From patchwork Sat Oct 5 10:31:29 2024 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Mark Brown X-Patchwork-Id: 833271 Received: from smtp.kernel.org (aws-us-west-2-korg-mail-1.web.codeaurora.org [10.30.226.201]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by smtp.subspace.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id BE40913A250; Sat, 5 Oct 2024 10:32:52 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; arc=none smtp.client-ip=10.30.226.201 ARC-Seal: i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1728124372; cv=none; b=UZ82oGOGrSIu352RhBB8eSK6FaDUrD4FGbo3MxgT5AQ4HADuWZRrqdphrntiXx76yU3ULQc6i2P5wMRkjKu06mEr4rvPDhDhnwY9gFoJIc7HNoziBlgJyIiugLqj7mt4yV2868yFf3C7qdDSil8N/WHnxg3J12d+jHITvHgZHIk= ARC-Message-Signature: i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1728124372; c=relaxed/simple; bh=tec4v7YIW6lSCaG+Grv8LNbscxtN/Lm0HS7zRkM5EGk=; h=From:Date:Subject:MIME-Version:Content-Type:Message-Id:References: In-Reply-To:To:Cc; b=uHMYvsG0Y0p3lsalP67YPQlycFSEBoUa2+3jsjQzaQ7s72TM6bNZWGSIPsDy5J8X45M54u4m8Qv8PMTmIEufZ93QdHFJ5p6ev3LGB2+1IFa531VcAUTDR1i6pDRLgLbMqXqZVWvx7Wad0UywuDIIToo4Ns5Y/xUU4fAbCj5UqK4= ARC-Authentication-Results: i=1; smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=kernel.org header.i=@kernel.org header.b=AxVRdiJH; arc=none smtp.client-ip=10.30.226.201 Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=kernel.org header.i=@kernel.org header.b="AxVRdiJH" Received: by smtp.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 67A34C4CECF; Sat, 5 Oct 2024 10:32:46 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=kernel.org; s=k20201202; t=1728124372; bh=tec4v7YIW6lSCaG+Grv8LNbscxtN/Lm0HS7zRkM5EGk=; h=From:Date:Subject:References:In-Reply-To:To:Cc:From; b=AxVRdiJHniLUMm9xJo6RstC2rz4Q7adj3zUc4DaLQuJJwft0JcshjJVatI5Wu756e 9uSdA+XwGZwdYnYHN+KxN0Q0iSdI8WfS1fRKPPuyxz3+kO4O2zR5TOTBha14/itWaa gskoLSZz01XK4DA5iN6cwdpwVv8XvtpJ/iZs+hEyzCdEk9eCjNeeWAMCny8I+3ZgGt st8az0NKEd+TpxcdCP6omqozrzk9QKyVTw2ga+zEIwi0X/j5WX4M8OXieDF5A6BsW1 vCIdXSZ7ba2G+r5Q6zZ46zYGk+94kVAA0RmbOSibw666z6eyakzWx1pVI+lxeT2D1D 6D8AlCbPHs/HA== From: Mark Brown Date: Sat, 05 Oct 2024 11:31:29 +0100 Subject: [PATCH RFT v11 2/8] Documentation: userspace-api: Add shadow stack API documentation Precedence: bulk X-Mailing-List: linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org List-Id: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: MIME-Version: 1.0 Message-Id: <20241005-clone3-shadow-stack-v11-2-2a6a2bd6d651@kernel.org> References: <20241005-clone3-shadow-stack-v11-0-2a6a2bd6d651@kernel.org> In-Reply-To: <20241005-clone3-shadow-stack-v11-0-2a6a2bd6d651@kernel.org> To: "Rick P. Edgecombe" , Deepak Gupta , Szabolcs Nagy , "H.J. Lu" , Florian Weimer , Thomas Gleixner , Ingo Molnar , Borislav Petkov , Dave Hansen , x86@kernel.org, "H. Peter Anvin" , Peter Zijlstra , Juri Lelli , Vincent Guittot , Dietmar Eggemann , Steven Rostedt , Ben Segall , Mel Gorman , Valentin Schneider , Christian Brauner , Shuah Khan Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, Catalin Marinas , Will Deacon , jannh@google.com, bsegall@google.com, Yury Khrustalev , Wilco Dijkstra , linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org, linux-api@vger.kernel.org, Mark Brown , Kees Cook , Kees Cook , Shuah Khan X-Mailer: b4 0.15-dev-9b746 X-Developer-Signature: v=1; a=openpgp-sha256; l=3137; i=broonie@kernel.org; h=from:subject:message-id; bh=tec4v7YIW6lSCaG+Grv8LNbscxtN/Lm0HS7zRkM5EGk=; b=owEBbQGS/pANAwAKASTWi3JdVIfQAcsmYgBnARW8SkYUT0D/Hh1aLXz4STfUnladQ+MlUroGKZIR 78H1KVOJATMEAAEKAB0WIQSt5miqZ1cYtZ/in+ok1otyXVSH0AUCZwEVvAAKCRAk1otyXVSH0IfAB/ 9dmXLrxIwAFg60Ni/ida60svBBatUI0FLf34hoHpyMsqfiA2XNe2kLSAMJ5AR16AtHKT5m8zceCdOr WC0de3ohrka+wdCUPKPpL3SSsVeBeipUDAJIWnGO7wwF7UJxlUkZVsb4u0v0QLkYT+92XuMv9SXYFc CV3NWrqEpCZzddjqvGOOqNTlwtx6TjAUXs/q+W7DcJrobFKU0QBqnqsWpkXsHNUgrzAoHbqRHiEHBr nwRZTXlWldf0Cc8SmV3cDfjKnikzK7TbeQbyrdZu8Ty8qvt9QNs/tG9CV41zbetenWY5eqv30bWqN2 uqbvyZ2heC7V3q5GUYjN/LnObt7zJv X-Developer-Key: i=broonie@kernel.org; a=openpgp; fpr=3F2568AAC26998F9E813A1C5C3F436CA30F5D8EB There are a number of architectures with shadow stack features which we are presenting to userspace with as consistent an API as we can (though there are some architecture specifics). Especially given that there are some important considerations for userspace code interacting directly with the feature let's provide some documentation covering the common aspects. Reviewed-by: Catalin Marinas Reviewed-by: Kees Cook Tested-by: Kees Cook Acked-by: Shuah Khan Signed-off-by: Mark Brown --- Documentation/userspace-api/index.rst | 1 + Documentation/userspace-api/shadow_stack.rst | 41 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 42 insertions(+) diff --git a/Documentation/userspace-api/index.rst b/Documentation/userspace-api/index.rst index 274cc7546efc2a042d2dc00aa67c71c52372179a..c39709bfba2c5682d0d1a22444db17c17bcf01ce 100644 --- a/Documentation/userspace-api/index.rst +++ b/Documentation/userspace-api/index.rst @@ -59,6 +59,7 @@ Everything else ELF netlink/index + shadow_stack sysfs-platform_profile vduse futex2 diff --git a/Documentation/userspace-api/shadow_stack.rst b/Documentation/userspace-api/shadow_stack.rst new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..c576ad3d7ec12f0f75bffa4e2bafd0c9d7230c9f --- /dev/null +++ b/Documentation/userspace-api/shadow_stack.rst @@ -0,0 +1,41 @@ +============= +Shadow Stacks +============= + +Introduction +============ + +Several architectures have features which provide backward edge +control flow protection through a hardware maintained stack, only +writeable by userspace through very limited operations. This feature +is referred to as shadow stacks on Linux, on x86 it is part of Intel +Control Enforcement Technology (CET), on arm64 it is Guarded Control +Stacks feature (FEAT_GCS) and for RISC-V it is the Zicfiss extension. +It is expected that this feature will normally be managed by the +system dynamic linker and libc in ways broadly transparent to +application code, this document covers interfaces and considerations. + + +Enabling +======== + +Shadow stacks default to disabled when a userspace process is +executed, they can be enabled for the current thread with a syscall: + + - For x86 the ARCH_SHSTK_ENABLE arch_prctl() + +It is expected that this will normally be done by the dynamic linker. +Any new threads created by a thread with shadow stacks enabled will +themselves have shadow stacks enabled. + + +Enablement considerations +========================= + +- Returning from the function that enables shadow stacks without first + disabling them will cause a shadow stack exception. This includes + any syscall wrapper or other library functions, the syscall will need + to be inlined. +- A lock feature allows userspace to prevent disabling of shadow stacks. +- Those that change the stack context like longjmp() or use of ucontext + changes on signal return will need support from libc.