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Tue, 27 Jul 2021 22:27:20 +0000 From: Tom Lendacky To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, x86@kernel.org, linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org, linux-s390@vger.kernel.org, iommu@lists.linux-foundation.org, kvm@vger.kernel.org, linux-efi@vger.kernel.org, platform-driver-x86@vger.kernel.org, linux-graphics-maintainer@vmware.com, amd-gfx@lists.freedesktop.org, dri-devel@lists.freedesktop.org, kexec@lists.infradead.org, linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org Cc: Borislav Petkov , Brijesh Singh , Joerg Roedel , Andi Kleen , Sathyanarayanan Kuppuswamy , Tianyu Lan , Thomas Gleixner , Ingo Molnar , Dave Hansen , Andy Lutomirski , Peter Zijlstra , Will Deacon Subject: [PATCH 04/11] x86/sme: Replace occurrences of sme_active() with prot_guest_has() Date: Tue, 27 Jul 2021 17:26:07 -0500 Message-Id: <1a5604f8fb84702f4ae0787428356d7e3e1d3a99.1627424774.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.32.0 In-Reply-To: References: X-ClientProxiedBy: SA0PR13CA0029.namprd13.prod.outlook.com (2603:10b6:806:130::34) To DM4PR12MB5229.namprd12.prod.outlook.com (2603:10b6:5:398::12) MIME-Version: 1.0 X-MS-Exchange-MessageSentRepresentingType: 1 Received: from tlendack-t1.amd.com (165.204.77.1) by SA0PR13CA0029.namprd13.prod.outlook.com (2603:10b6:806:130::34) with Microsoft SMTP Server (version=TLS1_2, cipher=TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384) id 15.20.4373.14 via Frontend Transport; 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If future support is added for other memory encryption technologies, the use of PATTR_HOST_MEM_ENCRYPT can be updated, as required, to use PATTR_SME. Cc: Thomas Gleixner Cc: Ingo Molnar Cc: Borislav Petkov Cc: Dave Hansen Cc: Andy Lutomirski Cc: Peter Zijlstra Cc: Joerg Roedel Cc: Will Deacon Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky Reviewed-by: Joerg Roedel --- arch/x86/include/asm/kexec.h | 2 +- arch/x86/include/asm/mem_encrypt.h | 2 -- arch/x86/kernel/machine_kexec_64.c | 3 ++- arch/x86/kernel/pci-swiotlb.c | 9 ++++----- arch/x86/kernel/relocate_kernel_64.S | 2 +- arch/x86/mm/ioremap.c | 6 +++--- arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c | 10 +++++----- arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_identity.c | 3 ++- arch/x86/realmode/init.c | 5 +++-- drivers/iommu/amd/init.c | 7 ++++--- 10 files changed, 25 insertions(+), 24 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/kexec.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/kexec.h index 0a6e34b07017..11b7c06e2828 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/kexec.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/kexec.h @@ -129,7 +129,7 @@ relocate_kernel(unsigned long indirection_page, unsigned long page_list, unsigned long start_address, unsigned int preserve_context, - unsigned int sme_active); + unsigned int host_mem_enc_active); #endif #define ARCH_HAS_KIMAGE_ARCH diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/mem_encrypt.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/mem_encrypt.h index a46d47662772..956338406cec 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/mem_encrypt.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/mem_encrypt.h @@ -50,7 +50,6 @@ void __init mem_encrypt_free_decrypted_mem(void); void __init mem_encrypt_init(void); void __init sev_es_init_vc_handling(void); -bool sme_active(void); bool sev_active(void); bool sev_es_active(void); bool amd_prot_guest_has(unsigned int attr); @@ -76,7 +75,6 @@ static inline void __init sme_encrypt_kernel(struct boot_params *bp) { } static inline void __init sme_enable(struct boot_params *bp) { } static inline void sev_es_init_vc_handling(void) { } -static inline bool sme_active(void) { return false; } static inline bool sev_active(void) { return false; } static inline bool sev_es_active(void) { return false; } static inline bool amd_prot_guest_has(unsigned int attr) { return false; } diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/machine_kexec_64.c b/arch/x86/kernel/machine_kexec_64.c index 131f30fdcfbd..8e7b517ad738 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/machine_kexec_64.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/machine_kexec_64.c @@ -17,6 +17,7 @@ #include #include #include +#include #include #include @@ -358,7 +359,7 @@ void machine_kexec(struct kimage *image) (unsigned long)page_list, image->start, image->preserve_context, - sme_active()); + prot_guest_has(PATTR_HOST_MEM_ENCRYPT)); #ifdef CONFIG_KEXEC_JUMP if (image->preserve_context) diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/pci-swiotlb.c b/arch/x86/kernel/pci-swiotlb.c index c2cfa5e7c152..bd9a9cfbc9a2 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/pci-swiotlb.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/pci-swiotlb.c @@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ #include #include #include -#include +#include #include #include @@ -45,11 +45,10 @@ int __init pci_swiotlb_detect_4gb(void) swiotlb = 1; /* - * If SME is active then swiotlb will be set to 1 so that bounce - * buffers are allocated and used for devices that do not support - * the addressing range required for the encryption mask. + * Set swiotlb to 1 so that bounce buffers are allocated and used for + * devices that can't support DMA to encrypted memory. */ - if (sme_active()) + if (prot_guest_has(PATTR_HOST_MEM_ENCRYPT)) swiotlb = 1; return swiotlb; diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/relocate_kernel_64.S b/arch/x86/kernel/relocate_kernel_64.S index c53271aebb64..c8fe74a28143 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/relocate_kernel_64.S +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/relocate_kernel_64.S @@ -47,7 +47,7 @@ SYM_CODE_START_NOALIGN(relocate_kernel) * %rsi page_list * %rdx start address * %rcx preserve_context - * %r8 sme_active + * %r8 host_mem_enc_active */ /* Save the CPU context, used for jumping back */ diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/ioremap.c b/arch/x86/mm/ioremap.c index 60ade7dd71bd..f899f02c0241 100644 --- a/arch/x86/mm/ioremap.c +++ b/arch/x86/mm/ioremap.c @@ -14,7 +14,7 @@ #include #include #include -#include +#include #include #include @@ -702,7 +702,7 @@ bool arch_memremap_can_ram_remap(resource_size_t phys_addr, unsigned long size, if (flags & MEMREMAP_DEC) return false; - if (sme_active()) { + if (prot_guest_has(PATTR_HOST_MEM_ENCRYPT)) { if (memremap_is_setup_data(phys_addr, size) || memremap_is_efi_data(phys_addr, size)) return false; @@ -728,7 +728,7 @@ pgprot_t __init early_memremap_pgprot_adjust(resource_size_t phys_addr, encrypted_prot = true; - if (sme_active()) { + if (prot_guest_has(PATTR_HOST_MEM_ENCRYPT)) { if (early_memremap_is_setup_data(phys_addr, size) || memremap_is_efi_data(phys_addr, size)) encrypted_prot = false; diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c b/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c index 7d3b2c6f5f88..d246a630feb9 100644 --- a/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c +++ b/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c @@ -144,7 +144,7 @@ void __init sme_unmap_bootdata(char *real_mode_data) struct boot_params *boot_data; unsigned long cmdline_paddr; - if (!sme_active()) + if (!amd_prot_guest_has(PATTR_SME)) return; /* Get the command line address before unmapping the real_mode_data */ @@ -164,7 +164,7 @@ void __init sme_map_bootdata(char *real_mode_data) struct boot_params *boot_data; unsigned long cmdline_paddr; - if (!sme_active()) + if (!amd_prot_guest_has(PATTR_SME)) return; __sme_early_map_unmap_mem(real_mode_data, sizeof(boot_params), true); @@ -378,7 +378,7 @@ bool sev_active(void) return sev_status & MSR_AMD64_SEV_ENABLED; } -bool sme_active(void) +static bool sme_active(void) { return sme_me_mask && !sev_active(); } @@ -428,7 +428,7 @@ bool force_dma_unencrypted(struct device *dev) * device does not support DMA to addresses that include the * encryption mask. */ - if (sme_active()) { + if (amd_prot_guest_has(PATTR_SME)) { u64 dma_enc_mask = DMA_BIT_MASK(__ffs64(sme_me_mask)); u64 dma_dev_mask = min_not_zero(dev->coherent_dma_mask, dev->bus_dma_limit); @@ -469,7 +469,7 @@ static void print_mem_encrypt_feature_info(void) pr_info("AMD Memory Encryption Features active:"); /* Secure Memory Encryption */ - if (sme_active()) { + if (amd_prot_guest_has(PATTR_SME)) { /* * SME is mutually exclusive with any of the SEV * features below. diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_identity.c b/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_identity.c index 470b20208430..088c8ab7dcc1 100644 --- a/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_identity.c +++ b/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_identity.c @@ -30,6 +30,7 @@ #include #include #include +#include #include #include @@ -287,7 +288,7 @@ void __init sme_encrypt_kernel(struct boot_params *bp) unsigned long pgtable_area_len; unsigned long decrypted_base; - if (!sme_active()) + if (!prot_guest_has(PATTR_SME)) return; /* diff --git a/arch/x86/realmode/init.c b/arch/x86/realmode/init.c index 6534c92d0f83..2109ae569c67 100644 --- a/arch/x86/realmode/init.c +++ b/arch/x86/realmode/init.c @@ -3,6 +3,7 @@ #include #include #include +#include #include #include @@ -44,7 +45,7 @@ void __init reserve_real_mode(void) static void sme_sev_setup_real_mode(struct trampoline_header *th) { #ifdef CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT - if (sme_active()) + if (prot_guest_has(PATTR_HOST_MEM_ENCRYPT)) th->flags |= TH_FLAGS_SME_ACTIVE; if (sev_es_active()) { @@ -81,7 +82,7 @@ static void __init setup_real_mode(void) * decrypted memory in order to bring up other processors * successfully. This is not needed for SEV. */ - if (sme_active()) + if (prot_guest_has(PATTR_HOST_MEM_ENCRYPT)) set_memory_decrypted((unsigned long)base, size >> PAGE_SHIFT); memcpy(base, real_mode_blob, size); diff --git a/drivers/iommu/amd/init.c b/drivers/iommu/amd/init.c index 46280e6e1535..05e770e3e631 100644 --- a/drivers/iommu/amd/init.c +++ b/drivers/iommu/amd/init.c @@ -20,7 +20,7 @@ #include #include #include -#include +#include #include #include #include @@ -965,7 +965,7 @@ static bool copy_device_table(void) pr_err("The address of old device table is above 4G, not trustworthy!\n"); return false; } - old_devtb = (sme_active() && is_kdump_kernel()) + old_devtb = (prot_guest_has(PATTR_HOST_MEM_ENCRYPT) && is_kdump_kernel()) ? (__force void *)ioremap_encrypted(old_devtb_phys, dev_table_size) : memremap(old_devtb_phys, dev_table_size, MEMREMAP_WB); @@ -3022,7 +3022,8 @@ static int __init amd_iommu_init(void) static bool amd_iommu_sme_check(void) { - if (!sme_active() || (boot_cpu_data.x86 != 0x17)) + if (!prot_guest_has(PATTR_HOST_MEM_ENCRYPT) || + (boot_cpu_data.x86 != 0x17)) return true; /* For Fam17h, a specific level of support is required */