From patchwork Tue Nov 14 20:05:54 2023 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Mark Brown X-Patchwork-Id: 743898 Received: from smtp.kernel.org (aws-us-west-2-korg-mail-1.web.codeaurora.org [10.30.226.201]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by smtp.subspace.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id DDFE635EE7; Tue, 14 Nov 2023 20:06:23 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=kernel.org header.i=@kernel.org header.b="dAMoMn4n" Received: by smtp.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 83A1EC433CA; Tue, 14 Nov 2023 20:06:17 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=kernel.org; s=k20201202; t=1699992383; bh=lxd13UVpNwg8UFzzUvQutHFWJR+9mMSrYBkm92AXfbg=; h=From:Date:Subject:References:In-Reply-To:To:Cc:From; b=dAMoMn4nNDlizf2/5z9VG8WyGtBPtE6lm9Abat7J8MCuT7mYLcNqy+5PWwFXhN3Cn ahAQfAKNrKm5TsjIWPt3gYWO45IuogBzP7Ym4g9AIOz6V7OOvgAaBf5o1eCdmp32zs EWhnikRE5T3P4zZmSzb+Swd91p4M6EJUH4oX4gHKfDmo9eo6fmX4tCPW4To3c5p1WN EOyWpwDOQt+8dMYMaP2VxYSlGvGUk/PUc/2Ojup99XCsww/AP8uCSMT//OFXnw19xm AFByJVckql0Abr2C86rW5OBvrMEmnMCxmymjLXFJe6JXc0XPf02LhD8NVmoi1IlWmO Q+fgsK5R52yIQ== From: Mark Brown Date: Tue, 14 Nov 2023 20:05:54 +0000 Subject: [PATCH RFC RFT v2 1/5] mm: Introduce ARCH_HAS_USER_SHADOW_STACK Precedence: bulk X-Mailing-List: linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org List-Id: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: MIME-Version: 1.0 Message-Id: <20231114-clone3-shadow-stack-v2-1-b613f8681155@kernel.org> References: <20231114-clone3-shadow-stack-v2-0-b613f8681155@kernel.org> In-Reply-To: <20231114-clone3-shadow-stack-v2-0-b613f8681155@kernel.org> To: "Rick P. Edgecombe" , Deepak Gupta , Szabolcs Nagy , "H.J. Lu" , Florian Weimer , Thomas Gleixner , Ingo Molnar , Borislav Petkov , Dave Hansen , x86@kernel.org, "H. Peter Anvin" , Peter Zijlstra , Juri Lelli , Vincent Guittot , Dietmar Eggemann , Steven Rostedt , Ben Segall , Mel Gorman , Daniel Bristot de Oliveira , Valentin Schneider , Christian Brauner , Shuah Khan Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, Catalin Marinas , Will Deacon , Kees Cook , jannh@google.com, bsegall@google.com, linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org, linux-api@vger.kernel.org, Mark Brown , David Hildenbrand X-Mailer: b4 0.13-dev-0438c X-Developer-Signature: v=1; a=openpgp-sha256; l=2302; i=broonie@kernel.org; h=from:subject:message-id; bh=lxd13UVpNwg8UFzzUvQutHFWJR+9mMSrYBkm92AXfbg=; b=owEBbQGS/pANAwAKASTWi3JdVIfQAcsmYgBlU9MtYr4nXcSuu//z+nY9j0Y0mgC9AkOYwlDq5caW zt8MhVuJATMEAAEKAB0WIQSt5miqZ1cYtZ/in+ok1otyXVSH0AUCZVPTLQAKCRAk1otyXVSH0Aj8B/ 9la80H2PcjfOgN4C5wr529/loi/SZ84kdt4QTtOSvLd0X53U2CTQjQ4ZMpe8YL0gDJUIH5ccPxGSpW 15Vih60XT79JDpTwH4t2ba0uaUbllDr7eKm6xpS54oW1PTQA+/p7MhJPk27S0A3c6kNfbgFkwEjG14 8+Ol0aF8Dq11mH5Tbe9FuAEC5oyoW7sFz/XCZRFBLMI1AXqiHhVRGRaFHb7o02dLvclx1djz0/1N+1 u5QI35aEncQdw1Uly9SYNODV3yxxabFLuM2K76XGfELwUs3Jtjcv0Nmpp5yPj+bKihx/ppD6C0ElIr cCjUSwb35ozMMV089NLdvJA5S0iap3 X-Developer-Key: i=broonie@kernel.org; a=openpgp; fpr=3F2568AAC26998F9E813A1C5C3F436CA30F5D8EB Since multiple architectures have support for shadow stacks and we need to select support for this feature in several places in the generic code provide a generic config option that the architectures can select. Suggested-by: David Hildenbrand Signed-off-by: Mark Brown Acked-by: David Hildenbrand --- arch/x86/Kconfig | 1 + fs/proc/task_mmu.c | 2 +- include/linux/mm.h | 2 +- mm/Kconfig | 6 ++++++ 4 files changed, 9 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/x86/Kconfig b/arch/x86/Kconfig index 3762f41bb092..14b7703a9a2b 100644 --- a/arch/x86/Kconfig +++ b/arch/x86/Kconfig @@ -1952,6 +1952,7 @@ config X86_USER_SHADOW_STACK depends on AS_WRUSS depends on X86_64 select ARCH_USES_HIGH_VMA_FLAGS + select ARCH_HAS_USER_SHADOW_STACK select X86_CET help Shadow stack protection is a hardware feature that detects function diff --git a/fs/proc/task_mmu.c b/fs/proc/task_mmu.c index ef2eb12906da..f0a904aeee8e 100644 --- a/fs/proc/task_mmu.c +++ b/fs/proc/task_mmu.c @@ -699,7 +699,7 @@ static void show_smap_vma_flags(struct seq_file *m, struct vm_area_struct *vma) #ifdef CONFIG_HAVE_ARCH_USERFAULTFD_MINOR [ilog2(VM_UFFD_MINOR)] = "ui", #endif /* CONFIG_HAVE_ARCH_USERFAULTFD_MINOR */ -#ifdef CONFIG_X86_USER_SHADOW_STACK +#ifdef CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_USER_SHADOW_STACK [ilog2(VM_SHADOW_STACK)] = "ss", #endif }; diff --git a/include/linux/mm.h b/include/linux/mm.h index 418d26608ece..10462f354614 100644 --- a/include/linux/mm.h +++ b/include/linux/mm.h @@ -341,7 +341,7 @@ extern unsigned int kobjsize(const void *objp); #endif #endif /* CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_PKEYS */ -#ifdef CONFIG_X86_USER_SHADOW_STACK +#ifdef CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_USER_SHADOW_STACK /* * VM_SHADOW_STACK should not be set with VM_SHARED because of lack of * support core mm. diff --git a/mm/Kconfig b/mm/Kconfig index 89971a894b60..b8638da636e1 100644 --- a/mm/Kconfig +++ b/mm/Kconfig @@ -1270,6 +1270,12 @@ config LOCK_MM_AND_FIND_VMA bool depends on !STACK_GROWSUP +config ARCH_HAS_USER_SHADOW_STACK + bool + help + The architecture has hardware support for userspace shadow call + stacks (eg, x86 CET, arm64 GCS, RISC-V Zisslpcfi). + source "mm/damon/Kconfig" endmenu