From patchwork Thu Apr 16 13:23:38 2020 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Greg Kroah-Hartman X-Patchwork-Id: 227528 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-6.8 required=3.0 tests=DKIMWL_WL_HIGH, DKIM_SIGNED, DKIM_VALID, HEADER_FROM_DIFFERENT_DOMAINS, MAILING_LIST_MULTI, SIGNED_OFF_BY, SPF_HELO_NONE,SPF_PASS,URIBL_BLOCKED,USER_AGENT_GIT autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no version=3.4.0 Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id E2067C2BB85 for ; Thu, 16 Apr 2020 15:55:32 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id C1165214AF for ; Thu, 16 Apr 2020 15:55:32 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=kernel.org; s=default; t=1587052532; bh=d3rPK+o6s1i/11GAyOvWBa5KXsljWQQoaILIlXSnfXM=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References:List-ID:From; b=zwOgdYrlR1YtIMbDVDcAeBes6CTHZDxyiYyCWHmLs3d4I24urJNOVJwcf5NkgOMHn BAXXspHIgm+B88Fl9vnz9hnj5Je+otwhL4KHmwAE4FYOLzO5HMS7SRv61NCy/KMAn5 w5+8oKSIchUenqGHlIvAWCOgNuUneOMHqFr/MnQM= Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S2633559AbgDPPzb (ORCPT ); Thu, 16 Apr 2020 11:55:31 -0400 Received: from mail.kernel.org ([198.145.29.99]:39458 "EHLO mail.kernel.org" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S2896010AbgDPN3e (ORCPT ); Thu, 16 Apr 2020 09:29:34 -0400 Received: from localhost (83-86-89-107.cable.dynamic.v4.ziggo.nl [83.86.89.107]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 29F8021D79; Thu, 16 Apr 2020 13:29:33 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=kernel.org; s=default; t=1587043773; bh=d3rPK+o6s1i/11GAyOvWBa5KXsljWQQoaILIlXSnfXM=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References:From; b=IZWrLRK1GVvsdlDlxa7lbkIqigu9/hFxgfo6hcuX2dEyD+YvAUPdWM8ALn9R+6UHJ 6iP8R0Q4QpCxIOrFxSkqYJMcNasf4udQJor2YK8lkUj76HShaFqCd5sGdKeQFc/v4B vO9ceUwqCkb8OSG01j0gjb3nJAOD83Dii6fESlIk= From: Greg Kroah-Hartman To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman , stable@vger.kernel.org, "Eric W. Biederman" Subject: [PATCH 4.19 077/146] signal: Extend exec_id to 64bits Date: Thu, 16 Apr 2020 15:23:38 +0200 Message-Id: <20200416131253.455184977@linuxfoundation.org> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.26.1 In-Reply-To: <20200416131242.353444678@linuxfoundation.org> References: <20200416131242.353444678@linuxfoundation.org> User-Agent: quilt/0.66 MIME-Version: 1.0 Sender: stable-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: stable@vger.kernel.org From: Eric W. Biederman commit d1e7fd6462ca9fc76650fbe6ca800e35b24267da upstream. Replace the 32bit exec_id with a 64bit exec_id to make it impossible to wrap the exec_id counter. With care an attacker can cause exec_id wrap and send arbitrary signals to a newly exec'd parent. This bypasses the signal sending checks if the parent changes their credentials during exec. The severity of this problem can been seen that in my limited testing of a 32bit exec_id it can take as little as 19s to exec 65536 times. Which means that it can take as little as 14 days to wrap a 32bit exec_id. Adam Zabrocki has succeeded wrapping the self_exe_id in 7 days. Even my slower timing is in the uptime of a typical server. Which means self_exec_id is simply a speed bump today, and if exec gets noticably faster self_exec_id won't even be a speed bump. Extending self_exec_id to 64bits introduces a problem on 32bit architectures where reading self_exec_id is no longer atomic and can take two read instructions. Which means that is is possible to hit a window where the read value of exec_id does not match the written value. So with very lucky timing after this change this still remains expoiltable. I have updated the update of exec_id on exec to use WRITE_ONCE and the read of exec_id in do_notify_parent to use READ_ONCE to make it clear that there is no locking between these two locations. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/kernel-hardening/20200324215049.GA3710@pi3.com.pl Fixes: 2.3.23pre2 Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- fs/exec.c | 2 +- include/linux/sched.h | 4 ++-- kernel/signal.c | 2 +- 3 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) --- a/fs/exec.c +++ b/fs/exec.c @@ -1378,7 +1378,7 @@ void setup_new_exec(struct linux_binprm /* An exec changes our domain. We are no longer part of the thread group */ - current->self_exec_id++; + WRITE_ONCE(current->self_exec_id, current->self_exec_id + 1); flush_signal_handlers(current, 0); } EXPORT_SYMBOL(setup_new_exec); --- a/include/linux/sched.h +++ b/include/linux/sched.h @@ -887,8 +887,8 @@ struct task_struct { struct seccomp seccomp; /* Thread group tracking: */ - u32 parent_exec_id; - u32 self_exec_id; + u64 parent_exec_id; + u64 self_exec_id; /* Protection against (de-)allocation: mm, files, fs, tty, keyrings, mems_allowed, mempolicy: */ spinlock_t alloc_lock; --- a/kernel/signal.c +++ b/kernel/signal.c @@ -1837,7 +1837,7 @@ bool do_notify_parent(struct task_struct * This is only possible if parent == real_parent. * Check if it has changed security domain. */ - if (tsk->parent_exec_id != tsk->parent->self_exec_id) + if (tsk->parent_exec_id != READ_ONCE(tsk->parent->self_exec_id)) sig = SIGCHLD; }