From patchwork Fri Apr 29 20:17:09 2022 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Martin Fernandez X-Patchwork-Id: 567604 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 6E03AC4332F for ; Fri, 29 Apr 2022 20:17:37 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1380351AbiD2UUz (ORCPT ); Fri, 29 Apr 2022 16:20:55 -0400 Received: from lindbergh.monkeyblade.net ([23.128.96.19]:49200 "EHLO lindbergh.monkeyblade.net" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1380335AbiD2UUy (ORCPT ); Fri, 29 Apr 2022 16:20:54 -0400 Received: from mail-oi1-x229.google.com (mail-oi1-x229.google.com [IPv6:2607:f8b0:4864:20::229]) by lindbergh.monkeyblade.net (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 2A5BC9E9D9 for ; Fri, 29 Apr 2022 13:17:35 -0700 (PDT) Received: by mail-oi1-x229.google.com with SMTP id l16so2400996oil.6 for ; Fri, 29 Apr 2022 13:17:35 -0700 (PDT) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=eclypsium.com; s=google; h=from:to:cc:subject:date:message-id:mime-version :content-transfer-encoding; bh=nYXkLp0fPhZ4miEUy66+jKkP3mtd+ed+kKhoj+7Arlw=; b=EZfC0Wd7Kbw6BPW9sWVjWND+mdI27q73yrr0HJYwPqOp8Lf/p0JKOj6VDiMsg+Q0nK sVE/iNKF2WknemJJDWIQ5jdCr8D15GQELuYdHcEGBfBPyNa+ngksK+vAtsb4jjuJOPCK mSd032rnnKOWxWDhHSF/O+kFKi5zt9r7wJcA/3QfhV8WabfXkaNFqRTfnbDadXZ3abR7 BjLXEw2419+T7584YmKWNxqonpx3eslpPSpJPgLkVsou5xTbQ+I0JHWFfROD0SSIW6Cp MfLUrTvomaV4gapy9hV+NJyh0xABJybSoN9XHROU2VQ1urrERCYVwlLrTGG9QlmyxeoV gWQg== X-Google-DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=1e100.net; s=20210112; h=x-gm-message-state:from:to:cc:subject:date:message-id:mime-version :content-transfer-encoding; bh=nYXkLp0fPhZ4miEUy66+jKkP3mtd+ed+kKhoj+7Arlw=; b=jt5G5Qt6vd+CEurjLV350x1flioq4kO7ij72sWzg4ckII9PLLEsFjYoTZ8k1rVY21z WcZCNJVW+3ssZsG3BOZa2mXp6H5MOp1pMJKn/FB1+kgNQJIe4EY2yOjz+AgsID6meo9b 8xlixpIcwNI6m7mabx3BczyUJqTAuln9cKFq0jMbBLDLxtYNlv/lf0vn3DKJAcpdqidc +DeKjQKrvIaD3BKXepENfijWPpcQsEDigErmi1PaTyIHA/KvtrXpmxjZ1vByqCb41JiL Tkya/lTrsMeWbZ401ePU+t62fMW4aI4jFh+KxXbHM+7jyo/j/d4dKBdLThHps8QYI17j 1bJA== X-Gm-Message-State: AOAM530WejwTpCenDt9E06OF0SxaoWi/Zsgn5S5gEdEX3I+SvxTT5itM kDInArT9SDvTNOpQlUo+P4mSJCCKlk/NWips X-Google-Smtp-Source: ABdhPJzSy3OSVGqtKyunus4UZG+M0Rq/rQsxtwQdjrAQqRXR2fT16vvwtUnNUofDKGpdsowU72xaew== X-Received: by 2002:a05:6808:148b:b0:325:21ad:fd18 with SMTP id e11-20020a056808148b00b0032521adfd18mr540018oiw.227.1651263454355; Fri, 29 Apr 2022 13:17:34 -0700 (PDT) Received: from localhost ([181.97.174.128]) by smtp.gmail.com with ESMTPSA id f21-20020a4ace95000000b0035eb4e5a6b8sm1176122oos.14.2022.04.29.13.17.28 (version=TLS1_3 cipher=TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 bits=128/128); Fri, 29 Apr 2022 13:17:33 -0700 (PDT) From: Martin Fernandez To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-efi@vger.kernel.org, platform-driver-x86@vger.kernel.org, linux-mm@kvack.org Cc: tglx@linutronix.de, mingo@redhat.com, bp@alien8.de, dave.hansen@linux.intel.com, x86@kernel.org, hpa@zytor.com, ardb@kernel.org, dvhart@infradead.org, andy@infradead.org, gregkh@linuxfoundation.org, rafael@kernel.org, rppt@kernel.org, akpm@linux-foundation.org, daniel.gutson@eclypsium.com, hughsient@gmail.com, alex.bazhaniuk@eclypsium.com, alison.schofield@intel.com, keescook@chromium.org, Martin Fernandez Subject: [PATCH v8 0/8] x86: Show in sysfs if a memory node is able to do encryption Date: Fri, 29 Apr 2022 17:17:09 -0300 Message-Id: <20220429201717.1946178-1-martin.fernandez@eclypsium.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.30.2 MIME-Version: 1.0 Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org Show for each node if every memory descriptor in that node has the EFI_MEMORY_CPU_CRYPTO attribute. fwupd project plans to use it as part of a check to see if the users have properly configured memory hardware encryption capabilities. fwupd's people have seen cases where it seems like there is memory encryption because all the hardware is capable of doing it, but on a closer look there is not, either because of system firmware or because some component requires updating to enable the feature. It's planned to make it part of a specification that can be passed to people purchasing hardware These checks will run at every boot. The specification is called Host Security ID: https://fwupd.github.io/libfwupdplugin/hsi.html. We choosed to do it a per-node basis because although an ABI that shows that the whole system memory is capable of encryption would be useful for the fwupd use case, doing it in a per-node basis gives also the capability to the user to target allocations from applications to NUMA nodes which have encryption capabilities. I did some tests for some of the functions introduced (and modified) in e820.c. Sadly KUnit is not able to test __init functions and data so I had some warnings during the linking. There is a KUnit patch already to fix that [1]. I wanted to wait for it to be merged but it is taking more time than I expected so I'm sending this without tests for now. I'm planning to add unit tests in the future to the e820 range update rework and e820_update_table. [1] https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20220419040515.43693-1-brendanhiggins@google.com/T/ Changes since v7: Less kerneldocs Less verbosity in the e820 code Changes since v6: Fixes in __e820__handle_range_update Const correctness in e820.c Correct alignment in memblock.h Rework memblock_overlaps_region Changes since v5: Refactor e820__range_{update, remove, set_crypto_capable} in order to avoid code duplication. Warn the user when a node has both encryptable and non-encryptable regions. Check that e820_table has enough size to store both current e820_table and EFI memmap. Changes since v4: Add enum to represent the cryptographic capabilities in e820: e820_crypto_capabilities. Revert __e820__range_update, only adding the new argument for __e820__range_add about crypto capabilities. Add a function __e820__range_update_crypto similar to __e820__range_update but to only update this new field. Changes since v3: Update date in Doc/ABI file. More information about the fwupd usecase and the rationale behind doing it in a per-NUMA-node. Changes since v2: e820__range_mark_crypto -> e820__range_mark_crypto_capable. In e820__range_remove: Create a region with crypto capabilities instead of creating one without it and then mark it. Changes since v1: Modify __e820__range_update to update the crypto capabilities of a range; now this function will change the crypto capability of a range if it's called with the same old_type and new_type. Rework efi_mark_e820_regions_as_crypto_capable based on this. Update do_add_efi_memmap to mark the regions as it creates them. Change the type of crypto_capable in e820_entry from bool to u8. Fix e820__update_table changes. Remove memblock_add_crypto_capable. Now you have to add the region and mark it then. Better place for crypto_capable in pglist_data. Martin Fernandez (8): mm/memblock: Tag memblocks with crypto capabilities mm/mmzone: Tag pg_data_t with crypto capabilities x86/e820: Add infrastructure to refactor e820__range_{update,remove} x86/e820: Refactor __e820__range_update x86/e820: Refactor e820__range_remove x86/e820: Tag e820_entry with crypto capabilities x86/efi: Mark e820_entries as crypto capable from EFI memmap drivers/node: Show in sysfs node's crypto capabilities Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-devices-node | 10 + arch/x86/include/asm/e820/api.h | 1 + arch/x86/include/asm/e820/types.h | 12 +- arch/x86/kernel/e820.c | 388 ++++++++++++++----- arch/x86/platform/efi/efi.c | 37 ++ drivers/base/node.c | 10 + include/linux/memblock.h | 5 + include/linux/mmzone.h | 3 + mm/memblock.c | 62 +++ mm/page_alloc.c | 1 + 10 files changed, 431 insertions(+), 98 deletions(-) create mode 100644 Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-devices-node