, conn->persistent_address, DDB_IPADDR_LEN);
+ strscpy(tddb->iscsi_name, sess->targetname, sizeof(tddb->iscsi_name));
+ strscpy(tddb->ip_addr, conn->persistent_address, sizeof(tddb->ip_addr));
}
static void qla4xxx_convert_param_ddb(struct dev_db_entry *fw_ddb_entry,
@@ -7792,7 +7792,7 @@ static int qla4xxx_sysfs_ddb_logout(struct iscsi_bus_flash_session *fnode_sess,
}
strscpy(flash_tddb->iscsi_name, fnode_sess->targetname,
- ISCSI_NAME_SIZE);
+ sizeof(flash_tddb->iscsi_name));
if (!strncmp(fnode_sess->portal_type, PORTAL_TYPE_IPV6, 4))
sprintf(flash_tddb->ip_addr, "%pI6", fnode_conn->ipaddress);
Replace 3 instances of strncpy in ql4_mbx.c No bugs exist in the current implementation as some care was taken to ensure the write length was decreased by one to leave some space for a NUL-byte. However, instead of using strncpy(dest, src, LEN-1) we can opt for strscpy(dest, src, sizeof(dest)) which will result in NUL-termination as well. It should be noted that the entire chap_table is zero-allocated so the NUL-padding provided by strncpy is not needed. While here, I noticed that MIN_CHAP_SECRET_LEN was not used anywhere. Since strscpy gives us the number of bytes copied into the destination buffer (or an -E2BIG) we can check both for an error during copying and also for a non-length compliant secret. Add a new jump label so we can properly clean up our chap_table should we have to abort due to bad secret. The third instance in this file involves some more peculiar handling of strings: | uint32_t mbox_cmd[MBOX_REG_COUNT]; | ... | memset(&mbox_cmd, 0, sizeof(mbox_cmd)); | ... | mbox_cmd[0] = MBOX_CMD_SET_PARAM; | if (param == SET_DRVR_VERSION) { | mbox_cmd[1] = SET_DRVR_VERSION; | strncpy((char *)&mbox_cmd[2], QLA4XXX_DRIVER_VERSION, | MAX_DRVR_VER_LEN - 1); mbox_cmd has a size of 8: | #define MBOX_REG_COUNT 8 ... and its type width is 4 bytes. Hence, we have 32 bytes to work with here. The first 4 bytes are used as a flag for the MBOX_CMD_SET_PARAM. The next 4 bytes are used for SET_DRVR_VERSION. We now have 32-8=24 bytes remaining -- which thankfully is what MAX_DRVR_VER_LEN is equal to | #define MAX_DRVR_VER_LEN 24 ... and the thing we're copying into this pseudo-string buffer is | #define QLA4XXX_DRIVER_VERSION "5.04.00-k6" ... which is great because its less than 24 bytes (therefore we aren't truncating the source). All to say, there's no bug in the existing implementation (yay!) but we can clean the code up a bit by using strscpy(). In ql4_os.c, there aren't any strncpy() uses to replace but there are some existing strscpy() calls that could be made more idiomatic. Where possible, use strscpy(dest, src, sizeof(dest)). Note that chap_rec->password has a size of ISCSI_CHAP_AUTH_SECRET_MAX_LEN | #define ISCSI_CHAP_AUTH_SECRET_MAX_LEN 256 ... while the current strscpy usage uses QL4_CHAP_MAX_SECRET_LEN | #define QL4_CHAP_MAX_SECRET_LEN 100 ... however since chap_table->secret was set and bounded properly in its string assignment its probably safe here to switch over to sizeof(). | struct iscsi_chap_rec { ... | char username[ISCSI_CHAP_AUTH_NAME_MAX_LEN]; | uint8_t password[ISCSI_CHAP_AUTH_SECRET_MAX_LEN]; ... | }; | strscpy(chap_rec->password, chap_table->secret, | QL4_CHAP_MAX_SECRET_LEN); Signed-off-by: Justin Stitt <justinstitt@google.com> --- drivers/scsi/qla4xxx/ql4_mbx.c | 17 ++++++++++++----- drivers/scsi/qla4xxx/ql4_os.c | 14 +++++++------- 2 files changed, 19 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)