From patchwork Mon Sep 21 07:58:39 2020 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Nicolai Stange X-Patchwork-Id: 252973 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-12.8 required=3.0 tests=BAYES_00, HEADER_FROM_DIFFERENT_DOMAINS, INCLUDES_PATCH, MAILING_LIST_MULTI, SIGNED_OFF_BY, SPF_HELO_NONE, SPF_PASS, URIBL_BLOCKED, USER_AGENT_GIT autolearn=unavailable autolearn_force=no version=3.4.0 Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 9301BC43464 for ; Mon, 21 Sep 2020 08:00:06 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 6BA8E214F1 for ; Mon, 21 Sep 2020 08:00:06 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1726628AbgIUH7u (ORCPT ); Mon, 21 Sep 2020 03:59:50 -0400 Received: from mx2.suse.de ([195.135.220.15]:56802 "EHLO mx2.suse.de" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1726420AbgIUH71 (ORCPT ); Mon, 21 Sep 2020 03:59:27 -0400 X-Virus-Scanned: by amavisd-new at test-mx.suse.de Received: from relay2.suse.de (unknown [195.135.221.27]) by mx2.suse.de (Postfix) with ESMTP id 80FADB51D; Mon, 21 Sep 2020 08:00:02 +0000 (UTC) From: Nicolai Stange To: "Theodore Y. Ts'o" Cc: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org, LKML , Arnd Bergmann , Greg Kroah-Hartman , "Eric W. Biederman" , "Alexander E. Patrakov" , "Ahmed S. Darwish" , Willy Tarreau , Matthew Garrett , Vito Caputo , Andreas Dilger , Jan Kara , Ray Strode , William Jon McCann , zhangjs , Andy Lutomirski , Florian Weimer , Lennart Poettering , Peter Matthias , Marcelo Henrique Cerri , Roman Drahtmueller , Neil Horman , Randy Dunlap , Julia Lawall , Dan Carpenter , Andy Lavr , Eric Biggers , "Jason A. Donenfeld" , =?utf-8?q?Stephan_M=C3=BCller?= , Torsten Duwe , Petr Tesarik , Nicolai Stange Subject: [RFC PATCH 23/41] random: don't award entropy to non-SP800-90B arch RNGs in FIPS mode Date: Mon, 21 Sep 2020 09:58:39 +0200 Message-Id: <20200921075857.4424-24-nstange@suse.de> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.26.2 In-Reply-To: <20200921075857.4424-1-nstange@suse.de> References: <20200921075857.4424-1-nstange@suse.de> MIME-Version: 1.0 Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org It is required by SP800-90C that only SP800-90B compliant entropy sources may be used for seeding DRBGs. Don't award any entropy to arch_get_random_long() if fips_enabled is true. Don't award any entropy to arch_get_random_seed_long() if fips_enabled && !arch_has_sp800_90b_random_seed(). This is achieved by making min_crng_reseed_pool_entropy() return the full minimum seed size if fips_enabled && !arch_has_sp800_90b_random_seed() is true. This prevents crng_reseed() from attempting to make up for any lack of entropy in the input_pool by reading from the architectural RNG. Make crng_reseed() bail out in FIPS mode if the input_pool provides insufficient entropy and any of the arch_get_random_seed_long() invocations fails: there's no statement regarding SP900-90B compliance of arch_get_random_long() and so it can't be used as a backup. Signed-off-by: Nicolai Stange --- drivers/char/random.c | 9 +++++++-- 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/char/random.c b/drivers/char/random.c index 7712b4464ef5..aaddee4e4ab1 100644 --- a/drivers/char/random.c +++ b/drivers/char/random.c @@ -1195,9 +1195,13 @@ static int min_crng_reseed_pool_entropy(void) * up to one half of the minimum entropy needed for * reseeding. That way it won't dominate the entropy * collected by other means at input_pool. + * If in FIPS mode, restrict this to SP900-90B compliant + * architectural RNGs. */ - if (arch_has_random() || arch_has_random_seed()) + if (arch_has_sp800_90b_random_seed() || + (!fips_enabled && (arch_has_random() || arch_has_random_seed()))) { return 8; + } return 16; } @@ -1233,7 +1237,8 @@ static void crng_reseed(struct crng_state *crng, struct entropy_store *r) for (i = 0; i < 8; i++) { unsigned long rv; if (!arch_get_random_seed_long(&rv) && - !arch_get_random_long(&rv)) { + ((arch_randomness_required && fips_enabled) || + !arch_get_random_long(&rv))) { if (arch_randomness_required) { /* * The input_pool failed to provide