From patchwork Mon Jan 24 18:43:55 2022 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Greg Kroah-Hartman X-Patchwork-Id: 536286 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 48FF2C433F5 for ; Mon, 24 Jan 2022 19:12:56 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1345466AbiAXTMz (ORCPT ); Mon, 24 Jan 2022 14:12:55 -0500 Received: from dfw.source.kernel.org ([139.178.84.217]:39938 "EHLO dfw.source.kernel.org" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1347443AbiAXTKb (ORCPT ); Mon, 24 Jan 2022 14:10:31 -0500 Received: from smtp.kernel.org (relay.kernel.org [52.25.139.140]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by dfw.source.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 05CDA60010; Mon, 24 Jan 2022 19:10:31 +0000 (UTC) Received: by smtp.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 049F7C340E5; Mon, 24 Jan 2022 19:10:29 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=linuxfoundation.org; s=korg; t=1643051430; bh=vwRGDU4N4TbEApmcUFKQ4hpx5acenT08Vv9AbCWceh8=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References:From; b=RowIxncB1llFSMkT8R7ZE3fgtuZEodIKyhfeluIQiHgzf4aHHKJsIT9J0X8Y3D3ig NShOgfD1SdWvFfE09BFCDO9y/sctknW0DnHghNfRALEVTzjTowD+v4y+kkeQTDAB9N TGKri1CfGFX6x+yfNDzbHGduNXXs8UVU5p+o8Eqs= From: Greg Kroah-Hartman To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman , stable@vger.kernel.org, Lukas Bulwahn , Jonathan Corbet Subject: [PATCH 4.14 160/186] Documentation: refer to config RANDOMIZE_BASE for kernel address-space randomization Date: Mon, 24 Jan 2022 19:43:55 +0100 Message-Id: <20220124183942.243699561@linuxfoundation.org> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.34.1 In-Reply-To: <20220124183937.101330125@linuxfoundation.org> References: <20220124183937.101330125@linuxfoundation.org> User-Agent: quilt/0.66 MIME-Version: 1.0 Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: stable@vger.kernel.org From: Lukas Bulwahn commit 82ca67321f55a8d1da6ac3ed611da3c32818bb37 upstream. The config RANDOMIZE_SLAB does not exist, the authors probably intended to refer to the config RANDOMIZE_BASE, which provides kernel address-space randomization. They probably just confused SLAB with BASE (these two four-letter words coincidentally share three common letters), as they also point out the config SLAB_FREELIST_RANDOM as further randomization within the same sentence. Fix the reference of the config for kernel address-space randomization to the config that provides that. Fixes: 6e88559470f5 ("Documentation: Add section about CPU vulnerabilities for Spectre") Signed-off-by: Lukas Bulwahn Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20211230171940.27558-1-lukas.bulwahn@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Jonathan Corbet Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/spectre.rst | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) --- a/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/spectre.rst +++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/spectre.rst @@ -468,7 +468,7 @@ Spectre variant 2 before invoking any firmware code to prevent Spectre variant 2 exploits using the firmware. - Using kernel address space randomization (CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_SLAB=y + Using kernel address space randomization (CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_BASE=y and CONFIG_SLAB_FREELIST_RANDOM=y in the kernel configuration) makes attacks on the kernel generally more difficult.