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Shutemov" , Andi Kleen , tony.luck@intel.com, marcorr@google.com, sathyanarayanan.kuppuswamy@linux.intel.com, Brijesh Singh Subject: [PATCH Part1 v5 28/38] x86/compressed/64: enable SEV-SNP-validated CPUID in #VC handler Date: Fri, 20 Aug 2021 10:19:23 -0500 Message-Id: <20210820151933.22401-29-brijesh.singh@amd.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.17.1 In-Reply-To: <20210820151933.22401-1-brijesh.singh@amd.com> References: <20210820151933.22401-1-brijesh.singh@amd.com> X-ClientProxiedBy: SA9P223CA0002.NAMP223.PROD.OUTLOOK.COM (2603:10b6:806:26::7) To SN6PR12MB2718.namprd12.prod.outlook.com (2603:10b6:805:6f::22) MIME-Version: 1.0 X-MS-Exchange-MessageSentRepresentingType: 1 Received: from sbrijesh-desktop.amd.com (165.204.77.1) by SA9P223CA0002.NAMP223.PROD.OUTLOOK.COM (2603:10b6:806:26::7) with Microsoft SMTP Server (version=TLS1_2, cipher=TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384) id 15.20.4436.19 via Frontend Transport; Fri, 20 Aug 2021 15:21:22 +0000 X-MS-PublicTrafficType: Email X-MS-Office365-Filtering-Correlation-Id: b7e71279-31da-494b-464a-08d963ee2bb7 X-MS-TrafficTypeDiagnostic: SN6PR12MB2638: X-MS-Exchange-Transport-Forked: True X-Microsoft-Antispam-PRVS: X-MS-Oob-TLC-OOBClassifiers: OLM:1332; X-MS-Exchange-SenderADCheck: 1 X-MS-Exchange-AntiSpam-Relay: 0 X-Microsoft-Antispam: BCL:0; X-Microsoft-Antispam-Message-Info: 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 X-Forefront-Antispam-Report: CIP:255.255.255.255; CTRY:; LANG:en; SCL:1; SRV:; IPV:NLI; SFV:NSPM; H:SN6PR12MB2718.namprd12.prod.outlook.com; PTR:; CAT:NONE; SFS:(4636009)(136003)(396003)(39860400002)(346002)(376002)(366004)(8676002)(8936002)(86362001)(83380400001)(30864003)(316002)(54906003)(1076003)(15650500001)(478600001)(2616005)(44832011)(2906002)(4326008)(7406005)(956004)(66556008)(7416002)(66476007)(186003)(66946007)(26005)(5660300002)(36756003)(7696005)(52116002)(38100700002)(6486002)(38350700002); DIR:OUT; SFP:1101; X-MS-Exchange-AntiSpam-MessageData-ChunkCount: 1 X-MS-Exchange-AntiSpam-MessageData-0: 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 X-OriginatorOrg: amd.com X-MS-Exchange-CrossTenant-Network-Message-Id: b7e71279-31da-494b-464a-08d963ee2bb7 X-MS-Exchange-CrossTenant-AuthSource: SN6PR12MB2718.namprd12.prod.outlook.com X-MS-Exchange-CrossTenant-AuthAs: Internal X-MS-Exchange-CrossTenant-OriginalArrivalTime: 20 Aug 2021 15:21:23.8522 (UTC) X-MS-Exchange-CrossTenant-FromEntityHeader: Hosted X-MS-Exchange-CrossTenant-Id: 3dd8961f-e488-4e60-8e11-a82d994e183d X-MS-Exchange-CrossTenant-MailboxType: HOSTED X-MS-Exchange-CrossTenant-UserPrincipalName: 3/77zIO8alTG4vWRQradJgNPimUSESyc/zSRW3fs/sQ9aAgJcP2upozjVYrFmgLiBCoD4w0PSv2qnPgCoGKofg== X-MS-Exchange-Transport-CrossTenantHeadersStamped: SN6PR12MB2638 Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org From: Michael Roth CPUID instructions generate a #VC exception for SEV-ES/SEV-SNP guests, for which early handlers are currently set up to handle. In the case of SEV-SNP, guests can use a special location in guest memory address space that has been pre-populated with firmware-validated CPUID information to look up the relevant CPUID values rather than requesting them from hypervisor via a VMGEXIT. Determine the location of the CPUID memory address in advance of any CPUID instructions/exceptions and, when available, use it to handle the CPUID lookup. Signed-off-by: Michael Roth Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh --- arch/x86/boot/compressed/efi.c | 1 + arch/x86/boot/compressed/head_64.S | 1 + arch/x86/boot/compressed/idt_64.c | 7 +- arch/x86/boot/compressed/misc.h | 1 + arch/x86/boot/compressed/sev.c | 3 + arch/x86/include/asm/sev-common.h | 2 + arch/x86/include/asm/sev.h | 3 + arch/x86/kernel/sev-shared.c | 374 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ arch/x86/kernel/sev.c | 4 + 9 files changed, 394 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/efi.c b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/efi.c index 16ff5cb9a1fb..a1529a230ea7 100644 --- a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/efi.c +++ b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/efi.c @@ -176,3 +176,4 @@ efi_get_conf_table(struct boot_params *boot_params, return 0; } + diff --git a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/head_64.S b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/head_64.S index a2347ded77ea..1c1658693fc9 100644 --- a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/head_64.S +++ b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/head_64.S @@ -441,6 +441,7 @@ SYM_CODE_START(startup_64) .Lon_kernel_cs: pushq %rsi + movq %rsi, %rdi /* real mode address */ call load_stage1_idt popq %rsi diff --git a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/idt_64.c b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/idt_64.c index 9b93567d663a..1f6511a6625d 100644 --- a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/idt_64.c +++ b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/idt_64.c @@ -3,6 +3,7 @@ #include #include #include "misc.h" +#include static void set_idt_entry(int vector, void (*handler)(void)) { @@ -28,13 +29,15 @@ static void load_boot_idt(const struct desc_ptr *dtr) } /* Setup IDT before kernel jumping to .Lrelocated */ -void load_stage1_idt(void) +void load_stage1_idt(void *rmode) { boot_idt_desc.address = (unsigned long)boot_idt; - if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT)) + if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT)) { + sev_snp_cpuid_init(rmode); set_idt_entry(X86_TRAP_VC, boot_stage1_vc); + } load_boot_idt(&boot_idt_desc); } diff --git a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/misc.h b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/misc.h index 16b092fd7aa1..cdd328aa42c2 100644 --- a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/misc.h +++ b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/misc.h @@ -190,6 +190,7 @@ int efi_get_conf_table(struct boot_params *boot_params, unsigned long *conf_table_pa, unsigned int *conf_table_len, bool *is_efi_64); + #else static inline int efi_find_vendor_table(unsigned long conf_table_pa, unsigned int conf_table_len, diff --git a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/sev.c b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/sev.c index 6e8d97c280aa..910bf5cf010e 100644 --- a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/sev.c +++ b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/sev.c @@ -20,6 +20,9 @@ #include #include #include +#include +#include +#include #include "error.h" diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/sev-common.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/sev-common.h index 072540dfb129..5f134c172dbf 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/sev-common.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/sev-common.h @@ -148,6 +148,8 @@ struct snp_psc_desc { #define GHCB_TERM_PSC 1 /* Page State Change failure */ #define GHCB_TERM_PVALIDATE 2 /* Pvalidate failure */ #define GHCB_TERM_NOT_VMPL0 3 /* SNP guest is not running at VMPL-0 */ +#define GHCB_TERM_CPUID 4 /* CPUID-validation failure */ +#define GHCB_TERM_CPUID_HV 5 /* CPUID failure during hypervisor fallback */ #define GHCB_RESP_CODE(v) ((v) & GHCB_MSR_INFO_MASK) diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/sev.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/sev.h index 534fa1c4c881..c73931548346 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/sev.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/sev.h @@ -11,6 +11,7 @@ #include #include #include +#include #define GHCB_PROTOCOL_MIN 1ULL #define GHCB_PROTOCOL_MAX 2ULL @@ -126,6 +127,7 @@ void __init snp_prep_memory(unsigned long paddr, unsigned int sz, enum psc_op op void snp_set_memory_shared(unsigned long vaddr, unsigned int npages); void snp_set_memory_private(unsigned long vaddr, unsigned int npages); void snp_set_wakeup_secondary_cpu(void); +void sev_snp_cpuid_init(struct boot_params *bp); #else static inline void sev_es_ist_enter(struct pt_regs *regs) { } static inline void sev_es_ist_exit(void) { } @@ -141,6 +143,7 @@ static inline void __init snp_prep_memory(unsigned long paddr, unsigned int sz, static inline void snp_set_memory_shared(unsigned long vaddr, unsigned int npages) { } static inline void snp_set_memory_private(unsigned long vaddr, unsigned int npages) { } static inline void snp_set_wakeup_secondary_cpu(void) { } +static inline void sev_snp_cpuid_init(struct boot_params *bp) { } #endif #endif diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/sev-shared.c b/arch/x86/kernel/sev-shared.c index ae4556925485..651980ddbd65 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/sev-shared.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/sev-shared.c @@ -14,6 +14,25 @@ #define has_cpuflag(f) boot_cpu_has(f) #endif +struct sev_snp_cpuid_fn { + u32 eax_in; + u32 ecx_in; + u64 unused; + u64 unused2; + u32 eax; + u32 ebx; + u32 ecx; + u32 edx; + u64 reserved; +} __packed; + +struct sev_snp_cpuid_info { + u32 count; + u32 reserved1; + u64 reserved2; + struct sev_snp_cpuid_fn fn[0]; +} __packed; + /* * Since feature negotiation related variables are set early in the boot * process they must reside in the .data section so as not to be zeroed @@ -26,6 +45,15 @@ static u16 __ro_after_init ghcb_version; /* Bitmap of SEV features supported by the hypervisor */ u64 __ro_after_init sev_hv_features = 0; +/* + * These are also stored in .data section to avoid the need to re-parse + * boot_params and re-determine CPUID memory range when .bss is cleared. + */ +static int sev_snp_cpuid_enabled __section(".data"); +static unsigned long sev_snp_cpuid_pa __section(".data"); +static unsigned long sev_snp_cpuid_sz __section(".data"); +static const struct sev_snp_cpuid_info *cpuid_info __section(".data"); + static bool __init sev_es_check_cpu_features(void) { if (!has_cpuflag(X86_FEATURE_RDRAND)) { @@ -236,6 +264,219 @@ static int sev_cpuid_hv(u32 func, u32 subfunc, u32 *eax, u32 *ebx, return 0; } +static bool sev_snp_cpuid_active(void) +{ + return sev_snp_cpuid_enabled; +} + +static int sev_snp_cpuid_xsave_size(u64 xfeatures_en, u32 base_size, + u32 *xsave_size, bool compacted) +{ + u64 xfeatures_found = 0; + int i; + + *xsave_size = base_size; + + for (i = 0; i < cpuid_info->count; i++) { + const struct sev_snp_cpuid_fn *fn = &cpuid_info->fn[i]; + + if (!(fn->eax_in == 0xd && fn->ecx_in > 1 && fn->ecx_in < 64)) + continue; + if (!(xfeatures_en & (1UL << fn->ecx_in))) + continue; + if (xfeatures_found & (1UL << fn->ecx_in)) + continue; + + xfeatures_found |= (1UL << fn->ecx_in); + if (compacted) + *xsave_size += fn->eax; + else + *xsave_size = max(*xsave_size, fn->eax + fn->ebx); + } + + /* + * Either the guest set unsupported XCR0/XSS bits, or the corresponding + * entries in the CPUID table were not present. This is not a valid + * state to be in. + */ + if (xfeatures_found != (xfeatures_en & ~3ULL)) + return -EINVAL; + + return 0; +} + +static void sev_snp_cpuid_hv(u32 func, u32 subfunc, u32 *eax, u32 *ebx, + u32 *ecx, u32 *edx) +{ + /* + * Currently MSR protocol is sufficient to handle fallback cases, but + * should that change make sure we terminate rather than grabbing random + * values. Handling can be added in future to use GHCB-page protocol for + * cases that occur late enough in boot that GHCB page is available + */ + if (cpuid_function_is_indexed(func) && subfunc != 0) + sev_es_terminate(1, GHCB_TERM_CPUID_HV); + + if (sev_cpuid_hv(func, 0, eax, ebx, ecx, edx)) + sev_es_terminate(1, GHCB_TERM_CPUID_HV); +} + +static bool sev_snp_cpuid_find(u32 func, u32 subfunc, u32 *eax, u32 *ebx, + u32 *ecx, u32 *edx) +{ + int i; + bool found = false; + + for (i = 0; i < cpuid_info->count; i++) { + const struct sev_snp_cpuid_fn *fn = &cpuid_info->fn[i]; + + if (fn->eax_in != func) + continue; + + if (cpuid_function_is_indexed(func) && fn->ecx_in != subfunc) + continue; + + *eax = fn->eax; + *ebx = fn->ebx; + *ecx = fn->ecx; + *edx = fn->edx; + found = true; + + break; + } + + return found; +} + +static bool sev_snp_cpuid_in_range(u32 func) +{ + int i; + u32 std_range_min = 0; + u32 std_range_max = 0; + u32 hyp_range_min = 0x40000000; + u32 hyp_range_max = 0; + u32 ext_range_min = 0x80000000; + u32 ext_range_max = 0; + + for (i = 0; i < cpuid_info->count; i++) { + const struct sev_snp_cpuid_fn *fn = &cpuid_info->fn[i]; + + if (fn->eax_in == std_range_min) + std_range_max = fn->eax; + else if (fn->eax_in == hyp_range_min) + hyp_range_max = fn->eax; + else if (fn->eax_in == ext_range_min) + ext_range_max = fn->eax; + } + + if ((func >= std_range_min && func <= std_range_max) || + (func >= hyp_range_min && func <= hyp_range_max) || + (func >= ext_range_min && func <= ext_range_max)) + return true; + + return false; +} + +/* + * Returns -EOPNOTSUPP if feature not enabled. Any other return value should be + * treated as fatal by caller since we cannot fall back to hypervisor to fetch + * the values for security reasons (outside of the specific cases handled here) + */ +static int sev_snp_cpuid(u32 func, u32 subfunc, u32 *eax, u32 *ebx, u32 *ecx, + u32 *edx) +{ + if (!sev_snp_cpuid_active()) + return -EOPNOTSUPP; + + if (!cpuid_info) + return -EIO; + + if (!sev_snp_cpuid_find(func, subfunc, eax, ebx, ecx, edx)) { + /* + * Some hypervisors will avoid keeping track of CPUID entries + * where all values are zero, since they can be handled the + * same as out-of-range values (all-zero). In our case, we want + * to be able to distinguish between out-of-range entries and + * in-range zero entries, since the CPUID table entries are + * only a template that may need to be augmented with + * additional values for things like CPU-specific information. + * So if it's not in the table, but is still in the valid + * range, proceed with the fix-ups below. Otherwise, just return + * zeros. + */ + *eax = *ebx = *ecx = *edx = 0; + if (!sev_snp_cpuid_in_range(func)) + goto out; + } + + if (func == 0x1) { + u32 ebx2, edx2; + + sev_snp_cpuid_hv(func, subfunc, NULL, &ebx2, NULL, &edx2); + /* initial APIC ID */ + *ebx = (*ebx & 0x00FFFFFF) | (ebx2 & 0xFF000000); + /* APIC enabled bit */ + *edx = (*edx & ~BIT_ULL(9)) | (edx2 & BIT_ULL(9)); + + /* OSXSAVE enabled bit */ + if (native_read_cr4() & X86_CR4_OSXSAVE) + *ecx |= BIT_ULL(27); + } else if (func == 0x7) { + /* OSPKE enabled bit */ + *ecx &= ~BIT_ULL(4); + if (native_read_cr4() & X86_CR4_PKE) + *ecx |= BIT_ULL(4); + } else if (func == 0xB) { + /* extended APIC ID */ + sev_snp_cpuid_hv(func, 0, NULL, NULL, NULL, edx); + } else if (func == 0xd && (subfunc == 0x0 || subfunc == 0x1)) { + bool compacted = false; + u64 xcr0 = 1, xss = 0; + u32 xsave_size; + + if (native_read_cr4() & X86_CR4_OSXSAVE) + xcr0 = xgetbv(XCR_XFEATURE_ENABLED_MASK); + if (subfunc == 1) { + /* boot/compressed doesn't set XSS so 0 is fine there */ +#ifndef __BOOT_COMPRESSED + if (*eax & 0x8) /* XSAVES */ + if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_XSAVES)) + rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_XSS, xss); +#endif + /* + * The PPR and APM aren't clear on what size should be + * encoded in 0xD:0x1:EBX when compaction is not enabled + * by either XSAVEC or XSAVES since SNP-capable hardware + * has the entries fixed as 1. KVM sets it to 0 in this + * case, but to avoid this becoming an issue it's safer + * to simply treat this as unsupported or SNP guests. + */ + if (!(*eax & 0xA)) /* (XSAVEC|XSAVES) */ + return -EINVAL; + + compacted = true; + } + + if (sev_snp_cpuid_xsave_size(xcr0 | xss, *ebx, &xsave_size, + compacted)) + return -EINVAL; + + *ebx = xsave_size; + } else if (func == 0x8000001E) { + u32 ebx2, ecx2; + + /* extended APIC ID */ + sev_snp_cpuid_hv(func, subfunc, eax, &ebx2, &ecx2, NULL); + /* compute ID */ + *ebx = (*ebx & 0xFFFFFFF00) | (ebx2 & 0x000000FF); + /* node ID */ + *ecx = (*ecx & 0xFFFFFFF00) | (ecx2 & 0x000000FF); + } + +out: + return 0; +} + /* * Boot VC Handler - This is the first VC handler during boot, there is no GHCB * page yet, so it only supports the MSR based communication with the @@ -244,15 +485,25 @@ static int sev_cpuid_hv(u32 func, u32 subfunc, u32 *eax, u32 *ebx, void __init do_vc_no_ghcb(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long exit_code) { unsigned int fn = lower_bits(regs->ax, 32); + unsigned int subfn = lower_bits(regs->cx, 32); u32 eax, ebx, ecx, edx; + int ret; /* Only CPUID is supported via MSR protocol */ if (exit_code != SVM_EXIT_CPUID) goto fail; + ret = sev_snp_cpuid(fn, subfn, &eax, &ebx, &ecx, &edx); + if (ret == 0) + goto out; + + if (ret != -EOPNOTSUPP) + goto fail; + if (sev_cpuid_hv(fn, 0, &eax, &ebx, &ecx, &edx)) goto fail; +out: regs->ax = eax; regs->bx = ebx; regs->cx = ecx; @@ -552,6 +803,19 @@ static enum es_result vc_handle_cpuid(struct ghcb *ghcb, struct pt_regs *regs = ctxt->regs; u32 cr4 = native_read_cr4(); enum es_result ret; + u32 eax, ebx, ecx, edx; + int cpuid_ret; + + cpuid_ret = sev_snp_cpuid(regs->ax, regs->cx, &eax, &ebx, &ecx, &edx); + if (cpuid_ret == 0) { + regs->ax = eax; + regs->bx = ebx; + regs->cx = ecx; + regs->dx = edx; + return ES_OK; + } + if (cpuid_ret != -EOPNOTSUPP) + return ES_VMM_ERROR; ghcb_set_rax(ghcb, regs->ax); ghcb_set_rcx(ghcb, regs->cx); @@ -603,3 +867,113 @@ static enum es_result vc_handle_rdtsc(struct ghcb *ghcb, return ES_OK; } + +#ifdef BOOT_COMPRESSED +static struct setup_data *get_cc_setup_data(struct boot_params *bp) +{ + struct setup_data *hdr = (struct setup_data *)bp->hdr.setup_data; + + while (hdr) { + if (hdr->type == SETUP_CC_BLOB) + return hdr; + hdr = (struct setup_data *)hdr->next; + } + + return NULL; +} + +/* + * For boot/compressed kernel: + * + * 1) Search for CC blob in the following order/precedence: + * - via linux boot protocol / setup_data entry + * - via EFI configuration table + * 2) Return a pointer to the CC blob, NULL otherwise. + */ +static struct cc_blob_sev_info *sev_snp_probe_cc_blob(struct boot_params *bp) +{ + struct cc_blob_sev_info *cc_info = NULL; + struct setup_data_cc { + struct setup_data header; + u32 cc_blob_address; + } *sd; + unsigned long conf_table_pa; + unsigned int conf_table_len; + bool efi_64; + + /* Try to get CC blob via setup_data */ + sd = (struct setup_data_cc *)get_cc_setup_data(bp); + if (sd) { + cc_info = (struct cc_blob_sev_info *)(unsigned long)sd->cc_blob_address; + goto out_verify; + } + + /* CC blob isn't in setup_data, see if it's in the EFI config table */ + if (!efi_get_conf_table(bp, &conf_table_pa, &conf_table_len, &efi_64)) + (void)efi_find_vendor_table(conf_table_pa, conf_table_len, + EFI_CC_BLOB_GUID, efi_64, + (unsigned long *)&cc_info); + +out_verify: + /* CC blob should be either valid or not present. Fail otherwise. */ + if (cc_info && cc_info->magic != CC_BLOB_SEV_HDR_MAGIC) + sev_es_terminate(1, GHCB_SNP_UNSUPPORTED); + + return cc_info; +} +#else +/* + * Probing for CC blob for run-time kernel will be enabled in a subsequent + * patch. For now we need to stub this out. + */ +static struct cc_blob_sev_info *sev_snp_probe_cc_blob(struct boot_params *bp) +{ + return NULL; +} +#endif + +/* + * Initial set up of CPUID table when running identity-mapped. + * + * NOTE: Since SEV_SNP feature partly relies on CPUID checks that can't + * happen until we access CPUID page, we skip the check and hope the + * bootloader is providing sane values. Current code relies on all CPUID + * page lookups originating from #VC handler, which at least provides + * indication that SEV-ES is enabled. Subsequent init levels will check for + * SEV_SNP feature once available to also take SEV MSR value into account. + */ +void sev_snp_cpuid_init(struct boot_params *bp) +{ + struct cc_blob_sev_info *cc_info; + + if (!bp) + sev_es_terminate(1, GHCB_TERM_CPUID); + + cc_info = sev_snp_probe_cc_blob(bp); + + if (!cc_info) + return; + + sev_snp_cpuid_pa = cc_info->cpuid_phys; + sev_snp_cpuid_sz = cc_info->cpuid_len; + + /* + * These should always be valid values for SNP, even if guest isn't + * actually configured to use the CPUID table. + */ + if (!sev_snp_cpuid_pa || sev_snp_cpuid_sz < PAGE_SIZE) + sev_es_terminate(1, GHCB_TERM_CPUID); + + cpuid_info = (const struct sev_snp_cpuid_info *)sev_snp_cpuid_pa; + + /* + * We should be able to trust the 'count' value in the CPUID table + * area, but ensure it agrees with CC blob value to be safe. + */ + if (sev_snp_cpuid_sz < (sizeof(struct sev_snp_cpuid_info) + + sizeof(struct sev_snp_cpuid_fn) * + cpuid_info->count)) + sev_es_terminate(1, GHCB_TERM_CPUID); + + sev_snp_cpuid_enabled = 1; +} diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/sev.c b/arch/x86/kernel/sev.c index ddf8ced4a879..d7b6f7420551 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/sev.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/sev.c @@ -19,6 +19,8 @@ #include #include #include +#include +#include #include #include @@ -32,6 +34,8 @@ #include #include #include +#include +#include #include "sev-internal.h"