From patchwork Wed Jan 20 09:05:15 2021 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: "Lee, Chun-Yi" X-Patchwork-Id: 367224 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-15.8 required=3.0 tests=BAYES_00,DKIM_SIGNED, DKIM_VALID,DKIM_VALID_AU,FREEMAIL_FORGED_FROMDOMAIN,FREEMAIL_FROM, HEADER_FROM_DIFFERENT_DOMAINS,INCLUDES_CR_TRAILER,INCLUDES_PATCH, MAILING_LIST_MULTI, SPF_HELO_NONE, SPF_PASS, URIBL_BLOCKED, USER_AGENT_GIT autolearn=unavailable autolearn_force=no version=3.4.0 Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 19D5FC433E0 for ; Wed, 20 Jan 2021 09:32:37 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id C188F22D08 for ; Wed, 20 Jan 2021 09:32:36 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1728275AbhATJKh (ORCPT ); Wed, 20 Jan 2021 04:10:37 -0500 Received: from lindbergh.monkeyblade.net ([23.128.96.19]:40126 "EHLO lindbergh.monkeyblade.net" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1728104AbhATJGm (ORCPT ); Wed, 20 Jan 2021 04:06:42 -0500 Received: from mail-pl1-x62f.google.com (mail-pl1-x62f.google.com [IPv6:2607:f8b0:4864:20::62f]) by lindbergh.monkeyblade.net (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 86D83C0613CF; Wed, 20 Jan 2021 01:06:01 -0800 (PST) Received: by mail-pl1-x62f.google.com with SMTP id s15so12161411plr.9; Wed, 20 Jan 2021 01:06:01 -0800 (PST) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=gmail.com; s=20161025; h=from:to:cc:subject:date:message-id:in-reply-to:references; bh=rEVQORojpxPILZoW25n2HNyuoMNfuJyQRA19mYILOf8=; b=eUrUOAmQGTtcQHmscv92Rr9YP8vGRMrNujLw1yvsfOd2jEBLnpiFtMXkXWhdtzyEY4 M49Lkp1+Xdkgij1tun5HpGdw+f0FHbXe9T39282jlBjuX4EV4UWsNMDR84HeYA6WQp/I +K9Izh1IdftESL2yzS8KcMzyMIElL/UGGreMofurhGA3khyiUthESxq9hrfj1z8OIg+H STO7dX3ol2dhu/koJrowyCr7tsadsSFwaQg013dtjXeiPAcP8V7XXRDguHBt3VL9pK5L abg4+XvO//cHpglW6Pim+u3Gnx64CxblVHt3NkWL+W3Dk1I5scX2hbO7wm3v1/69l5R2 HQsg== X-Google-DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=1e100.net; s=20161025; h=x-gm-message-state:from:to:cc:subject:date:message-id:in-reply-to :references; bh=rEVQORojpxPILZoW25n2HNyuoMNfuJyQRA19mYILOf8=; b=lGZVN6ORm5NQZoNeqJIwBrJhl46pchX6ixGgDB3OP4Icp5iMXV3N5BX1O9+gNRbPhm ioEvEAqDRuYR0mRA3glvNyjQqUcxBb/lliZPxzTK9urRSRdtUA/8a2X7sFntp8KM7lB8 A1qfoyxFyhDexjjvKyvPEOzubrA4YAAJ9EB9EbSdEgMW5niOZX99bEKo+UmWr3cBxcQp vk886LW6aEBN54I0gIKWTdL00D0MXCso30fcka5PCSReioHgGgWKI8rntZUeb5jEdW8h ClJCWu2Qm2X+9QLwqdI59fqowagNp3sreyc9xTb3YhwrE7YYPSPxm2ELybOKJnLB3BM7 hXHQ== X-Gm-Message-State: AOAM531PkNtw0oOvjcJ4B8MYWYVW0kjEXjkjxJd3gzyij7DnsZaXurn7 Sn0iPFnDlM4eNmKH/+uppSE= X-Google-Smtp-Source: ABdhPJwjnzVg81wICugVbbYS2ElbIu+3zxJhnEOchjy7lPa82OoUNcPhlSSxBzrsCb2LkIWI4EsG5w== X-Received: by 2002:a17:902:ed93:b029:de:84d2:9ce1 with SMTP id e19-20020a170902ed93b02900de84d29ce1mr8976390plj.47.1611133561052; Wed, 20 Jan 2021 01:06:01 -0800 (PST) Received: from linux-l9pv.suse ([124.11.22.254]) by smtp.gmail.com with ESMTPSA id z2sm1585226pgl.49.2021.01.20.01.05.58 (version=TLS1_2 cipher=ECDHE-ECDSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256 bits=128/128); Wed, 20 Jan 2021 01:06:00 -0800 (PST) From: "Lee, Chun-Yi" X-Google-Original-From: "Lee, Chun-Yi" To: David Howells Cc: Herbert Xu , "David S . Miller" , Ben Boeckel , Randy Dunlap , Malte Gell , keyrings@vger.kernel.org, linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, "Lee, Chun-Yi" Subject: [PATCH 2/4] PKCS#7: Check codeSigning EKU for kernel module and kexec pe verification Date: Wed, 20 Jan 2021 17:05:15 +0800 Message-Id: <20210120090517.23851-3-jlee@suse.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.12.3 In-Reply-To: <20210120090517.23851-1-jlee@suse.com> References: <20210120090517.23851-1-jlee@suse.com> Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org This patch adds the logic for checking the CodeSigning extended key usage when verifying signature of kernel module or kexec PE binary in PKCS#7. Signed-off-by: "Lee, Chun-Yi" --- certs/system_keyring.c | 2 +- crypto/asymmetric_keys/Kconfig | 9 +++++++++ crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_trust.c | 37 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--- include/crypto/pkcs7.h | 3 ++- 4 files changed, 46 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) diff --git a/certs/system_keyring.c b/certs/system_keyring.c index 798291177186..4104f5465d8a 100644 --- a/certs/system_keyring.c +++ b/certs/system_keyring.c @@ -242,7 +242,7 @@ int verify_pkcs7_message_sig(const void *data, size_t len, goto error; } } - ret = pkcs7_validate_trust(pkcs7, trusted_keys); + ret = pkcs7_validate_trust(pkcs7, trusted_keys, usage); if (ret < 0) { if (ret == -ENOKEY) pr_devel("PKCS#7 signature not signed with a trusted key\n"); diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/Kconfig b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/Kconfig index 1f1f004dc757..1754812df989 100644 --- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/Kconfig +++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/Kconfig @@ -96,4 +96,13 @@ config SIGNED_PE_FILE_VERIFICATION This option provides support for verifying the signature(s) on a signed PE binary. +config CHECK_CODESIGN_EKU + bool "Check codeSigning extended key usage" + depends on PKCS7_MESSAGE_PARSER=y + depends on SYSTEM_DATA_VERIFICATION + help + This option provides support for checking the codeSigning extended + key usage when verifying the signature in PKCS#7. It affects kernel + module verification and kexec PE binary verification. + endif # ASYMMETRIC_KEY_TYPE diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_trust.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_trust.c index 61af3c4d82cc..1d2318ff63db 100644 --- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_trust.c +++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_trust.c @@ -16,12 +16,36 @@ #include #include "pkcs7_parser.h" +#ifdef CONFIG_CHECK_CODESIGN_EKU +static bool check_codesign_eku(struct key *key, + enum key_being_used_for usage) +{ + struct public_key *public_key = key->payload.data[asym_crypto]; + + switch (usage) { + case VERIFYING_MODULE_SIGNATURE: + case VERIFYING_KEXEC_PE_SIGNATURE: + return !!(public_key->eku & EKU_codeSigning); + default: + break; + } + return true; +} +#else +static bool check_codesign_eku(struct key *key, + enum key_being_used_for usage) +{ + return true; +} +#endif + /** * Check the trust on one PKCS#7 SignedInfo block. */ static int pkcs7_validate_trust_one(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7, struct pkcs7_signed_info *sinfo, - struct key *trust_keyring) + struct key *trust_keyring, + enum key_being_used_for usage) { struct public_key_signature *sig = sinfo->sig; struct x509_certificate *x509, *last = NULL, *p; @@ -112,6 +136,12 @@ static int pkcs7_validate_trust_one(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7, return -ENOKEY; matched: + if (!check_codesign_eku(key, usage)) { + pr_warn("sinfo %u: The signer %x key is not CodeSigning\n", + sinfo->index, key_serial(key)); + key_put(key); + return -ENOKEY; + } ret = verify_signature(key, sig); key_put(key); if (ret < 0) { @@ -156,7 +186,8 @@ static int pkcs7_validate_trust_one(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7, * May also return -ENOMEM. */ int pkcs7_validate_trust(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7, - struct key *trust_keyring) + struct key *trust_keyring, + enum key_being_used_for usage) { struct pkcs7_signed_info *sinfo; struct x509_certificate *p; @@ -167,7 +198,7 @@ int pkcs7_validate_trust(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7, p->seen = false; for (sinfo = pkcs7->signed_infos; sinfo; sinfo = sinfo->next) { - ret = pkcs7_validate_trust_one(pkcs7, sinfo, trust_keyring); + ret = pkcs7_validate_trust_one(pkcs7, sinfo, trust_keyring, usage); switch (ret) { case -ENOKEY: continue; diff --git a/include/crypto/pkcs7.h b/include/crypto/pkcs7.h index 38ec7f5f9041..b3b48240ba73 100644 --- a/include/crypto/pkcs7.h +++ b/include/crypto/pkcs7.h @@ -30,7 +30,8 @@ extern int pkcs7_get_content_data(const struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7, * pkcs7_trust.c */ extern int pkcs7_validate_trust(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7, - struct key *trust_keyring); + struct key *trust_keyring, + enum key_being_used_for usage); /* * pkcs7_verify.c