@@ -729,4 +729,61 @@ l0_%=: r0 = 0; \
" ::: __clobber_all);
}
+SEC("socket")
+__description("unpriv: Spectre v1 path-based type confusion of scalar as stack-ptr")
+__success __success_unpriv __retval(0)
+#ifdef SPEC_V1
+__xlated_unpriv("if r0 != 0x1 goto pc+2")
+/* This nospec prevents the exploit because it forces the mispredicted (not
+ * taken) `if r0 != 0x0 goto l0_%=` to resolve before using r6 as a pointer.
+ * This causes the CPU to realize that `r6 = r9` should have never executed. It
+ * ensures that r6 always contains a readable stack slot ptr when the insn after
+ * the nospec executes.
+ */
+__xlated_unpriv("nospec")
+__xlated_unpriv("r9 = *(u8 *)(r6 +0)")
+#endif
+__naked void unpriv_spec_v1_type_confusion(void)
+{
+ asm volatile (" \
+ r1 = 0; \
+ *(u64*)(r10 - 8) = r1; \
+ r2 = r10; \
+ r2 += -8; \
+ r1 = %[map_hash_8b] ll; \
+ call %[bpf_map_lookup_elem]; \
+ if r0 == 0 goto l2_%=; \
+ /* r0: pointer to a map array entry */ \
+ r2 = r10; \
+ r2 += -8; \
+ r1 = %[map_hash_8b] ll; \
+ /* r1, r2: prepared call args */ \
+ r6 = r10; \
+ r6 += -8; \
+ /* r6: pointer to readable stack slot */ \
+ r9 = 0xffffc900; \
+ r9 <<= 32; \
+ /* r9: scalar controlled by attacker */ \
+ r0 = *(u64 *)(r0 + 0); /* cache miss */ \
+ if r0 != 0x0 goto l0_%=; \
+ r6 = r9; \
+l0_%=: if r0 != 0x1 goto l1_%=; \
+ r9 = *(u8 *)(r6 + 0); \
+l1_%=: /* leak r9 */ \
+ r9 &= 1; \
+ r9 <<= 9; \
+ *(u64*)(r10 - 8) = r9; \
+ call %[bpf_map_lookup_elem]; \
+ if r0 == 0 goto l2_%=; \
+ /* leak secret into is_cached(map[0|512]): */ \
+ r0 = *(u64 *)(r0 + 0); \
+l2_%=: \
+ r0 = 0; \
+ exit; \
+" :
+ : __imm(bpf_map_lookup_elem),
+ __imm_addr(map_hash_8b)
+ : __clobber_all);
+}
+
char _license[] SEC("license") = "GPL";
This is based on the gadget from the description of commit 9183671af6db ("bpf: Fix leakage under speculation on mispredicted branches"). Signed-off-by: Luis Gerhorst <luis.gerhorst@fau.de> --- .../selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_unpriv.c | 57 +++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 57 insertions(+)