From patchwork Tue Oct 27 13:49:29 2020 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Greg Kroah-Hartman X-Patchwork-Id: 312111 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-17.8 required=3.0 tests=BAYES_00,DKIMWL_WL_HIGH, DKIM_SIGNED, DKIM_VALID, HEADER_FROM_DIFFERENT_DOMAINS, INCLUDES_PATCH, MAILING_LIST_MULTI, MENTIONS_GIT_HOSTING, SIGNED_OFF_BY, SPF_HELO_NONE, SPF_PASS, URIBL_BLOCKED, USER_AGENT_GIT autolearn=unavailable autolearn_force=no version=3.4.0 Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id D9F66C388F9 for ; Tue, 27 Oct 2020 17:16:36 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 7F5062225C for ; Tue, 27 Oct 2020 17:16:36 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=kernel.org; s=default; t=1603818996; bh=DCgQ9rO8eT5AKp6LgqlnZWOe584uEltQyBx8h0ap0CA=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References:List-ID:From; b=NjD03GtwN35ES0ps4gpnCATWMf0DMfHlToCld7ULtJV36NE0gy+Hdir7YTbTGlbMl G+gUi+0bqci4sbrrmDvGuFnR5Y2VdK0eRY6gQ6o0rJwpJ3Nc1nMCXj1xpxwXPdNpa5 Og1QtpMYG4H0/Ahok2VdUzi0YuUTEQgfoolwYDKk= Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1783248AbgJ0O6B (ORCPT ); Tue, 27 Oct 2020 10:58:01 -0400 Received: from mail.kernel.org ([198.145.29.99]:59168 "EHLO mail.kernel.org" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1783233AbgJ0O6B (ORCPT ); Tue, 27 Oct 2020 10:58:01 -0400 Received: from localhost (83-86-74-64.cable.dynamic.v4.ziggo.nl [83.86.74.64]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 66C2020780; Tue, 27 Oct 2020 14:57:59 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=kernel.org; s=default; t=1603810680; bh=DCgQ9rO8eT5AKp6LgqlnZWOe584uEltQyBx8h0ap0CA=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References:From; b=RfeGH9knrC68sVqnyf2zK2s9wpNm8/xbxKbERcIr8JUSnJzPMC5U5kB1EJYKzwAaF AGIcKBnEExq1wenkzIm14XC9npsdqDNMqih7sYOZ7oXiROtIu9g/zJL5NfKTJ4lSik bssZ1elN0FuYWqLK9w4sbU8l+A7rcUmS4fmTuG7k= From: Greg Kroah-Hartman To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman , stable@vger.kernel.org, Takashi Iwai , Pierre-Louis Bossart , Ranjani Sridharan , Bard Liao , Jaska Uimonen , Kai Vehmanen , Mark Brown , Sasha Levin Subject: [PATCH 5.8 226/633] ASoC: topology: disable size checks for bytes_ext controls if needed Date: Tue, 27 Oct 2020 14:49:29 +0100 Message-Id: <20201027135533.284609954@linuxfoundation.org> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.29.1 In-Reply-To: <20201027135522.655719020@linuxfoundation.org> References: <20201027135522.655719020@linuxfoundation.org> User-Agent: quilt/0.66 MIME-Version: 1.0 Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: stable@vger.kernel.org From: Pierre-Louis Bossart [ Upstream commit 6788fc1a66a0c1d1cec7a0f84f94b517eae8611c ] When CONFIG_SND_CTL_VALIDATION is set, accesses to extended bytes control generate spurious error messages when the size exceeds 512 bytes, such as [ 11.224223] sof_sdw sof_sdw: control 2:0:0:EQIIR5.0 eqiir_coef_5:0: invalid count 1024 In addition the error check returns -EINVAL which has the nasty side effect of preventing applications accessing controls from working, e.g. root@plb:~# alsamixer cannot load mixer controls: Invalid argument It's agreed that the control interface has been abused since 2014, but forcing a check should not prevent existing solutions from working. This patch skips the checks conditionally if CONFIG_SND_CTL_VALIDATION is set and the byte array provided by topology is > 512. This preserves the checks for all other cases. Fixes: 1a3232d2f61d2 ('ASoC: topology: Add support for TLV bytes controls') BugLink: https://github.com/thesofproject/linux/issues/2430 Reported-by: Takashi Iwai Signed-off-by: Pierre-Louis Bossart Reviewed-by: Ranjani Sridharan Reviewed-by: Bard Liao Reviewed-by: Jaska Uimonen Signed-off-by: Kai Vehmanen Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200917103912.2565907-1-kai.vehmanen@linux.intel.com Signed-off-by: Mark Brown Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- sound/soc/soc-topology.c | 11 +++++++++++ 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+) diff --git a/sound/soc/soc-topology.c b/sound/soc/soc-topology.c index 6eaa00c210117..a5460155b3f64 100644 --- a/sound/soc/soc-topology.c +++ b/sound/soc/soc-topology.c @@ -592,6 +592,17 @@ static int soc_tplg_kcontrol_bind_io(struct snd_soc_tplg_ctl_hdr *hdr, k->info = snd_soc_bytes_info_ext; k->tlv.c = snd_soc_bytes_tlv_callback; + /* + * When a topology-based implementation abuses the + * control interface and uses bytes_ext controls of + * more than 512 bytes, we need to disable the size + * checks, otherwise accesses to such controls will + * return an -EINVAL error and prevent the card from + * being configured. + */ + if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SND_CTL_VALIDATION) && sbe->max > 512) + k->access |= SNDRV_CTL_ELEM_ACCESS_SKIP_CHECK; + ext_ops = tplg->bytes_ext_ops; num_ops = tplg->bytes_ext_ops_count; for (i = 0; i < num_ops; i++) {