From patchwork Tue Apr 12 21:21:24 2022 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Dov Murik X-Patchwork-Id: 560109 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 89043C433FE for ; Tue, 12 Apr 2022 23:24:33 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S230025AbiDLX0q (ORCPT ); Tue, 12 Apr 2022 19:26:46 -0400 Received: from lindbergh.monkeyblade.net ([23.128.96.19]:44308 "EHLO lindbergh.monkeyblade.net" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S230044AbiDLX0W (ORCPT ); Tue, 12 Apr 2022 19:26:22 -0400 Received: from mx0a-001b2d01.pphosted.com (mx0a-001b2d01.pphosted.com [148.163.156.1]) by lindbergh.monkeyblade.net (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 1870EE9967; Tue, 12 Apr 2022 15:40:33 -0700 (PDT) Received: from pps.filterd (m0098393.ppops.net [127.0.0.1]) by mx0a-001b2d01.pphosted.com (8.16.1.2/8.16.1.2) with SMTP id 23CL7kSC009058; Tue, 12 Apr 2022 21:21:41 GMT DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=ibm.com; h=from : to : cc : subject : date : message-id : in-reply-to : references : mime-version : content-transfer-encoding; s=pp1; bh=MsEQHlRc5s0kB5gw3dEIoCSQBugOphAjhjTsJWExk10=; b=aO/9mjbFf3ZFGcZMn5Kwy0Lm80/zDaeyZUtYf0Pinh1dbuGOAgsSWtekQUg5ziI8h9TY ajc5/qjPkCg/Spnt6/8NDUxvj35lVBQr7JCT0dxy80Pnne8z8Y9GHm8YVvagIoYOtu+G WwIREwQwO8at3D9s1Z67YMTghHTgN5NNE4jkWlYKu9jNschkUTQvaZzKIZn8wZWq94OP mv78LV2i7pv+T4JRzARcLlowB1WvLi7G9QomgCCMx/jD9ztt7LfHrugwgJBvEVTjBLyS Q301ggRG4FpT67olidEnQoaR9ctyOiCLyyu5NOzgQQyDlmYV6AEDnUcQ4bQRzEdd1RQ0 9Q== Received: from pps.reinject (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by mx0a-001b2d01.pphosted.com with ESMTP id 3fde22c7m1-1 (version=TLSv1.2 cipher=ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 bits=256 verify=NOT); Tue, 12 Apr 2022 21:21:40 +0000 Received: from m0098393.ppops.net (m0098393.ppops.net [127.0.0.1]) by pps.reinject (8.16.0.43/8.16.0.43) with SMTP id 23CL5tvt001731; Tue, 12 Apr 2022 21:21:40 GMT Received: from ppma03dal.us.ibm.com (b.bd.3ea9.ip4.static.sl-reverse.com [169.62.189.11]) by mx0a-001b2d01.pphosted.com with ESMTP id 3fde22c7kk-1 (version=TLSv1.2 cipher=ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 bits=256 verify=NOT); Tue, 12 Apr 2022 21:21:40 +0000 Received: from pps.filterd (ppma03dal.us.ibm.com [127.0.0.1]) by ppma03dal.us.ibm.com (8.16.1.2/8.16.1.2) with SMTP id 23CLC1fp007798; Tue, 12 Apr 2022 21:21:39 GMT Received: from b03cxnp08027.gho.boulder.ibm.com (b03cxnp08027.gho.boulder.ibm.com [9.17.130.19]) by ppma03dal.us.ibm.com with ESMTP id 3fb1sa1t6e-1 (version=TLSv1.2 cipher=ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 bits=256 verify=NOT); Tue, 12 Apr 2022 21:21:39 +0000 Received: from b03ledav002.gho.boulder.ibm.com (b03ledav002.gho.boulder.ibm.com [9.17.130.233]) by b03cxnp08027.gho.boulder.ibm.com (8.14.9/8.14.9/NCO v10.0) with ESMTP id 23CLLbng14287330 (version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=DHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 bits=256 verify=OK); Tue, 12 Apr 2022 21:21:37 GMT Received: from b03ledav002.gho.boulder.ibm.com (unknown [127.0.0.1]) by IMSVA (Postfix) with ESMTP id 7DB4E13605E; Tue, 12 Apr 2022 21:21:37 +0000 (GMT) Received: from b03ledav002.gho.boulder.ibm.com (unknown [127.0.0.1]) by IMSVA (Postfix) with ESMTP id 99E3D136053; Tue, 12 Apr 2022 21:21:35 +0000 (GMT) Received: from amdrome3.watson.ibm.com (unknown [9.2.130.16]) by b03ledav002.gho.boulder.ibm.com (Postfix) with ESMTP; Tue, 12 Apr 2022 21:21:35 +0000 (GMT) From: Dov Murik To: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org Cc: Dov Murik , Gerd Hoffmann , Borislav Petkov , Ashish Kalra , Brijesh Singh , Tom Lendacky , Ard Biesheuvel , James Morris , "Serge E. Hallyn" , Andi Kleen , Greg KH , Andrew Scull , Dave Hansen , "Dr. David Alan Gilbert" , Lenny Szubowicz , Peter Gonda , Matthew Garrett , James Bottomley , Tobin Feldman-Fitzthum , Jim Cadden , Daniele Buono , linux-coco@lists.linux.dev, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Subject: [PATCH v10 1/4] efi: Save location of EFI confidential computing area Date: Tue, 12 Apr 2022 21:21:24 +0000 Message-Id: <20220412212127.154182-2-dovmurik@linux.ibm.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.25.1 In-Reply-To: <20220412212127.154182-1-dovmurik@linux.ibm.com> References: <20220412212127.154182-1-dovmurik@linux.ibm.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 X-TM-AS-GCONF: 00 X-Proofpoint-ORIG-GUID: DiCSi1JcTGmGkiljjdGDXQd_QerrljCx X-Proofpoint-GUID: mNB_XaO3fkUvQpKH2Dgz9pmdfcNctiyQ X-Proofpoint-Virus-Version: vendor=baseguard engine=ICAP:2.0.205,Aquarius:18.0.858,Hydra:6.0.486,FMLib:17.11.64.514 definitions=2022-04-12_06,2022-04-12_02,2022-02-23_01 X-Proofpoint-Spam-Details: rule=outbound_notspam policy=outbound score=0 bulkscore=0 adultscore=0 mlxlogscore=999 impostorscore=0 lowpriorityscore=0 mlxscore=0 malwarescore=0 phishscore=0 priorityscore=1501 clxscore=1015 spamscore=0 suspectscore=0 classifier=spam adjust=0 reason=mlx scancount=1 engine=8.12.0-2202240000 definitions=main-2204120097 Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org Confidential computing (coco) hardware such as AMD SEV (Secure Encrypted Virtualization) allows a guest owner to inject secrets into the VMs memory without the host/hypervisor being able to read them. Firmware support for secret injection is available in OVMF, which reserves a memory area for secret injection and includes a pointer to it the in EFI config table entry LINUX_EFI_COCO_SECRET_TABLE_GUID. If EFI exposes such a table entry, uefi_init() will keep a pointer to the EFI config table entry in efi.coco_secret, so it can be used later by the kernel (specifically drivers/virt/coco/efi_secret). It will also appear in the kernel log as "CocoSecret=ADDRESS"; for example: [ 0.000000] efi: EFI v2.70 by EDK II [ 0.000000] efi: CocoSecret=0x7f22e680 SMBIOS=0x7f541000 ACPI=0x7f77e000 ACPI 2.0=0x7f77e014 MEMATTR=0x7ea0c018 The new functionality can be enabled with CONFIG_EFI_COCO_SECRET=y. Signed-off-by: Dov Murik Reviewed-by: Gerd Hoffmann --- arch/x86/platform/efi/efi.c | 3 +++ drivers/firmware/efi/Kconfig | 16 ++++++++++++++++ drivers/firmware/efi/efi.c | 6 ++++++ include/linux/efi.h | 10 ++++++++++ 4 files changed, 35 insertions(+) diff --git a/arch/x86/platform/efi/efi.c b/arch/x86/platform/efi/efi.c index 147c30a81f15..1591d67e0bcd 100644 --- a/arch/x86/platform/efi/efi.c +++ b/arch/x86/platform/efi/efi.c @@ -93,6 +93,9 @@ static const unsigned long * const efi_tables[] = { #ifdef CONFIG_LOAD_UEFI_KEYS &efi.mokvar_table, #endif +#ifdef CONFIG_EFI_COCO_SECRET + &efi.coco_secret, +#endif }; u64 efi_setup; /* efi setup_data physical address */ diff --git a/drivers/firmware/efi/Kconfig b/drivers/firmware/efi/Kconfig index 2c3dac5ecb36..6fa251b3709f 100644 --- a/drivers/firmware/efi/Kconfig +++ b/drivers/firmware/efi/Kconfig @@ -284,3 +284,19 @@ config EFI_CUSTOM_SSDT_OVERLAYS See Documentation/admin-guide/acpi/ssdt-overlays.rst for more information. + +config EFI_COCO_SECRET + bool "EFI Confidential Computing Secret Area Support" + depends on EFI + help + Confidential Computing platforms (such as AMD SEV) allow the + Guest Owner to securely inject secrets during guest VM launch. + The secrets are placed in a designated EFI reserved memory area. + + In order to use the secrets in the kernel, the location of the secret + area (as published in the EFI config table) must be kept. + + If you say Y here, the address of the EFI secret area will be kept + for usage inside the kernel. This will allow the + virt/coco/efi_secret module to access the secrets, which in turn + allows userspace programs to access the injected secrets. diff --git a/drivers/firmware/efi/efi.c b/drivers/firmware/efi/efi.c index 7de3f5b6e8d0..378d044b2463 100644 --- a/drivers/firmware/efi/efi.c +++ b/drivers/firmware/efi/efi.c @@ -46,6 +46,9 @@ struct efi __read_mostly efi = { #ifdef CONFIG_LOAD_UEFI_KEYS .mokvar_table = EFI_INVALID_TABLE_ADDR, #endif +#ifdef CONFIG_EFI_COCO_SECRET + .coco_secret = EFI_INVALID_TABLE_ADDR, +#endif }; EXPORT_SYMBOL(efi); @@ -528,6 +531,9 @@ static const efi_config_table_type_t common_tables[] __initconst = { #endif #ifdef CONFIG_LOAD_UEFI_KEYS {LINUX_EFI_MOK_VARIABLE_TABLE_GUID, &efi.mokvar_table, "MOKvar" }, +#endif +#ifdef CONFIG_EFI_COCO_SECRET + {LINUX_EFI_COCO_SECRET_AREA_GUID, &efi.coco_secret, "CocoSecret" }, #endif {}, }; diff --git a/include/linux/efi.h b/include/linux/efi.h index ccd4d3f91c98..771d4cd06b56 100644 --- a/include/linux/efi.h +++ b/include/linux/efi.h @@ -405,6 +405,7 @@ void efi_native_runtime_setup(void); #define LINUX_EFI_MEMRESERVE_TABLE_GUID EFI_GUID(0x888eb0c6, 0x8ede, 0x4ff5, 0xa8, 0xf0, 0x9a, 0xee, 0x5c, 0xb9, 0x77, 0xc2) #define LINUX_EFI_INITRD_MEDIA_GUID EFI_GUID(0x5568e427, 0x68fc, 0x4f3d, 0xac, 0x74, 0xca, 0x55, 0x52, 0x31, 0xcc, 0x68) #define LINUX_EFI_MOK_VARIABLE_TABLE_GUID EFI_GUID(0xc451ed2b, 0x9694, 0x45d3, 0xba, 0xba, 0xed, 0x9f, 0x89, 0x88, 0xa3, 0x89) +#define LINUX_EFI_COCO_SECRET_AREA_GUID EFI_GUID(0xadf956ad, 0xe98c, 0x484c, 0xae, 0x11, 0xb5, 0x1c, 0x7d, 0x33, 0x64, 0x47) /* OEM GUIDs */ #define DELLEMC_EFI_RCI2_TABLE_GUID EFI_GUID(0x2d9f28a2, 0xa886, 0x456a, 0x97, 0xa8, 0xf1, 0x1e, 0xf2, 0x4f, 0xf4, 0x55) @@ -596,6 +597,7 @@ extern struct efi { unsigned long tpm_log; /* TPM2 Event Log table */ unsigned long tpm_final_log; /* TPM2 Final Events Log table */ unsigned long mokvar_table; /* MOK variable config table */ + unsigned long coco_secret; /* Confidential computing secret table */ efi_get_time_t *get_time; efi_set_time_t *set_time; @@ -1335,4 +1337,12 @@ extern void efifb_setup_from_dmi(struct screen_info *si, const char *opt); static inline void efifb_setup_from_dmi(struct screen_info *si, const char *opt) { } #endif +struct linux_efi_coco_secret_area { + u64 base_pa; + u64 size; +}; + +/* Header of a populated EFI secret area */ +#define EFI_SECRET_TABLE_HEADER_GUID EFI_GUID(0x1e74f542, 0x71dd, 0x4d66, 0x96, 0x3e, 0xef, 0x42, 0x87, 0xff, 0x17, 0x3b) + #endif /* _LINUX_EFI_H */ From patchwork Tue Apr 12 21:21:25 2022 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Dov Murik X-Patchwork-Id: 561267 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 39746C433EF for ; Tue, 12 Apr 2022 23:22:38 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S229917AbiDLXYz (ORCPT ); Tue, 12 Apr 2022 19:24:55 -0400 Received: from lindbergh.monkeyblade.net ([23.128.96.19]:39404 "EHLO lindbergh.monkeyblade.net" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S229911AbiDLXYZ (ORCPT ); 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Tue, 12 Apr 2022 21:21:39 GMT Received: from b03ledav002.gho.boulder.ibm.com (unknown [127.0.0.1]) by IMSVA (Postfix) with ESMTP id 9941113604F; Tue, 12 Apr 2022 21:21:39 +0000 (GMT) Received: from b03ledav002.gho.boulder.ibm.com (unknown [127.0.0.1]) by IMSVA (Postfix) with ESMTP id A4713136053; Tue, 12 Apr 2022 21:21:37 +0000 (GMT) Received: from amdrome3.watson.ibm.com (unknown [9.2.130.16]) by b03ledav002.gho.boulder.ibm.com (Postfix) with ESMTP; Tue, 12 Apr 2022 21:21:37 +0000 (GMT) From: Dov Murik To: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org Cc: Dov Murik , Gerd Hoffmann , Borislav Petkov , Ashish Kalra , Brijesh Singh , Tom Lendacky , Ard Biesheuvel , James Morris , "Serge E. Hallyn" , Andi Kleen , Greg KH , Andrew Scull , Dave Hansen , "Dr. David Alan Gilbert" , Lenny Szubowicz , Peter Gonda , Matthew Garrett , James Bottomley , Tobin Feldman-Fitzthum , Jim Cadden , Daniele Buono , linux-coco@lists.linux.dev, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Subject: [PATCH v10 2/4] virt: Add efi_secret module to expose confidential computing secrets Date: Tue, 12 Apr 2022 21:21:25 +0000 Message-Id: <20220412212127.154182-3-dovmurik@linux.ibm.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.25.1 In-Reply-To: <20220412212127.154182-1-dovmurik@linux.ibm.com> References: <20220412212127.154182-1-dovmurik@linux.ibm.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 X-TM-AS-GCONF: 00 X-Proofpoint-ORIG-GUID: IE-ypMd3jx80PZbNnuEA5Z0AUAmLfZE9 X-Proofpoint-GUID: zDEF-W4Pnn0njo9itrEZ2aOaejLK0dIa X-Proofpoint-Virus-Version: vendor=baseguard engine=ICAP:2.0.205,Aquarius:18.0.858,Hydra:6.0.486,FMLib:17.11.64.514 definitions=2022-04-12_06,2022-04-12_02,2022-02-23_01 X-Proofpoint-Spam-Details: rule=outbound_notspam policy=outbound score=0 spamscore=0 impostorscore=0 phishscore=0 clxscore=1015 mlxscore=0 lowpriorityscore=0 bulkscore=0 priorityscore=1501 mlxlogscore=999 adultscore=0 malwarescore=0 suspectscore=0 classifier=spam adjust=0 reason=mlx scancount=1 engine=8.12.0-2202240000 definitions=main-2204120097 Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org The new efi_secret module exposes the confidential computing (coco) EFI secret area via securityfs interface. When the module is loaded (and securityfs is mounted, typically under /sys/kernel/security), a "secrets/coco" directory is created in securityfs. In it, a file is created for each secret entry. The name of each such file is the GUID of the secret entry, and its content is the secret data. This allows applications running in a confidential computing setting to read secrets provided by the guest owner via a secure secret injection mechanism (such as AMD SEV's LAUNCH_SECRET command). Removing (unlinking) files in the "secrets/coco" directory will zero out the secret in memory, and remove the filesystem entry. If the module is removed and loaded again, that secret will not appear in the filesystem. Signed-off-by: Dov Murik Reviewed-by: Gerd Hoffmann --- Documentation/ABI/testing/securityfs-secrets-coco | 51 +++ drivers/virt/Kconfig | 3 + drivers/virt/Makefile | 1 + drivers/virt/coco/efi_secret/Kconfig | 16 + drivers/virt/coco/efi_secret/Makefile | 2 + drivers/virt/coco/efi_secret/efi_secret.c | 349 ++++++++++++++++++++ 6 files changed, 422 insertions(+) diff --git a/Documentation/ABI/testing/securityfs-secrets-coco b/Documentation/ABI/testing/securityfs-secrets-coco new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..f2b6909155f9 --- /dev/null +++ b/Documentation/ABI/testing/securityfs-secrets-coco @@ -0,0 +1,51 @@ +What: security/secrets/coco +Date: February 2022 +Contact: Dov Murik +Description: + Exposes confidential computing (coco) EFI secrets to + userspace via securityfs. + + EFI can declare memory area used by confidential computing + platforms (such as AMD SEV and SEV-ES) for secret injection by + the Guest Owner during VM's launch. The secrets are encrypted + by the Guest Owner and decrypted inside the trusted enclave, + and therefore are not readable by the untrusted host. + + The efi_secret module exposes the secrets to userspace. Each + secret appears as a file under /secrets/coco, + where the filename is the GUID of the entry in the secrets + table. This module is loaded automatically by the EFI driver + if the EFI secret area is populated. + + Two operations are supported for the files: read and unlink. + Reading the file returns the content of secret entry. + Unlinking the file overwrites the secret data with zeroes and + removes the entry from the filesystem. A secret cannot be read + after it has been unlinked. + + For example, listing the available secrets:: + + # modprobe efi_secret + # ls -l /sys/kernel/security/secrets/coco + -r--r----- 1 root root 0 Jun 28 11:54 736870e5-84f0-4973-92ec-06879ce3da0b + -r--r----- 1 root root 0 Jun 28 11:54 83c83f7f-1356-4975-8b7e-d3a0b54312c6 + -r--r----- 1 root root 0 Jun 28 11:54 9553f55d-3da2-43ee-ab5d-ff17f78864d2 + -r--r----- 1 root root 0 Jun 28 11:54 e6f5a162-d67f-4750-a67c-5d065f2a9910 + + Reading the secret data by reading a file:: + + # cat /sys/kernel/security/secrets/coco/e6f5a162-d67f-4750-a67c-5d065f2a9910 + the-content-of-the-secret-data + + Wiping a secret by unlinking a file:: + + # rm /sys/kernel/security/secrets/coco/e6f5a162-d67f-4750-a67c-5d065f2a9910 + # ls -l /sys/kernel/security/secrets/coco + -r--r----- 1 root root 0 Jun 28 11:54 736870e5-84f0-4973-92ec-06879ce3da0b + -r--r----- 1 root root 0 Jun 28 11:54 83c83f7f-1356-4975-8b7e-d3a0b54312c6 + -r--r----- 1 root root 0 Jun 28 11:54 9553f55d-3da2-43ee-ab5d-ff17f78864d2 + + Note: The binary format of the secrets table injected by the + Guest Owner is described in + drivers/virt/coco/efi_secret/efi_secret.c under "Structure of + the EFI secret area". diff --git a/drivers/virt/Kconfig b/drivers/virt/Kconfig index 8061e8ef449f..fe7a6579b974 100644 --- a/drivers/virt/Kconfig +++ b/drivers/virt/Kconfig @@ -36,4 +36,7 @@ source "drivers/virt/vboxguest/Kconfig" source "drivers/virt/nitro_enclaves/Kconfig" source "drivers/virt/acrn/Kconfig" + +source "drivers/virt/coco/efi_secret/Kconfig" + endif diff --git a/drivers/virt/Makefile b/drivers/virt/Makefile index 3e272ea60cd9..efdb015783f9 100644 --- a/drivers/virt/Makefile +++ b/drivers/virt/Makefile @@ -8,3 +8,4 @@ obj-y += vboxguest/ obj-$(CONFIG_NITRO_ENCLAVES) += nitro_enclaves/ obj-$(CONFIG_ACRN_HSM) += acrn/ +obj-$(CONFIG_EFI_SECRET) += coco/efi_secret/ diff --git a/drivers/virt/coco/efi_secret/Kconfig b/drivers/virt/coco/efi_secret/Kconfig new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..4404d198f3b2 --- /dev/null +++ b/drivers/virt/coco/efi_secret/Kconfig @@ -0,0 +1,16 @@ +# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only +config EFI_SECRET + tristate "EFI secret area securityfs support" + depends on EFI && X86_64 + select EFI_COCO_SECRET + select SECURITYFS + help + This is a driver for accessing the EFI secret area via securityfs. + The EFI secret area is a memory area designated by the firmware for + confidential computing secret injection (for example for AMD SEV + guests). The driver exposes the secrets as files in + /secrets/coco. Files can be read and deleted (deleting + a file wipes the secret from memory). + + To compile this driver as a module, choose M here. + The module will be called efi_secret. diff --git a/drivers/virt/coco/efi_secret/Makefile b/drivers/virt/coco/efi_secret/Makefile new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..c7047ce804f7 --- /dev/null +++ b/drivers/virt/coco/efi_secret/Makefile @@ -0,0 +1,2 @@ +# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only +obj-$(CONFIG_EFI_SECRET) += efi_secret.o diff --git a/drivers/virt/coco/efi_secret/efi_secret.c b/drivers/virt/coco/efi_secret/efi_secret.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..e700a5ef7043 --- /dev/null +++ b/drivers/virt/coco/efi_secret/efi_secret.c @@ -0,0 +1,349 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 +/* + * efi_secret module + * + * Copyright (C) 2022 IBM Corporation + * Author: Dov Murik + */ + +/** + * DOC: efi_secret: Allow reading EFI confidential computing (coco) secret area + * via securityfs interface. + * + * When the module is loaded (and securityfs is mounted, typically under + * /sys/kernel/security), a "secrets/coco" directory is created in securityfs. + * In it, a file is created for each secret entry. The name of each such file + * is the GUID of the secret entry, and its content is the secret data. + */ + +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include + +#define EFI_SECRET_NUM_FILES 64 + +struct efi_secret { + struct dentry *secrets_dir; + struct dentry *fs_dir; + struct dentry *fs_files[EFI_SECRET_NUM_FILES]; + void __iomem *secret_data; + u64 secret_data_len; +}; + +/* + * Structure of the EFI secret area + * + * Offset Length + * (bytes) (bytes) Usage + * ------- ------- ----- + * 0 16 Secret table header GUID (must be 1e74f542-71dd-4d66-963e-ef4287ff173b) + * 16 4 Length of bytes of the entire secret area + * + * 20 16 First secret entry's GUID + * 36 4 First secret entry's length in bytes (= 16 + 4 + x) + * 40 x First secret entry's data + * + * 40+x 16 Second secret entry's GUID + * 56+x 4 Second secret entry's length in bytes (= 16 + 4 + y) + * 60+x y Second secret entry's data + * + * (... and so on for additional entries) + * + * The GUID of each secret entry designates the usage of the secret data. + */ + +/** + * struct secret_header - Header of entire secret area; this should be followed + * by instances of struct secret_entry. + * @guid: Must be EFI_SECRET_TABLE_HEADER_GUID + * @len: Length in bytes of entire secret area, including header + */ +struct secret_header { + efi_guid_t guid; + u32 len; +} __attribute((packed)); + +/** + * struct secret_entry - Holds one secret entry + * @guid: Secret-specific GUID (or NULL_GUID if this secret entry was deleted) + * @len: Length of secret entry, including its guid and len fields + * @data: The secret data (full of zeros if this secret entry was deleted) + */ +struct secret_entry { + efi_guid_t guid; + u32 len; + u8 data[]; +} __attribute((packed)); + +static size_t secret_entry_data_len(struct secret_entry *e) +{ + return e->len - sizeof(*e); +} + +static struct efi_secret the_efi_secret; + +static inline struct efi_secret *efi_secret_get(void) +{ + return &the_efi_secret; +} + +static int efi_secret_bin_file_show(struct seq_file *file, void *data) +{ + struct secret_entry *e = file->private; + + if (e) + seq_write(file, e->data, secret_entry_data_len(e)); + + return 0; +} +DEFINE_SHOW_ATTRIBUTE(efi_secret_bin_file); + +/* + * Overwrite memory content with zeroes, and ensure that dirty cache lines are + * actually written back to memory, to clear out the secret. + */ +static void wipe_memory(void *addr, size_t size) +{ + memzero_explicit(addr, size); +#ifdef CONFIG_X86 + clflush_cache_range(addr, size); +#endif +} + +static int efi_secret_unlink(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry) +{ + struct efi_secret *s = efi_secret_get(); + struct inode *inode = d_inode(dentry); + struct secret_entry *e = (struct secret_entry *)inode->i_private; + int i; + + if (e) { + /* Zero out the secret data */ + wipe_memory(e->data, secret_entry_data_len(e)); + e->guid = NULL_GUID; + } + + inode->i_private = NULL; + + for (i = 0; i < EFI_SECRET_NUM_FILES; i++) + if (s->fs_files[i] == dentry) + s->fs_files[i] = NULL; + + /* + * securityfs_remove tries to lock the directory's inode, but we reach + * the unlink callback when it's already locked + */ + inode_unlock(dir); + securityfs_remove(dentry); + inode_lock(dir); + + return 0; +} + +static const struct inode_operations efi_secret_dir_inode_operations = { + .lookup = simple_lookup, + .unlink = efi_secret_unlink, +}; + +static int efi_secret_map_area(struct platform_device *dev) +{ + int ret; + struct efi_secret *s = efi_secret_get(); + struct linux_efi_coco_secret_area *secret_area; + + if (efi.coco_secret == EFI_INVALID_TABLE_ADDR) { + dev_err(&dev->dev, "Secret area address is not available\n"); + return -EINVAL; + } + + secret_area = memremap(efi.coco_secret, sizeof(*secret_area), MEMREMAP_WB); + if (secret_area == NULL) { + dev_err(&dev->dev, "Could not map secret area EFI config entry\n"); + return -ENOMEM; + } + if (!secret_area->base_pa || secret_area->size < sizeof(struct secret_header)) { + dev_err(&dev->dev, + "Invalid secret area memory location (base_pa=0x%llx size=0x%llx)\n", + secret_area->base_pa, secret_area->size); + ret = -EINVAL; + goto unmap; + } + + s->secret_data = ioremap_encrypted(secret_area->base_pa, secret_area->size); + if (s->secret_data == NULL) { + dev_err(&dev->dev, "Could not map secret area\n"); + ret = -ENOMEM; + goto unmap; + } + + s->secret_data_len = secret_area->size; + ret = 0; + +unmap: + memunmap(secret_area); + return ret; +} + +static void efi_secret_securityfs_teardown(struct platform_device *dev) +{ + struct efi_secret *s = efi_secret_get(); + int i; + + for (i = (EFI_SECRET_NUM_FILES - 1); i >= 0; i--) { + securityfs_remove(s->fs_files[i]); + s->fs_files[i] = NULL; + } + + securityfs_remove(s->fs_dir); + s->fs_dir = NULL; + + securityfs_remove(s->secrets_dir); + s->secrets_dir = NULL; + + dev_dbg(&dev->dev, "Removed securityfs entries\n"); +} + +static int efi_secret_securityfs_setup(struct platform_device *dev) +{ + struct efi_secret *s = efi_secret_get(); + int ret = 0, i = 0, bytes_left; + unsigned char *ptr; + struct secret_header *h; + struct secret_entry *e; + struct dentry *dent; + char guid_str[EFI_VARIABLE_GUID_LEN + 1]; + + ptr = (void __force *)s->secret_data; + h = (struct secret_header *)ptr; + if (efi_guidcmp(h->guid, EFI_SECRET_TABLE_HEADER_GUID)) { + /* + * This is not an error: it just means that EFI defines secret + * area but it was not populated by the Guest Owner. + */ + dev_dbg(&dev->dev, "EFI secret area does not start with correct GUID\n"); + return -ENODEV; + } + if (h->len < sizeof(*h)) { + dev_err(&dev->dev, "EFI secret area reported length is too small\n"); + return -EINVAL; + } + if (h->len > s->secret_data_len) { + dev_err(&dev->dev, "EFI secret area reported length is too big\n"); + return -EINVAL; + } + + s->secrets_dir = NULL; + s->fs_dir = NULL; + memset(s->fs_files, 0, sizeof(s->fs_files)); + + dent = securityfs_create_dir("secrets", NULL); + if (IS_ERR(dent)) { + dev_err(&dev->dev, "Error creating secrets securityfs directory entry err=%ld\n", + PTR_ERR(dent)); + return PTR_ERR(dent); + } + s->secrets_dir = dent; + + dent = securityfs_create_dir("coco", s->secrets_dir); + if (IS_ERR(dent)) { + dev_err(&dev->dev, "Error creating coco securityfs directory entry err=%ld\n", + PTR_ERR(dent)); + return PTR_ERR(dent); + } + d_inode(dent)->i_op = &efi_secret_dir_inode_operations; + s->fs_dir = dent; + + bytes_left = h->len - sizeof(*h); + ptr += sizeof(*h); + while (bytes_left >= (int)sizeof(*e) && i < EFI_SECRET_NUM_FILES) { + e = (struct secret_entry *)ptr; + if (e->len < sizeof(*e) || e->len > (unsigned int)bytes_left) { + dev_err(&dev->dev, "EFI secret area is corrupted\n"); + ret = -EINVAL; + goto err_cleanup; + } + + /* Skip deleted entries (which will have NULL_GUID) */ + if (efi_guidcmp(e->guid, NULL_GUID)) { + efi_guid_to_str(&e->guid, guid_str); + + dent = securityfs_create_file(guid_str, 0440, s->fs_dir, (void *)e, + &efi_secret_bin_file_fops); + if (IS_ERR(dent)) { + dev_err(&dev->dev, "Error creating efi_secret securityfs entry\n"); + ret = PTR_ERR(dent); + goto err_cleanup; + } + + s->fs_files[i++] = dent; + } + ptr += e->len; + bytes_left -= e->len; + } + + dev_info(&dev->dev, "Created %d entries in securityfs secrets/coco\n", i); + return 0; + +err_cleanup: + efi_secret_securityfs_teardown(dev); + return ret; +} + +static void efi_secret_unmap_area(void) +{ + struct efi_secret *s = efi_secret_get(); + + if (s->secret_data) { + iounmap(s->secret_data); + s->secret_data = NULL; + s->secret_data_len = 0; + } +} + +static int efi_secret_probe(struct platform_device *dev) +{ + int ret; + + ret = efi_secret_map_area(dev); + if (ret) + return ret; + + ret = efi_secret_securityfs_setup(dev); + if (ret) + goto err_unmap; + + return ret; + +err_unmap: + efi_secret_unmap_area(); + return ret; +} + +static int efi_secret_remove(struct platform_device *dev) +{ + efi_secret_securityfs_teardown(dev); + efi_secret_unmap_area(); + return 0; +} + +static struct platform_driver efi_secret_driver = { + .probe = efi_secret_probe, + .remove = efi_secret_remove, + .driver = { + .name = "efi_secret", + }, +}; + +module_platform_driver(efi_secret_driver); + +MODULE_DESCRIPTION("Confidential computing EFI secret area access"); +MODULE_AUTHOR("IBM"); +MODULE_LICENSE("GPL"); +MODULE_ALIAS("platform:efi_secret"); From patchwork Tue Apr 12 21:21:26 2022 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Dov Murik X-Patchwork-Id: 560110 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id ADB6DC4332F for ; Tue, 12 Apr 2022 23:22:12 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S229969AbiDLXY3 (ORCPT ); Tue, 12 Apr 2022 19:24:29 -0400 Received: from lindbergh.monkeyblade.net ([23.128.96.19]:39048 "EHLO lindbergh.monkeyblade.net" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S229746AbiDLXYY (ORCPT ); Tue, 12 Apr 2022 19:24:24 -0400 Received: from mx0b-001b2d01.pphosted.com (mx0b-001b2d01.pphosted.com [148.163.158.5]) by lindbergh.monkeyblade.net (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 851C225597; Tue, 12 Apr 2022 15:46:29 -0700 (PDT) Received: from pps.filterd (m0098421.ppops.net [127.0.0.1]) by mx0a-001b2d01.pphosted.com (8.16.1.2/8.16.1.2) with SMTP id 23CIq6ti008918; 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Tue, 12 Apr 2022 21:21:39 +0000 (GMT) Received: from amdrome3.watson.ibm.com (unknown [9.2.130.16]) by b03ledav002.gho.boulder.ibm.com (Postfix) with ESMTP; Tue, 12 Apr 2022 21:21:39 +0000 (GMT) From: Dov Murik To: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org Cc: Dov Murik , Gerd Hoffmann , Borislav Petkov , Ashish Kalra , Brijesh Singh , Tom Lendacky , Ard Biesheuvel , James Morris , "Serge E. Hallyn" , Andi Kleen , Greg KH , Andrew Scull , Dave Hansen , "Dr. David Alan Gilbert" , Lenny Szubowicz , Peter Gonda , Matthew Garrett , James Bottomley , Tobin Feldman-Fitzthum , Jim Cadden , Daniele Buono , linux-coco@lists.linux.dev, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Subject: [PATCH v10 3/4] efi: Register efi_secret platform device if EFI secret area is declared Date: Tue, 12 Apr 2022 21:21:26 +0000 Message-Id: <20220412212127.154182-4-dovmurik@linux.ibm.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.25.1 In-Reply-To: <20220412212127.154182-1-dovmurik@linux.ibm.com> References: <20220412212127.154182-1-dovmurik@linux.ibm.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 X-TM-AS-GCONF: 00 X-Proofpoint-GUID: u2uTO1zImiDvv4PXQBKeJLTtOesbo-J2 X-Proofpoint-ORIG-GUID: xXX4t1_Acjk5qWhE6wrxt_BfOhH5jdEX X-Proofpoint-Virus-Version: vendor=baseguard engine=ICAP:2.0.205,Aquarius:18.0.858,Hydra:6.0.486,FMLib:17.11.64.514 definitions=2022-04-12_06,2022-04-12_02,2022-02-23_01 X-Proofpoint-Spam-Details: rule=outbound_notspam policy=outbound score=0 impostorscore=0 mlxscore=0 suspectscore=0 phishscore=0 priorityscore=1501 malwarescore=0 bulkscore=0 clxscore=1015 adultscore=0 spamscore=0 mlxlogscore=999 lowpriorityscore=0 classifier=spam adjust=0 reason=mlx scancount=1 engine=8.12.0-2202240000 definitions=main-2204120097 Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org During efi initialization, check if coco_secret is defined in the EFI configuration table; in such case, register platform device "efi_secret". This allows udev to automatically load the efi_secret module (platform driver), which in turn will populate the /secrets/coco directory in guests into which secrets were injected. Note that a declared address of an EFI secret area doesn't mean that secrets where indeed injected to that area; if the secret area is not populated, the driver will not load (but the platform device will still be registered). Signed-off-by: Dov Murik Reviewed-by: Gerd Hoffmann --- drivers/firmware/efi/efi.c | 5 +++++ 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+) diff --git a/drivers/firmware/efi/efi.c b/drivers/firmware/efi/efi.c index 378d044b2463..b8e68a121119 100644 --- a/drivers/firmware/efi/efi.c +++ b/drivers/firmware/efi/efi.c @@ -425,6 +425,11 @@ static int __init efisubsys_init(void) if (efi_enabled(EFI_DBG) && efi_enabled(EFI_PRESERVE_BS_REGIONS)) efi_debugfs_init(); +#ifdef CONFIG_EFI_COCO_SECRET + if (efi.coco_secret != EFI_INVALID_TABLE_ADDR) + platform_device_register_simple("efi_secret", 0, NULL, 0); +#endif + return 0; err_remove_group: From patchwork Tue Apr 12 21:21:27 2022 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Dov Murik X-Patchwork-Id: 560108 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 2DB0CC433F5 for ; Tue, 12 Apr 2022 23:33:13 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S230471AbiDLXfY (ORCPT ); Tue, 12 Apr 2022 19:35:24 -0400 Received: from lindbergh.monkeyblade.net ([23.128.96.19]:58120 "EHLO lindbergh.monkeyblade.net" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S230473AbiDLXcG (ORCPT ); Tue, 12 Apr 2022 19:32:06 -0400 Received: from mx0a-001b2d01.pphosted.com (mx0a-001b2d01.pphosted.com [148.163.156.1]) by lindbergh.monkeyblade.net (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 582ED92330; Tue, 12 Apr 2022 15:18:39 -0700 (PDT) Received: from pps.filterd (m0098396.ppops.net [127.0.0.1]) by mx0a-001b2d01.pphosted.com (8.16.1.2/8.16.1.2) with SMTP id 23CIbSme002614; Tue, 12 Apr 2022 21:21:47 GMT DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=ibm.com; h=from : to : cc : subject : date : message-id : in-reply-to : references : content-transfer-encoding : mime-version; s=pp1; bh=2oSiORtt5a9QwiuhXxdU0VsQ+I8NwUBoWpk6NI0GnpI=; b=TyaimdxyeZELeLBRiqK5XS+dfaaRi4yOTbP0Nl7Hz0dkxc4SkcE1vFJ0UdZmDbCEhzkE /9rSoI4wiFrYOxdXVG2Wuc+lePx+qtIzc1W6vk4e2q7g+taswnlO9Tjyvb18VaZzIskl sfFyKdrMWpINR1uSaQ6qW6Q2sGdMb2qE13wluV80cVv8tZn+mW5Tl9eqjWL5ZaF+KYgG 04vuMB97N34+fNMV17ODjZaxS4pp6jbW/HRXA+vt4mkaHQkdWmJ4FyGPaFepS/vaf1Ta Z9RWhqZ0YT7uLakcBugapETlpI9/OUmtqIJgk9VHFuXSelwCIr8E75mVk4LxBb38kdeX wA== Received: from pps.reinject (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by mx0a-001b2d01.pphosted.com with ESMTP id 3fdc9ppsjv-1 (version=TLSv1.2 cipher=ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 bits=256 verify=NOT); Tue, 12 Apr 2022 21:21:47 +0000 Received: from m0098396.ppops.net (m0098396.ppops.net [127.0.0.1]) by pps.reinject (8.16.0.43/8.16.0.43) with SMTP id 23CLFZC5030137; Tue, 12 Apr 2022 21:21:46 GMT Received: from ppma01dal.us.ibm.com (83.d6.3fa9.ip4.static.sl-reverse.com [169.63.214.131]) by mx0a-001b2d01.pphosted.com with ESMTP id 3fdc9ppsje-1 (version=TLSv1.2 cipher=ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 bits=256 verify=NOT); Tue, 12 Apr 2022 21:21:46 +0000 Received: from pps.filterd (ppma01dal.us.ibm.com [127.0.0.1]) by ppma01dal.us.ibm.com (8.16.1.2/8.16.1.2) with SMTP id 23CLDKGr020483; Tue, 12 Apr 2022 21:21:45 GMT Received: from b03cxnp07027.gho.boulder.ibm.com (b03cxnp07027.gho.boulder.ibm.com [9.17.130.14]) by ppma01dal.us.ibm.com with ESMTP id 3fb1s9huky-1 (version=TLSv1.2 cipher=ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 bits=256 verify=NOT); Tue, 12 Apr 2022 21:21:45 +0000 Received: from b03ledav002.gho.boulder.ibm.com (b03ledav002.gho.boulder.ibm.com [9.17.130.233]) by b03cxnp07027.gho.boulder.ibm.com (8.14.9/8.14.9/NCO v10.0) with ESMTP id 23CLLhti32440750 (version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=DHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 bits=256 verify=OK); Tue, 12 Apr 2022 21:21:43 GMT Received: from b03ledav002.gho.boulder.ibm.com (unknown [127.0.0.1]) by IMSVA (Postfix) with ESMTP id AD10A136059; Tue, 12 Apr 2022 21:21:43 +0000 (GMT) Received: from b03ledav002.gho.boulder.ibm.com (unknown [127.0.0.1]) by IMSVA (Postfix) with ESMTP id C8BF0136053; Tue, 12 Apr 2022 21:21:41 +0000 (GMT) Received: from amdrome3.watson.ibm.com (unknown [9.2.130.16]) by b03ledav002.gho.boulder.ibm.com (Postfix) with ESMTP; Tue, 12 Apr 2022 21:21:41 +0000 (GMT) From: Dov Murik To: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org Cc: Dov Murik , Gerd Hoffmann , Borislav Petkov , Ashish Kalra , Brijesh Singh , Tom Lendacky , Ard Biesheuvel , James Morris , "Serge E. Hallyn" , Andi Kleen , Greg KH , Andrew Scull , Dave Hansen , "Dr. David Alan Gilbert" , Lenny Szubowicz , Peter Gonda , Matthew Garrett , James Bottomley , Tobin Feldman-Fitzthum , Jim Cadden , Daniele Buono , linux-coco@lists.linux.dev, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Subject: [PATCH v10 4/4] docs: security: Add secrets/coco documentation Date: Tue, 12 Apr 2022 21:21:27 +0000 Message-Id: <20220412212127.154182-5-dovmurik@linux.ibm.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.25.1 In-Reply-To: <20220412212127.154182-1-dovmurik@linux.ibm.com> References: <20220412212127.154182-1-dovmurik@linux.ibm.com> X-TM-AS-GCONF: 00 X-Proofpoint-ORIG-GUID: All8PHM9a5wLlvG52Y76Y60pFu9FqBbv X-Proofpoint-GUID: iHhYFuIIKZ8o6CQeGJvxz-qn-H1xfyuF X-Proofpoint-UnRewURL: 0 URL was un-rewritten MIME-Version: 1.0 X-Proofpoint-Virus-Version: vendor=baseguard engine=ICAP:2.0.205,Aquarius:18.0.858,Hydra:6.0.486,FMLib:17.11.64.514 definitions=2022-04-12_06,2022-04-12_02,2022-02-23_01 X-Proofpoint-Spam-Details: rule=outbound_notspam policy=outbound score=0 impostorscore=0 priorityscore=1501 spamscore=0 lowpriorityscore=0 mlxlogscore=999 malwarescore=0 suspectscore=0 mlxscore=0 clxscore=1015 adultscore=0 phishscore=0 bulkscore=0 classifier=spam adjust=0 reason=mlx scancount=1 engine=8.12.0-2202240000 definitions=main-2204120097 Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org Add documentation for the efi_secret module which allows access to Confidential Computing injected secrets. Signed-off-by: Dov Murik Reviewed-by: Gerd Hoffmann --- Documentation/security/index.rst | 1 + Documentation/security/secrets/coco.rst | 103 ++++++++++++++++++++ Documentation/security/secrets/index.rst | 9 ++ 3 files changed, 113 insertions(+) diff --git a/Documentation/security/index.rst b/Documentation/security/index.rst index 16335de04e8c..6ed8d2fa6f9e 100644 --- a/Documentation/security/index.rst +++ b/Documentation/security/index.rst @@ -17,3 +17,4 @@ Security Documentation tpm/index digsig landlock + secrets/index diff --git a/Documentation/security/secrets/coco.rst b/Documentation/security/secrets/coco.rst new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..262e7abb1b24 --- /dev/null +++ b/Documentation/security/secrets/coco.rst @@ -0,0 +1,103 @@ +.. SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 + +============================== +Confidential Computing secrets +============================== + +This document describes how Confidential Computing secret injection is handled +from the firmware to the operating system, in the EFI driver and the efi_secret +kernel module. + + +Introduction +============ + +Confidential Computing (coco) hardware such as AMD SEV (Secure Encrypted +Virtualization) allows guest owners to inject secrets into the VMs +memory without the host/hypervisor being able to read them. In SEV, +secret injection is performed early in the VM launch process, before the +guest starts running. + +The efi_secret kernel module allows userspace applications to access these +secrets via securityfs. + + +Secret data flow +================ + +The guest firmware may reserve a designated memory area for secret injection, +and publish its location (base GPA and length) in the EFI configuration table +under a ``LINUX_EFI_COCO_SECRET_AREA_GUID`` entry +(``adf956ad-e98c-484c-ae11-b51c7d336447``). This memory area should be marked +by the firmware as ``EFI_RESERVED_TYPE``, and therefore the kernel should not +be use it for its own purposes. + +During the VM's launch, the virtual machine manager may inject a secret to that +area. In AMD SEV and SEV-ES this is performed using the +``KVM_SEV_LAUNCH_SECRET`` command (see [sev]_). The strucutre of the injected +Guest Owner secret data should be a GUIDed table of secret values; the binary +format is described in ``drivers/virt/coco/efi_secret/efi_secret.c`` under +"Structure of the EFI secret area". + +On kernel start, the kernel's EFI driver saves the location of the secret area +(taken from the EFI configuration table) in the ``efi.coco_secret`` field. +Later it checks if the secret area is populated: it maps the area and checks +whether its content begins with ``EFI_SECRET_TABLE_HEADER_GUID`` +(``1e74f542-71dd-4d66-963e-ef4287ff173b``). If the secret area is populated, +the EFI driver will autoload the efi_secret kernel module, which exposes the +secrets to userspace applications via securityfs. The details of the +efi_secret filesystem interface are in [secrets-coco-abi]_. + + +Application usage example +========================= + +Consider a guest performing computations on encrypted files. The Guest Owner +provides the decryption key (= secret) using the secret injection mechanism. +The guest application reads the secret from the efi_secret filesystem and +proceeds to decrypt the files into memory and then performs the needed +computations on the content. + +In this example, the host can't read the files from the disk image +because they are encrypted. Host can't read the decryption key because +it is passed using the secret injection mechanism (= secure channel). +Host can't read the decrypted content from memory because it's a +confidential (memory-encrypted) guest. + +Here is a simple example for usage of the efi_secret module in a guest +to which an EFI secret area with 4 secrets was injected during launch:: + + # ls -la /sys/kernel/security/secrets/coco + total 0 + drwxr-xr-x 2 root root 0 Jun 28 11:54 . + drwxr-xr-x 3 root root 0 Jun 28 11:54 .. + -r--r----- 1 root root 0 Jun 28 11:54 736870e5-84f0-4973-92ec-06879ce3da0b + -r--r----- 1 root root 0 Jun 28 11:54 83c83f7f-1356-4975-8b7e-d3a0b54312c6 + -r--r----- 1 root root 0 Jun 28 11:54 9553f55d-3da2-43ee-ab5d-ff17f78864d2 + -r--r----- 1 root root 0 Jun 28 11:54 e6f5a162-d67f-4750-a67c-5d065f2a9910 + + # hd /sys/kernel/security/secrets/coco/e6f5a162-d67f-4750-a67c-5d065f2a9910 + 00000000 74 68 65 73 65 2d 61 72 65 2d 74 68 65 2d 6b 61 |these-are-the-ka| + 00000010 74 61 2d 73 65 63 72 65 74 73 00 01 02 03 04 05 |ta-secrets......| + 00000020 06 07 |..| + 00000022 + + # rm /sys/kernel/security/secrets/coco/e6f5a162-d67f-4750-a67c-5d065f2a9910 + + # ls -la /sys/kernel/security/secrets/coco + total 0 + drwxr-xr-x 2 root root 0 Jun 28 11:55 . + drwxr-xr-x 3 root root 0 Jun 28 11:54 .. + -r--r----- 1 root root 0 Jun 28 11:54 736870e5-84f0-4973-92ec-06879ce3da0b + -r--r----- 1 root root 0 Jun 28 11:54 83c83f7f-1356-4975-8b7e-d3a0b54312c6 + -r--r----- 1 root root 0 Jun 28 11:54 9553f55d-3da2-43ee-ab5d-ff17f78864d2 + + +References +========== + +See [sev-api-spec]_ for more info regarding SEV ``LAUNCH_SECRET`` operation. + +.. [sev] Documentation/virt/kvm/amd-memory-encryption.rst +.. [secrets-coco-abi] Documentation/ABI/testing/securityfs-secrets-coco +.. [sev-api-spec] https://www.amd.com/system/files/TechDocs/55766_SEV-KM_API_Specification.pdf diff --git a/Documentation/security/secrets/index.rst b/Documentation/security/secrets/index.rst new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..ced34e9c43bd --- /dev/null +++ b/Documentation/security/secrets/index.rst @@ -0,0 +1,9 @@ +.. SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 + +===================== +Secrets documentation +===================== + +.. toctree:: + + coco