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[71.56.157.77]) by smtp.gmail.com with ESMTPSA id f20sm14295325pfa.10.2021.03.15.14.39.31 for (version=TLS1_3 cipher=TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 bits=256/256); Mon, 15 Mar 2021 14:39:31 -0700 (PDT) From: Luiz Augusto von Dentz To: linux-bluetooth@vger.kernel.org Subject: [PATCH v3] Bluetooth: SMP: Convert BT_ERR/BT_DBG to bt_dev_err/bt_dev_dbg Date: Mon, 15 Mar 2021 14:39:29 -0700 Message-Id: <20210315213929.1828052-1-luiz.dentz@gmail.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.30.2 MIME-Version: 1.0 Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-bluetooth@vger.kernel.org From: Luiz Augusto von Dentz This converts instances of BT_ERR and BT_DBG to bt_dev_err and bt_dev_dbg which can be enabled at runtime when BT_FEATURE_DEBUG is enabled. Note: Not all instances could be converted as some are exercised by selftest. Signed-off-by: Luiz Augusto von Dentz --- v2: Fix issues found by CI v3: Remove instances of hdev->name since that is already printed by the likes of bt_dev_dbg. net/bluetooth/smp.c | 98 ++++++++++++++++++++++++--------------------- 1 file changed, 52 insertions(+), 46 deletions(-) diff --git a/net/bluetooth/smp.c b/net/bluetooth/smp.c index e03cc284161c..efc19f98b959 100644 --- a/net/bluetooth/smp.c +++ b/net/bluetooth/smp.c @@ -595,7 +595,7 @@ static void smp_send_cmd(struct l2cap_conn *conn, u8 code, u16 len, void *data) if (!chan) return; - BT_DBG("code 0x%2.2x", code); + bt_dev_dbg(conn->hcon->hdev, "code 0x%2.2x", code); iv[0].iov_base = &code; iv[0].iov_len = 1; @@ -859,7 +859,8 @@ static int tk_request(struct l2cap_conn *conn, u8 remote_oob, u8 auth, memset(smp->tk, 0, sizeof(smp->tk)); clear_bit(SMP_FLAG_TK_VALID, &smp->flags); - BT_DBG("tk_request: auth:%d lcl:%d rem:%d", auth, local_io, remote_io); + bt_dev_dbg(hcon->hdev, "auth:%d lcl:%d rem:%d", auth, local_io, + remote_io); /* If neither side wants MITM, either "just" confirm an incoming * request or use just-works for outgoing ones. The JUST_CFM @@ -924,7 +925,7 @@ static int tk_request(struct l2cap_conn *conn, u8 remote_oob, u8 auth, get_random_bytes(&passkey, sizeof(passkey)); passkey %= 1000000; put_unaligned_le32(passkey, smp->tk); - BT_DBG("PassKey: %d", passkey); + bt_dev_dbg(hcon->hdev, "PassKey: %d", passkey); set_bit(SMP_FLAG_TK_VALID, &smp->flags); } @@ -949,7 +950,7 @@ static u8 smp_confirm(struct smp_chan *smp) struct smp_cmd_pairing_confirm cp; int ret; - BT_DBG("conn %p", conn); + bt_dev_dbg(conn->hcon->hdev, "conn %p", conn); ret = smp_c1(smp->tk, smp->prnd, smp->preq, smp->prsp, conn->hcon->init_addr_type, &conn->hcon->init_addr, @@ -977,7 +978,8 @@ static u8 smp_random(struct smp_chan *smp) u8 confirm[16]; int ret; - BT_DBG("conn %p %s", conn, conn->hcon->out ? "master" : "slave"); + bt_dev_dbg(conn->hcon->hdev, "conn %p %s", conn, + conn->hcon->out ? "master" : "slave"); ret = smp_c1(smp->tk, smp->rrnd, smp->preq, smp->prsp, hcon->init_addr_type, &hcon->init_addr, @@ -1236,7 +1238,7 @@ static void smp_distribute_keys(struct smp_chan *smp) struct hci_dev *hdev = hcon->hdev; __u8 *keydist; - BT_DBG("conn %p", conn); + bt_dev_dbg(hdev, "conn %p", conn); rsp = (void *) &smp->prsp[1]; @@ -1266,7 +1268,7 @@ static void smp_distribute_keys(struct smp_chan *smp) *keydist &= ~SMP_SC_NO_DIST; } - BT_DBG("keydist 0x%x", *keydist); + bt_dev_dbg(hdev, "keydist 0x%x", *keydist); if (*keydist & SMP_DIST_ENC_KEY) { struct smp_cmd_encrypt_info enc; @@ -1366,13 +1368,14 @@ static void smp_timeout(struct work_struct *work) security_timer.work); struct l2cap_conn *conn = smp->conn; - BT_DBG("conn %p", conn); + bt_dev_dbg(conn->hcon->hdev, "conn %p", conn); hci_disconnect(conn->hcon, HCI_ERROR_REMOTE_USER_TERM); } static struct smp_chan *smp_chan_create(struct l2cap_conn *conn) { + struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon; struct l2cap_chan *chan = conn->smp; struct smp_chan *smp; @@ -1382,13 +1385,13 @@ static struct smp_chan *smp_chan_create(struct l2cap_conn *conn) smp->tfm_cmac = crypto_alloc_shash("cmac(aes)", 0, 0); if (IS_ERR(smp->tfm_cmac)) { - BT_ERR("Unable to create CMAC crypto context"); + bt_dev_err(hcon->hdev, "Unable to create CMAC crypto context"); goto zfree_smp; } smp->tfm_ecdh = crypto_alloc_kpp("ecdh", 0, 0); if (IS_ERR(smp->tfm_ecdh)) { - BT_ERR("Unable to create ECDH crypto context"); + bt_dev_err(hcon->hdev, "Unable to create ECDH crypto context"); goto free_shash; } @@ -1399,7 +1402,7 @@ static struct smp_chan *smp_chan_create(struct l2cap_conn *conn) INIT_DELAYED_WORK(&smp->security_timer, smp_timeout); - hci_conn_hold(conn->hcon); + hci_conn_hold(hcon); return smp; @@ -1564,8 +1567,8 @@ static u8 sc_passkey_round(struct smp_chan *smp, u8 smp_op) if (!hcon->out) return 0; - BT_DBG("%s Starting passkey round %u", hdev->name, - smp->passkey_round + 1); + bt_dev_dbg(hdev, "Starting passkey round %u", + smp->passkey_round + 1); SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_CONFIRM); @@ -1625,7 +1628,7 @@ int smp_user_confirm_reply(struct hci_conn *hcon, u16 mgmt_op, __le32 passkey) u32 value; int err; - BT_DBG(""); + bt_dev_dbg(conn->hcon->hdev, ""); if (!conn) return -ENOTCONN; @@ -1651,7 +1654,7 @@ int smp_user_confirm_reply(struct hci_conn *hcon, u16 mgmt_op, __le32 passkey) case MGMT_OP_USER_PASSKEY_REPLY: value = le32_to_cpu(passkey); memset(smp->tk, 0, sizeof(smp->tk)); - BT_DBG("PassKey: %d", value); + bt_dev_dbg(conn->hcon->hdev, "PassKey: %d", value); put_unaligned_le32(value, smp->tk); fallthrough; case MGMT_OP_USER_CONFIRM_REPLY: @@ -1733,7 +1736,7 @@ static u8 smp_cmd_pairing_req(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb) u8 key_size, auth, sec_level; int ret; - BT_DBG("conn %p", conn); + bt_dev_dbg(hdev, "conn %p", conn); if (skb->len < sizeof(*req)) return SMP_INVALID_PARAMS; @@ -1887,7 +1890,7 @@ static u8 sc_send_public_key(struct smp_chan *smp) } if (hci_dev_test_flag(hdev, HCI_USE_DEBUG_KEYS)) { - BT_DBG("Using debug keys"); + bt_dev_dbg(hdev, "Using debug keys"); if (set_ecdh_privkey(smp->tfm_ecdh, debug_sk)) return SMP_UNSPECIFIED; memcpy(smp->local_pk, debug_pk, 64); @@ -1924,7 +1927,7 @@ static u8 smp_cmd_pairing_rsp(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb) u8 key_size, auth; int ret; - BT_DBG("conn %p", conn); + bt_dev_dbg(hdev, "conn %p", conn); if (skb->len < sizeof(*rsp)) return SMP_INVALID_PARAMS; @@ -2019,7 +2022,7 @@ static u8 sc_check_confirm(struct smp_chan *smp) { struct l2cap_conn *conn = smp->conn; - BT_DBG(""); + bt_dev_dbg(conn->hcon->hdev, ""); if (smp->method == REQ_PASSKEY || smp->method == DSP_PASSKEY) return sc_passkey_round(smp, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_CONFIRM); @@ -2078,8 +2081,10 @@ static u8 smp_cmd_pairing_confirm(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb) { struct l2cap_chan *chan = conn->smp; struct smp_chan *smp = chan->data; + struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon; + struct hci_dev *hdev = hcon->hdev; - BT_DBG("conn %p %s", conn, conn->hcon->out ? "master" : "slave"); + bt_dev_dbg(hdev, "conn %p %s", conn, hcon->out ? "master" : "slave"); if (skb->len < sizeof(smp->pcnf)) return SMP_INVALID_PARAMS; @@ -2094,7 +2099,7 @@ static u8 smp_cmd_pairing_confirm(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb) if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_REMOTE_PK, &smp->flags)) return sc_check_confirm(smp); - BT_ERR("Unexpected SMP Pairing Confirm"); + bt_dev_err(hdev, "Unexpected SMP Pairing Confirm"); ret = fixup_sc_false_positive(smp); if (ret) @@ -2125,7 +2130,7 @@ static u8 smp_cmd_pairing_random(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb) u32 passkey; int err; - BT_DBG("conn %p", conn); + bt_dev_dbg(hcon->hdev, "conn %p", conn); if (skb->len < sizeof(smp->rrnd)) return SMP_INVALID_PARAMS; @@ -2284,7 +2289,7 @@ static u8 smp_cmd_security_req(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb) struct smp_chan *smp; u8 sec_level, auth; - BT_DBG("conn %p", conn); + bt_dev_dbg(hdev, "conn %p", conn); if (skb->len < sizeof(*rp)) return SMP_INVALID_PARAMS; @@ -2347,7 +2352,8 @@ int smp_conn_security(struct hci_conn *hcon, __u8 sec_level) __u8 authreq; int ret; - BT_DBG("conn %p hcon %p level 0x%2.2x", conn, hcon, sec_level); + bt_dev_dbg(hcon->hdev, "conn %p hcon %p level 0x%2.2x", conn, hcon, + sec_level); /* This may be NULL if there's an unexpected disconnection */ if (!conn) @@ -2483,7 +2489,7 @@ static int smp_cmd_encrypt_info(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb) struct l2cap_chan *chan = conn->smp; struct smp_chan *smp = chan->data; - BT_DBG("conn %p", conn); + bt_dev_dbg(conn->hcon->hdev, "conn %p", conn); if (skb->len < sizeof(*rp)) return SMP_INVALID_PARAMS; @@ -2516,7 +2522,7 @@ static int smp_cmd_master_ident(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb) struct smp_ltk *ltk; u8 authenticated; - BT_DBG("conn %p", conn); + bt_dev_dbg(hdev, "conn %p", conn); if (skb->len < sizeof(*rp)) return SMP_INVALID_PARAMS; @@ -2548,7 +2554,7 @@ static int smp_cmd_ident_info(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb) struct l2cap_chan *chan = conn->smp; struct smp_chan *smp = chan->data; - BT_DBG(""); + bt_dev_dbg(conn->hcon->hdev, ""); if (skb->len < sizeof(*info)) return SMP_INVALID_PARAMS; @@ -2580,7 +2586,7 @@ static int smp_cmd_ident_addr_info(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon; bdaddr_t rpa; - BT_DBG(""); + bt_dev_dbg(hcon->hdev, ""); if (skb->len < sizeof(*info)) return SMP_INVALID_PARAMS; @@ -2647,7 +2653,7 @@ static int smp_cmd_sign_info(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb) struct smp_chan *smp = chan->data; struct smp_csrk *csrk; - BT_DBG("conn %p", conn); + bt_dev_dbg(conn->hcon->hdev, "conn %p", conn); if (skb->len < sizeof(*rp)) return SMP_INVALID_PARAMS; @@ -2727,7 +2733,7 @@ static int smp_cmd_public_key(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb) struct smp_cmd_pairing_confirm cfm; int err; - BT_DBG("conn %p", conn); + bt_dev_dbg(hdev, "conn %p", conn); if (skb->len < sizeof(*key)) return SMP_INVALID_PARAMS; @@ -2791,7 +2797,7 @@ static int smp_cmd_public_key(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb) smp->method = sc_select_method(smp); - BT_DBG("%s selected method 0x%02x", hdev->name, smp->method); + bt_dev_dbg(hdev, "selected method 0x%02x", smp->method); /* JUST_WORKS and JUST_CFM result in an unauthenticated key */ if (smp->method == JUST_WORKS || smp->method == JUST_CFM) @@ -2866,7 +2872,7 @@ static int smp_cmd_dhkey_check(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb) u8 io_cap[3], r[16], e[16]; int err; - BT_DBG("conn %p", conn); + bt_dev_dbg(hcon->hdev, "conn %p", conn); if (skb->len < sizeof(*check)) return SMP_INVALID_PARAMS; @@ -2926,7 +2932,7 @@ static int smp_cmd_keypress_notify(struct l2cap_conn *conn, { struct smp_cmd_keypress_notify *kp = (void *) skb->data; - BT_DBG("value 0x%02x", kp->value); + bt_dev_dbg(conn->hcon->hdev, "value 0x%02x", kp->value); return 0; } @@ -3023,7 +3029,7 @@ static int smp_sig_channel(struct l2cap_chan *chan, struct sk_buff *skb) break; default: - BT_DBG("Unknown command code 0x%2.2x", code); + bt_dev_dbg(hcon->hdev, "Unknown command code 0x%2.2x", code); reason = SMP_CMD_NOTSUPP; goto done; } @@ -3048,7 +3054,7 @@ static void smp_teardown_cb(struct l2cap_chan *chan, int err) { struct l2cap_conn *conn = chan->conn; - BT_DBG("chan %p", chan); + bt_dev_dbg(conn->hcon->hdev, "chan %p", chan); if (chan->data) smp_chan_destroy(conn); @@ -3065,7 +3071,7 @@ static void bredr_pairing(struct l2cap_chan *chan) struct smp_cmd_pairing req; struct smp_chan *smp; - BT_DBG("chan %p", chan); + bt_dev_dbg(hdev, "chan %p", chan); /* Only new pairings are interesting */ if (!test_bit(HCI_CONN_NEW_LINK_KEY, &hcon->flags)) @@ -3112,7 +3118,7 @@ static void bredr_pairing(struct l2cap_chan *chan) set_bit(SMP_FLAG_SC, &smp->flags); - BT_DBG("%s starting SMP over BR/EDR", hdev->name); + bt_dev_dbg(hdev, "starting SMP over BR/EDR"); /* Prepare and send the BR/EDR SMP Pairing Request */ build_bredr_pairing_cmd(smp, &req, NULL); @@ -3130,7 +3136,7 @@ static void smp_resume_cb(struct l2cap_chan *chan) struct l2cap_conn *conn = chan->conn; struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon; - BT_DBG("chan %p", chan); + bt_dev_dbg(hcon->hdev, "chan %p", chan); if (hcon->type == ACL_LINK) { bredr_pairing(chan); @@ -3153,7 +3159,7 @@ static void smp_ready_cb(struct l2cap_chan *chan) struct l2cap_conn *conn = chan->conn; struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon; - BT_DBG("chan %p", chan); + bt_dev_dbg(hcon->hdev, "chan %p", chan); /* No need to call l2cap_chan_hold() here since we already own * the reference taken in smp_new_conn_cb(). This is just the @@ -3171,7 +3177,7 @@ static int smp_recv_cb(struct l2cap_chan *chan, struct sk_buff *skb) { int err; - BT_DBG("chan %p", chan); + bt_dev_dbg(chan->conn->hcon->hdev, "chan %p", chan); err = smp_sig_channel(chan, skb); if (err) { @@ -3223,7 +3229,7 @@ static inline struct l2cap_chan *smp_new_conn_cb(struct l2cap_chan *pchan) { struct l2cap_chan *chan; - BT_DBG("pchan %p", pchan); + bt_dev_dbg(pchan->conn->hcon->hdev, "pchan %p", pchan); chan = l2cap_chan_create(); if (!chan) @@ -3244,7 +3250,7 @@ static inline struct l2cap_chan *smp_new_conn_cb(struct l2cap_chan *pchan) */ atomic_set(&chan->nesting, L2CAP_NESTING_SMP); - BT_DBG("created chan %p", chan); + bt_dev_dbg(pchan->conn->hcon->hdev, "created chan %p", chan); return chan; } @@ -3285,14 +3291,14 @@ static struct l2cap_chan *smp_add_cid(struct hci_dev *hdev, u16 cid) tfm_cmac = crypto_alloc_shash("cmac(aes)", 0, 0); if (IS_ERR(tfm_cmac)) { - BT_ERR("Unable to create CMAC crypto context"); + bt_dev_err(hdev, "Unable to create CMAC crypto context"); kfree_sensitive(smp); return ERR_CAST(tfm_cmac); } tfm_ecdh = crypto_alloc_kpp("ecdh", 0, 0); if (IS_ERR(tfm_ecdh)) { - BT_ERR("Unable to create ECDH crypto context"); + bt_dev_err(hdev, "Unable to create ECDH crypto context"); crypto_free_shash(tfm_cmac); kfree_sensitive(smp); return ERR_CAST(tfm_ecdh); @@ -3348,7 +3354,7 @@ static void smp_del_chan(struct l2cap_chan *chan) { struct smp_dev *smp; - BT_DBG("chan %p", chan); + bt_dev_dbg(chan->conn->hcon->hdev, "chan %p", chan); smp = chan->data; if (smp) { @@ -3391,7 +3397,7 @@ int smp_register(struct hci_dev *hdev) { struct l2cap_chan *chan; - BT_DBG("%s", hdev->name); + bt_dev_dbg(hdev, ""); /* If the controller does not support Low Energy operation, then * there is also no need to register any SMP channel.