From patchwork Fri Jun 19 14:32:13 2020 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Greg Kroah-Hartman X-Patchwork-Id: 223622 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-9.8 required=3.0 tests=DKIMWL_WL_HIGH, DKIM_SIGNED, DKIM_VALID, HEADER_FROM_DIFFERENT_DOMAINS, INCLUDES_PATCH, MAILING_LIST_MULTI, SIGNED_OFF_BY,SPF_HELO_NONE,SPF_PASS,URIBL_BLOCKED,USER_AGENT_GIT autolearn=unavailable autolearn_force=no version=3.4.0 Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 967F5C433E1 for ; Fri, 19 Jun 2020 16:54:50 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 768A121924 for ; Fri, 19 Jun 2020 16:54:50 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=kernel.org; s=default; t=1592585690; bh=zo1TRB7urDGI9AIr7ew6Rcf8a0+B/l02NMUWTRVQC34=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References:List-ID:From; b=zw/nsP/sbvv8SariOzLa18+KXHXkW4JBjAdftgyV8nRg09rBxdvIG14e7GytbSbQ/ 4L3UBcDzqHQNNwWTExPlY8SVcrTKFTO8gDCmoObOmpUFGg3ES9Dr9IGgPWqHbH0GvZ HQ34SM2VT3SIfDROxXtsD5Qc6J7twsg6FQNHNIv4= Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S2387498AbgFSOgU (ORCPT ); Fri, 19 Jun 2020 10:36:20 -0400 Received: from mail.kernel.org ([198.145.29.99]:52622 "EHLO mail.kernel.org" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S2387481AbgFSOgO (ORCPT ); Fri, 19 Jun 2020 10:36:14 -0400 Received: from localhost (83-86-89-107.cable.dynamic.v4.ziggo.nl [83.86.89.107]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id CAFFD21582; Fri, 19 Jun 2020 14:36:11 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=kernel.org; s=default; t=1592577372; bh=zo1TRB7urDGI9AIr7ew6Rcf8a0+B/l02NMUWTRVQC34=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References:From; b=nGCYEMzNRsHrQGcOr3IuR+ZUuUpphQRpKqT0IwQgaLvo/UxKGliajX8HgdgQgTycU +OZ5Lwu6f8zxasMVlqOCGj9wtDCoFenfQhb0tOZ5NWoyPwC8uuW5mCazzBavCtCNuC IgFmMKJcIQI7D58xytiX44w8PHyJ4t3dKnIiV1zA= From: Greg Kroah-Hartman To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman , stable@vger.kernel.org, Anthony Steinhauser , Thomas Gleixner , Sasha Levin Subject: [PATCH 4.4 024/101] x86/speculation: Avoid force-disabling IBPB based on STIBP and enhanced IBRS. Date: Fri, 19 Jun 2020 16:32:13 +0200 Message-Id: <20200619141615.360662136@linuxfoundation.org> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.27.0 In-Reply-To: <20200619141614.001544111@linuxfoundation.org> References: <20200619141614.001544111@linuxfoundation.org> User-Agent: quilt/0.66 MIME-Version: 1.0 Sender: stable-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: stable@vger.kernel.org From: Anthony Steinhauser [ Upstream commit 21998a351512eba4ed5969006f0c55882d995ada ] When STIBP is unavailable or enhanced IBRS is available, Linux force-disables the IBPB mitigation of Spectre-BTB even when simultaneous multithreading is disabled. While attempts to enable IBPB using prctl(PR_SET_SPECULATION_CTRL, PR_SPEC_INDIRECT_BRANCH, ...) fail with EPERM, the seccomp syscall (or its prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP, ...) equivalent) which are used e.g. by Chromium or OpenSSH succeed with no errors but the application remains silently vulnerable to cross-process Spectre v2 attacks (classical BTB poisoning). At the same time the SYSFS reporting (/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/spectre_v2) displays that IBPB is conditionally enabled when in fact it is unconditionally disabled. STIBP is useful only when SMT is enabled. When SMT is disabled and STIBP is unavailable, it makes no sense to force-disable also IBPB, because IBPB protects against cross-process Spectre-BTB attacks regardless of the SMT state. At the same time since missing STIBP was only observed on AMD CPUs, AMD does not recommend using STIBP, but recommends using IBPB, so disabling IBPB because of missing STIBP goes directly against AMD's advice: https://developer.amd.com/wp-content/resources/Architecture_Guidelines_Update_Indirect_Branch_Control.pdf Similarly, enhanced IBRS is designed to protect cross-core BTB poisoning and BTB-poisoning attacks from user space against kernel (and BTB-poisoning attacks from guest against hypervisor), it is not designed to prevent cross-process (or cross-VM) BTB poisoning between processes (or VMs) running on the same core. Therefore, even with enhanced IBRS it is necessary to flush the BTB during context-switches, so there is no reason to force disable IBPB when enhanced IBRS is available. Enable the prctl control of IBPB even when STIBP is unavailable or enhanced IBRS is available. Fixes: 7cc765a67d8e ("x86/speculation: Enable prctl mode for spectre_v2_user") Signed-off-by: Anthony Steinhauser Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 86 ++++++++++++++++++++++---------------- 1 file changed, 49 insertions(+), 37 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c index 6ee7d81fe339..94e10898126a 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c @@ -558,7 +558,8 @@ early_param("nospectre_v1", nospectre_v1_cmdline); static enum spectre_v2_mitigation spectre_v2_enabled = SPECTRE_V2_NONE; -static enum spectre_v2_user_mitigation spectre_v2_user = SPECTRE_V2_USER_NONE; +static enum spectre_v2_user_mitigation spectre_v2_user_stibp = SPECTRE_V2_USER_NONE; +static enum spectre_v2_user_mitigation spectre_v2_user_ibpb = SPECTRE_V2_USER_NONE; #ifdef RETPOLINE static bool spectre_v2_bad_module; @@ -702,15 +703,6 @@ spectre_v2_user_select_mitigation(enum spectre_v2_mitigation_cmd v2_cmd) break; } - /* - * At this point, an STIBP mode other than "off" has been set. - * If STIBP support is not being forced, check if STIBP always-on - * is preferred. - */ - if (mode != SPECTRE_V2_USER_STRICT && - boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_AMD_STIBP_ALWAYS_ON)) - mode = SPECTRE_V2_USER_STRICT_PREFERRED; - /* Initialize Indirect Branch Prediction Barrier */ if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBPB)) { setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_USE_IBPB); @@ -733,23 +725,36 @@ spectre_v2_user_select_mitigation(enum spectre_v2_mitigation_cmd v2_cmd) pr_info("mitigation: Enabling %s Indirect Branch Prediction Barrier\n", static_key_enabled(&switch_mm_always_ibpb) ? "always-on" : "conditional"); + + spectre_v2_user_ibpb = mode; } - /* If enhanced IBRS is enabled no STIBP required */ - if (spectre_v2_enabled == SPECTRE_V2_IBRS_ENHANCED) + /* + * If enhanced IBRS is enabled or SMT impossible, STIBP is not + * required. + */ + if (!smt_possible || spectre_v2_enabled == SPECTRE_V2_IBRS_ENHANCED) return; /* - * If SMT is not possible or STIBP is not available clear the STIBP - * mode. + * At this point, an STIBP mode other than "off" has been set. + * If STIBP support is not being forced, check if STIBP always-on + * is preferred. */ - if (!smt_possible || !boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_STIBP)) + if (mode != SPECTRE_V2_USER_STRICT && + boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_AMD_STIBP_ALWAYS_ON)) + mode = SPECTRE_V2_USER_STRICT_PREFERRED; + + /* + * If STIBP is not available, clear the STIBP mode. + */ + if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_STIBP)) mode = SPECTRE_V2_USER_NONE; + + spectre_v2_user_stibp = mode; + set_mode: - spectre_v2_user = mode; - /* Only print the STIBP mode when SMT possible */ - if (smt_possible) - pr_info("%s\n", spectre_v2_user_strings[mode]); + pr_info("%s\n", spectre_v2_user_strings[mode]); } static const char * const spectre_v2_strings[] = { @@ -989,7 +994,7 @@ void arch_smt_update(void) { mutex_lock(&spec_ctrl_mutex); - switch (spectre_v2_user) { + switch (spectre_v2_user_stibp) { case SPECTRE_V2_USER_NONE: break; case SPECTRE_V2_USER_STRICT: @@ -1222,14 +1227,16 @@ static int ib_prctl_set(struct task_struct *task, unsigned long ctrl) { switch (ctrl) { case PR_SPEC_ENABLE: - if (spectre_v2_user == SPECTRE_V2_USER_NONE) + if (spectre_v2_user_ibpb == SPECTRE_V2_USER_NONE && + spectre_v2_user_stibp == SPECTRE_V2_USER_NONE) return 0; /* * Indirect branch speculation is always disabled in strict * mode. */ - if (spectre_v2_user == SPECTRE_V2_USER_STRICT || - spectre_v2_user == SPECTRE_V2_USER_STRICT_PREFERRED) + if (spectre_v2_user_ibpb == SPECTRE_V2_USER_STRICT || + spectre_v2_user_stibp == SPECTRE_V2_USER_STRICT || + spectre_v2_user_stibp == SPECTRE_V2_USER_STRICT_PREFERRED) return -EPERM; task_clear_spec_ib_disable(task); task_update_spec_tif(task); @@ -1240,10 +1247,12 @@ static int ib_prctl_set(struct task_struct *task, unsigned long ctrl) * Indirect branch speculation is always allowed when * mitigation is force disabled. */ - if (spectre_v2_user == SPECTRE_V2_USER_NONE) + if (spectre_v2_user_ibpb == SPECTRE_V2_USER_NONE && + spectre_v2_user_stibp == SPECTRE_V2_USER_NONE) return -EPERM; - if (spectre_v2_user == SPECTRE_V2_USER_STRICT || - spectre_v2_user == SPECTRE_V2_USER_STRICT_PREFERRED) + if (spectre_v2_user_ibpb == SPECTRE_V2_USER_STRICT || + spectre_v2_user_stibp == SPECTRE_V2_USER_STRICT || + spectre_v2_user_stibp == SPECTRE_V2_USER_STRICT_PREFERRED) return 0; task_set_spec_ib_disable(task); if (ctrl == PR_SPEC_FORCE_DISABLE) @@ -1274,7 +1283,8 @@ void arch_seccomp_spec_mitigate(struct task_struct *task) { if (ssb_mode == SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_SECCOMP) ssb_prctl_set(task, PR_SPEC_FORCE_DISABLE); - if (spectre_v2_user == SPECTRE_V2_USER_SECCOMP) + if (spectre_v2_user_ibpb == SPECTRE_V2_USER_SECCOMP || + spectre_v2_user_stibp == SPECTRE_V2_USER_SECCOMP) ib_prctl_set(task, PR_SPEC_FORCE_DISABLE); } #endif @@ -1303,22 +1313,24 @@ static int ib_prctl_get(struct task_struct *task) if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V2)) return PR_SPEC_NOT_AFFECTED; - switch (spectre_v2_user) { - case SPECTRE_V2_USER_NONE: + if (spectre_v2_user_ibpb == SPECTRE_V2_USER_NONE && + spectre_v2_user_stibp == SPECTRE_V2_USER_NONE) return PR_SPEC_ENABLE; - case SPECTRE_V2_USER_PRCTL: - case SPECTRE_V2_USER_SECCOMP: + else if (spectre_v2_user_ibpb == SPECTRE_V2_USER_STRICT || + spectre_v2_user_stibp == SPECTRE_V2_USER_STRICT || + spectre_v2_user_stibp == SPECTRE_V2_USER_STRICT_PREFERRED) + return PR_SPEC_DISABLE; + else if (spectre_v2_user_ibpb == SPECTRE_V2_USER_PRCTL || + spectre_v2_user_ibpb == SPECTRE_V2_USER_SECCOMP || + spectre_v2_user_stibp == SPECTRE_V2_USER_PRCTL || + spectre_v2_user_stibp == SPECTRE_V2_USER_SECCOMP) { if (task_spec_ib_force_disable(task)) return PR_SPEC_PRCTL | PR_SPEC_FORCE_DISABLE; if (task_spec_ib_disable(task)) return PR_SPEC_PRCTL | PR_SPEC_DISABLE; return PR_SPEC_PRCTL | PR_SPEC_ENABLE; - case SPECTRE_V2_USER_STRICT: - case SPECTRE_V2_USER_STRICT_PREFERRED: - return PR_SPEC_DISABLE; - default: + } else return PR_SPEC_NOT_AFFECTED; - } } int arch_prctl_spec_ctrl_get(struct task_struct *task, unsigned long which) @@ -1459,7 +1471,7 @@ static char *stibp_state(void) if (spectre_v2_enabled == SPECTRE_V2_IBRS_ENHANCED) return ""; - switch (spectre_v2_user) { + switch (spectre_v2_user_stibp) { case SPECTRE_V2_USER_NONE: return ", STIBP: disabled"; case SPECTRE_V2_USER_STRICT: