From patchwork Thu Aug 18 19:59:35 2022 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Leonard Crestez X-Patchwork-Id: 598940 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 5EBCFC32774 for ; Thu, 18 Aug 2022 20:00:58 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1345694AbiHRUA4 (ORCPT ); Thu, 18 Aug 2022 16:00:56 -0400 Received: from lindbergh.monkeyblade.net ([23.128.96.19]:54634 "EHLO lindbergh.monkeyblade.net" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1344870AbiHRUAW (ORCPT ); Thu, 18 Aug 2022 16:00:22 -0400 Received: from mail-ej1-x62a.google.com (mail-ej1-x62a.google.com [IPv6:2a00:1450:4864:20::62a]) by lindbergh.monkeyblade.net (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 187CCD11D4; Thu, 18 Aug 2022 13:00:20 -0700 (PDT) Received: by mail-ej1-x62a.google.com with SMTP id w19so5174885ejc.7; Thu, 18 Aug 2022 13:00:19 -0700 (PDT) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=gmail.com; s=20210112; h=content-transfer-encoding:mime-version:references:in-reply-to :message-id:date:subject:cc:to:from:from:to:cc; bh=Nf9BA+Y8PcTFBc7/UFSdzG95FPPUF2z5i+juXoSi/so=; b=P6h3c1oVVj0xav3p7xXC65WHevUDvvpvKUszMZ/FciJb+s76beNirDcLOoK9UhCHIk dpGQKRceNW0yoOoQEqYOAXgU6TPg/x5ZYBqz5ObAqXFSp+eUUKjtqZdrcGt4GIxpgBPp a8qYixeUfNka5H5TJGiMHaVHD0CM4DUHoxL6GYKnZLxuhaTFxaGbzxbFqBVNFhkjZMJf AWWrEF1v3h/R8ICFSnWMDiky1k8Kfq0KNEtS+CR9w/4MiktJ39PkeVMTbsmy8zgEIkXG D4fP/BSNB7LNzL9wYZi3Soy4Sd9G9huqQ82dKlx3ZK9S6AmSZXcqGoD8iOQ7xJJxODZ9 jBLQ== X-Google-DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=1e100.net; s=20210112; h=content-transfer-encoding:mime-version:references:in-reply-to :message-id:date:subject:cc:to:from:x-gm-message-state:from:to:cc; bh=Nf9BA+Y8PcTFBc7/UFSdzG95FPPUF2z5i+juXoSi/so=; b=biagYh2R6knh0GPYMGQZ4AqIRbnFcpGduVmkzNMX+4GAlaF3F+D49srfV3ganwnWUw omzYQoKvONYqOJ39gi2qvHq2CkZAqOh5HaiklqYIIu83UV5dp15x88V1gx6AoN04Fh2Z sFLHD/apRi18oxtoTln4T8C+G+N//ayfsDn7apblCBQKD7oCprHFebhDXjxNhy+IV/Kl 9W4m02C7GsVqjaQUpiGP1XF8lXlE0M8MYjR8D9s4hNpZMEjFXJ7tIyKgxqT7MvF3CkFJ L7bDy3iGPGuES8OMV0ibFrsBmZdy4lxzkzUvY7xXZyl1idXYhargqJNLTVXeugMhvEjP x5dg== X-Gm-Message-State: ACgBeo1HMWM8pS0+5hEwUSxAlQR2U+VWqzINl47mkSQvepfMtuGSqTTQ zq0xsc4pPPrDUDCP9q9WmfY= X-Google-Smtp-Source: AA6agR7EZf7u081lQL2aMSPy7NTZSYebTTxVaxqNA5XnMdX1vcS1OgklORGMO57SIODM3ihhYPTHYg== X-Received: by 2002:a17:907:75ce:b0:73b:dab0:8937 with SMTP id jl14-20020a17090775ce00b0073bdab08937mr2292310ejc.568.1660852818402; Thu, 18 Aug 2022 13:00:18 -0700 (PDT) Received: from localhost.localdomain ([2a04:241e:502:a080:17c8:ba1c:b6f3:3fe0]) by smtp.gmail.com with ESMTPSA id fw30-20020a170907501e00b00722e4bab163sm1215087ejc.200.2022.08.18.13.00.16 (version=TLS1_3 cipher=TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 bits=256/256); Thu, 18 Aug 2022 13:00:17 -0700 (PDT) From: Leonard Crestez To: David Ahern , Eric Dumazet , Philip Paeps Cc: Dmitry Safonov <0x7f454c46@gmail.com>, Shuah Khan , "David S. Miller" , Herbert Xu , Kuniyuki Iwashima , Hideaki YOSHIFUJI , Jakub Kicinski , Yuchung Cheng , Francesco Ruggeri , Mat Martineau , Christoph Paasch , Ivan Delalande , Caowangbao , Priyaranjan Jha , netdev@vger.kernel.org, linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org, linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Subject: [PATCH v7 01/26] tcp: authopt: Initial support and key management Date: Thu, 18 Aug 2022 22:59:35 +0300 Message-Id: <3b1a1be61e9300af242280313c93b901da9f57a6.1660852705.git.cdleonard@gmail.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.25.1 In-Reply-To: References: MIME-Version: 1.0 Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org This commit adds support to add and remove keys but does not use them further. Similar to tcp md5 a single pointer to a struct tcp_authopt_info* struct is added to struct tcp_sock, this avoids increasing memory usage. The data structures related to tcp_authopt are initialized on setsockopt and only freed on socket close. Signed-off-by: Leonard Crestez --- include/linux/tcp.h | 9 + include/net/net_namespace.h | 4 + include/net/netns/tcp_authopt.h | 12 ++ include/net/tcp.h | 1 + include/net/tcp_authopt.h | 70 +++++++ include/uapi/linux/tcp.h | 81 ++++++++ net/ipv4/Kconfig | 14 ++ net/ipv4/Makefile | 1 + net/ipv4/tcp.c | 32 ++++ net/ipv4/tcp_authopt.c | 317 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c | 2 + 11 files changed, 543 insertions(+) create mode 100644 include/net/netns/tcp_authopt.h create mode 100644 include/net/tcp_authopt.h create mode 100644 net/ipv4/tcp_authopt.c diff --git a/include/linux/tcp.h b/include/linux/tcp.h index a9fbe22732c3..551942883f06 100644 --- a/include/linux/tcp.h +++ b/include/linux/tcp.h @@ -170,10 +170,12 @@ struct tcp_request_sock { static inline struct tcp_request_sock *tcp_rsk(const struct request_sock *req) { return (struct tcp_request_sock *)req; } +struct tcp_authopt_info; + struct tcp_sock { /* inet_connection_sock has to be the first member of tcp_sock */ struct inet_connection_sock inet_conn; u16 tcp_header_len; /* Bytes of tcp header to send */ u16 gso_segs; /* Max number of segs per GSO packet */ @@ -434,10 +436,14 @@ struct tcp_sock { /* TCP MD5 Signature Option information */ struct tcp_md5sig_info __rcu *md5sig_info; #endif +#ifdef CONFIG_TCP_AUTHOPT + struct tcp_authopt_info __rcu *authopt_info; +#endif + /* TCP fastopen related information */ struct tcp_fastopen_request *fastopen_req; /* fastopen_rsk points to request_sock that resulted in this big * socket. Used to retransmit SYNACKs etc. */ @@ -484,10 +490,13 @@ struct tcp_timewait_sock { int tw_ts_recent_stamp; u32 tw_tx_delay; #ifdef CONFIG_TCP_MD5SIG struct tcp_md5sig_key *tw_md5_key; #endif +#ifdef CONFIG_TCP_AUTHOPT + struct tcp_authopt_info *tw_authopt_info; +#endif }; static inline struct tcp_timewait_sock *tcp_twsk(const struct sock *sk) { return (struct tcp_timewait_sock *)sk; diff --git a/include/net/net_namespace.h b/include/net/net_namespace.h index 8c3587d5c308..30964366951d 100644 --- a/include/net/net_namespace.h +++ b/include/net/net_namespace.h @@ -35,10 +35,11 @@ #include #include #include #include #include +#include #include #include #include #include #include @@ -184,10 +185,13 @@ struct net { #endif struct sock *diag_nlsk; #if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SMC) struct netns_smc smc; #endif +#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_TCP_AUTHOPT) + struct netns_tcp_authopt tcp_authopt; +#endif } __randomize_layout; #include /* Init's network namespace */ diff --git a/include/net/netns/tcp_authopt.h b/include/net/netns/tcp_authopt.h new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..03b7f4e58448 --- /dev/null +++ b/include/net/netns/tcp_authopt.h @@ -0,0 +1,12 @@ +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */ +#ifndef __NETNS_TCP_AUTHOPT_H__ +#define __NETNS_TCP_AUTHOPT_H__ + +#include + +struct netns_tcp_authopt { + struct hlist_head head; + struct mutex mutex; +}; + +#endif /* __NETNS_TCP_AUTHOPT_H__ */ diff --git a/include/net/tcp.h b/include/net/tcp.h index d10962b9f0d0..9955a88faf9b 100644 --- a/include/net/tcp.h +++ b/include/net/tcp.h @@ -184,10 +184,11 @@ void tcp_time_wait(struct sock *sk, int state, int timeo); #define TCPOPT_WINDOW 3 /* Window scaling */ #define TCPOPT_SACK_PERM 4 /* SACK Permitted */ #define TCPOPT_SACK 5 /* SACK Block */ #define TCPOPT_TIMESTAMP 8 /* Better RTT estimations/PAWS */ #define TCPOPT_MD5SIG 19 /* MD5 Signature (RFC2385) */ +#define TCPOPT_AUTHOPT 29 /* Auth Option (RFC5925) */ #define TCPOPT_MPTCP 30 /* Multipath TCP (RFC6824) */ #define TCPOPT_FASTOPEN 34 /* Fast open (RFC7413) */ #define TCPOPT_EXP 254 /* Experimental */ /* Magic number to be after the option value for sharing TCP * experimental options. See draft-ietf-tcpm-experimental-options-00.txt diff --git a/include/net/tcp_authopt.h b/include/net/tcp_authopt.h new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..bc2cff82830d --- /dev/null +++ b/include/net/tcp_authopt.h @@ -0,0 +1,70 @@ +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later */ +#ifndef _LINUX_TCP_AUTHOPT_H +#define _LINUX_TCP_AUTHOPT_H + +#include +#include +#include + +/** + * struct tcp_authopt_key_info - Representation of a Master Key Tuple as per RFC5925 + * + * Key structure lifetime is protected by RCU so send/recv code needs to hold a + * single rcu_read_lock until they're done with the key. + * + * Global keys can be cached in sockets, this requires increasing kref. + */ +struct tcp_authopt_key_info { + /** @node: node in &netns_tcp_authopt.head list */ + struct hlist_node node; + /** @rcu: for kfree_rcu */ + struct rcu_head rcu; + /** @ref: for kref_put */ + struct kref ref; + /** @flags: Combination of &enum tcp_authopt_key_flag */ + u32 flags; + /** @send_id: Same as &tcp_authopt_key.send_id */ + u8 send_id; + /** @recv_id: Same as &tcp_authopt_key.recv_id */ + u8 recv_id; + /** @alg_id: Same as &tcp_authopt_key.alg */ + u8 alg_id; + /** @keylen: Same as &tcp_authopt_key.keylen */ + u8 keylen; + /** @key: Same as &tcp_authopt_key.key */ + u8 key[TCP_AUTHOPT_MAXKEYLEN]; + /** @addr: Same as &tcp_authopt_key.addr */ + struct sockaddr_storage addr; +}; + +/** + * struct tcp_authopt_info - Per-socket information regarding tcp_authopt + * + * This is lazy-initialized in order to avoid increasing memory usage for + * regular TCP sockets. Once created it is only destroyed on socket close. + */ +struct tcp_authopt_info { + /** @rcu: for kfree_rcu */ + struct rcu_head rcu; + /** @flags: Combination of &enum tcp_authopt_flag */ + u32 flags; + /** @src_isn: Local Initial Sequence Number */ + u32 src_isn; + /** @dst_isn: Remote Initial Sequence Number */ + u32 dst_isn; +}; + +#ifdef CONFIG_TCP_AUTHOPT +DECLARE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(tcp_authopt_needed_key); +#define tcp_authopt_needed (static_branch_unlikely(&tcp_authopt_needed_key)) +void tcp_authopt_clear(struct sock *sk); +int tcp_set_authopt(struct sock *sk, sockptr_t optval, unsigned int optlen); +int tcp_get_authopt_val(struct sock *sk, struct tcp_authopt *key); +int tcp_set_authopt_key(struct sock *sk, sockptr_t optval, unsigned int optlen); +#else +static inline void tcp_authopt_clear(struct sock *sk) +{ +} +#endif + +#endif /* _LINUX_TCP_AUTHOPT_H */ diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/tcp.h b/include/uapi/linux/tcp.h index 8fc09e8638b3..76d7be6b27f4 100644 --- a/include/uapi/linux/tcp.h +++ b/include/uapi/linux/tcp.h @@ -126,10 +126,12 @@ enum { #define TCP_INQ 36 /* Notify bytes available to read as a cmsg on read */ #define TCP_CM_INQ TCP_INQ #define TCP_TX_DELAY 37 /* delay outgoing packets by XX usec */ +#define TCP_AUTHOPT 38 /* TCP Authentication Option (RFC5925) */ +#define TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY 39 /* TCP Authentication Option Key (RFC5925) */ #define TCP_REPAIR_ON 1 #define TCP_REPAIR_OFF 0 #define TCP_REPAIR_OFF_NO_WP -1 /* Turn off without window probes */ @@ -340,10 +342,89 @@ struct tcp_diag_md5sig { __u16 tcpm_keylen; __be32 tcpm_addr[4]; __u8 tcpm_key[TCP_MD5SIG_MAXKEYLEN]; }; +/** + * enum tcp_authopt_flag - flags for `tcp_authopt.flags` + */ +enum tcp_authopt_flag { + /** + * @TCP_AUTHOPT_FLAG_REJECT_UNEXPECTED: + * Configure behavior of segments with TCP-AO coming from hosts for which no + * key is configured. The default recommended by RFC is to silently accept + * such connections. + */ + TCP_AUTHOPT_FLAG_REJECT_UNEXPECTED = (1 << 2), +}; + +/** + * struct tcp_authopt - Per-socket options related to TCP Authentication Option + */ +struct tcp_authopt { + /** @flags: Combination of &enum tcp_authopt_flag */ + __u32 flags; +}; + +/** + * enum tcp_authopt_key_flag - flags for `tcp_authopt.flags` + * + * @TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_DEL: Delete the key and ignore non-id fields + * @TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_EXCLUDE_OPTS: Exclude TCP options from signature + * @TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_ADDR_BIND: Key only valid for `tcp_authopt.addr` + */ +enum tcp_authopt_key_flag { + TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_DEL = (1 << 0), + TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_EXCLUDE_OPTS = (1 << 1), + TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_ADDR_BIND = (1 << 2), +}; + +/** + * enum tcp_authopt_alg - Algorithms for TCP Authentication Option + */ +enum tcp_authopt_alg { + /** @TCP_AUTHOPT_ALG_HMAC_SHA_1_96: HMAC-SHA-1-96 as described in RFC5926 */ + TCP_AUTHOPT_ALG_HMAC_SHA_1_96 = 1, + /** @TCP_AUTHOPT_ALG_AES_128_CMAC_96: AES-128-CMAC-96 as described in RFC5926 */ + TCP_AUTHOPT_ALG_AES_128_CMAC_96 = 2, +}; + +/* for TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY socket option */ +#define TCP_AUTHOPT_MAXKEYLEN 80 + +/** + * struct tcp_authopt_key - TCP Authentication KEY + * + * Key are identified by the combination of: + * - send_id + * - recv_id + * - addr (iff TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_ADDR_BIND) + * + * RFC5925 requires that key ids must not overlap for the same TCP connection. + * This is not enforced by linux. + */ +struct tcp_authopt_key { + /** @flags: Combination of &enum tcp_authopt_key_flag */ + __u32 flags; + /** @send_id: keyid value for send */ + __u8 send_id; + /** @recv_id: keyid value for receive */ + __u8 recv_id; + /** @alg: One of &enum tcp_authopt_alg */ + __u8 alg; + /** @keylen: Length of the key buffer */ + __u8 keylen; + /** @key: Secret key */ + __u8 key[TCP_AUTHOPT_MAXKEYLEN]; + /** + * @addr: Key is only valid for this address + * + * Ignored unless TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_ADDR_BIND flag is set + */ + struct __kernel_sockaddr_storage addr; +}; + /* setsockopt(fd, IPPROTO_TCP, TCP_ZEROCOPY_RECEIVE, ...) */ #define TCP_RECEIVE_ZEROCOPY_FLAG_TLB_CLEAN_HINT 0x1 struct tcp_zerocopy_receive { __u64 address; /* in: address of mapping */ diff --git a/net/ipv4/Kconfig b/net/ipv4/Kconfig index e983bb0c5012..75f7e3c75ea6 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/Kconfig +++ b/net/ipv4/Kconfig @@ -739,5 +739,19 @@ config TCP_MD5SIG RFC2385 specifies a method of giving MD5 protection to TCP sessions. Its main (only?) use is to protect BGP sessions between core routers on the Internet. If unsure, say N. + +config TCP_AUTHOPT + bool "TCP: Authentication Option support (RFC5925)" + select CRYPTO + select CRYPTO_SHA1 + select CRYPTO_HMAC + select CRYPTO_AES + select CRYPTO_CMAC + help + RFC5925 specifies a new method of giving protection to TCP sessions. + Its intended use is to protect BGP sessions between core routers + on the Internet. It obsoletes TCP MD5 (RFC2385) but is incompatible. + + If unsure, say N. diff --git a/net/ipv4/Makefile b/net/ipv4/Makefile index bbdd9c44f14e..d336f32ce177 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/Makefile +++ b/net/ipv4/Makefile @@ -59,10 +59,11 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_TCP_CONG_NV) += tcp_nv.o obj-$(CONFIG_TCP_CONG_VENO) += tcp_veno.o obj-$(CONFIG_TCP_CONG_SCALABLE) += tcp_scalable.o obj-$(CONFIG_TCP_CONG_LP) += tcp_lp.o obj-$(CONFIG_TCP_CONG_YEAH) += tcp_yeah.o obj-$(CONFIG_TCP_CONG_ILLINOIS) += tcp_illinois.o +obj-$(CONFIG_TCP_AUTHOPT) += tcp_authopt.o obj-$(CONFIG_NET_SOCK_MSG) += tcp_bpf.o obj-$(CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL) += udp_bpf.o obj-$(CONFIG_NETLABEL) += cipso_ipv4.o obj-$(CONFIG_XFRM) += xfrm4_policy.o xfrm4_state.o xfrm4_input.o \ diff --git a/net/ipv4/tcp.c b/net/ipv4/tcp.c index 970e9a2cca4a..1e9eaf805e4c 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/tcp.c +++ b/net/ipv4/tcp.c @@ -270,10 +270,11 @@ #include #include #include #include +#include #include #include #include #include @@ -3706,10 +3707,18 @@ static int do_tcp_setsockopt(struct sock *sk, int level, int optname, #ifdef CONFIG_TCP_MD5SIG case TCP_MD5SIG: case TCP_MD5SIG_EXT: err = tp->af_specific->md5_parse(sk, optname, optval, optlen); break; +#endif +#ifdef CONFIG_TCP_AUTHOPT + case TCP_AUTHOPT: + err = tcp_set_authopt(sk, optval, optlen); + break; + case TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY: + err = tcp_set_authopt_key(sk, optval, optlen); + break; #endif case TCP_USER_TIMEOUT: /* Cap the max time in ms TCP will retry or probe the window * before giving up and aborting (ETIMEDOUT) a connection. */ @@ -4357,10 +4366,33 @@ static int do_tcp_getsockopt(struct sock *sk, int level, if (!err && copy_to_user(optval, &zc, len)) err = -EFAULT; return err; } #endif +#ifdef CONFIG_TCP_AUTHOPT + case TCP_AUTHOPT: { + struct tcp_authopt info; + int err; + + if (get_user(len, optlen)) + return -EFAULT; + + lock_sock(sk); + err = tcp_get_authopt_val(sk, &info); + release_sock(sk); + + if (err) + return err; + len = min_t(unsigned int, len, sizeof(info)); + if (put_user(len, optlen)) + return -EFAULT; + if (copy_to_user(optval, &info, len)) + return -EFAULT; + return 0; + } +#endif + default: return -ENOPROTOOPT; } if (put_user(len, optlen)) diff --git a/net/ipv4/tcp_authopt.c b/net/ipv4/tcp_authopt.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..d38e9c89c89d --- /dev/null +++ b/net/ipv4/tcp_authopt.c @@ -0,0 +1,317 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later + +#include +#include +#include +#include + +/* This is enabled when first struct tcp_authopt_info is allocated and never released */ +DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(tcp_authopt_needed_key); +EXPORT_SYMBOL(tcp_authopt_needed_key); + +static inline struct netns_tcp_authopt *sock_net_tcp_authopt(const struct sock *sk) +{ + return &sock_net(sk)->tcp_authopt; +} + +static void tcp_authopt_key_release_kref(struct kref *ref) +{ + struct tcp_authopt_key_info *key = container_of(ref, struct tcp_authopt_key_info, ref); + + kfree_rcu(key, rcu); +} + +static void tcp_authopt_key_put(struct tcp_authopt_key_info *key) +{ + if (key) + kref_put(&key->ref, tcp_authopt_key_release_kref); +} + +static void tcp_authopt_key_del(struct netns_tcp_authopt *net, + struct tcp_authopt_key_info *key) +{ + lockdep_assert_held(&net->mutex); + hlist_del_rcu(&key->node); + key->flags |= TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_DEL; + kref_put(&key->ref, tcp_authopt_key_release_kref); +} + +/* Free info and keys. + * Don't touch tp->authopt_info, it might not even be assigned yes. + */ +void tcp_authopt_free(struct sock *sk, struct tcp_authopt_info *info) +{ + kfree_rcu(info, rcu); +} + +/* Free everything and clear tcp_sock.authopt_info to NULL */ +void tcp_authopt_clear(struct sock *sk) +{ + struct tcp_authopt_info *info; + + info = rcu_dereference_protected(tcp_sk(sk)->authopt_info, lockdep_sock_is_held(sk)); + if (info) { + tcp_authopt_free(sk, info); + tcp_sk(sk)->authopt_info = NULL; + } +} + +/* checks that ipv4 or ipv6 addr matches. */ +static bool ipvx_addr_match(struct sockaddr_storage *a1, + struct sockaddr_storage *a2) +{ + if (a1->ss_family != a2->ss_family) + return false; + if (a1->ss_family == AF_INET && + (((struct sockaddr_in *)a1)->sin_addr.s_addr != + ((struct sockaddr_in *)a2)->sin_addr.s_addr)) + return false; + if (a1->ss_family == AF_INET6 && + !ipv6_addr_equal(&((struct sockaddr_in6 *)a1)->sin6_addr, + &((struct sockaddr_in6 *)a2)->sin6_addr)) + return false; + return true; +} + +static bool tcp_authopt_key_match_exact(struct tcp_authopt_key_info *info, + struct tcp_authopt_key *key) +{ + if (info->send_id != key->send_id) + return false; + if (info->recv_id != key->recv_id) + return false; + if ((info->flags & TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_ADDR_BIND) != (key->flags & TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_ADDR_BIND)) + return false; + if (info->flags & TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_ADDR_BIND) + if (!ipvx_addr_match(&info->addr, &key->addr)) + return false; + + return true; +} + +static struct tcp_authopt_key_info *tcp_authopt_key_lookup_exact(const struct sock *sk, + struct netns_tcp_authopt *net, + struct tcp_authopt_key *ukey) +{ + struct tcp_authopt_key_info *key_info; + + hlist_for_each_entry_rcu(key_info, &net->head, node, lockdep_is_held(&net->mutex)) + if (tcp_authopt_key_match_exact(key_info, ukey)) + return key_info; + + return NULL; +} + +static struct tcp_authopt_info *__tcp_authopt_info_get_or_create(struct sock *sk) +{ + struct tcp_sock *tp = tcp_sk(sk); + struct tcp_authopt_info *info; + + info = rcu_dereference_check(tp->authopt_info, lockdep_sock_is_held(sk)); + if (info) + return info; + + info = kzalloc(sizeof(*info), GFP_KERNEL); + if (!info) + return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM); + + /* Never released: */ + static_branch_inc(&tcp_authopt_needed_key); + sk_gso_disable(sk); + rcu_assign_pointer(tp->authopt_info, info); + + return info; +} + +#define TCP_AUTHOPT_KNOWN_FLAGS ( \ + TCP_AUTHOPT_FLAG_REJECT_UNEXPECTED) + +/* Like copy_from_sockptr except tolerate different optlen for compatibility reasons + * + * If the src is shorter then it's from an old userspace and the rest of dst is + * filled with zeros. + * + * If the dst is shorter then src is from a newer userspace and we only accept + * if the rest of the option is all zeros. + * + * This allows sockopts to grow as long as for new fields zeros has no effect. + */ +static int _copy_from_sockptr_tolerant(u8 *dst, + unsigned int dstlen, + sockptr_t src, + unsigned int srclen) +{ + int err; + + /* If userspace optlen is too short fill the rest with zeros */ + if (srclen > dstlen) { + if (sockptr_is_kernel(src)) + return -EINVAL; + err = check_zeroed_user(src.user + dstlen, srclen - dstlen); + if (err < 0) + return err; + if (err == 0) + return -EINVAL; + } + err = copy_from_sockptr(dst, src, min(srclen, dstlen)); + if (err) + return err; + if (srclen < dstlen) + memset(dst + srclen, 0, dstlen - srclen); + + return err; +} + +int tcp_set_authopt(struct sock *sk, sockptr_t optval, unsigned int optlen) +{ + struct tcp_authopt opt; + struct tcp_authopt_info *info; + int err; + + sock_owned_by_me(sk); + + err = _copy_from_sockptr_tolerant((u8 *)&opt, sizeof(opt), optval, optlen); + if (err) + return err; + + if (opt.flags & ~TCP_AUTHOPT_KNOWN_FLAGS) + return -EINVAL; + + info = __tcp_authopt_info_get_or_create(sk); + if (IS_ERR(info)) + return PTR_ERR(info); + + info->flags = opt.flags & TCP_AUTHOPT_KNOWN_FLAGS; + + return 0; +} + +int tcp_get_authopt_val(struct sock *sk, struct tcp_authopt *opt) +{ + struct tcp_sock *tp = tcp_sk(sk); + struct tcp_authopt_info *info; + + memset(opt, 0, sizeof(*opt)); + sock_owned_by_me(sk); + + info = rcu_dereference_check(tp->authopt_info, lockdep_sock_is_held(sk)); + if (!info) + return -ENOENT; + + opt->flags = info->flags & TCP_AUTHOPT_KNOWN_FLAGS; + + return 0; +} + +#define TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_KNOWN_FLAGS ( \ + TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_DEL | \ + TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_EXCLUDE_OPTS | \ + TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_ADDR_BIND) + +int tcp_set_authopt_key(struct sock *sk, sockptr_t optval, unsigned int optlen) +{ + struct tcp_authopt_key opt; + struct tcp_authopt_info *info; + struct tcp_authopt_key_info *key_info, *old_key_info; + struct netns_tcp_authopt *net = sock_net_tcp_authopt(sk); + int err; + + sock_owned_by_me(sk); + if (!ns_capable(sock_net(sk)->user_ns, CAP_NET_ADMIN)) + return -EPERM; + + err = _copy_from_sockptr_tolerant((u8 *)&opt, sizeof(opt), optval, optlen); + if (err) + return err; + + if (opt.flags & ~TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_KNOWN_FLAGS) + return -EINVAL; + + if (opt.keylen > TCP_AUTHOPT_MAXKEYLEN) + return -EINVAL; + + /* Delete is a special case: */ + if (opt.flags & TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_DEL) { + mutex_lock(&net->mutex); + key_info = tcp_authopt_key_lookup_exact(sk, net, &opt); + if (key_info) { + tcp_authopt_key_del(net, key_info); + err = 0; + } else { + err = -ENOENT; + } + mutex_unlock(&net->mutex); + return err; + } + + /* check key family */ + if (opt.flags & TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_ADDR_BIND) { + if (sk->sk_family != opt.addr.ss_family) + return -EINVAL; + } + + /* Initialize tcp_authopt_info if not already set */ + info = __tcp_authopt_info_get_or_create(sk); + if (IS_ERR(info)) + return PTR_ERR(info); + + key_info = kmalloc(sizeof(*key_info), GFP_KERNEL | __GFP_ZERO); + if (!key_info) + return -ENOMEM; + mutex_lock(&net->mutex); + kref_init(&key_info->ref); + /* If an old key exists with exact ID then remove and replace. + * RCU-protected readers might observe both and pick any. + */ + old_key_info = tcp_authopt_key_lookup_exact(sk, net, &opt); + if (old_key_info) + tcp_authopt_key_del(net, old_key_info); + key_info->flags = opt.flags & TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_KNOWN_FLAGS; + key_info->send_id = opt.send_id; + key_info->recv_id = opt.recv_id; + key_info->alg_id = opt.alg; + key_info->keylen = opt.keylen; + memcpy(key_info->key, opt.key, opt.keylen); + memcpy(&key_info->addr, &opt.addr, sizeof(key_info->addr)); + hlist_add_head_rcu(&key_info->node, &net->head); + mutex_unlock(&net->mutex); + + return 0; +} + +static int tcp_authopt_init_net(struct net *full_net) +{ + struct netns_tcp_authopt *net = &full_net->tcp_authopt; + + mutex_init(&net->mutex); + INIT_HLIST_HEAD(&net->head); + + return 0; +} + +static void tcp_authopt_exit_net(struct net *full_net) +{ + struct netns_tcp_authopt *net = &full_net->tcp_authopt; + struct tcp_authopt_key_info *key; + struct hlist_node *n; + + mutex_lock(&net->mutex); + + hlist_for_each_entry_safe(key, n, &net->head, node) { + hlist_del_rcu(&key->node); + tcp_authopt_key_put(key); + } + + mutex_unlock(&net->mutex); +} + +static struct pernet_operations net_ops = { + .init = tcp_authopt_init_net, + .exit = tcp_authopt_exit_net, +}; + +static int __init tcp_authopt_init(void) +{ + return register_pernet_subsys(&net_ops); +} +late_initcall(tcp_authopt_init); diff --git a/net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c b/net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c index 0c83780dc9bf..e8b2ab088828 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c +++ b/net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c @@ -60,10 +60,11 @@ #include #include #include #include +#include #include #include #include #include #include @@ -2248,10 +2249,11 @@ void tcp_v4_destroy_sock(struct sock *sk) tcp_clear_md5_list(sk); kfree_rcu(rcu_dereference_protected(tp->md5sig_info, 1), rcu); tp->md5sig_info = NULL; } #endif + tcp_authopt_clear(sk); /* Clean up a referenced TCP bind bucket. */ if (inet_csk(sk)->icsk_bind_hash) inet_put_port(sk); From patchwork Thu Aug 18 19:59:36 2022 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Leonard Crestez X-Patchwork-Id: 598939 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id D6E51C32789 for ; Thu, 18 Aug 2022 20:01:00 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1345703AbiHRUA6 (ORCPT ); Thu, 18 Aug 2022 16:00:58 -0400 Received: from lindbergh.monkeyblade.net ([23.128.96.19]:54644 "EHLO lindbergh.monkeyblade.net" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S232582AbiHRUAW (ORCPT ); Thu, 18 Aug 2022 16:00:22 -0400 Received: from mail-ej1-x629.google.com (mail-ej1-x629.google.com [IPv6:2a00:1450:4864:20::629]) by lindbergh.monkeyblade.net (Postfix) with ESMTPS id DD4ECD11C8; 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Miller" , Herbert Xu , Kuniyuki Iwashima , Hideaki YOSHIFUJI , Jakub Kicinski , Yuchung Cheng , Francesco Ruggeri , Mat Martineau , Christoph Paasch , Ivan Delalande , Caowangbao , Priyaranjan Jha , netdev@vger.kernel.org, linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org, linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Subject: [PATCH v7 02/26] docs: Add user documentation for tcp_authopt Date: Thu, 18 Aug 2022 22:59:36 +0300 Message-Id: <8594c8d9de865b7d4d6ec3a783758fec23a70104.1660852705.git.cdleonard@gmail.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.25.1 In-Reply-To: References: MIME-Version: 1.0 Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org The .rst documentation contains a brief description of the user interface and includes kernel-doc generated from uapi header. Signed-off-by: Leonard Crestez --- Documentation/networking/index.rst | 1 + Documentation/networking/tcp_authopt.rst | 51 ++++++++++++++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 52 insertions(+) create mode 100644 Documentation/networking/tcp_authopt.rst diff --git a/Documentation/networking/index.rst b/Documentation/networking/index.rst index 03b215bddde8..294b87137cd2 100644 --- a/Documentation/networking/index.rst +++ b/Documentation/networking/index.rst @@ -103,10 +103,11 @@ Contents: strparser switchdev sysfs-tagging tc-actions-env-rules tcp-thin + tcp_authopt team timestamping tipc tproxy tuntap diff --git a/Documentation/networking/tcp_authopt.rst b/Documentation/networking/tcp_authopt.rst new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..72adb7a891ce --- /dev/null +++ b/Documentation/networking/tcp_authopt.rst @@ -0,0 +1,51 @@ +.. SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 + +========================= +TCP Authentication Option +========================= + +The TCP Authentication option specified by RFC5925 replaces the TCP MD5 +Signature option. It similar in goals but not compatible in either wire formats +or ABI. + +Interface +========= + +Individual keys can be added to or removed through an TCP socket by using +TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY setsockopt and a struct tcp_authopt_key. There is no +support for reading back keys and updates always replace the old key. These +structures represent "Master Key Tuples (MKTs)" as described by the RFC. + +Per-socket options can set or read using the TCP_AUTHOPT sockopt and a struct +tcp_authopt. This is optional: doing setsockopt TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY is sufficient to +enable the feature. + +Configuration associated with TCP Authentication is global for each network +namespace, this means that all sockets for which TCP_AUTHOPT is enabled will +be affected by the same set of keys. + +Manipulating keys requires ``CAP_NET_ADMIN``. + +Key binding +----------- + +Keys can be bound to remote addresses in a way that is somewhat similar to +``TCP_MD5SIG``. By default a key matches all connections but matching criteria can +be specified as fields inside struct tcp_authopt_key together with matching +flags in tcp_authopt_key.flags. The sort of these "matching criteria" can +expand over time by increasing the size of `struct tcp_authopt_key` and adding +new flags. + + * Address binding is optional, by default keys match all addresses + * Local address is ignored, matching is done by remote address + * Ports are ignored + +RFC5925 requires that key ids do not overlap when tcp identifiers (addr/port) +overlap. This is not enforced by linux, configuring ambiguous keys will result +in packet drops and lost connections. + +ABI Reference +============= + +.. kernel-doc:: include/uapi/linux/tcp.h + :identifiers: tcp_authopt tcp_authopt_flag tcp_authopt_key tcp_authopt_key_flag tcp_authopt_alg From patchwork Thu Aug 18 19:59:37 2022 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Leonard Crestez X-Patchwork-Id: 598243 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 9A824C32796 for ; Thu, 18 Aug 2022 20:00:51 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S241645AbiHRUAs (ORCPT ); Thu, 18 Aug 2022 16:00:48 -0400 Received: from lindbergh.monkeyblade.net ([23.128.96.19]:54690 "EHLO lindbergh.monkeyblade.net" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1344896AbiHRUAZ (ORCPT ); Thu, 18 Aug 2022 16:00:25 -0400 Received: from mail-ej1-x631.google.com (mail-ej1-x631.google.com [IPv6:2a00:1450:4864:20::631]) by lindbergh.monkeyblade.net (Postfix) with ESMTPS id AA74BD11DC; Thu, 18 Aug 2022 13:00:23 -0700 (PDT) Received: by mail-ej1-x631.google.com with SMTP id dc19so5140962ejb.12; Thu, 18 Aug 2022 13:00:23 -0700 (PDT) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=gmail.com; s=20210112; h=content-transfer-encoding:mime-version:references:in-reply-to :message-id:date:subject:cc:to:from:from:to:cc; bh=dNut1tYrnFJpk8I6+5NwfzPqP/nyk6YyQOFAs7t5ZVg=; b=YtmUSx2QFY6xTtaNCyUD3gcoqFPya5c7UCOLh2N7qlqWkLxq+xYgSRv3wQ6XHDwAz6 fK/5Hy7qgrt36krYIzqzOREOBKKj0/N5g344BxfWPNDhegMur37GnyKntpFfxrfKF5n2 JK3Fs6hXeP7/mv7gqvVCpLNZ12XjUyydXZT2oDml4jXR0y6oRwhDeLliymSgjKs1ifLJ tspmRv2hxDpwYlqtbov5fgqSx2oGIeQUPLao4/B5pO4iFt9PpeopCWl1GMMpaCyfwcik 7K07K3ak1zUTaUG5ZLnRd40xrqTIvZZ4v02dLmZdx4ZpHhibPIuG00mXxPus+scZ0mdt z/1w== X-Google-DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=1e100.net; s=20210112; h=content-transfer-encoding:mime-version:references:in-reply-to :message-id:date:subject:cc:to:from:x-gm-message-state:from:to:cc; bh=dNut1tYrnFJpk8I6+5NwfzPqP/nyk6YyQOFAs7t5ZVg=; b=Dhkg/dtKxHjPjhpPxYvf1AdHsjaxkM0225XpcfzlyzZRzRPUhd7uLWx7QBUlC+HXe0 /ORi/anGtGFODYsYtjMEHYHLRnxIstu8NtSB10iu5e5jha+ge8o4jZTQqKsahfsYhXog a7MibXKSFkf9wmQqzBSl7yESTvcAe07NFYxEIJ+moRE/gAQOqpurLF0pwFvSGl05ico2 zwuYM9glJSitY14Njbu2U0Ln5GTHPGCC57v+SzikRVb7yp3ui20bZKYLbGtXKcFacjTC wPb3yecym+xGw23IFo+pxO4Rg2cr2cYtLreDDFA5WOjtLgP+UNKjdjoOqy9UZcipmPfn Tepg== X-Gm-Message-State: ACgBeo17iX98yw/X5UphUnVt5OCD/Gbqu5VPbMSliqGozXa1LxiGOl74 UCavtNPngKg3LgVCqWCJkdE= X-Google-Smtp-Source: AA6agR5xIMdStCjsDi4ONKKzKfeHbfH5g6sk87tZ9+ZXC4ue1o7nMlSvfXMnDlaeKtk4v3xM19fmwQ== X-Received: by 2002:a17:907:9628:b0:731:1e3:b168 with SMTP id gb40-20020a170907962800b0073101e3b168mr2839867ejc.526.1660852822152; Thu, 18 Aug 2022 13:00:22 -0700 (PDT) Received: from localhost.localdomain ([2a04:241e:502:a080:17c8:ba1c:b6f3:3fe0]) by smtp.gmail.com with ESMTPSA id fw30-20020a170907501e00b00722e4bab163sm1215087ejc.200.2022.08.18.13.00.20 (version=TLS1_3 cipher=TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 bits=256/256); Thu, 18 Aug 2022 13:00:21 -0700 (PDT) From: Leonard Crestez To: David Ahern , Eric Dumazet , Philip Paeps Cc: Dmitry Safonov <0x7f454c46@gmail.com>, Shuah Khan , "David S. Miller" , Herbert Xu , Kuniyuki Iwashima , Hideaki YOSHIFUJI , Jakub Kicinski , Yuchung Cheng , Francesco Ruggeri , Mat Martineau , Christoph Paasch , Ivan Delalande , Caowangbao , Priyaranjan Jha , netdev@vger.kernel.org, linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org, linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Subject: [PATCH v7 03/26] tcp: authopt: Add crypto initialization Date: Thu, 18 Aug 2022 22:59:37 +0300 Message-Id: <1ff4b6ca611ddcf130f1bd5ba9ffcbaac0cc786d.1660852705.git.cdleonard@gmail.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.25.1 In-Reply-To: References: MIME-Version: 1.0 Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org The crypto_shash API is used in order to compute packet signatures. The API comes with several unfortunate limitations: 1) Allocating a crypto_shash can sleep and must be done in user context. 2) Packet signatures must be computed in softirq context 3) Packet signatures use dynamic "traffic keys" which require exclusive access to crypto_shash for crypto_setkey. The solution is to allocate one crypto_shash for each possible cpu for each algorithm at setsockopt time. The per-cpu tfm is then borrowed from softirq context, signatures are computed and the tfm is returned. The pool for each algorithm is allocated on first use. Signed-off-by: Leonard Crestez --- include/net/tcp_authopt.h | 16 +++ net/ipv4/tcp_authopt.c | 199 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++- 2 files changed, 214 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/include/net/tcp_authopt.h b/include/net/tcp_authopt.h index bc2cff82830d..ed9995c8d486 100644 --- a/include/net/tcp_authopt.h +++ b/include/net/tcp_authopt.h @@ -4,10 +4,24 @@ #include #include #include +/* According to RFC5925 the length of the authentication option varies based on + * the signature algorithm. Linux only implements the algorithms defined in + * RFC5926 which have a constant length of 16. + * + * This is used in stack allocation of tcp option buffers for output. It is + * shorter than the length of the MD5 option. + * + * Input packets can have authentication options of different lengths but they + * will always be flagged as invalid (since no such algorithms are supported). + */ +#define TCPOLEN_AUTHOPT_OUTPUT 16 + +struct tcp_authopt_alg_imp; + /** * struct tcp_authopt_key_info - Representation of a Master Key Tuple as per RFC5925 * * Key structure lifetime is protected by RCU so send/recv code needs to hold a * single rcu_read_lock until they're done with the key. @@ -33,10 +47,12 @@ struct tcp_authopt_key_info { u8 keylen; /** @key: Same as &tcp_authopt_key.key */ u8 key[TCP_AUTHOPT_MAXKEYLEN]; /** @addr: Same as &tcp_authopt_key.addr */ struct sockaddr_storage addr; + /** @alg: Algorithm implementation matching alg_id */ + struct tcp_authopt_alg_imp *alg; }; /** * struct tcp_authopt_info - Per-socket information regarding tcp_authopt * diff --git a/net/ipv4/tcp_authopt.c b/net/ipv4/tcp_authopt.c index d38e9c89c89d..005fac36760b 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/tcp_authopt.c +++ b/net/ipv4/tcp_authopt.c @@ -2,15 +2,201 @@ #include #include #include #include +#include /* This is enabled when first struct tcp_authopt_info is allocated and never released */ DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(tcp_authopt_needed_key); EXPORT_SYMBOL(tcp_authopt_needed_key); +/* All current algorithms have a mac length of 12 but crypto API digestsize can be larger */ +#define TCP_AUTHOPT_MAXMACBUF 20 +#define TCP_AUTHOPT_MAX_TRAFFIC_KEY_LEN 20 +#define TCP_AUTHOPT_MACLEN 12 + +struct tcp_authopt_alg_pool { + struct crypto_ahash *tfm; + struct ahash_request *req; +}; + +/* Constant data with per-algorithm information from RFC5926 + * The "KDF" and "MAC" happen to be the same for both algorithms. + */ +struct tcp_authopt_alg_imp { + /* Name of algorithm in crypto-api */ + const char *alg_name; + /* One of the TCP_AUTHOPT_ALG_* constants from uapi */ + u8 alg_id; + /* Length of traffic key */ + u8 traffic_key_len; + + /* shared crypto_ahash */ + struct mutex init_mutex; + bool init_done; + struct tcp_authopt_alg_pool __percpu *pool; +}; + +static struct tcp_authopt_alg_imp tcp_authopt_alg_list[] = { + { + .alg_id = TCP_AUTHOPT_ALG_HMAC_SHA_1_96, + .alg_name = "hmac(sha1)", + .traffic_key_len = 20, + .init_mutex = __MUTEX_INITIALIZER(tcp_authopt_alg_list[0].init_mutex), + }, + { + .alg_id = TCP_AUTHOPT_ALG_AES_128_CMAC_96, + .alg_name = "cmac(aes)", + .traffic_key_len = 16, + .init_mutex = __MUTEX_INITIALIZER(tcp_authopt_alg_list[1].init_mutex), + }, +}; + +/* get a pointer to the tcp_authopt_alg instance or NULL if id invalid */ +static inline struct tcp_authopt_alg_imp *tcp_authopt_alg_get(int alg_num) +{ + if (alg_num <= 0 || alg_num > 2) + return NULL; + return &tcp_authopt_alg_list[alg_num - 1]; +} + +static int tcp_authopt_alg_pool_init(struct tcp_authopt_alg_imp *alg, + struct tcp_authopt_alg_pool *pool) +{ + pool->tfm = crypto_alloc_ahash(alg->alg_name, 0, CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC); + if (IS_ERR(pool->tfm)) + return PTR_ERR(pool->tfm); + + pool->req = ahash_request_alloc(pool->tfm, GFP_ATOMIC); + if (IS_ERR(pool->req)) + return PTR_ERR(pool->req); + ahash_request_set_callback(pool->req, 0, NULL, NULL); + + return 0; +} + +static void tcp_authopt_alg_pool_free(struct tcp_authopt_alg_pool *pool) +{ + if (!IS_ERR_OR_NULL(pool->req)) + ahash_request_free(pool->req); + pool->req = NULL; + if (!IS_ERR_OR_NULL(pool->tfm)) + crypto_free_ahash(pool->tfm); + pool->tfm = NULL; +} + +static void __tcp_authopt_alg_free(struct tcp_authopt_alg_imp *alg) +{ + int cpu; + struct tcp_authopt_alg_pool *pool; + + if (!alg->pool) + return; + for_each_possible_cpu(cpu) { + pool = per_cpu_ptr(alg->pool, cpu); + tcp_authopt_alg_pool_free(pool); + } + free_percpu(alg->pool); + alg->pool = NULL; +} + +static int __tcp_authopt_alg_init(struct tcp_authopt_alg_imp *alg) +{ + struct tcp_authopt_alg_pool *pool; + int cpu; + int err; + + BUILD_BUG_ON(TCP_AUTHOPT_MAXMACBUF < TCPOLEN_AUTHOPT_OUTPUT); + if (WARN_ON_ONCE(alg->traffic_key_len > TCP_AUTHOPT_MAX_TRAFFIC_KEY_LEN)) + return -ENOBUFS; + + alg->pool = alloc_percpu(struct tcp_authopt_alg_pool); + if (!alg->pool) + return -ENOMEM; + for_each_possible_cpu(cpu) { + pool = per_cpu_ptr(alg->pool, cpu); + err = tcp_authopt_alg_pool_init(alg, pool); + if (err) + goto out_err; + + pool = per_cpu_ptr(alg->pool, cpu); + /* sanity checks: */ + if (WARN_ON_ONCE(crypto_ahash_digestsize(pool->tfm) != alg->traffic_key_len)) { + err = -EINVAL; + goto out_err; + } + if (WARN_ON_ONCE(crypto_ahash_digestsize(pool->tfm) > TCP_AUTHOPT_MAXMACBUF)) { + err = -EINVAL; + goto out_err; + } + } + return 0; + +out_err: + pr_info("Failed to initialize %s\n", alg->alg_name); + __tcp_authopt_alg_free(alg); + return err; +} + +static int tcp_authopt_alg_require(struct tcp_authopt_alg_imp *alg) +{ + int err = 0; + + mutex_lock(&alg->init_mutex); + if (alg->init_done) + goto out; + err = __tcp_authopt_alg_init(alg); + if (err) + goto out; + pr_info("initialized tcp-ao algorithm %s", alg->alg_name); + alg->init_done = true; + +out: + mutex_unlock(&alg->init_mutex); + return err; +} + +static struct tcp_authopt_alg_pool *tcp_authopt_alg_get_pool(struct tcp_authopt_alg_imp *alg) +{ + local_bh_disable(); + return this_cpu_ptr(alg->pool); +} + +static void tcp_authopt_alg_put_pool(struct tcp_authopt_alg_imp *alg, + struct tcp_authopt_alg_pool *pool) +{ + WARN_ON(pool != this_cpu_ptr(alg->pool)); + local_bh_enable(); +} + +__always_unused +static struct tcp_authopt_alg_pool *tcp_authopt_get_kdf_pool(struct tcp_authopt_key_info *key) +{ + return tcp_authopt_alg_get_pool(key->alg); +} + +__always_unused +static void tcp_authopt_put_kdf_pool(struct tcp_authopt_key_info *key, + struct tcp_authopt_alg_pool *pool) +{ + return tcp_authopt_alg_put_pool(key->alg, pool); +} + +__always_unused +static struct tcp_authopt_alg_pool *tcp_authopt_get_mac_pool(struct tcp_authopt_key_info *key) +{ + return tcp_authopt_alg_get_pool(key->alg); +} + +__always_unused +static void tcp_authopt_put_mac_pool(struct tcp_authopt_key_info *key, + struct tcp_authopt_alg_pool *pool) +{ + return tcp_authopt_alg_put_pool(key->alg, pool); +} + static inline struct netns_tcp_authopt *sock_net_tcp_authopt(const struct sock *sk) { return &sock_net(sk)->tcp_authopt; } @@ -53,11 +239,10 @@ void tcp_authopt_clear(struct sock *sk) if (info) { tcp_authopt_free(sk, info); tcp_sk(sk)->authopt_info = NULL; } } - /* checks that ipv4 or ipv6 addr matches. */ static bool ipvx_addr_match(struct sockaddr_storage *a1, struct sockaddr_storage *a2) { if (a1->ss_family != a2->ss_family) @@ -212,10 +397,11 @@ int tcp_set_authopt_key(struct sock *sk, sockptr_t optval, unsigned int optlen) { struct tcp_authopt_key opt; struct tcp_authopt_info *info; struct tcp_authopt_key_info *key_info, *old_key_info; struct netns_tcp_authopt *net = sock_net_tcp_authopt(sk); + struct tcp_authopt_alg_imp *alg; int err; sock_owned_by_me(sk); if (!ns_capable(sock_net(sk)->user_ns, CAP_NET_ADMIN)) return -EPERM; @@ -253,10 +439,20 @@ int tcp_set_authopt_key(struct sock *sk, sockptr_t optval, unsigned int optlen) /* Initialize tcp_authopt_info if not already set */ info = __tcp_authopt_info_get_or_create(sk); if (IS_ERR(info)) return PTR_ERR(info); + /* check the algorithm */ + alg = tcp_authopt_alg_get(opt.alg); + if (!alg) + return -EINVAL; + if (WARN_ON_ONCE(alg->alg_id != opt.alg)) + return -EINVAL; + err = tcp_authopt_alg_require(alg); + if (err) + return err; + key_info = kmalloc(sizeof(*key_info), GFP_KERNEL | __GFP_ZERO); if (!key_info) return -ENOMEM; mutex_lock(&net->mutex); kref_init(&key_info->ref); @@ -268,10 +464,11 @@ int tcp_set_authopt_key(struct sock *sk, sockptr_t optval, unsigned int optlen) tcp_authopt_key_del(net, old_key_info); key_info->flags = opt.flags & TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_KNOWN_FLAGS; key_info->send_id = opt.send_id; key_info->recv_id = opt.recv_id; key_info->alg_id = opt.alg; + key_info->alg = alg; key_info->keylen = opt.keylen; memcpy(key_info->key, opt.key, opt.keylen); memcpy(&key_info->addr, &opt.addr, sizeof(key_info->addr)); hlist_add_head_rcu(&key_info->node, &net->head); mutex_unlock(&net->mutex); From patchwork Thu Aug 18 19:59:38 2022 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Leonard Crestez X-Patchwork-Id: 598239 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 78A1AC32774 for ; Thu, 18 Aug 2022 20:01:04 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1345709AbiHRUA7 (ORCPT ); Thu, 18 Aug 2022 16:00:59 -0400 Received: from lindbergh.monkeyblade.net ([23.128.96.19]:54696 "EHLO lindbergh.monkeyblade.net" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1345017AbiHRUA0 (ORCPT ); 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Thu, 18 Aug 2022 13:00:23 -0700 (PDT) From: Leonard Crestez To: David Ahern , Eric Dumazet , Philip Paeps Cc: Dmitry Safonov <0x7f454c46@gmail.com>, Shuah Khan , "David S. Miller" , Herbert Xu , Kuniyuki Iwashima , Hideaki YOSHIFUJI , Jakub Kicinski , Yuchung Cheng , Francesco Ruggeri , Mat Martineau , Christoph Paasch , Ivan Delalande , Caowangbao , Priyaranjan Jha , netdev@vger.kernel.org, linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org, linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Subject: [PATCH v7 04/26] tcp: Refactor tcp_sig_hash_skb_data for AO Date: Thu, 18 Aug 2022 22:59:38 +0300 Message-Id: <1ec72c2b8d06cef533bc5fde79eae04a205e10ed.1660852705.git.cdleonard@gmail.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.25.1 In-Reply-To: References: MIME-Version: 1.0 Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org This function feeds all SKB data into an ahash and this behavior is identical between the TCP-MD5 and TCP-AO so rename and refactor. Signed-off-by: Leonard Crestez --- include/net/tcp.h | 2 +- net/ipv4/tcp.c | 17 ++++++++++++----- net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c | 2 +- net/ipv6/tcp_ipv6.c | 2 +- 4 files changed, 15 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-) diff --git a/include/net/tcp.h b/include/net/tcp.h index 9955a88faf9b..fbe18b5bf576 100644 --- a/include/net/tcp.h +++ b/include/net/tcp.h @@ -1718,11 +1718,11 @@ struct tcp_md5sig_pool *tcp_get_md5sig_pool(void); static inline void tcp_put_md5sig_pool(void) { local_bh_enable(); } -int tcp_md5_hash_skb_data(struct tcp_md5sig_pool *, const struct sk_buff *, +int tcp_sig_hash_skb_data(struct ahash_request *, const struct sk_buff *, unsigned int header_len); int tcp_md5_hash_key(struct tcp_md5sig_pool *hp, const struct tcp_md5sig_key *key); /* From tcp_fastopen.c */ diff --git a/net/ipv4/tcp.c b/net/ipv4/tcp.c index 1e9eaf805e4c..4c61c32ccf49 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/tcp.c +++ b/net/ipv4/tcp.c @@ -4508,16 +4508,19 @@ struct tcp_md5sig_pool *tcp_get_md5sig_pool(void) local_bh_enable(); return NULL; } EXPORT_SYMBOL(tcp_get_md5sig_pool); -int tcp_md5_hash_skb_data(struct tcp_md5sig_pool *hp, +#endif /* CONFIG_TCP_MD5SIG */ + +#if defined(CONFIG_TCP_MD5SIG) || defined(CONFIG_TCP_AUTHOPT) + +int tcp_sig_hash_skb_data(struct ahash_request *req, const struct sk_buff *skb, unsigned int header_len) { struct scatterlist sg; const struct tcphdr *tp = tcp_hdr(skb); - struct ahash_request *req = hp->md5_req; unsigned int i; const unsigned int head_data_len = skb_headlen(skb) > header_len ? skb_headlen(skb) - header_len : 0; const struct skb_shared_info *shi = skb_shinfo(skb); struct sk_buff *frag_iter; @@ -4540,16 +4543,20 @@ int tcp_md5_hash_skb_data(struct tcp_md5sig_pool *hp, if (crypto_ahash_update(req)) return 1; } skb_walk_frags(skb, frag_iter) - if (tcp_md5_hash_skb_data(hp, frag_iter, 0)) + if (tcp_sig_hash_skb_data(req, frag_iter, 0)) return 1; return 0; } -EXPORT_SYMBOL(tcp_md5_hash_skb_data); +EXPORT_SYMBOL(tcp_sig_hash_skb_data); + +#endif /* defined(CONFIG_TCP_MD5SIG) || defined(CONFIG_TCP_AUTHOPT) */ + +#ifdef CONFIG_TCP_MD5SIG int tcp_md5_hash_key(struct tcp_md5sig_pool *hp, const struct tcp_md5sig_key *key) { u8 keylen = READ_ONCE(key->keylen); /* paired with WRITE_ONCE() in tcp_md5_do_add */ struct scatterlist sg; @@ -4636,11 +4643,11 @@ tcp_inbound_md5_hash(const struct sock *sk, const struct sk_buff *skb, } return SKB_NOT_DROPPED_YET; } EXPORT_SYMBOL(tcp_inbound_md5_hash); -#endif +#endif /* CONFIG_TCP_MD5SIG */ void tcp_done(struct sock *sk) { struct request_sock *req; diff --git a/net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c b/net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c index e8b2ab088828..46ba754afd2b 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c +++ b/net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c @@ -1388,11 +1388,11 @@ int tcp_v4_md5_hash_skb(char *md5_hash, const struct tcp_md5sig_key *key, if (crypto_ahash_init(req)) goto clear_hash; if (tcp_v4_md5_hash_headers(hp, daddr, saddr, th, skb->len)) goto clear_hash; - if (tcp_md5_hash_skb_data(hp, skb, th->doff << 2)) + if (tcp_sig_hash_skb_data(hp->md5_req, skb, th->doff << 2)) goto clear_hash; if (tcp_md5_hash_key(hp, key)) goto clear_hash; ahash_request_set_crypt(req, NULL, md5_hash, 0); if (crypto_ahash_final(req)) diff --git a/net/ipv6/tcp_ipv6.c b/net/ipv6/tcp_ipv6.c index e54eee80ce5f..30dc9d4eec83 100644 --- a/net/ipv6/tcp_ipv6.c +++ b/net/ipv6/tcp_ipv6.c @@ -751,11 +751,11 @@ static int tcp_v6_md5_hash_skb(char *md5_hash, if (crypto_ahash_init(req)) goto clear_hash; if (tcp_v6_md5_hash_headers(hp, daddr, saddr, th, skb->len)) goto clear_hash; - if (tcp_md5_hash_skb_data(hp, skb, th->doff << 2)) + if (tcp_sig_hash_skb_data(hp->md5_req, skb, th->doff << 2)) goto clear_hash; if (tcp_md5_hash_key(hp, key)) goto clear_hash; ahash_request_set_crypt(req, NULL, md5_hash, 0); if (crypto_ahash_final(req)) From patchwork Thu Aug 18 19:59:39 2022 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Leonard Crestez X-Patchwork-Id: 598240 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id A9246C00140 for ; Thu, 18 Aug 2022 20:00:59 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1345698AbiHRUA5 (ORCPT ); Thu, 18 Aug 2022 16:00:57 -0400 Received: from lindbergh.monkeyblade.net ([23.128.96.19]:54712 "EHLO lindbergh.monkeyblade.net" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1345253AbiHRUA3 (ORCPT ); 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Thu, 18 Aug 2022 13:00:25 -0700 (PDT) From: Leonard Crestez To: David Ahern , Eric Dumazet , Philip Paeps Cc: Dmitry Safonov <0x7f454c46@gmail.com>, Shuah Khan , "David S. Miller" , Herbert Xu , Kuniyuki Iwashima , Hideaki YOSHIFUJI , Jakub Kicinski , Yuchung Cheng , Francesco Ruggeri , Mat Martineau , Christoph Paasch , Ivan Delalande , Caowangbao , Priyaranjan Jha , netdev@vger.kernel.org, linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org, linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Subject: [PATCH v7 05/26] tcp: authopt: Compute packet signatures Date: Thu, 18 Aug 2022 22:59:39 +0300 Message-Id: X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.25.1 In-Reply-To: References: MIME-Version: 1.0 Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org Computing tcp authopt packet signatures is a two step process: * traffic key is computed based on tcp 4-tuple, initial sequence numbers and the secret key. * packet mac is computed based on traffic key and content of individual packets. The traffic key could be cached for established sockets but it is not. A single code path exists for ipv4/ipv6 and input/output. This keeps the code short but slightly slower due to lots of conditionals. On output we read remote IP address from socket members on output, we can't use skb network header because it's computed after TCP options. On input we read remote IP address from skb network headers, we can't use socket binding members because those are not available for SYN. Signed-off-by: Leonard Crestez --- include/net/tcp_authopt.h | 9 + net/ipv4/tcp_authopt.c | 460 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++- 2 files changed, 465 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/include/net/tcp_authopt.h b/include/net/tcp_authopt.h index ed9995c8d486..e303ef53e1a3 100644 --- a/include/net/tcp_authopt.h +++ b/include/net/tcp_authopt.h @@ -68,10 +68,19 @@ struct tcp_authopt_info { u32 src_isn; /** @dst_isn: Remote Initial Sequence Number */ u32 dst_isn; }; +/* TCP authopt as found in header */ +struct tcphdr_authopt { + u8 num; + u8 len; + u8 keyid; + u8 rnextkeyid; + u8 mac[0]; +}; + #ifdef CONFIG_TCP_AUTHOPT DECLARE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(tcp_authopt_needed_key); #define tcp_authopt_needed (static_branch_unlikely(&tcp_authopt_needed_key)) void tcp_authopt_clear(struct sock *sk); int tcp_set_authopt(struct sock *sk, sockptr_t optval, unsigned int optlen); diff --git a/net/ipv4/tcp_authopt.c b/net/ipv4/tcp_authopt.c index 005fac36760b..440d329b52f4 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/tcp_authopt.c +++ b/net/ipv4/tcp_authopt.c @@ -167,30 +167,26 @@ static void tcp_authopt_alg_put_pool(struct tcp_authopt_alg_imp *alg, { WARN_ON(pool != this_cpu_ptr(alg->pool)); local_bh_enable(); } -__always_unused static struct tcp_authopt_alg_pool *tcp_authopt_get_kdf_pool(struct tcp_authopt_key_info *key) { return tcp_authopt_alg_get_pool(key->alg); } -__always_unused static void tcp_authopt_put_kdf_pool(struct tcp_authopt_key_info *key, struct tcp_authopt_alg_pool *pool) { return tcp_authopt_alg_put_pool(key->alg, pool); } -__always_unused static struct tcp_authopt_alg_pool *tcp_authopt_get_mac_pool(struct tcp_authopt_key_info *key) { return tcp_authopt_alg_get_pool(key->alg); } -__always_unused static void tcp_authopt_put_mac_pool(struct tcp_authopt_key_info *key, struct tcp_authopt_alg_pool *pool) { return tcp_authopt_alg_put_pool(key->alg, pool); } @@ -474,10 +470,466 @@ int tcp_set_authopt_key(struct sock *sk, sockptr_t optval, unsigned int optlen) mutex_unlock(&net->mutex); return 0; } +static int tcp_authopt_get_isn(struct sock *sk, + struct tcp_authopt_info *info, + struct sk_buff *skb, + int input, + __be32 *sisn, + __be32 *disn) +{ + struct tcphdr *th = tcp_hdr(skb); + + /* Special cases for SYN and SYN/ACK */ + if (th->syn && !th->ack) { + *sisn = th->seq; + *disn = 0; + return 0; + } + if (th->syn && th->ack) { + *sisn = th->seq; + *disn = htonl(ntohl(th->ack_seq) - 1); + return 0; + } + + if (sk->sk_state == TCP_NEW_SYN_RECV) { + struct tcp_request_sock *rsk = (struct tcp_request_sock *)sk; + + if (WARN_ONCE(!input, "Caller passed wrong socket")) + return -EINVAL; + *sisn = htonl(rsk->rcv_isn); + *disn = htonl(rsk->snt_isn); + return 0; + } else if (sk->sk_state == TCP_LISTEN) { + /* Signature computation for non-syn packet on a listen + * socket is not possible because we lack the initial + * sequence numbers. + * + * Input segments that are not matched by any request, + * established or timewait socket will get here. These + * are not normally sent by peers. + * + * Their signature might be valid but we don't have + * enough state to determine that. TCP-MD5 can attempt + * to validate and reply with a signed RST because it + * doesn't care about ISNs. + * + * Reporting an error from signature code causes the + * packet to be discarded which is good. + */ + if (WARN_ONCE(!input, "Caller passed wrong socket")) + return -EINVAL; + *sisn = 0; + *disn = 0; + return 0; + } + if (WARN_ONCE(!info, "caller did not pass tcp_authopt_info\n")) + return -EINVAL; + /* Initial sequence numbers for ESTABLISHED connections from info */ + if (input) { + *sisn = htonl(info->dst_isn); + *disn = htonl(info->src_isn); + } else { + *sisn = htonl(info->src_isn); + *disn = htonl(info->dst_isn); + } + return 0; +} + +/* Feed one buffer into ahash + * The buffer is assumed to be DMA-able + */ +static int crypto_ahash_buf(struct ahash_request *req, u8 *buf, uint len) +{ + struct scatterlist sg; + + sg_init_one(&sg, buf, len); + ahash_request_set_crypt(req, &sg, NULL, len); + + return crypto_ahash_update(req); +} + +/* feed traffic key into ahash */ +static int tcp_authopt_ahash_traffic_key(struct tcp_authopt_alg_pool *pool, + struct sock *sk, + struct sk_buff *skb, + struct tcp_authopt_info *info, + bool input, + bool ipv6) +{ + struct tcphdr *th = tcp_hdr(skb); + int err; + __be32 sisn, disn; + __be16 digestbits = htons(crypto_ahash_digestsize(pool->tfm) * 8); + /* For ahash const data buffers don't work so ensure header is on stack */ + char traffic_key_context_header[7] = "\x01TCP-AO"; + + // RFC5926 section 3.1.1.1 + err = crypto_ahash_buf(pool->req, traffic_key_context_header, 7); + if (err) + return err; + + /* Addresses from packet on input and from sk_common on output + * This is because on output MAC is computed before prepending IP header + */ + if (input) { + if (ipv6) + err = crypto_ahash_buf(pool->req, (u8 *)&ipv6_hdr(skb)->saddr, 32); + else + err = crypto_ahash_buf(pool->req, (u8 *)&ip_hdr(skb)->saddr, 8); + if (err) + return err; + } else { + if (ipv6) { +#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6) + err = crypto_ahash_buf(pool->req, (u8 *)&sk->sk_v6_rcv_saddr, 16); + if (err) + return err; + err = crypto_ahash_buf(pool->req, (u8 *)&sk->sk_v6_daddr, 16); + if (err) + return err; +#else + return -EINVAL; +#endif + } else { + err = crypto_ahash_buf(pool->req, (u8 *)&sk->sk_rcv_saddr, 4); + if (err) + return err; + err = crypto_ahash_buf(pool->req, (u8 *)&sk->sk_daddr, 4); + if (err) + return err; + } + } + + /* TCP ports from header */ + err = crypto_ahash_buf(pool->req, (u8 *)&th->source, 4); + if (err) + return err; + err = tcp_authopt_get_isn(sk, info, skb, input, &sisn, &disn); + if (err) + return err; + err = crypto_ahash_buf(pool->req, (u8 *)&sisn, 4); + if (err) + return err; + err = crypto_ahash_buf(pool->req, (u8 *)&disn, 4); + if (err) + return err; + err = crypto_ahash_buf(pool->req, (u8 *)&digestbits, 2); + if (err) + return err; + + return 0; +} + +/* Convert a variable-length key to a 16-byte fixed-length key for AES-CMAC + * This is described in RFC5926 section 3.1.1.2 + */ +static int aes_setkey_derived(struct crypto_ahash *tfm, struct ahash_request *req, + u8 *key, size_t keylen) +{ + static const u8 zeros[16] = {0}; + struct scatterlist sg; + u8 derived_key[16]; + int err; + + if (WARN_ON_ONCE(crypto_ahash_digestsize(tfm) != sizeof(derived_key))) + return -EINVAL; + err = crypto_ahash_setkey(tfm, zeros, sizeof(zeros)); + if (err) + return err; + err = crypto_ahash_init(req); + if (err) + return err; + sg_init_one(&sg, key, keylen); + ahash_request_set_crypt(req, &sg, derived_key, keylen); + err = crypto_ahash_digest(req); + if (err) + return err; + return crypto_ahash_setkey(tfm, derived_key, sizeof(derived_key)); +} + +static int tcp_authopt_setkey(struct tcp_authopt_alg_pool *pool, struct tcp_authopt_key_info *key) +{ + if (key->alg_id == TCP_AUTHOPT_ALG_AES_128_CMAC_96 && key->keylen != 16) + return aes_setkey_derived(pool->tfm, pool->req, key->key, key->keylen); + else + return crypto_ahash_setkey(pool->tfm, key->key, key->keylen); +} + +static int tcp_authopt_get_traffic_key(struct sock *sk, + struct sk_buff *skb, + struct tcp_authopt_key_info *key, + struct tcp_authopt_info *info, + bool input, + bool ipv6, + u8 *traffic_key) +{ + struct tcp_authopt_alg_pool *pool; + int err; + + pool = tcp_authopt_get_kdf_pool(key); + if (IS_ERR(pool)) + return PTR_ERR(pool); + + err = tcp_authopt_setkey(pool, key); + if (err) + goto out; + err = crypto_ahash_init(pool->req); + if (err) + goto out; + + err = tcp_authopt_ahash_traffic_key(pool, sk, skb, info, input, ipv6); + if (err) + goto out; + + ahash_request_set_crypt(pool->req, NULL, traffic_key, 0); + err = crypto_ahash_final(pool->req); + if (err) + return err; + +out: + tcp_authopt_put_kdf_pool(key, pool); + return err; +} + +static int crypto_ahash_buf_zero(struct ahash_request *req, int len) +{ + u8 zeros[TCP_AUTHOPT_MACLEN] = {0}; + int buflen, err; + + /* In practice this is always called with len exactly 12. + * Even on input we drop unusual signature sizes early. + */ + while (len) { + buflen = min_t(int, len, sizeof(zeros)); + err = crypto_ahash_buf(req, zeros, buflen); + if (err) + return err; + len -= buflen; + } + + return 0; +} + +static int tcp_authopt_hash_tcp4_pseudoheader(struct tcp_authopt_alg_pool *pool, + __be32 saddr, + __be32 daddr, + int nbytes) +{ + struct tcp4_pseudohdr phdr = { + .saddr = saddr, + .daddr = daddr, + .pad = 0, + .protocol = IPPROTO_TCP, + .len = htons(nbytes) + }; + return crypto_ahash_buf(pool->req, (u8 *)&phdr, sizeof(phdr)); +} + +#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6) +static int tcp_authopt_hash_tcp6_pseudoheader(struct tcp_authopt_alg_pool *pool, + struct in6_addr *saddr, + struct in6_addr *daddr, + u32 plen) +{ + int err; + __be32 buf[2]; + + buf[0] = htonl(plen); + buf[1] = htonl(IPPROTO_TCP); + + err = crypto_ahash_buf(pool->req, (u8 *)saddr, sizeof(*saddr)); + if (err) + return err; + err = crypto_ahash_buf(pool->req, (u8 *)daddr, sizeof(*daddr)); + if (err) + return err; + return crypto_ahash_buf(pool->req, (u8 *)&buf, sizeof(buf)); +} +#endif + +/** Hash tcphdr options. + * + * If include_options is false then only the TCPOPT_AUTHOPT option itself is hashed + * Point to AO inside TH is passed by the caller + */ +static int tcp_authopt_hash_opts(struct tcp_authopt_alg_pool *pool, + struct tcphdr *th, + struct tcphdr_authopt *aoptr, + bool include_options) +{ + int err; + /* start of options */ + u8 *tcp_opts = (u8 *)(th + 1); + /* start of options */ + u8 *aobuf = (u8 *)aoptr; + u8 aolen = aoptr->len; + + if (WARN_ONCE(aoptr->num != TCPOPT_AUTHOPT, "Bad aoptr\n")) + return -EINVAL; + + if (include_options) { + /* end of options */ + u8 *tcp_data = ((u8 *)th) + th->doff * 4; + + err = crypto_ahash_buf(pool->req, tcp_opts, aobuf - tcp_opts + 4); + if (err) + return err; + err = crypto_ahash_buf_zero(pool->req, aolen - 4); + if (err) + return err; + err = crypto_ahash_buf(pool->req, aobuf + aolen, tcp_data - (aobuf + aolen)); + if (err) + return err; + } else { + err = crypto_ahash_buf(pool->req, aobuf, 4); + if (err) + return err; + err = crypto_ahash_buf_zero(pool->req, aolen - 4); + if (err) + return err; + } + + return 0; +} + +static int tcp_authopt_hash_packet(struct tcp_authopt_alg_pool *pool, + struct sock *sk, + struct sk_buff *skb, + struct tcphdr_authopt *aoptr, + struct tcp_authopt_info *info, + bool input, + bool ipv6, + bool include_options, + u8 *macbuf) +{ + struct tcphdr *th = tcp_hdr(skb); + int err; + + /* NOTE: SNE unimplemented */ + __be32 sne = 0; + + err = crypto_ahash_init(pool->req); + if (err) + return err; + + err = crypto_ahash_buf(pool->req, (u8 *)&sne, 4); + if (err) + return err; + + if (ipv6) { +#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6) + struct in6_addr *saddr; + struct in6_addr *daddr; + + if (input) { + saddr = &ipv6_hdr(skb)->saddr; + daddr = &ipv6_hdr(skb)->daddr; + } else { + saddr = &sk->sk_v6_rcv_saddr; + daddr = &sk->sk_v6_daddr; + } + err = tcp_authopt_hash_tcp6_pseudoheader(pool, saddr, daddr, skb->len); + if (err) + return err; +#else + return -EINVAL; +#endif + } else { + __be32 saddr; + __be32 daddr; + + if (input) { + saddr = ip_hdr(skb)->saddr; + daddr = ip_hdr(skb)->daddr; + } else { + saddr = sk->sk_rcv_saddr; + daddr = sk->sk_daddr; + } + err = tcp_authopt_hash_tcp4_pseudoheader(pool, saddr, daddr, skb->len); + if (err) + return err; + } + + // TCP header with checksum set to zero + { + struct tcphdr hashed_th = *th; + + hashed_th.check = 0; + err = crypto_ahash_buf(pool->req, (u8 *)&hashed_th, sizeof(hashed_th)); + if (err) + return err; + } + + // TCP options + err = tcp_authopt_hash_opts(pool, th, aoptr, include_options); + if (err) + return err; + + // Rest of SKB->data + err = tcp_sig_hash_skb_data(pool->req, skb, th->doff << 2); + if (err) + return err; + + ahash_request_set_crypt(pool->req, NULL, macbuf, 0); + return crypto_ahash_final(pool->req); +} + +/* __tcp_authopt_calc_mac - Compute packet MAC using key + * + * The macbuf output buffer must be large enough to fit the digestsize of the + * underlying transform before truncation. + * This means TCP_AUTHOPT_MAXMACBUF, not TCP_AUTHOPT_MACLEN + */ +__always_unused +static int __tcp_authopt_calc_mac(struct sock *sk, + struct sk_buff *skb, + struct tcphdr_authopt *aoptr, + struct tcp_authopt_key_info *key, + struct tcp_authopt_info *info, + bool input, + char *macbuf) +{ + struct tcp_authopt_alg_pool *mac_pool; + u8 traffic_key[TCP_AUTHOPT_MAX_TRAFFIC_KEY_LEN]; + int err; + bool ipv6 = (sk->sk_family != AF_INET); + + if (sk->sk_family != AF_INET && sk->sk_family != AF_INET6) + return -EINVAL; + + err = tcp_authopt_get_traffic_key(sk, skb, key, info, input, ipv6, traffic_key); + if (err) + return err; + + mac_pool = tcp_authopt_get_mac_pool(key); + if (IS_ERR(mac_pool)) + return PTR_ERR(mac_pool); + err = crypto_ahash_setkey(mac_pool->tfm, traffic_key, key->alg->traffic_key_len); + if (err) + goto out; + err = crypto_ahash_init(mac_pool->req); + if (err) + return err; + + err = tcp_authopt_hash_packet(mac_pool, + sk, + skb, + aoptr, + info, + input, + ipv6, + !(key->flags & TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_EXCLUDE_OPTS), + macbuf); + +out: + tcp_authopt_put_mac_pool(key, mac_pool); + return err; +} + static int tcp_authopt_init_net(struct net *full_net) { struct netns_tcp_authopt *net = &full_net->tcp_authopt; mutex_init(&net->mutex); From patchwork Thu Aug 18 19:59:40 2022 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Leonard Crestez X-Patchwork-Id: 598242 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 82548C32774 for ; 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Thu, 18 Aug 2022 13:00:27 -0700 (PDT) From: Leonard Crestez To: David Ahern , Eric Dumazet , Philip Paeps Cc: Dmitry Safonov <0x7f454c46@gmail.com>, Shuah Khan , "David S. Miller" , Herbert Xu , Kuniyuki Iwashima , Hideaki YOSHIFUJI , Jakub Kicinski , Yuchung Cheng , Francesco Ruggeri , Mat Martineau , Christoph Paasch , Ivan Delalande , Caowangbao , Priyaranjan Jha , netdev@vger.kernel.org, linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org, linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Subject: [PATCH v7 06/26] tcp: Refactor tcp_inbound_md5_hash into tcp_inbound_sig_hash Date: Thu, 18 Aug 2022 22:59:40 +0300 Message-Id: <42b7fa32c0fca77abb1e6a234f2dac45798f605b.1660852705.git.cdleonard@gmail.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.25.1 In-Reply-To: References: MIME-Version: 1.0 Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org The TCP-MD5 and TCP-AO signature options must be handled together so replace the old tcp_inbound_md5_hash with tcp_inbound_sig_hash which will handle both options. As a side effect of this change Linux will start dropping packets where both MD5 and AO are present instead of ignoring the so-far unrecognized AO option. This is a direct requirement from RFC5925 2.2 This difference can be detected remotely without ever establishing a connection and used to fingerprint linux version. This seems acceptable. Signed-off-by: Leonard Crestez --- include/net/dropreason.h | 4 ++++ include/net/tcp.h | 52 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----------- net/ipv4/tcp.c | 39 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++---- net/ipv4/tcp_input.c | 39 ++++++++++++++++++++++-------- net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c | 12 +++++----- net/ipv6/tcp_ipv6.c | 8 +++---- 6 files changed, 115 insertions(+), 39 deletions(-) diff --git a/include/net/dropreason.h b/include/net/dropreason.h index fae9b40e54fa..c5397c24296c 100644 --- a/include/net/dropreason.h +++ b/include/net/dropreason.h @@ -229,10 +229,14 @@ enum skb_drop_reason { /** * @SKB_DROP_REASON_PKT_TOO_BIG: packet size is too big (maybe exceed the * MTU) */ SKB_DROP_REASON_PKT_TOO_BIG, + /** + * @SKB_DROP_REASON_TCP_BOTHAOMD5: Both AO and MD5 found in packet. + */ + SKB_DROP_REASON_TCP_BOTHAOMD5, /** * @SKB_DROP_REASON_MAX: the maximum of drop reason, which shouldn't be * used as a real 'reason' */ SKB_DROP_REASON_MAX, diff --git a/include/net/tcp.h b/include/net/tcp.h index fbe18b5bf576..96e7e406e324 100644 --- a/include/net/tcp.h +++ b/include/net/tcp.h @@ -424,11 +424,33 @@ int tcp_mmap(struct file *file, struct socket *sock, struct vm_area_struct *vma); #endif void tcp_parse_options(const struct net *net, const struct sk_buff *skb, struct tcp_options_received *opt_rx, int estab, struct tcp_fastopen_cookie *foc); -const u8 *tcp_parse_md5sig_option(const struct tcphdr *th); +#if defined(CONFIG_TCP_MD5SIG) || defined(CONFIG_TCP_AUTHOPT) +enum skb_drop_reason tcp_parse_sig_options(const struct tcphdr *th, + const u8 **md5ptr, + const u8 **aoptr); +#else +static inline enum skb_drop_reason tcp_parse_sig_options(const struct tcphdr *th, + const u8 **md5ptr, + const u8 **aoptr) +{ + *aoptr = NULL; + *md5ptr = NULL; + return 0; +} +#endif +static inline const u8 *tcp_parse_md5sig_option(const struct tcphdr *th) +{ + const u8 *md5, *ao; + int ret; + + ret = tcp_parse_sig_options(th, &md5, &ao); + + return (md5 && !ao && !ret) ? md5 : NULL; +} /* * BPF SKB-less helpers */ u16 tcp_v4_get_syncookie(struct sock *sk, struct iphdr *iph, @@ -1685,32 +1707,19 @@ tcp_md5_do_lookup(const struct sock *sk, int l3index, if (!static_branch_unlikely(&tcp_md5_needed)) return NULL; return __tcp_md5_do_lookup(sk, l3index, addr, family); } -enum skb_drop_reason -tcp_inbound_md5_hash(const struct sock *sk, const struct sk_buff *skb, - const void *saddr, const void *daddr, - int family, int dif, int sdif); - - #define tcp_twsk_md5_key(twsk) ((twsk)->tw_md5_key) #else static inline struct tcp_md5sig_key * tcp_md5_do_lookup(const struct sock *sk, int l3index, const union tcp_md5_addr *addr, int family) { return NULL; } -static inline enum skb_drop_reason -tcp_inbound_md5_hash(const struct sock *sk, const struct sk_buff *skb, - const void *saddr, const void *daddr, - int family, int dif, int sdif) -{ - return SKB_NOT_DROPPED_YET; -} #define tcp_twsk_md5_key(twsk) NULL #endif bool tcp_alloc_md5sig_pool(void); @@ -1723,10 +1732,25 @@ static inline void tcp_put_md5sig_pool(void) int tcp_sig_hash_skb_data(struct ahash_request *, const struct sk_buff *, unsigned int header_len); int tcp_md5_hash_key(struct tcp_md5sig_pool *hp, const struct tcp_md5sig_key *key); +#if defined(CONFIG_TCP_MD5SIG) || defined(CONFIG_TCP_AUTHOPT) +enum skb_drop_reason +tcp_inbound_sig_hash(const struct sock *sk, const struct sk_buff *skb, + const void *saddr, const void *daddr, + int family, int dif, int sdif); +#else +static inline enum skb_drop_reason +tcp_inbound_sig_hash(const struct sock *sk, const struct sk_buff *skb, + const void *saddr, const void *daddr, + int family, int dif, int sdif) +{ + return SKB_NOT_DROPPED_YET; +} +#endif + /* From tcp_fastopen.c */ void tcp_fastopen_cache_get(struct sock *sk, u16 *mss, struct tcp_fastopen_cookie *cookie); void tcp_fastopen_cache_set(struct sock *sk, u16 mss, struct tcp_fastopen_cookie *cookie, bool syn_lost, diff --git a/net/ipv4/tcp.c b/net/ipv4/tcp.c index 4c61c32ccf49..0611a2160b63 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/tcp.c +++ b/net/ipv4/tcp.c @@ -4568,24 +4568,24 @@ int tcp_md5_hash_key(struct tcp_md5sig_pool *hp, const struct tcp_md5sig_key *ke return data_race(crypto_ahash_update(hp->md5_req)); } EXPORT_SYMBOL(tcp_md5_hash_key); /* Called with rcu_read_lock() */ -enum skb_drop_reason +static enum skb_drop_reason tcp_inbound_md5_hash(const struct sock *sk, const struct sk_buff *skb, const void *saddr, const void *daddr, - int family, int dif, int sdif) + int family, int dif, int sdif, + const u8 *hash_location) { /* * This gets called for each TCP segment that arrives * so we want to be efficient. * We have 3 drop cases: * o No MD5 hash and one expected. * o MD5 hash and we're not expecting one. * o MD5 hash and its wrong. */ - const __u8 *hash_location = NULL; struct tcp_md5sig_key *hash_expected; const struct tcphdr *th = tcp_hdr(skb); struct tcp_sock *tp = tcp_sk(sk); int genhash, l3index; u8 newhash[16]; @@ -4594,11 +4594,10 @@ tcp_inbound_md5_hash(const struct sock *sk, const struct sk_buff *skb, * in an L3 domain and dif is set to the l3mdev */ l3index = sdif ? dif : 0; hash_expected = tcp_md5_do_lookup(sk, l3index, saddr, family); - hash_location = tcp_parse_md5sig_option(th); /* We've parsed the options - do we have a hash? */ if (!hash_expected && !hash_location) return SKB_NOT_DROPPED_YET; @@ -4641,14 +4640,44 @@ tcp_inbound_md5_hash(const struct sock *sk, const struct sk_buff *skb, } return SKB_DROP_REASON_TCP_MD5FAILURE; } return SKB_NOT_DROPPED_YET; } -EXPORT_SYMBOL(tcp_inbound_md5_hash); #endif /* CONFIG_TCP_MD5SIG */ +#if defined(CONFIG_TCP_MD5SIG) || defined(CONFIG_TCP_AUTHOPT) + +enum skb_drop_reason +tcp_inbound_sig_hash(const struct sock *sk, const struct sk_buff *skb, + const void *saddr, const void *daddr, + int family, int dif, int sdif) +{ + /* FIXME: Restore reqsk handling */ + const u8 *md5, *ao; + enum skb_drop_reason ret; + const struct sock *parent_sk; + + if (sk->sk_state == TCP_NEW_SYN_RECV) + parent_sk = inet_reqsk(sk)->rsk_listener; + else + parent_sk = sk; + + ret = tcp_parse_sig_options(tcp_hdr(skb), &md5, &ao); + if (ret) + return ret; + +#ifdef CONFIG_TCP_MD5SIG + return tcp_inbound_md5_hash(parent_sk, skb, saddr, daddr, family, dif, sdif, md5); +#else + return SKB_NOT_DROPPED_YET; +#endif +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL(tcp_inbound_sig_hash); + +#endif /* defined(CONFIG_TCP_MD5SIG) || defined(CONFIG_TCP_AUTHOPT) */ + void tcp_done(struct sock *sk) { struct request_sock *req; /* We might be called with a new socket, after diff --git a/net/ipv4/tcp_input.c b/net/ipv4/tcp_input.c index ab5f0ea166f1..fa20afd15248 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/tcp_input.c +++ b/net/ipv4/tcp_input.c @@ -4186,43 +4186,62 @@ static bool tcp_fast_parse_options(const struct net *net, tp->rx_opt.rcv_tsecr -= tp->tsoffset; return true; } -#ifdef CONFIG_TCP_MD5SIG +#if defined(CONFIG_TCP_MD5SIG) || defined(CONFIG_TCP_AUTHOPT) /* - * Parse MD5 Signature option + * Parse MD5 and AO options + * + * md5ptr: pointer to content of MD5 option (16-byte hash) + * aoptr: pointer to start of AO option (variable length) */ -const u8 *tcp_parse_md5sig_option(const struct tcphdr *th) +enum skb_drop_reason tcp_parse_sig_options(const struct tcphdr *th, + const u8 **md5ptr, + const u8 **aoptr) { int length = (th->doff << 2) - sizeof(*th); const u8 *ptr = (const u8 *)(th + 1); + *md5ptr = NULL; + *aoptr = NULL; + /* If not enough data remaining, we can short cut */ - while (length >= TCPOLEN_MD5SIG) { + while (length >= 4) { int opcode = *ptr++; int opsize; switch (opcode) { case TCPOPT_EOL: - return NULL; + goto out; case TCPOPT_NOP: length--; continue; default: opsize = *ptr++; if (opsize < 2 || opsize > length) - return NULL; - if (opcode == TCPOPT_MD5SIG) - return opsize == TCPOLEN_MD5SIG ? ptr : NULL; + goto out; + if (opcode == TCPOPT_MD5SIG && opsize == TCPOLEN_MD5SIG) + *md5ptr = ptr; + if (opcode == TCPOPT_AUTHOPT) + *aoptr = ptr - 2; } ptr += opsize - 2; length -= opsize; } - return NULL; + +out: + /* RFC5925 2.2: An endpoint MUST NOT use TCP-AO for the same connection + * in which TCP MD5 is used. When both options appear, TCP MUST silently + * discard the segment. + */ + if (*md5ptr && *aoptr) + return SKB_DROP_REASON_TCP_BOTHAOMD5; + + return SKB_NOT_DROPPED_YET; } -EXPORT_SYMBOL(tcp_parse_md5sig_option); +EXPORT_SYMBOL(tcp_parse_sig_options); #endif /* Sorry, PAWS as specified is broken wrt. pure-ACKs -DaveM * * It is not fatal. If this ACK does _not_ change critical state (seqs, window) diff --git a/net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c b/net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c index 46ba754afd2b..58b5f197bde1 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c +++ b/net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c @@ -1964,17 +1964,17 @@ int tcp_v4_rcv(struct sk_buff *skb) if (sk->sk_state == TCP_NEW_SYN_RECV) { struct request_sock *req = inet_reqsk(sk); bool req_stolen = false; struct sock *nsk; - sk = req->rsk_listener; - if (!xfrm4_policy_check(sk, XFRM_POLICY_IN, skb)) + if (!xfrm4_policy_check(req->rsk_listener, XFRM_POLICY_IN, skb)) drop_reason = SKB_DROP_REASON_XFRM_POLICY; else - drop_reason = tcp_inbound_md5_hash(sk, skb, - &iph->saddr, &iph->daddr, - AF_INET, dif, sdif); + drop_reason = tcp_inbound_sig_hash(sk, skb, + &iph->saddr, &iph->daddr, + AF_INET, dif, sdif); + sk = req->rsk_listener; if (unlikely(drop_reason)) { sk_drops_add(sk, skb); reqsk_put(req); goto discard_it; } @@ -2046,11 +2046,11 @@ int tcp_v4_rcv(struct sk_buff *skb) if (!xfrm4_policy_check(sk, XFRM_POLICY_IN, skb)) { drop_reason = SKB_DROP_REASON_XFRM_POLICY; goto discard_and_relse; } - drop_reason = tcp_inbound_md5_hash(sk, skb, &iph->saddr, + drop_reason = tcp_inbound_sig_hash(sk, skb, &iph->saddr, &iph->daddr, AF_INET, dif, sdif); if (drop_reason) goto discard_and_relse; nf_reset_ct(skb); diff --git a/net/ipv6/tcp_ipv6.c b/net/ipv6/tcp_ipv6.c index 30dc9d4eec83..2edfe631878e 100644 --- a/net/ipv6/tcp_ipv6.c +++ b/net/ipv6/tcp_ipv6.c @@ -1632,14 +1632,14 @@ INDIRECT_CALLABLE_SCOPE int tcp_v6_rcv(struct sk_buff *skb) if (sk->sk_state == TCP_NEW_SYN_RECV) { struct request_sock *req = inet_reqsk(sk); bool req_stolen = false; struct sock *nsk; - sk = req->rsk_listener; - drop_reason = tcp_inbound_md5_hash(sk, skb, + drop_reason = tcp_inbound_sig_hash(sk, skb, &hdr->saddr, &hdr->daddr, AF_INET6, dif, sdif); + sk = req->rsk_listener; if (drop_reason) { sk_drops_add(sk, skb); reqsk_put(req); goto discard_it; } @@ -1707,12 +1707,12 @@ INDIRECT_CALLABLE_SCOPE int tcp_v6_rcv(struct sk_buff *skb) if (!xfrm6_policy_check(sk, XFRM_POLICY_IN, skb)) { drop_reason = SKB_DROP_REASON_XFRM_POLICY; goto discard_and_relse; } - drop_reason = tcp_inbound_md5_hash(sk, skb, &hdr->saddr, &hdr->daddr, - AF_INET6, dif, sdif); + drop_reason = tcp_inbound_sig_hash(sk, skb, &hdr->saddr, + &hdr->daddr, AF_INET6, dif, sdif); if (drop_reason) goto discard_and_relse; if (tcp_filter(sk, skb)) { drop_reason = SKB_DROP_REASON_SOCKET_FILTER; From patchwork Thu Aug 18 19:59:41 2022 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Leonard Crestez X-Patchwork-Id: 598944 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 5FDD0C32773 for ; Thu, 18 Aug 2022 20:00:47 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1345210AbiHRUAp (ORCPT ); Thu, 18 Aug 2022 16:00:45 -0400 Received: from lindbergh.monkeyblade.net ([23.128.96.19]:54742 "EHLO lindbergh.monkeyblade.net" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1345461AbiHRUAd (ORCPT ); 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Thu, 18 Aug 2022 13:00:29 -0700 (PDT) From: Leonard Crestez To: David Ahern , Eric Dumazet , Philip Paeps Cc: Dmitry Safonov <0x7f454c46@gmail.com>, Shuah Khan , "David S. Miller" , Herbert Xu , Kuniyuki Iwashima , Hideaki YOSHIFUJI , Jakub Kicinski , Yuchung Cheng , Francesco Ruggeri , Mat Martineau , Christoph Paasch , Ivan Delalande , Caowangbao , Priyaranjan Jha , netdev@vger.kernel.org, linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org, linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Subject: [PATCH v7 07/26] tcp: authopt: Hook into tcp core Date: Thu, 18 Aug 2022 22:59:41 +0300 Message-Id: <887a4cd26bbf7dd792def034cf6d8b40fd11c43d.1660852705.git.cdleonard@gmail.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.25.1 In-Reply-To: References: MIME-Version: 1.0 Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org The tcp_authopt features exposes a minimal interface to the rest of the TCP stack. Only a few functions are exposed and if the feature is disabled they return neutral values, avoiding ifdefs in the rest of the code. This approach is different from MD5. Add calls into tcp authopt from send, receive, accept, close code. Signed-off-by: Leonard Crestez --- include/net/dropreason.h | 12 ++ include/net/tcp_authopt.h | 85 +++++++++++ include/uapi/linux/snmp.h | 1 + net/ipv4/proc.c | 1 + net/ipv4/tcp.c | 17 +++ net/ipv4/tcp_authopt.c | 302 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++- net/ipv4/tcp_input.c | 3 + net/ipv4/tcp_minisocks.c | 12 ++ net/ipv4/tcp_output.c | 85 ++++++++++- 9 files changed, 515 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/include/net/dropreason.h b/include/net/dropreason.h index c5397c24296c..d5dd92affde8 100644 --- a/include/net/dropreason.h +++ b/include/net/dropreason.h @@ -233,10 +233,22 @@ enum skb_drop_reason { SKB_DROP_REASON_PKT_TOO_BIG, /** * @SKB_DROP_REASON_TCP_BOTHAOMD5: Both AO and MD5 found in packet. */ SKB_DROP_REASON_TCP_BOTHAOMD5, + /** + * @SKB_DROP_REASON_TCP_AONOTFOUND: No AO signature and one expected. + */ + SKB_DROP_REASON_TCP_AONOTFOUND, + /** + * @SKB_DROP_REASON_TCP_AOUNEXPECTED: AO hash and we're not expecting + */ + SKB_DROP_REASON_TCP_AOUNEXPECTED, + /** + * @SKB_DROP_REASON_TCP_AOFAILURE: AO hash incorrect + */ + SKB_DROP_REASON_TCP_AOFAILURE, /** * @SKB_DROP_REASON_MAX: the maximum of drop reason, which shouldn't be * used as a real 'reason' */ SKB_DROP_REASON_MAX, diff --git a/include/net/tcp_authopt.h b/include/net/tcp_authopt.h index e303ef53e1a3..7ad34a6987ec 100644 --- a/include/net/tcp_authopt.h +++ b/include/net/tcp_authopt.h @@ -80,16 +80,101 @@ struct tcphdr_authopt { }; #ifdef CONFIG_TCP_AUTHOPT DECLARE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(tcp_authopt_needed_key); #define tcp_authopt_needed (static_branch_unlikely(&tcp_authopt_needed_key)) +void tcp_authopt_free(struct sock *sk, struct tcp_authopt_info *info); void tcp_authopt_clear(struct sock *sk); int tcp_set_authopt(struct sock *sk, sockptr_t optval, unsigned int optlen); int tcp_get_authopt_val(struct sock *sk, struct tcp_authopt *key); int tcp_set_authopt_key(struct sock *sk, sockptr_t optval, unsigned int optlen); +struct tcp_authopt_key_info *__tcp_authopt_select_key( + const struct sock *sk, + struct tcp_authopt_info *info, + const struct sock *addr_sk, + u8 *rnextkeyid); +static inline struct tcp_authopt_key_info *tcp_authopt_select_key( + const struct sock *sk, + const struct sock *addr_sk, + struct tcp_authopt_info **info, + u8 *rnextkeyid) +{ + if (tcp_authopt_needed) { + *info = rcu_dereference(tcp_sk(sk)->authopt_info); + + if (*info) + return __tcp_authopt_select_key(sk, *info, addr_sk, rnextkeyid); + } + return NULL; +} +int tcp_authopt_hash( + char *hash_location, + struct tcp_authopt_key_info *key, + struct tcp_authopt_info *info, + struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb); +int __tcp_authopt_openreq(struct sock *newsk, const struct sock *oldsk, struct request_sock *req); +static inline int tcp_authopt_openreq( + struct sock *newsk, + const struct sock *oldsk, + struct request_sock *req) +{ + if (!rcu_dereference(tcp_sk(oldsk)->authopt_info)) + return 0; + else + return __tcp_authopt_openreq(newsk, oldsk, req); +} +void __tcp_authopt_finish_connect(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb, + struct tcp_authopt_info *info); +static inline void tcp_authopt_finish_connect(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb) +{ + struct tcp_authopt_info *info; + + if (skb && tcp_authopt_needed) { + info = rcu_dereference_protected(tcp_sk(sk)->authopt_info, + lockdep_sock_is_held(sk)); + + if (info) + __tcp_authopt_finish_connect(sk, skb, info); + } +} +static inline void tcp_authopt_time_wait( + struct tcp_timewait_sock *tcptw, + struct tcp_sock *tp) +{ + if (tcp_authopt_needed) { + /* Transfer ownership of authopt_info to the twsk + * This requires no other users of the origin sock. + */ + tcptw->tw_authopt_info = rcu_dereference_protected( + tp->authopt_info, + lockdep_sock_is_held((struct sock *)tp)); + rcu_assign_pointer(tp->authopt_info, NULL); + } else { + tcptw->tw_authopt_info = NULL; + } +} +int __tcp_authopt_inbound_check( + struct sock *sk, + struct sk_buff *skb, + struct tcp_authopt_info *info, + const u8 *opt); #else static inline void tcp_authopt_clear(struct sock *sk) { } +static inline int tcp_authopt_openreq(struct sock *newsk, + const struct sock *oldsk, + struct request_sock *req) +{ + return 0; +} +static inline void tcp_authopt_finish_connect(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb) +{ +} +static inline void tcp_authopt_time_wait( + struct tcp_timewait_sock *tcptw, + struct tcp_sock *tp) +{ +} #endif #endif /* _LINUX_TCP_AUTHOPT_H */ diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/snmp.h b/include/uapi/linux/snmp.h index 4d7470036a8b..ae2738a7992b 100644 --- a/include/uapi/linux/snmp.h +++ b/include/uapi/linux/snmp.h @@ -290,10 +290,11 @@ enum LINUX_MIB_TCPDUPLICATEDATAREHASH, /* TCPDuplicateDataRehash */ LINUX_MIB_TCPDSACKRECVSEGS, /* TCPDSACKRecvSegs */ LINUX_MIB_TCPDSACKIGNOREDDUBIOUS, /* TCPDSACKIgnoredDubious */ LINUX_MIB_TCPMIGRATEREQSUCCESS, /* TCPMigrateReqSuccess */ LINUX_MIB_TCPMIGRATEREQFAILURE, /* TCPMigrateReqFailure */ + LINUX_MIB_TCPAUTHOPTFAILURE, /* TCPAuthOptFailure */ __LINUX_MIB_MAX }; /* linux Xfrm mib definitions */ enum diff --git a/net/ipv4/proc.c b/net/ipv4/proc.c index 0088a4c64d77..e48c7245c571 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/proc.c +++ b/net/ipv4/proc.c @@ -295,10 +295,11 @@ static const struct snmp_mib snmp4_net_list[] = { SNMP_MIB_ITEM("TcpDuplicateDataRehash", LINUX_MIB_TCPDUPLICATEDATAREHASH), SNMP_MIB_ITEM("TCPDSACKRecvSegs", LINUX_MIB_TCPDSACKRECVSEGS), SNMP_MIB_ITEM("TCPDSACKIgnoredDubious", LINUX_MIB_TCPDSACKIGNOREDDUBIOUS), SNMP_MIB_ITEM("TCPMigrateReqSuccess", LINUX_MIB_TCPMIGRATEREQSUCCESS), SNMP_MIB_ITEM("TCPMigrateReqFailure", LINUX_MIB_TCPMIGRATEREQFAILURE), + SNMP_MIB_ITEM("TCPAuthOptFailure", LINUX_MIB_TCPAUTHOPTFAILURE), SNMP_MIB_SENTINEL }; static void icmpmsg_put_line(struct seq_file *seq, unsigned long *vals, unsigned short *type, int count) diff --git a/net/ipv4/tcp.c b/net/ipv4/tcp.c index 0611a2160b63..205534d501ec 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/tcp.c +++ b/net/ipv4/tcp.c @@ -4664,10 +4664,27 @@ tcp_inbound_sig_hash(const struct sock *sk, const struct sk_buff *skb, ret = tcp_parse_sig_options(tcp_hdr(skb), &md5, &ao); if (ret) return ret; +#if defined(CONFIG_TCP_AUTHOPT) + if (tcp_authopt_needed) { + struct tcp_authopt_info *info = rcu_dereference(tcp_sk(parent_sk)->authopt_info); + int aoret; + + if (info) { + aoret = __tcp_authopt_inbound_check((struct sock *)sk, + (struct sk_buff *)skb, + info, ao); + /* Don't do MD5 lookup if AO found */ + if (aoret == 1) + return SKB_NOT_DROPPED_YET; + if (aoret < 0) + return -aoret; + } + } +#endif #ifdef CONFIG_TCP_MD5SIG return tcp_inbound_md5_hash(parent_sk, skb, saddr, daddr, family, dif, sdif, md5); #else return SKB_NOT_DROPPED_YET; #endif diff --git a/net/ipv4/tcp_authopt.c b/net/ipv4/tcp_authopt.c index 440d329b52f4..9215a8377e4d 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/tcp_authopt.c +++ b/net/ipv4/tcp_authopt.c @@ -268,10 +268,57 @@ static bool tcp_authopt_key_match_exact(struct tcp_authopt_key_info *info, return false; return true; } +static bool tcp_authopt_key_match_skb_addr(struct tcp_authopt_key_info *key, + struct sk_buff *skb) +{ + u16 keyaf = key->addr.ss_family; + struct iphdr *iph = (struct iphdr *)skb_network_header(skb); + + if (keyaf == AF_INET && iph->version == 4) { + struct sockaddr_in *key_addr = (struct sockaddr_in *)&key->addr; + + return iph->saddr == key_addr->sin_addr.s_addr; + } else if (keyaf == AF_INET6 && iph->version == 6) { + struct ipv6hdr *ip6h = (struct ipv6hdr *)skb_network_header(skb); + struct sockaddr_in6 *key_addr = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)&key->addr; + + return ipv6_addr_equal(&ip6h->saddr, &key_addr->sin6_addr); + } + + /* This actually happens with ipv6-mapped-ipv4-addresses + * IPv6 listen sockets will be asked to validate ipv4 packets. + */ + return false; +} + +static bool tcp_authopt_key_match_sk_addr(struct tcp_authopt_key_info *key, + const struct sock *addr_sk) +{ + u16 keyaf = key->addr.ss_family; + + /* This probably can't happen even with ipv4-mapped-ipv6 */ + if (keyaf != addr_sk->sk_family) + return false; + + if (keyaf == AF_INET) { + struct sockaddr_in *key_addr = (struct sockaddr_in *)&key->addr; + + return addr_sk->sk_daddr == key_addr->sin_addr.s_addr; +#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6) + } else if (keyaf == AF_INET6) { + struct sockaddr_in6 *key_addr = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)&key->addr; + + return ipv6_addr_equal(&addr_sk->sk_v6_daddr, &key_addr->sin6_addr); +#endif + } + + return false; +} + static struct tcp_authopt_key_info *tcp_authopt_key_lookup_exact(const struct sock *sk, struct netns_tcp_authopt *net, struct tcp_authopt_key *ukey) { struct tcp_authopt_key_info *key_info; @@ -281,10 +328,63 @@ static struct tcp_authopt_key_info *tcp_authopt_key_lookup_exact(const struct so return key_info; return NULL; } +/** + * tcp_authopt_lookup_send - lookup key for sending + * + * @net: Per-namespace information containing keys + * @addr_sk: Socket used for destination address lookup + * @send_id: Optional send_id. If >= 0 then only return keys that match + * + * If anykey is false then authentication is not required for peer. + * + * If anykey is true but no key was found then all our keys must be expired and sending should fail. + */ +static struct tcp_authopt_key_info *tcp_authopt_lookup_send(struct netns_tcp_authopt *net, + const struct sock *addr_sk, + int send_id) +{ + struct tcp_authopt_key_info *result = NULL; + struct tcp_authopt_key_info *key; + + hlist_for_each_entry_rcu(key, &net->head, node, 0) { + if (send_id >= 0 && key->send_id != send_id) + continue; + if (key->flags & TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_ADDR_BIND) + if (!tcp_authopt_key_match_sk_addr(key, addr_sk)) + continue; + if (result && net_ratelimit()) + pr_warn("ambiguous tcp authentication keys configured for send\n"); + result = key; + } + + return result; +} + +/** + * __tcp_authopt_select_key - select key for sending + * + * @sk: socket + * @info: socket's tcp_authopt_info + * @addr_sk: socket used for address lookup. Same as sk except for synack case + * @rnextkeyid: value of rnextkeyid caller should write in packet + * + * Result is protected by RCU and can't be stored, it may only be passed to + * tcp_authopt_hash and only under a single rcu_read_lock. + */ +struct tcp_authopt_key_info *__tcp_authopt_select_key(const struct sock *sk, + struct tcp_authopt_info *info, + const struct sock *addr_sk, + u8 *rnextkeyid) +{ + struct netns_tcp_authopt *net = sock_net_tcp_authopt(sk); + + return tcp_authopt_lookup_send(net, addr_sk, -1); +} + static struct tcp_authopt_info *__tcp_authopt_info_get_or_create(struct sock *sk) { struct tcp_sock *tp = tcp_sk(sk); struct tcp_authopt_info *info; @@ -548,10 +648,45 @@ static int crypto_ahash_buf(struct ahash_request *req, u8 *buf, uint len) ahash_request_set_crypt(req, &sg, NULL, len); return crypto_ahash_update(req); } +/** Called to create accepted sockets. + * + * Need to copy authopt info from listen socket. + */ +int __tcp_authopt_openreq(struct sock *newsk, const struct sock *oldsk, struct request_sock *req) +{ + struct tcp_authopt_info *old_info; + struct tcp_authopt_info *new_info; + + old_info = rcu_dereference(tcp_sk(oldsk)->authopt_info); + if (!old_info) + return 0; + + /* Clear value copies from oldsk: */ + rcu_assign_pointer(tcp_sk(newsk)->authopt_info, NULL); + + new_info = kzalloc(sizeof(*new_info), GFP_ATOMIC); + if (!new_info) + return -ENOMEM; + + new_info->src_isn = tcp_rsk(req)->snt_isn; + new_info->dst_isn = tcp_rsk(req)->rcv_isn; + sk_gso_disable(newsk); + rcu_assign_pointer(tcp_sk(newsk)->authopt_info, new_info); + + return 0; +} + +void __tcp_authopt_finish_connect(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb, + struct tcp_authopt_info *info) +{ + info->src_isn = ntohl(tcp_hdr(skb)->ack_seq) - 1; + info->dst_isn = ntohl(tcp_hdr(skb)->seq); +} + /* feed traffic key into ahash */ static int tcp_authopt_ahash_traffic_key(struct tcp_authopt_alg_pool *pool, struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb, struct tcp_authopt_info *info, @@ -880,11 +1015,10 @@ static int tcp_authopt_hash_packet(struct tcp_authopt_alg_pool *pool, * * The macbuf output buffer must be large enough to fit the digestsize of the * underlying transform before truncation. * This means TCP_AUTHOPT_MAXMACBUF, not TCP_AUTHOPT_MACLEN */ -__always_unused static int __tcp_authopt_calc_mac(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb, struct tcphdr_authopt *aoptr, struct tcp_authopt_key_info *key, struct tcp_authopt_info *info, @@ -926,10 +1060,176 @@ static int __tcp_authopt_calc_mac(struct sock *sk, out: tcp_authopt_put_mac_pool(key, mac_pool); return err; } +/* tcp_authopt_hash - fill in the mac + * + * The key must come from tcp_authopt_select_key. + */ +int tcp_authopt_hash(char *hash_location, + struct tcp_authopt_key_info *key, + struct tcp_authopt_info *info, + struct sock *sk, + struct sk_buff *skb) +{ + /* MAC inside option is truncated to 12 bytes but crypto API needs output + * buffer to be large enough so we use a buffer on the stack. + */ + u8 macbuf[TCP_AUTHOPT_MAXMACBUF]; + int err; + struct tcphdr_authopt *aoptr = (struct tcphdr_authopt *)(hash_location - 4); + + err = __tcp_authopt_calc_mac(sk, skb, aoptr, key, info, false, macbuf); + if (err) + goto fail; + memcpy(hash_location, macbuf, TCP_AUTHOPT_MACLEN); + + return 0; + +fail: + /* If mac calculation fails and caller doesn't handle the error + * try to make it obvious inside the packet. + */ + memset(hash_location, 0, TCP_AUTHOPT_MACLEN); + return err; +} + +/** + * tcp_authopt_lookup_recv - lookup key for receive + * + * @sk: Receive socket + * @skb: Packet, used to compare addr and iface + * @net: Per-namespace information containing keys + * @recv_id: Optional recv_id. If >= 0 then only return keys that match + * @anykey: Set to true if any keys are present for the peer + * + * If anykey is false then authentication is not expected from peer. + * + * If anykey is true then a valid key is required. + */ +static struct tcp_authopt_key_info *tcp_authopt_lookup_recv(struct sock *sk, + struct sk_buff *skb, + struct netns_tcp_authopt *net, + int recv_id, + bool *anykey) +{ + struct tcp_authopt_key_info *result = NULL; + struct tcp_authopt_key_info *key; + + *anykey = false; + /* multiple matches will cause occasional failures */ + hlist_for_each_entry_rcu(key, &net->head, node, 0) { + if (key->flags & TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_ADDR_BIND && + !tcp_authopt_key_match_skb_addr(key, skb)) + continue; + *anykey = true; + if (recv_id >= 0 && key->recv_id != recv_id) + continue; + if (!result) + result = key; + else if (result) + net_warn_ratelimited("ambiguous tcp authentication keys configured for recv\n"); + } + + return result; +} + +/* Show a rate-limited message for authentication fail */ +static void print_tcpao_notice(const char *msg, struct sk_buff *skb) +{ + struct iphdr *iph = (struct iphdr *)skb_network_header(skb); + struct tcphdr *th = (struct tcphdr *)skb_transport_header(skb); + + if (iph->version == 4) { + net_info_ratelimited("%s (%pI4, %d)->(%pI4, %d)\n", msg, + &iph->saddr, ntohs(th->source), + &iph->daddr, ntohs(th->dest)); + } else if (iph->version == 6) { + struct ipv6hdr *ip6h = (struct ipv6hdr *)skb_network_header(skb); + + net_info_ratelimited("%s (%pI6, %d)->(%pI6, %d)\n", msg, + &ip6h->saddr, ntohs(th->source), + &ip6h->daddr, ntohs(th->dest)); + } else { + WARN_ONCE(1, "%s unknown IP version\n", msg); + } +} + +/** + * __tcp_authopt_inbound_check - Check inbound TCP authentication option + * + * @sk: Receive socket. For the SYN_RECV state this must be the request_sock, not the listener + * @skb: Input Packet + * @info: TCP authentication option information + * @_opt: Pointer to TCP authentication option inside the skb + * + * Return: + * 0: Nothing found or expected + * 1: Found and verified + * <0: Error, negative skb_drop_reason + */ +int __tcp_authopt_inbound_check(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb, + struct tcp_authopt_info *info, const u8 *_opt) +{ + struct netns_tcp_authopt *net = sock_net_tcp_authopt(sk); + struct tcphdr_authopt *opt = (struct tcphdr_authopt *)_opt; + struct tcp_authopt_key_info *key; + bool anykey; + u8 macbuf[TCP_AUTHOPT_MAXMACBUF]; + int err; + + key = tcp_authopt_lookup_recv(sk, skb, net, opt ? opt->keyid : -1, &anykey); + + /* nothing found or expected */ + if (!opt && !anykey) + return 0; + if (!opt && anykey) { + NET_INC_STATS(sock_net(sk), LINUX_MIB_TCPAUTHOPTFAILURE); + print_tcpao_notice("TCP Authentication Missing", skb); + return -SKB_DROP_REASON_TCP_AONOTFOUND; + } + if (opt && !anykey) { + /* RFC5925 Section 7.3: + * A TCP-AO implementation MUST allow for configuration of the behavior + * of segments with TCP-AO but that do not match an MKT. The initial + * default of this configuration SHOULD be to silently accept such + * connections. + */ + if (info->flags & TCP_AUTHOPT_FLAG_REJECT_UNEXPECTED) { + NET_INC_STATS(sock_net(sk), LINUX_MIB_TCPAUTHOPTFAILURE); + print_tcpao_notice("TCP Authentication Unexpected: Rejected", skb); + return -SKB_DROP_REASON_TCP_AOUNEXPECTED; + } + print_tcpao_notice("TCP Authentication Unexpected: Accepted", skb); + return 0; + } + if (opt && !key) { + /* Keys are configured for peer but with different keyid than packet */ + NET_INC_STATS(sock_net(sk), LINUX_MIB_TCPAUTHOPTFAILURE); + print_tcpao_notice("TCP Authentication Failed", skb); + return -SKB_DROP_REASON_TCP_AOFAILURE; + } + + /* bad inbound key len */ + if (opt->len != TCPOLEN_AUTHOPT_OUTPUT) + return -SKB_DROP_REASON_TCP_AOFAILURE; + + err = __tcp_authopt_calc_mac(sk, skb, opt, key, info, true, macbuf); + if (err) + return -SKB_DROP_REASON_TCP_AOFAILURE; + + if (memcmp(macbuf, opt->mac, TCP_AUTHOPT_MACLEN)) { + NET_INC_STATS(sock_net(sk), LINUX_MIB_TCPAUTHOPTFAILURE); + print_tcpao_notice("TCP Authentication Failed", skb); + return -SKB_DROP_REASON_TCP_AOFAILURE; + } + + return 1; +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL(__tcp_authopt_inbound_check); + static int tcp_authopt_init_net(struct net *full_net) { struct netns_tcp_authopt *net = &full_net->tcp_authopt; mutex_init(&net->mutex); diff --git a/net/ipv4/tcp_input.c b/net/ipv4/tcp_input.c index fa20afd15248..b0c883521b1a 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/tcp_input.c +++ b/net/ipv4/tcp_input.c @@ -70,10 +70,11 @@ #include #include #include #include #include +#include #include #include #include #include #include @@ -6059,10 +6060,12 @@ void tcp_finish_connect(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb) struct inet_connection_sock *icsk = inet_csk(sk); tcp_set_state(sk, TCP_ESTABLISHED); icsk->icsk_ack.lrcvtime = tcp_jiffies32; + tcp_authopt_finish_connect(sk, skb); + if (skb) { icsk->icsk_af_ops->sk_rx_dst_set(sk, skb); security_inet_conn_established(sk, skb); sk_mark_napi_id(sk, skb); } diff --git a/net/ipv4/tcp_minisocks.c b/net/ipv4/tcp_minisocks.c index cb95d88497ae..64357bf5ede2 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/tcp_minisocks.c +++ b/net/ipv4/tcp_minisocks.c @@ -18,10 +18,11 @@ * Arnt Gulbrandsen, * Jorge Cwik, */ #include +#include #include #include static bool tcp_in_window(u32 seq, u32 end_seq, u32 s_win, u32 e_win) { @@ -300,10 +301,11 @@ void tcp_time_wait(struct sock *sk, int state, int timeo) BUG_ON(tcptw->tw_md5_key && !tcp_alloc_md5sig_pool()); } } } while (0); #endif + tcp_authopt_time_wait(tcptw, tcp_sk(sk)); /* Get the TIME_WAIT timeout firing. */ if (timeo < rto) timeo = rto; @@ -342,10 +344,19 @@ void tcp_twsk_destructor(struct sock *sk) if (twsk->tw_md5_key) kfree_rcu(twsk->tw_md5_key, rcu); } #endif +#ifdef CONFIG_TCP_AUTHOPT + if (tcp_authopt_needed) { + struct tcp_timewait_sock *twsk = tcp_twsk(sk); + + /* twsk only contains sock_common so pass NULL as sk. */ + if (twsk->tw_authopt_info) + tcp_authopt_free(NULL, twsk->tw_authopt_info); + } +#endif } EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(tcp_twsk_destructor); /* Warning : This function is called without sk_listener being locked. * Be sure to read socket fields once, as their value could change under us. @@ -532,10 +543,11 @@ struct sock *tcp_create_openreq_child(const struct sock *sk, #ifdef CONFIG_TCP_MD5SIG newtp->md5sig_info = NULL; /*XXX*/ if (treq->af_specific->req_md5_lookup(sk, req_to_sk(req))) newtp->tcp_header_len += TCPOLEN_MD5SIG_ALIGNED; #endif + tcp_authopt_openreq(newsk, sk, req); if (skb->len >= TCP_MSS_DEFAULT + newtp->tcp_header_len) newicsk->icsk_ack.last_seg_size = skb->len - newtp->tcp_header_len; newtp->rx_opt.mss_clamp = req->mss; tcp_ecn_openreq_child(newtp, req); newtp->fastopen_req = NULL; diff --git a/net/ipv4/tcp_output.c b/net/ipv4/tcp_output.c index 78b654ff421b..ae69936947f3 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/tcp_output.c +++ b/net/ipv4/tcp_output.c @@ -37,10 +37,11 @@ #define pr_fmt(fmt) "TCP: " fmt #include #include +#include #include #include #include #include @@ -408,10 +409,11 @@ static inline bool tcp_urg_mode(const struct tcp_sock *tp) #define OPTION_SACK_ADVERTISE BIT(0) #define OPTION_TS BIT(1) #define OPTION_MD5 BIT(2) #define OPTION_WSCALE BIT(3) +#define OPTION_AUTHOPT BIT(4) #define OPTION_FAST_OPEN_COOKIE BIT(8) #define OPTION_SMC BIT(9) #define OPTION_MPTCP BIT(10) static void smc_options_write(__be32 *ptr, u16 *options) @@ -432,16 +434,22 @@ static void smc_options_write(__be32 *ptr, u16 *options) struct tcp_out_options { u16 options; /* bit field of OPTION_* */ u16 mss; /* 0 to disable */ u8 ws; /* window scale, 0 to disable */ u8 num_sack_blocks; /* number of SACK blocks to include */ - u8 hash_size; /* bytes in hash_location */ u8 bpf_opt_len; /* length of BPF hdr option */ +#ifdef CONFIG_TCP_AUTHOPT + u8 authopt_rnextkeyid; /* rnextkey */ +#endif __u8 *hash_location; /* temporary pointer, overloaded */ __u32 tsval, tsecr; /* need to include OPTION_TS */ struct tcp_fastopen_cookie *fastopen_cookie; /* Fast open cookie */ struct mptcp_out_options mptcp; +#ifdef CONFIG_TCP_AUTHOPT + struct tcp_authopt_info *authopt_info; + struct tcp_authopt_key_info *authopt_key; +#endif }; static void mptcp_options_write(struct tcphdr *th, __be32 *ptr, struct tcp_sock *tp, struct tcp_out_options *opts) @@ -616,10 +624,25 @@ static void tcp_options_write(struct tcphdr *th, struct tcp_sock *tp, /* overload cookie hash location */ opts->hash_location = (__u8 *)ptr; ptr += 4; } +#ifdef CONFIG_TCP_AUTHOPT + if (unlikely(OPTION_AUTHOPT & options)) { + struct tcp_authopt_key_info *key = opts->authopt_key; + + WARN_ON(!key); + *ptr = htonl((TCPOPT_AUTHOPT << 24) | + (TCPOLEN_AUTHOPT_OUTPUT << 16) | + (key->send_id << 8) | + opts->authopt_rnextkeyid); + /* overload cookie hash location */ + opts->hash_location = (__u8 *)(ptr + 1); + ptr += TCPOLEN_AUTHOPT_OUTPUT / 4; + } +#endif + if (unlikely(opts->mss)) { *ptr++ = htonl((TCPOPT_MSS << 24) | (TCPOLEN_MSS << 16) | opts->mss); } @@ -751,10 +774,28 @@ static void mptcp_set_option_cond(const struct request_sock *req, } } } } +static int tcp_authopt_init_options(const struct sock *sk, + const struct sock *addr_sk, + struct tcp_out_options *opts) +{ +#ifdef CONFIG_TCP_AUTHOPT + struct tcp_authopt_key_info *key; + + key = tcp_authopt_select_key(sk, addr_sk, &opts->authopt_info, &opts->authopt_rnextkeyid); + if (key) { + opts->options |= OPTION_AUTHOPT; + opts->authopt_key = key; + return TCPOLEN_AUTHOPT_OUTPUT; + } +#endif + + return 0; +} + /* Compute TCP options for SYN packets. This is not the final * network wire format yet. */ static unsigned int tcp_syn_options(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb, struct tcp_out_options *opts, @@ -763,12 +804,15 @@ static unsigned int tcp_syn_options(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb, struct tcp_sock *tp = tcp_sk(sk); unsigned int remaining = MAX_TCP_OPTION_SPACE; struct tcp_fastopen_request *fastopen = tp->fastopen_req; *md5 = NULL; + + remaining -= tcp_authopt_init_options(sk, sk, opts); #ifdef CONFIG_TCP_MD5SIG if (static_branch_unlikely(&tcp_md5_needed) && + !(opts->options & OPTION_AUTHOPT) && rcu_access_pointer(tp->md5sig_info)) { *md5 = tp->af_specific->md5_lookup(sk, sk); if (*md5) { opts->options |= OPTION_MD5; remaining -= TCPOLEN_MD5SIG_ALIGNED; @@ -847,12 +891,13 @@ static unsigned int tcp_synack_options(const struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *syn_skb) { struct inet_request_sock *ireq = inet_rsk(req); unsigned int remaining = MAX_TCP_OPTION_SPACE; + remaining -= tcp_authopt_init_options(sk, req_to_sk(req), opts); #ifdef CONFIG_TCP_MD5SIG - if (md5) { + if (md5 && !(opts->options & OPTION_AUTHOPT)) { opts->options |= OPTION_MD5; remaining -= TCPOLEN_MD5SIG_ALIGNED; /* We can't fit any SACK blocks in a packet with MD5 + TS * options. There was discussion about disabling SACK @@ -918,13 +963,15 @@ static unsigned int tcp_established_options(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb unsigned int size = 0; unsigned int eff_sacks; opts->options = 0; + size += tcp_authopt_init_options(sk, sk, opts); *md5 = NULL; #ifdef CONFIG_TCP_MD5SIG if (static_branch_unlikely(&tcp_md5_needed) && + !(opts->options & OPTION_AUTHOPT) && rcu_access_pointer(tp->md5sig_info)) { *md5 = tp->af_specific->md5_lookup(sk, sk); if (*md5) { opts->options |= OPTION_MD5; size += TCPOLEN_MD5SIG_ALIGNED; @@ -1274,10 +1321,14 @@ static int __tcp_transmit_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb, inet = inet_sk(sk); tcb = TCP_SKB_CB(skb); memset(&opts, 0, sizeof(opts)); +#ifdef CONFIG_TCP_AUTHOPT + /* for tcp_authopt_init_options inside tcp_syn_options or tcp_established_options */ + rcu_read_lock(); +#endif if (unlikely(tcb->tcp_flags & TCPHDR_SYN)) { tcp_options_size = tcp_syn_options(sk, skb, &opts, &md5); } else { tcp_options_size = tcp_established_options(sk, skb, &opts, &md5); @@ -1362,10 +1413,17 @@ static int __tcp_transmit_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb, sk_gso_disable(sk); tp->af_specific->calc_md5_hash(opts.hash_location, md5, sk, skb); } #endif +#ifdef CONFIG_TCP_AUTHOPT + if (opts.authopt_key) { + sk_gso_disable(sk); + tcp_authopt_hash(opts.hash_location, opts.authopt_key, opts.authopt_info, sk, skb); + } + rcu_read_unlock(); +#endif /* BPF prog is the last one writing header option */ bpf_skops_write_hdr_opt(sk, skb, NULL, NULL, 0, &opts); INDIRECT_CALL_INET(icsk->icsk_af_ops->send_check, @@ -1832,12 +1890,21 @@ unsigned int tcp_current_mss(struct sock *sk) u32 mtu = dst_mtu(dst); if (mtu != inet_csk(sk)->icsk_pmtu_cookie) mss_now = tcp_sync_mss(sk, mtu); } +#ifdef CONFIG_TCP_AUTHOPT + /* Even if the result is not used rcu_read_lock is required when scanning for + * tcp authentication keys. Otherwise lockdep will complain. + */ + rcu_read_lock(); +#endif header_len = tcp_established_options(sk, NULL, &opts, &md5) + sizeof(struct tcphdr); +#ifdef CONFIG_TCP_AUTHOPT + rcu_read_unlock(); +#endif /* The mss_cache is sized based on tp->tcp_header_len, which assumes * some common options. If this is an odd packet (because we have SACK * blocks etc) then our calculated header_len will be different, and * we have to adjust mss_now correspondingly */ if (header_len != tp->tcp_header_len) { @@ -3573,10 +3640,14 @@ struct sk_buff *tcp_make_synack(const struct sock *sk, struct dst_entry *dst, } #ifdef CONFIG_TCP_MD5SIG rcu_read_lock(); md5 = tcp_rsk(req)->af_specific->req_md5_lookup(sk, req_to_sk(req)); +#endif +#ifdef CONFIG_TCP_AUTHOPT + /* for tcp_authopt_init_options inside tcp_synack_options */ + rcu_read_lock(); #endif skb_set_hash(skb, tcp_rsk(req)->txhash, PKT_HASH_TYPE_L4); /* bpf program will be interested in the tcp_flags */ TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->tcp_flags = TCPHDR_SYN | TCPHDR_ACK; tcp_header_size = tcp_synack_options(sk, req, mss, skb, &opts, md5, @@ -3610,10 +3681,20 @@ struct sk_buff *tcp_make_synack(const struct sock *sk, struct dst_entry *dst, if (md5) tcp_rsk(req)->af_specific->calc_md5_hash(opts.hash_location, md5, req_to_sk(req), skb); rcu_read_unlock(); #endif +#ifdef CONFIG_TCP_AUTHOPT + /* If signature fails we do nothing */ + if (opts.authopt_key) + tcp_authopt_hash(opts.hash_location, + opts.authopt_key, + opts.authopt_info, + req_to_sk(req), + skb); + rcu_read_unlock(); +#endif bpf_skops_write_hdr_opt((struct sock *)sk, skb, req, syn_skb, synack_type, &opts); skb_set_delivery_time(skb, now, true); From patchwork Thu Aug 18 19:59:42 2022 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Leonard Crestez X-Patchwork-Id: 598942 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 87958C38145 for ; Thu, 18 Aug 2022 20:00:52 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1345667AbiHRUAt (ORCPT ); Thu, 18 Aug 2022 16:00:49 -0400 Received: from lindbergh.monkeyblade.net ([23.128.96.19]:54744 "EHLO lindbergh.monkeyblade.net" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1345494AbiHRUAe (ORCPT ); Thu, 18 Aug 2022 16:00:34 -0400 Received: from mail-ed1-x532.google.com (mail-ed1-x532.google.com [IPv6:2a00:1450:4864:20::532]) by lindbergh.monkeyblade.net (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 0B3C7D11CF; Thu, 18 Aug 2022 13:00:33 -0700 (PDT) Received: by mail-ed1-x532.google.com with SMTP id b16so3208105edd.4; Thu, 18 Aug 2022 13:00:32 -0700 (PDT) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=gmail.com; s=20210112; h=content-transfer-encoding:mime-version:references:in-reply-to :message-id:date:subject:cc:to:from:from:to:cc; bh=9+tjht34D1dlDj0OddUS2R2tL5a9PSfhOIZtSRRjUmM=; b=ELG95gd7G6ZaYTjtrhjPCa/Oq+V9x2JkI7cajsnimepCHr0NSQIgxotbL1ZNsOBhfP Obac/HElACsaKnTLmwGgWKY+tiqvMW5eFVc04EmfD4TtSvb8PL9yJqZ3TVwuX6vYNfXs ESmbJ3CA2zzYlfAmzWC8+8DQyUEFphuHcp2ajGsTRXXKmoP56wLWo/P2bY5wEq7BMyry HteB+pe/ZjZMghF1dRp/TAW6xs1KudRFKSkhZtyMnQLYYnqXNeP6NiWOxnPUMb/7AJJe /iY/ZqXjCS4pihCCFUzM4dqIGgQ3bGsxb09NCD5upxz3eg6FyXRzEwIy/h0cDzezhFKh sGDg== X-Google-DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=1e100.net; s=20210112; h=content-transfer-encoding:mime-version:references:in-reply-to :message-id:date:subject:cc:to:from:x-gm-message-state:from:to:cc; bh=9+tjht34D1dlDj0OddUS2R2tL5a9PSfhOIZtSRRjUmM=; b=a4Lc1r1MbrN08h4FUjNCoDFX4pWDrzUi1V8Z+PjD1EjPz4Gdz0iEOCmL8Gy091Xlo3 piKAJc9vDphsf+t1beaYX8DLPAE+GjheA8oHYRt5GpvHfdhAS675A/Bz8NiBP0lMC/9d 2A3DEZv55VR9UxsJF+5czH5qD86WC/U5opOAIuDgLwaGYR3A5bCOKI5kp+oulQIcsSEp ZpMDejFgcQFF02g0IXkRigvRlm4V6ZTJUAhI9aq25OTtkAPVVhYqp/T6XQAWLErTq9y9 qCruq3i+1VIXeK21X5/HB9B9XR6+er1xHOyho9DfUFtfi/Qyrt2/HW0Q/z/I0ozwgM2+ pF5w== X-Gm-Message-State: ACgBeo3yPnwmwwWuhHPgB42Yej/YG74bpugOv8ijget4p8NebtNog2aC qFVsQiswx+TrMGwItQSLROqsQptoLxs= X-Google-Smtp-Source: AA6agR62/JxiiT5oWYVCKQNZl7LBh+4w+pL3qoaJi9vm0oCo422DAOOJA/KSfhBjxFwCG8dScIirag== X-Received: by 2002:a05:6402:2691:b0:43d:ba10:854b with SMTP id w17-20020a056402269100b0043dba10854bmr3375892edd.158.1660852831602; Thu, 18 Aug 2022 13:00:31 -0700 (PDT) Received: from localhost.localdomain ([2a04:241e:502:a080:17c8:ba1c:b6f3:3fe0]) by smtp.gmail.com with ESMTPSA id fw30-20020a170907501e00b00722e4bab163sm1215087ejc.200.2022.08.18.13.00.29 (version=TLS1_3 cipher=TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 bits=256/256); Thu, 18 Aug 2022 13:00:31 -0700 (PDT) From: Leonard Crestez To: David Ahern , Eric Dumazet , Philip Paeps Cc: Dmitry Safonov <0x7f454c46@gmail.com>, Shuah Khan , "David S. Miller" , Herbert Xu , Kuniyuki Iwashima , Hideaki YOSHIFUJI , Jakub Kicinski , Yuchung Cheng , Francesco Ruggeri , Mat Martineau , Christoph Paasch , Ivan Delalande , Caowangbao , Priyaranjan Jha , netdev@vger.kernel.org, linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org, linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Subject: [PATCH v7 08/26] tcp: authopt: Disable via sysctl by default Date: Thu, 18 Aug 2022 22:59:42 +0300 Message-Id: <8f9a90263b025f586cc31fba09d7cd9c9d58b2e5.1660852705.git.cdleonard@gmail.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.25.1 In-Reply-To: References: MIME-Version: 1.0 Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org This is mainly intended to protect against local privilege escalations through a rarely used feature so it is deliberately not namespaced. Enforcement is only at the setsockopt level, this should be enough to ensure that the tcp_authopt_needed static key never turns on. No effort is made to handle disabling when the feature is already in use. Signed-off-by: Leonard Crestez --- Documentation/networking/ip-sysctl.rst | 6 ++++ include/net/tcp_authopt.h | 1 + net/ipv4/sysctl_net_ipv4.c | 39 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++ net/ipv4/tcp_authopt.c | 25 +++++++++++++++++ 4 files changed, 71 insertions(+) diff --git a/Documentation/networking/ip-sysctl.rst b/Documentation/networking/ip-sysctl.rst index 56cd4ea059b2..234d0a4217f6 100644 --- a/Documentation/networking/ip-sysctl.rst +++ b/Documentation/networking/ip-sysctl.rst @@ -1035,10 +1035,16 @@ tcp_limit_output_bytes - INTEGER tcp_challenge_ack_limit - INTEGER Limits number of Challenge ACK sent per second, as recommended in RFC 5961 (Improving TCP's Robustness to Blind In-Window Attacks) Default: 1000 +tcp_authopt - BOOLEAN + Enable the TCP Authentication Option (RFC5925), a replacement for TCP + MD5 Signatures (RFC2835). + + Default: 0 + UDP variables ============= udp_l3mdev_accept - BOOLEAN Enabling this option allows a "global" bound socket to work diff --git a/include/net/tcp_authopt.h b/include/net/tcp_authopt.h index 7ad34a6987ec..1f5020b790dd 100644 --- a/include/net/tcp_authopt.h +++ b/include/net/tcp_authopt.h @@ -80,10 +80,11 @@ struct tcphdr_authopt { }; #ifdef CONFIG_TCP_AUTHOPT DECLARE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(tcp_authopt_needed_key); #define tcp_authopt_needed (static_branch_unlikely(&tcp_authopt_needed_key)) +extern int sysctl_tcp_authopt; void tcp_authopt_free(struct sock *sk, struct tcp_authopt_info *info); void tcp_authopt_clear(struct sock *sk); int tcp_set_authopt(struct sock *sk, sockptr_t optval, unsigned int optlen); int tcp_get_authopt_val(struct sock *sk, struct tcp_authopt *key); int tcp_set_authopt_key(struct sock *sk, sockptr_t optval, unsigned int optlen); diff --git a/net/ipv4/sysctl_net_ipv4.c b/net/ipv4/sysctl_net_ipv4.c index 5490c285668b..908a3ef15b47 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/sysctl_net_ipv4.c +++ b/net/ipv4/sysctl_net_ipv4.c @@ -17,10 +17,11 @@ #include #include #include #include #include +#include static int tcp_retr1_max = 255; static int ip_local_port_range_min[] = { 1, 1 }; static int ip_local_port_range_max[] = { 65535, 65535 }; static int tcp_adv_win_scale_min = -31; @@ -413,10 +414,37 @@ static int proc_fib_multipath_hash_fields(struct ctl_table *table, int write, return ret; } #endif +#ifdef CONFIG_TCP_AUTHOPT +static int proc_tcp_authopt(struct ctl_table *ctl, + int write, void *buffer, size_t *lenp, + loff_t *ppos) +{ + int val = sysctl_tcp_authopt; + struct ctl_table tmp = { + .data = &val, + .mode = ctl->mode, + .maxlen = sizeof(val), + .extra1 = SYSCTL_ZERO, + .extra2 = SYSCTL_ONE, + }; + int err; + + err = proc_dointvec_minmax(&tmp, write, buffer, lenp, ppos); + if (err) + return err; + if (sysctl_tcp_authopt && !val) { + net_warn_ratelimited("Enabling TCP Authentication Option is permanent\n"); + return -EINVAL; + } + sysctl_tcp_authopt = val; + return 0; +} +#endif + static struct ctl_table ipv4_table[] = { { .procname = "tcp_max_orphans", .data = &sysctl_tcp_max_orphans, .maxlen = sizeof(int), @@ -524,10 +552,21 @@ static struct ctl_table ipv4_table[] = { .mode = 0644, .proc_handler = proc_douintvec_minmax, .extra1 = &sysctl_fib_sync_mem_min, .extra2 = &sysctl_fib_sync_mem_max, }, +#ifdef CONFIG_TCP_AUTHOPT + { + .procname = "tcp_authopt", + .data = &sysctl_tcp_authopt, + .maxlen = sizeof(int), + .mode = 0644, + .proc_handler = proc_tcp_authopt, + .extra1 = SYSCTL_ZERO, + .extra2 = SYSCTL_ONE, + }, +#endif { } }; static struct ctl_table ipv4_net_table[] = { /* tcp_max_tw_buckets must be first in this table. */ diff --git a/net/ipv4/tcp_authopt.c b/net/ipv4/tcp_authopt.c index 9215a8377e4d..c470fce52f78 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/tcp_authopt.c +++ b/net/ipv4/tcp_authopt.c @@ -4,10 +4,15 @@ #include #include #include #include +/* This is mainly intended to protect against local privilege escalations through + * a rarely used feature so it is deliberately not namespaced. + */ +int sysctl_tcp_authopt; + /* This is enabled when first struct tcp_authopt_info is allocated and never released */ DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(tcp_authopt_needed_key); EXPORT_SYMBOL(tcp_authopt_needed_key); /* All current algorithms have a mac length of 12 but crypto API digestsize can be larger */ @@ -441,17 +446,30 @@ static int _copy_from_sockptr_tolerant(u8 *dst, memset(dst + srclen, 0, dstlen - srclen); return err; } +static int check_sysctl_tcp_authopt(void) +{ + if (!sysctl_tcp_authopt) { + net_warn_ratelimited("TCP Authentication Option disabled by sysctl.\n"); + return -EPERM; + } + + return 0; +} + int tcp_set_authopt(struct sock *sk, sockptr_t optval, unsigned int optlen) { struct tcp_authopt opt; struct tcp_authopt_info *info; int err; sock_owned_by_me(sk); + err = check_sysctl_tcp_authopt(); + if (err) + return err; err = _copy_from_sockptr_tolerant((u8 *)&opt, sizeof(opt), optval, optlen); if (err) return err; @@ -469,13 +487,17 @@ int tcp_set_authopt(struct sock *sk, sockptr_t optval, unsigned int optlen) int tcp_get_authopt_val(struct sock *sk, struct tcp_authopt *opt) { struct tcp_sock *tp = tcp_sk(sk); struct tcp_authopt_info *info; + int err; memset(opt, 0, sizeof(*opt)); sock_owned_by_me(sk); + err = check_sysctl_tcp_authopt(); + if (err) + return err; info = rcu_dereference_check(tp->authopt_info, lockdep_sock_is_held(sk)); if (!info) return -ENOENT; @@ -497,10 +519,13 @@ int tcp_set_authopt_key(struct sock *sk, sockptr_t optval, unsigned int optlen) struct netns_tcp_authopt *net = sock_net_tcp_authopt(sk); struct tcp_authopt_alg_imp *alg; int err; sock_owned_by_me(sk); + err = check_sysctl_tcp_authopt(); + if (err) + return err; if (!ns_capable(sock_net(sk)->user_ns, CAP_NET_ADMIN)) return -EPERM; err = _copy_from_sockptr_tolerant((u8 *)&opt, sizeof(opt), optval, optlen); if (err) From patchwork Thu Aug 18 19:59:43 2022 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Leonard Crestez X-Patchwork-Id: 598244 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 938E0C32774 for ; Thu, 18 Aug 2022 20:00:49 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1345659AbiHRUAq (ORCPT ); Thu, 18 Aug 2022 16:00:46 -0400 Received: from lindbergh.monkeyblade.net ([23.128.96.19]:54796 "EHLO lindbergh.monkeyblade.net" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1345565AbiHRUAh (ORCPT ); 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Thu, 18 Aug 2022 13:00:33 -0700 (PDT) From: Leonard Crestez To: David Ahern , Eric Dumazet , Philip Paeps Cc: Dmitry Safonov <0x7f454c46@gmail.com>, Shuah Khan , "David S. Miller" , Herbert Xu , Kuniyuki Iwashima , Hideaki YOSHIFUJI , Jakub Kicinski , Yuchung Cheng , Francesco Ruggeri , Mat Martineau , Christoph Paasch , Ivan Delalande , Caowangbao , Priyaranjan Jha , netdev@vger.kernel.org, linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org, linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Subject: [PATCH v7 09/26] tcp: authopt: Implement Sequence Number Extension Date: Thu, 18 Aug 2022 22:59:43 +0300 Message-Id: X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.25.1 In-Reply-To: References: MIME-Version: 1.0 Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org Add a compute_sne function which finds the value of SNE for a certain SEQ given an already known "recent" SNE/SEQ. This is implemented using the standard tcp before/after macro and will work for SEQ values that are without 2^31 of the SEQ for which we know the SNE. For updating we advance the value for rcv_sne at the same time as rcv_nxt and for snd_sne at the same time as snd_nxt. We could track other values (for example snd_una) but this is good enough and works very easily for timewait socket. This implementation is different from RFC suggestions and doesn't require additional flags. It does pass tests from this draft: https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-touch-sne/ Signed-off-by: Leonard Crestez --- include/net/tcp_authopt.h | 34 ++++++++++++++ net/ipv4/tcp_authopt.c | 98 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++- net/ipv4/tcp_input.c | 1 + net/ipv4/tcp_output.c | 1 + 4 files changed, 132 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/include/net/tcp_authopt.h b/include/net/tcp_authopt.h index 1f5020b790dd..1fa1b968c80c 100644 --- a/include/net/tcp_authopt.h +++ b/include/net/tcp_authopt.h @@ -66,10 +66,14 @@ struct tcp_authopt_info { u32 flags; /** @src_isn: Local Initial Sequence Number */ u32 src_isn; /** @dst_isn: Remote Initial Sequence Number */ u32 dst_isn; + /** @rcv_sne: Recv-side Sequence Number Extension tracking tcp_sock.rcv_nxt */ + u32 rcv_sne; + /** @snd_sne: Send-side Sequence Number Extension tracking tcp_sock.snd_nxt */ + u32 snd_sne; }; /* TCP authopt as found in header */ struct tcphdr_authopt { u8 num; @@ -156,10 +160,34 @@ static inline void tcp_authopt_time_wait( int __tcp_authopt_inbound_check( struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb, struct tcp_authopt_info *info, const u8 *opt); +void __tcp_authopt_update_rcv_sne(struct tcp_sock *tp, struct tcp_authopt_info *info, u32 seq); +static inline void tcp_authopt_update_rcv_sne(struct tcp_sock *tp, u32 seq) +{ + struct tcp_authopt_info *info; + + if (tcp_authopt_needed) { + info = rcu_dereference_protected(tp->authopt_info, + lockdep_sock_is_held((struct sock *)tp)); + if (info) + __tcp_authopt_update_rcv_sne(tp, info, seq); + } +} +void __tcp_authopt_update_snd_sne(struct tcp_sock *tp, struct tcp_authopt_info *info, u32 seq); +static inline void tcp_authopt_update_snd_sne(struct tcp_sock *tp, u32 seq) +{ + struct tcp_authopt_info *info; + + if (tcp_authopt_needed) { + info = rcu_dereference_protected(tp->authopt_info, + lockdep_sock_is_held((struct sock *)tp)); + if (info) + __tcp_authopt_update_snd_sne(tp, info, seq); + } +} #else static inline void tcp_authopt_clear(struct sock *sk) { } static inline int tcp_authopt_openreq(struct sock *newsk, @@ -174,8 +202,14 @@ static inline void tcp_authopt_finish_connect(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *s static inline void tcp_authopt_time_wait( struct tcp_timewait_sock *tcptw, struct tcp_sock *tp) { } +static inline void tcp_authopt_update_rcv_sne(struct tcp_sock *tp, u32 seq) +{ +} +static inline void tcp_authopt_update_snd_sne(struct tcp_sock *tp, u32 seq) +{ +} #endif #endif /* _LINUX_TCP_AUTHOPT_H */ diff --git a/net/ipv4/tcp_authopt.c b/net/ipv4/tcp_authopt.c index c470fce52f78..e64b97db927e 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/tcp_authopt.c +++ b/net/ipv4/tcp_authopt.c @@ -660,10 +660,97 @@ static int tcp_authopt_get_isn(struct sock *sk, *disn = htonl(info->dst_isn); } return 0; } +/* compute_sne - Calculate Sequence Number Extension + * + * Give old upper/lower 32bit values and a new lower 32bit value determine the + * new value of the upper 32 bit. The new sequence number can be 2^31 before or + * after prev_seq but TCP window scaling should limit this further. + * + * For correct accounting the stored SNE value should be only updated together + * with the SEQ. + */ +static u32 compute_sne(u32 sne, u32 prev_seq, u32 seq) +{ + if (before(seq, prev_seq)) { + if (seq > prev_seq) + --sne; + } else { + if (seq < prev_seq) + ++sne; + } + + return sne; +} + +/* Update rcv_sne, must be called immediately before rcv_nxt update */ +void __tcp_authopt_update_rcv_sne(struct tcp_sock *tp, + struct tcp_authopt_info *info, u32 seq) +{ + info->rcv_sne = compute_sne(info->rcv_sne, tp->rcv_nxt, seq); +} + +/* Update snd_sne, must be called immediately before snd_nxt update */ +void __tcp_authopt_update_snd_sne(struct tcp_sock *tp, + struct tcp_authopt_info *info, u32 seq) +{ + info->snd_sne = compute_sne(info->snd_sne, tp->snd_nxt, seq); +} + +/* Compute SNE for a specific packet (by seq). */ +static int compute_packet_sne(struct sock *sk, struct tcp_authopt_info *info, + u32 seq, bool input, __be32 *sne) +{ + u32 rcv_nxt, snd_nxt; + + // For TCP_NEW_SYN_RECV we have no tcp_authopt_info but tcp_request_sock holds ISN. + if (sk->sk_state == TCP_NEW_SYN_RECV) { + struct tcp_request_sock *rsk = tcp_rsk((struct request_sock *)sk); + + if (input) + *sne = htonl(compute_sne(0, rsk->rcv_isn, seq)); + else + *sne = htonl(compute_sne(0, rsk->snt_isn, seq)); + return 0; + } + + /* TCP_LISTEN only receives SYN */ + if (sk->sk_state == TCP_LISTEN && input) + return 0; + + /* TCP_SYN_SENT only sends SYN and receives SYN/ACK + * For the input case rcv_nxt is initialized after the packet is + * validated so tcp_sk(sk)->rcv_nxt is not initialized. + */ + if (sk->sk_state == TCP_SYN_SENT) + return 0; + + if (sk->sk_state == TCP_TIME_WAIT) { + rcv_nxt = tcp_twsk(sk)->tw_rcv_nxt; + snd_nxt = tcp_twsk(sk)->tw_snd_nxt; + } else { + if (WARN_ONCE(!sk_fullsock(sk), + "unexpected minisock sk=%p state=%d", sk, + sk->sk_state)) + return -EINVAL; + rcv_nxt = tcp_sk(sk)->rcv_nxt; + snd_nxt = tcp_sk(sk)->snd_nxt; + } + + if (WARN_ONCE(!info, "unexpected missing info for sk=%p sk_state=%d", sk, sk->sk_state)) + return -EINVAL; + + if (input) + *sne = htonl(compute_sne(info->rcv_sne, rcv_nxt, seq)); + else + *sne = htonl(compute_sne(info->snd_sne, snd_nxt, seq)); + + return 0; +} + /* Feed one buffer into ahash * The buffer is assumed to be DMA-able */ static int crypto_ahash_buf(struct ahash_request *req, u8 *buf, uint len) { @@ -695,10 +782,13 @@ int __tcp_authopt_openreq(struct sock *newsk, const struct sock *oldsk, struct r if (!new_info) return -ENOMEM; new_info->src_isn = tcp_rsk(req)->snt_isn; new_info->dst_isn = tcp_rsk(req)->rcv_isn; + /* Caller is tcp_create_openreq_child and already initializes snd_nxt/rcv_nxt */ + new_info->snd_sne = compute_sne(0, new_info->src_isn, tcp_sk(newsk)->snd_nxt); + new_info->rcv_sne = compute_sne(0, new_info->dst_isn, tcp_sk(newsk)->rcv_nxt); sk_gso_disable(newsk); rcu_assign_pointer(tcp_sk(newsk)->authopt_info, new_info); return 0; } @@ -706,10 +796,12 @@ int __tcp_authopt_openreq(struct sock *newsk, const struct sock *oldsk, struct r void __tcp_authopt_finish_connect(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb, struct tcp_authopt_info *info) { info->src_isn = ntohl(tcp_hdr(skb)->ack_seq) - 1; info->dst_isn = ntohl(tcp_hdr(skb)->seq); + info->snd_sne = compute_sne(0, info->src_isn, tcp_sk(sk)->snd_nxt); + info->rcv_sne = compute_sne(0, info->dst_isn, tcp_sk(sk)->rcv_nxt); } /* feed traffic key into ahash */ static int tcp_authopt_ahash_traffic_key(struct tcp_authopt_alg_pool *pool, struct sock *sk, @@ -963,14 +1055,16 @@ static int tcp_authopt_hash_packet(struct tcp_authopt_alg_pool *pool, bool ipv6, bool include_options, u8 *macbuf) { struct tcphdr *th = tcp_hdr(skb); + __be32 sne = 0; int err; - /* NOTE: SNE unimplemented */ - __be32 sne = 0; + err = compute_packet_sne(sk, info, ntohl(th->seq), input, &sne); + if (err) + return err; err = crypto_ahash_init(pool->req); if (err) return err; diff --git a/net/ipv4/tcp_input.c b/net/ipv4/tcp_input.c index b0c883521b1a..d901e27801d1 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/tcp_input.c +++ b/net/ipv4/tcp_input.c @@ -3527,10 +3527,11 @@ static void tcp_snd_una_update(struct tcp_sock *tp, u32 ack) static void tcp_rcv_nxt_update(struct tcp_sock *tp, u32 seq) { u32 delta = seq - tp->rcv_nxt; sock_owned_by_me((struct sock *)tp); + tcp_authopt_update_rcv_sne(tp, seq); tp->bytes_received += delta; WRITE_ONCE(tp->rcv_nxt, seq); } /* Update our send window. diff --git a/net/ipv4/tcp_output.c b/net/ipv4/tcp_output.c index ae69936947f3..74c3ef86f0bc 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/tcp_output.c +++ b/net/ipv4/tcp_output.c @@ -67,10 +67,11 @@ static void tcp_event_new_data_sent(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb) { struct inet_connection_sock *icsk = inet_csk(sk); struct tcp_sock *tp = tcp_sk(sk); unsigned int prior_packets = tp->packets_out; + tcp_authopt_update_snd_sne(tp, TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->end_seq); WRITE_ONCE(tp->snd_nxt, TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->end_seq); __skb_unlink(skb, &sk->sk_write_queue); tcp_rbtree_insert(&sk->tcp_rtx_queue, skb); From patchwork Thu Aug 18 19:59:44 2022 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Leonard Crestez X-Patchwork-Id: 598941 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id AB98BC32792 for ; 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Thu, 18 Aug 2022 13:00:34 -0700 (PDT) From: Leonard Crestez To: David Ahern , Eric Dumazet , Philip Paeps Cc: Dmitry Safonov <0x7f454c46@gmail.com>, Shuah Khan , "David S. Miller" , Herbert Xu , Kuniyuki Iwashima , Hideaki YOSHIFUJI , Jakub Kicinski , Yuchung Cheng , Francesco Ruggeri , Mat Martineau , Christoph Paasch , Ivan Delalande , Caowangbao , Priyaranjan Jha , netdev@vger.kernel.org, linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org, linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Subject: [PATCH v7 10/26] tcp: ipv6: Add AO signing for tcp_v6_send_response Date: Thu, 18 Aug 2022 22:59:44 +0300 Message-Id: <51c98f3663f53bf122e1d857f046dd4f279e5845.1660852705.git.cdleonard@gmail.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.25.1 In-Reply-To: References: MIME-Version: 1.0 Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org This is a special code path for acks and resets outside of normal connection establishment and closing. Signed-off-by: Leonard Crestez --- net/ipv4/tcp_authopt.c | 2 ++ net/ipv6/tcp_ipv6.c | 60 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 62 insertions(+) diff --git a/net/ipv4/tcp_authopt.c b/net/ipv4/tcp_authopt.c index e64b97db927e..2a216356d280 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/tcp_authopt.c +++ b/net/ipv4/tcp_authopt.c @@ -385,10 +385,11 @@ struct tcp_authopt_key_info *__tcp_authopt_select_key(const struct sock *sk, { struct netns_tcp_authopt *net = sock_net_tcp_authopt(sk); return tcp_authopt_lookup_send(net, addr_sk, -1); } +EXPORT_SYMBOL(__tcp_authopt_select_key); static struct tcp_authopt_info *__tcp_authopt_info_get_or_create(struct sock *sk) { struct tcp_sock *tp = tcp_sk(sk); struct tcp_authopt_info *info; @@ -1210,10 +1211,11 @@ int tcp_authopt_hash(char *hash_location, * try to make it obvious inside the packet. */ memset(hash_location, 0, TCP_AUTHOPT_MACLEN); return err; } +EXPORT_SYMBOL(tcp_authopt_hash); /** * tcp_authopt_lookup_recv - lookup key for receive * * @sk: Receive socket diff --git a/net/ipv6/tcp_ipv6.c b/net/ipv6/tcp_ipv6.c index 2edfe631878e..151254345dee 100644 --- a/net/ipv6/tcp_ipv6.c +++ b/net/ipv6/tcp_ipv6.c @@ -40,10 +40,11 @@ #include #include #include #include +#include #include #include #include #include #include @@ -836,10 +837,48 @@ const struct tcp_request_sock_ops tcp_request_sock_ipv6_ops = { .init_seq = tcp_v6_init_seq, .init_ts_off = tcp_v6_init_ts_off, .send_synack = tcp_v6_send_synack, }; +#ifdef CONFIG_TCP_AUTHOPT +static int tcp_v6_send_response_init_authopt(const struct sock *sk, + struct tcp_authopt_info **info, + struct tcp_authopt_key_info **key, + u8 *rnextkeyid) +{ + /* Key lookup before SKB allocation */ + if (!(tcp_authopt_needed && sk)) + return 0; + if (sk->sk_state == TCP_TIME_WAIT) + *info = tcp_twsk(sk)->tw_authopt_info; + else + *info = rcu_dereference(tcp_sk(sk)->authopt_info); + if (!*info) + return 0; + *key = __tcp_authopt_select_key(sk, *info, sk, rnextkeyid); + if (*key) + return TCPOLEN_AUTHOPT_OUTPUT; + return 0; +} + +static void tcp_v6_send_response_sign_authopt(const struct sock *sk, + struct tcp_authopt_info *info, + struct tcp_authopt_key_info *key, + struct sk_buff *skb, + struct tcphdr_authopt *ptr, + u8 rnextkeyid) +{ + if (!(tcp_authopt_needed && key)) + return; + ptr->num = TCPOPT_AUTHOPT; + ptr->len = TCPOLEN_AUTHOPT_OUTPUT; + ptr->keyid = key->send_id; + ptr->rnextkeyid = rnextkeyid; + tcp_authopt_hash(ptr->mac, key, info, (struct sock *)sk, skb); +} +#endif + static void tcp_v6_send_response(const struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb, u32 seq, u32 ack, u32 win, u32 tsval, u32 tsecr, int oif, struct tcp_md5sig_key *key, int rst, u8 tclass, __be32 label, u32 priority) { @@ -851,13 +890,30 @@ static void tcp_v6_send_response(const struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb, u32 struct sock *ctl_sk = net->ipv6.tcp_sk; unsigned int tot_len = sizeof(struct tcphdr); __be32 mrst = 0, *topt; struct dst_entry *dst; __u32 mark = 0; +#ifdef CONFIG_TCP_AUTHOPT + struct tcp_authopt_info *aoinfo; + struct tcp_authopt_key_info *aokey; + u8 aornextkeyid; + int aolen; +#endif if (tsecr) tot_len += TCPOLEN_TSTAMP_ALIGNED; +#ifdef CONFIG_TCP_AUTHOPT + /* Key lookup before SKB allocation */ + aolen = tcp_v6_send_response_init_authopt(sk, &aoinfo, &aokey, &aornextkeyid); + if (aolen) { + tot_len += aolen; +#ifdef CONFIG_TCP_MD5SIG + /* Don't use MD5 */ + key = NULL; +#endif + } +#endif #ifdef CONFIG_TCP_MD5SIG if (key) tot_len += TCPOLEN_MD5SIG_ALIGNED; #endif @@ -909,10 +965,14 @@ static void tcp_v6_send_response(const struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb, u32 tcp_v6_md5_hash_hdr((__u8 *)topt, key, &ipv6_hdr(skb)->saddr, &ipv6_hdr(skb)->daddr, t1); } #endif +#ifdef CONFIG_TCP_AUTHOPT + tcp_v6_send_response_sign_authopt(sk, aoinfo, aokey, buff, + (struct tcphdr_authopt *)topt, aornextkeyid); +#endif memset(&fl6, 0, sizeof(fl6)); fl6.daddr = ipv6_hdr(skb)->saddr; fl6.saddr = ipv6_hdr(skb)->daddr; fl6.flowlabel = label; From patchwork Thu Aug 18 19:59:45 2022 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Leonard Crestez X-Patchwork-Id: 598241 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 42E32C32796 for ; Thu, 18 Aug 2022 20:00:58 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1345688AbiHRUAy (ORCPT ); Thu, 18 Aug 2022 16:00:54 -0400 Received: from lindbergh.monkeyblade.net ([23.128.96.19]:54818 "EHLO lindbergh.monkeyblade.net" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1345637AbiHRUAk (ORCPT ); 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Thu, 18 Aug 2022 13:00:36 -0700 (PDT) From: Leonard Crestez To: David Ahern , Eric Dumazet , Philip Paeps Cc: Dmitry Safonov <0x7f454c46@gmail.com>, Shuah Khan , "David S. Miller" , Herbert Xu , Kuniyuki Iwashima , Hideaki YOSHIFUJI , Jakub Kicinski , Yuchung Cheng , Francesco Ruggeri , Mat Martineau , Christoph Paasch , Ivan Delalande , Caowangbao , Priyaranjan Jha , netdev@vger.kernel.org, linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org, linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Subject: [PATCH v7 11/26] tcp: authopt: Add support for signing skb-less replies Date: Thu, 18 Aug 2022 22:59:45 +0300 Message-Id: X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.25.1 In-Reply-To: References: MIME-Version: 1.0 Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org This is required because tcp ipv4 sometimes sends replies without allocating a full skb that can be signed by tcp authopt. Handle this with additional code in tcp authopt. Signed-off-by: Leonard Crestez --- include/net/tcp_authopt.h | 7 ++ net/ipv4/tcp_authopt.c | 144 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 151 insertions(+) diff --git a/include/net/tcp_authopt.h b/include/net/tcp_authopt.h index 1fa1b968c80c..9bc0f58a78cb 100644 --- a/include/net/tcp_authopt.h +++ b/include/net/tcp_authopt.h @@ -114,10 +114,17 @@ static inline struct tcp_authopt_key_info *tcp_authopt_select_key( int tcp_authopt_hash( char *hash_location, struct tcp_authopt_key_info *key, struct tcp_authopt_info *info, struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb); +int tcp_v4_authopt_hash_reply( + char *hash_location, + struct tcp_authopt_info *info, + struct tcp_authopt_key_info *key, + __be32 saddr, + __be32 daddr, + struct tcphdr *th); int __tcp_authopt_openreq(struct sock *newsk, const struct sock *oldsk, struct request_sock *req); static inline int tcp_authopt_openreq( struct sock *newsk, const struct sock *oldsk, struct request_sock *req) diff --git a/net/ipv4/tcp_authopt.c b/net/ipv4/tcp_authopt.c index 2a216356d280..2af6265041b4 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/tcp_authopt.c +++ b/net/ipv4/tcp_authopt.c @@ -944,10 +944,72 @@ static int tcp_authopt_get_traffic_key(struct sock *sk, out: tcp_authopt_put_kdf_pool(key, pool); return err; } +struct tcp_v4_authopt_context_data { + __be32 saddr; + __be32 daddr; + __be16 sport; + __be16 dport; + __be32 sisn; + __be32 disn; + __be16 digestbits; +} __packed; + +static int tcp_v4_authopt_get_traffic_key_noskb(struct tcp_authopt_key_info *key, + __be32 saddr, + __be32 daddr, + __be16 sport, + __be16 dport, + __be32 sisn, + __be32 disn, + u8 *traffic_key) +{ + int err; + struct tcp_authopt_alg_pool *pool; + struct tcp_v4_authopt_context_data data; + + BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(data) != 22); + + pool = tcp_authopt_get_kdf_pool(key); + if (IS_ERR(pool)) + return PTR_ERR(pool); + + err = tcp_authopt_setkey(pool, key); + if (err) + goto out; + err = crypto_ahash_init(pool->req); + if (err) + goto out; + + // RFC5926 section 3.1.1.1 + // Separate to keep alignment semi-sane + err = crypto_ahash_buf(pool->req, "\x01TCP-AO", 7); + if (err) + return err; + data.saddr = saddr; + data.daddr = daddr; + data.sport = sport; + data.dport = dport; + data.sisn = sisn; + data.disn = disn; + data.digestbits = htons(crypto_ahash_digestsize(pool->tfm) * 8); + + err = crypto_ahash_buf(pool->req, (u8 *)&data, sizeof(data)); + if (err) + goto out; + ahash_request_set_crypt(pool->req, NULL, traffic_key, 0); + err = crypto_ahash_final(pool->req); + if (err) + goto out; + +out: + tcp_authopt_put_kdf_pool(key, pool); + return err; +} + static int crypto_ahash_buf_zero(struct ahash_request *req, int len) { u8 zeros[TCP_AUTHOPT_MACLEN] = {0}; int buflen, err; @@ -1214,10 +1276,92 @@ int tcp_authopt_hash(char *hash_location, return err; } EXPORT_SYMBOL(tcp_authopt_hash); /** + * tcp_v4_authopt_hash_reply - Hash tcp+ipv4 header without SKB + * + * @hash_location: output buffer + * @info: sending socket's tcp_authopt_info + * @key: signing key, from tcp_authopt_select_key. + * @saddr: source address + * @daddr: destination address + * @th: Pointer to TCP header and options + */ +int tcp_v4_authopt_hash_reply(char *hash_location, + struct tcp_authopt_info *info, + struct tcp_authopt_key_info *key, + __be32 saddr, + __be32 daddr, + struct tcphdr *th) +{ + struct tcp_authopt_alg_pool *pool; + u8 macbuf[TCP_AUTHOPT_MAXMACBUF]; + u8 traffic_key[TCP_AUTHOPT_MAX_TRAFFIC_KEY_LEN]; + __be32 sne = 0; + int err; + + /* Call special code path for computing traffic key without skb + * This can be called from tcp_v4_reqsk_send_ack so caching would be + * difficult here. + */ + err = tcp_v4_authopt_get_traffic_key_noskb(key, saddr, daddr, + th->source, th->dest, + htonl(info->src_isn), htonl(info->dst_isn), + traffic_key); + if (err) + goto out_err_traffic_key; + + /* Init mac shash */ + pool = tcp_authopt_get_mac_pool(key); + if (IS_ERR(pool)) + return PTR_ERR(pool); + err = crypto_ahash_setkey(pool->tfm, traffic_key, key->alg->traffic_key_len); + if (err) + goto out_err; + err = crypto_ahash_init(pool->req); + if (err) + return err; + + err = crypto_ahash_buf(pool->req, (u8 *)&sne, 4); + if (err) + return err; + + err = tcp_authopt_hash_tcp4_pseudoheader(pool, saddr, daddr, th->doff * 4); + if (err) + return err; + + // TCP header with checksum set to zero. Caller ensures this. + if (WARN_ON_ONCE(th->check != 0)) + goto out_err; + err = crypto_ahash_buf(pool->req, (u8 *)th, sizeof(*th)); + if (err) + goto out_err; + + // TCP options + err = tcp_authopt_hash_opts(pool, th, (struct tcphdr_authopt *)(hash_location - 4), + !(key->flags & TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_EXCLUDE_OPTS)); + if (err) + goto out_err; + + ahash_request_set_crypt(pool->req, NULL, macbuf, 0); + err = crypto_ahash_final(pool->req); + if (err) + goto out_err; + memcpy(hash_location, macbuf, TCP_AUTHOPT_MACLEN); + + tcp_authopt_put_mac_pool(key, pool); + return 0; + +out_err: + tcp_authopt_put_mac_pool(key, pool); +out_err_traffic_key: + memset(hash_location, 0, TCP_AUTHOPT_MACLEN); + return err; +} + +/* * tcp_authopt_lookup_recv - lookup key for receive * * @sk: Receive socket * @skb: Packet, used to compare addr and iface * @net: Per-namespace information containing keys From patchwork Thu Aug 18 19:59:46 2022 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Leonard Crestez X-Patchwork-Id: 598943 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id A382FC32792 for ; Thu, 18 Aug 2022 20:00:49 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1345655AbiHRUAp (ORCPT ); Thu, 18 Aug 2022 16:00:45 -0400 Received: from lindbergh.monkeyblade.net ([23.128.96.19]:54830 "EHLO lindbergh.monkeyblade.net" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1345639AbiHRUAk (ORCPT ); Thu, 18 Aug 2022 16:00:40 -0400 Received: from mail-ej1-x636.google.com (mail-ej1-x636.google.com [IPv6:2a00:1450:4864:20::636]) by lindbergh.monkeyblade.net (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 8606AD11D4; Thu, 18 Aug 2022 13:00:39 -0700 (PDT) Received: by mail-ej1-x636.google.com with SMTP id gb36so5150664ejc.10; Thu, 18 Aug 2022 13:00:39 -0700 (PDT) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=gmail.com; s=20210112; h=content-transfer-encoding:mime-version:references:in-reply-to :message-id:date:subject:cc:to:from:from:to:cc; bh=ALA3NgbJH24c7kXFgyLAAjdU36rH8Zjbi/84b6XrCIo=; b=H2Qbfehzi73jxoFVUDeu0cxg9MI6/SbH1eBQyX1S+JQyMJS/Q21IuPEErbLl00QiZw eklwW8Y4eoAA4oAKT+xz08pOqtTpPsBp+J848vO4X3TkOUA0P3zabjjGunW0ROi3InI9 UnGNq5Yq+RANA+TsQ3UQqBYMZz0A0fa1DPNlsjS52eZj0Y8RO1Gg+BqvYjEQP9kK7RjS 2U14L9J/iyGTyiKmeo+1NS1oBTNpQkI90T3yhKIxAReQYjKOgCe/rSp4ZuWmJZHYCEre 2Q3Xrxn3xw7xjzmMxb5cih+Zxlar73Z91bKwdA8s9evmkh24090X9541Me10cm0ozqe7 Y7TA== X-Google-DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=1e100.net; s=20210112; h=content-transfer-encoding:mime-version:references:in-reply-to :message-id:date:subject:cc:to:from:x-gm-message-state:from:to:cc; bh=ALA3NgbJH24c7kXFgyLAAjdU36rH8Zjbi/84b6XrCIo=; b=tMGXWH4zRUbp3yXxUd/CwHtSbEUZB4CBtv5kWddaNM0UmSGg0iLDVYEIiS4oRKSQ+s anejwxArsAFEuYMOEjeQYzQS1DJ6iXt0FRy8zURWR95mKADSYAi9NZxVt0qWtf5Vzw2u xyHmM5u9KSxAge8KzLvjeGY7lPidJgPZ4Y4OtCTi7Q/3DMY6Txz2RSLKY5CznbtPF3ee qPCd6d/cOGrPc37vKcNWiRZBH18pBof6xrlV99M7qcEHw3lLgsOimxkP49vtfrboC/MI r74wZSLqarWJWpy6To+jB5edpi74DFL9kbDOkrPOuwLt7I+y6oRiDHZNrXCLhRxcS7qt pjSg== X-Gm-Message-State: ACgBeo22TAw4IGZ6LVmTUOslpUNp42ySugLM+C80x3rKmqo01/GVd8nr BswJYrXkWELPY09inN1P7Ic= X-Google-Smtp-Source: AA6agR41iMVxP+t2Wb+MtTV9H7NL2L69biZ446IdOquMzBBulxaY0L5XM/0bi0uxGe/GO7xVjz5S2g== X-Received: by 2002:a17:907:7e9f:b0:730:d954:c2b5 with SMTP id qb31-20020a1709077e9f00b00730d954c2b5mr2693257ejc.311.1660852839133; Thu, 18 Aug 2022 13:00:39 -0700 (PDT) Received: from localhost.localdomain ([2a04:241e:502:a080:17c8:ba1c:b6f3:3fe0]) by smtp.gmail.com with ESMTPSA id fw30-20020a170907501e00b00722e4bab163sm1215087ejc.200.2022.08.18.13.00.37 (version=TLS1_3 cipher=TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 bits=256/256); Thu, 18 Aug 2022 13:00:38 -0700 (PDT) From: Leonard Crestez To: David Ahern , Eric Dumazet , Philip Paeps Cc: Dmitry Safonov <0x7f454c46@gmail.com>, Shuah Khan , "David S. Miller" , Herbert Xu , Kuniyuki Iwashima , Hideaki YOSHIFUJI , Jakub Kicinski , Yuchung Cheng , Francesco Ruggeri , Mat Martineau , Christoph Paasch , Ivan Delalande , Caowangbao , Priyaranjan Jha , netdev@vger.kernel.org, linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org, linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Subject: [PATCH v7 12/26] tcp: ipv4: Add AO signing for skb-less replies Date: Thu, 18 Aug 2022 22:59:46 +0300 Message-Id: <9e034bbf242527335a139919bf6beb9da79af292.1660852705.git.cdleonard@gmail.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.25.1 In-Reply-To: References: MIME-Version: 1.0 Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org The code in tcp_v4_send_ack and tcp_v4_send_reset does not allocate a full skb so special handling is required for tcp-authopt handling. Signed-off-by: Leonard Crestez --- net/ipv4/tcp_authopt.c | 3 +- net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c | 84 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-- 2 files changed, 83 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/net/ipv4/tcp_authopt.c b/net/ipv4/tcp_authopt.c index 2af6265041b4..f7635a37b972 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/tcp_authopt.c +++ b/net/ipv4/tcp_authopt.c @@ -966,10 +966,11 @@ static int tcp_v4_authopt_get_traffic_key_noskb(struct tcp_authopt_key_info *key u8 *traffic_key) { int err; struct tcp_authopt_alg_pool *pool; struct tcp_v4_authopt_context_data data; + char traffic_key_context_header[7] = "\x01TCP-AO"; BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(data) != 22); pool = tcp_authopt_get_kdf_pool(key); if (IS_ERR(pool)) @@ -982,11 +983,11 @@ static int tcp_v4_authopt_get_traffic_key_noskb(struct tcp_authopt_key_info *key if (err) goto out; // RFC5926 section 3.1.1.1 // Separate to keep alignment semi-sane - err = crypto_ahash_buf(pool->req, "\x01TCP-AO", 7); + err = crypto_ahash_buf(pool->req, traffic_key_context_header, 7); if (err) return err; data.saddr = saddr; data.daddr = daddr; data.sport = sport; diff --git a/net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c b/net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c index 58b5f197bde1..acce593bb7c9 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c +++ b/net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c @@ -645,10 +645,50 @@ void tcp_v4_send_check(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb) __tcp_v4_send_check(skb, inet->inet_saddr, inet->inet_daddr); } EXPORT_SYMBOL(tcp_v4_send_check); +#ifdef CONFIG_TCP_AUTHOPT +/** tcp_v4_authopt_handle_reply - Insert TCPOPT_AUTHOPT if required + * + * returns number of bytes (always aligned to 4) or zero + */ +static int tcp_v4_authopt_handle_reply(const struct sock *sk, + struct sk_buff *skb, + __be32 *optptr, + struct tcphdr *th) +{ + struct tcp_authopt_info *info; + struct tcp_authopt_key_info *key_info; + u8 rnextkeyid; + + if (sk->sk_state == TCP_TIME_WAIT) + info = tcp_twsk(sk)->tw_authopt_info; + else + info = rcu_dereference_check(tcp_sk(sk)->authopt_info, lockdep_sock_is_held(sk)); + if (!info) + return 0; + key_info = __tcp_authopt_select_key(sk, info, sk, &rnextkeyid); + if (!key_info) + return 0; + *optptr = htonl((TCPOPT_AUTHOPT << 24) | + (TCPOLEN_AUTHOPT_OUTPUT << 16) | + (key_info->send_id << 8) | + (rnextkeyid)); + /* must update doff before signature computation */ + th->doff += TCPOLEN_AUTHOPT_OUTPUT / 4; + tcp_v4_authopt_hash_reply((char *)(optptr + 1), + info, + key_info, + ip_hdr(skb)->daddr, + ip_hdr(skb)->saddr, + th); + + return TCPOLEN_AUTHOPT_OUTPUT; +} +#endif + /* * This routine will send an RST to the other tcp. * * Someone asks: why I NEVER use socket parameters (TOS, TTL etc.) * for reset. @@ -660,10 +700,12 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(tcp_v4_send_check); * Exception: precedence violation. We do not implement it in any case. */ #ifdef CONFIG_TCP_MD5SIG #define OPTION_BYTES TCPOLEN_MD5SIG_ALIGNED +#elif defined(OPTION_BYTES_TCP_AUTHOPT) +#define OPTION_BYTES TCPOLEN_AUTHOPT_OUTPUT #else #define OPTION_BYTES sizeof(__be32) #endif static void tcp_v4_send_reset(const struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb) @@ -713,12 +755,29 @@ static void tcp_v4_send_reset(const struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb) memset(&arg, 0, sizeof(arg)); arg.iov[0].iov_base = (unsigned char *)&rep; arg.iov[0].iov_len = sizeof(rep.th); net = sk ? sock_net(sk) : dev_net(skb_dst(skb)->dev); -#ifdef CONFIG_TCP_MD5SIG +#if defined(CONFIG_TCP_MD5SIG) || defined(CONFIG_TCP_AUTHOPT) rcu_read_lock(); +#endif +#ifdef CONFIG_TCP_AUTHOPT + /* Unlike TCP-MD5 the signatures for TCP-AO depend on initial sequence + * numbers so we can only handle established and time-wait sockets. + */ + if (tcp_authopt_needed && sk && + sk->sk_state != TCP_NEW_SYN_RECV && + sk->sk_state != TCP_LISTEN) { + int tcp_authopt_ret = tcp_v4_authopt_handle_reply(sk, skb, rep.opt, &rep.th); + + if (tcp_authopt_ret) { + arg.iov[0].iov_len += tcp_authopt_ret; + goto skip_md5sig; + } + } +#endif +#ifdef CONFIG_TCP_MD5SIG hash_location = tcp_parse_md5sig_option(th); if (sk && sk_fullsock(sk)) { const union tcp_md5_addr *addr; int l3index; @@ -756,11 +815,10 @@ static void tcp_v4_send_reset(const struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb) addr = (union tcp_md5_addr *)&ip_hdr(skb)->saddr; key = tcp_md5_do_lookup(sk1, l3index, addr, AF_INET); if (!key) goto out; - genhash = tcp_v4_md5_hash_skb(newhash, key, NULL, skb); if (genhash || memcmp(hash_location, newhash, 16) != 0) goto out; } @@ -776,10 +834,13 @@ static void tcp_v4_send_reset(const struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb) tcp_v4_md5_hash_hdr((__u8 *) &rep.opt[1], key, ip_hdr(skb)->saddr, ip_hdr(skb)->daddr, &rep.th); } +#endif +#ifdef CONFIG_TCP_AUTHOPT +skip_md5sig: #endif /* Can't co-exist with TCPMD5, hence check rep.opt[0] */ if (rep.opt[0] == 0) { __be32 mrst = mptcp_reset_option(skb); @@ -833,12 +894,14 @@ static void tcp_v4_send_reset(const struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb) sock_net_set(ctl_sk, &init_net); __TCP_INC_STATS(net, TCP_MIB_OUTSEGS); __TCP_INC_STATS(net, TCP_MIB_OUTRSTS); local_bh_enable(); -#ifdef CONFIG_TCP_MD5SIG +#if defined(CONFIG_TCP_MD5SIG) out: +#endif +#if defined(CONFIG_TCP_MD5SIG) || defined(CONFIG_TCP_AUTHOPT) rcu_read_unlock(); #endif } /* The code following below sending ACKs in SYN-RECV and TIME-WAIT states @@ -855,10 +918,12 @@ static void tcp_v4_send_ack(const struct sock *sk, struct { struct tcphdr th; __be32 opt[(TCPOLEN_TSTAMP_ALIGNED >> 2) #ifdef CONFIG_TCP_MD5SIG + (TCPOLEN_MD5SIG_ALIGNED >> 2) +#elif defined(CONFIG_TCP_AUTHOPT) + + (TCPOLEN_AUTHOPT_OUTPUT >> 2) #endif ]; } rep; struct net *net = sock_net(sk); struct ip_reply_arg arg; @@ -886,10 +951,23 @@ static void tcp_v4_send_ack(const struct sock *sk, rep.th.seq = htonl(seq); rep.th.ack_seq = htonl(ack); rep.th.ack = 1; rep.th.window = htons(win); +#ifdef CONFIG_TCP_AUTHOPT + if (tcp_authopt_needed) { + int aoret, offset = (tsecr) ? 3 : 0; + + aoret = tcp_v4_authopt_handle_reply(sk, skb, &rep.opt[offset], &rep.th); + if (aoret) { + arg.iov[0].iov_len += aoret; +#ifdef CONFIG_TCP_MD5SIG + key = NULL; +#endif + } + } +#endif #ifdef CONFIG_TCP_MD5SIG if (key) { int offset = (tsecr) ? 3 : 0; rep.opt[offset++] = htonl((TCPOPT_NOP << 24) | From patchwork Thu Aug 18 19:59:47 2022 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Leonard Crestez X-Patchwork-Id: 598938 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id A090CC32792 for ; Thu, 18 Aug 2022 20:01:05 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1345716AbiHRUBB (ORCPT ); Thu, 18 Aug 2022 16:01:01 -0400 Received: from lindbergh.monkeyblade.net ([23.128.96.19]:54848 "EHLO lindbergh.monkeyblade.net" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1345650AbiHRUAo (ORCPT ); Thu, 18 Aug 2022 16:00:44 -0400 Received: from mail-ed1-x52d.google.com (mail-ed1-x52d.google.com [IPv6:2a00:1450:4864:20::52d]) by lindbergh.monkeyblade.net (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 849EBD11C6; Thu, 18 Aug 2022 13:00:42 -0700 (PDT) Received: by mail-ed1-x52d.google.com with SMTP id o22so3187816edc.10; Thu, 18 Aug 2022 13:00:42 -0700 (PDT) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=gmail.com; s=20210112; h=content-transfer-encoding:mime-version:references:in-reply-to :message-id:date:subject:cc:to:from:from:to:cc; bh=ETS4rz/SqLJLeYcVdtmRbgs5a88+lIdO+e6i/D2p730=; b=aZoC+li/WZLDQIl8Tb2bVZOBNOdGNwpehoVvGFlpPq+kwYkqyJWf12To/7jiJ78o72 fKlflY4qcWFc6/sz+MvYS8LbymtxHH1QnDpb/W/hXwh8EARkevKs9jCUOvDvmXYLaqVq VKlFaSJb8WQ6zCPjjObvmD8bmF/0DVArQVc4rMhP4jqCyw/hSY3XU0Ec4U+njJTtBQUs 9VHjDg7JvBXdjFt1iG0l67XpRja/xrEhuyn34/ga7mrkVxHWoc+MUFURvnScMO8LG6iM zOKSsrE4UPV+ovDEm1fuH6ELNXT6Kbjx8xUvzlsOYWhodauUv7fKnsfeDCzHEcdd0gw1 PEtQ== X-Google-DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=1e100.net; s=20210112; h=content-transfer-encoding:mime-version:references:in-reply-to :message-id:date:subject:cc:to:from:x-gm-message-state:from:to:cc; bh=ETS4rz/SqLJLeYcVdtmRbgs5a88+lIdO+e6i/D2p730=; b=iQBo8hC/a3SYcWZM8NjBzuj8yPlRNaZznvKateH1BzkRnN7rdQVZtFi1DYw6y18Cbo CURFs+wdfIiTlA9g/qPdj+qTihF2xdFCT/Ihyo2enqTYyQ5EZZ/lfyQfEpU4XbsRU4jK So3dX21KyQPBOJLhR2ANNoVRRl/PeeqwTO5TrjAq6PaEm5cZKWs24lCHrxHgBxLWLCfM ssGlJLUZPWLp5ibzasQwkoTlqBM4Tax0fBd6ZBsUR8yJzIjfwKIqhgiJBahKWTFi0TVx uXsDd7fscBujXqX22Af2Gv0voTAIVMO+YslHxkBApbBqhyrv43SjcxH2zOSQrzKKWmuU 9UBg== X-Gm-Message-State: ACgBeo1spcjHkkH72AT999aXN/KQcODh18c7nB0v5SX6G1H8F83LPLky uHtHxxgEm+k9b8bKtzp0KrH2NNkRkjw= X-Google-Smtp-Source: AA6agR4+rCSA+oy7H4teaA8AcKRtYz4AtU6exYHd9LTIXUMN/ALqeI0Yqw0INVv71EV4Gn5ZfEhPpw== X-Received: by 2002:a05:6402:1e8c:b0:43d:db52:78a8 with SMTP id f12-20020a0564021e8c00b0043ddb5278a8mr3386910edf.324.1660852841034; Thu, 18 Aug 2022 13:00:41 -0700 (PDT) Received: from localhost.localdomain ([2a04:241e:502:a080:17c8:ba1c:b6f3:3fe0]) by smtp.gmail.com with ESMTPSA id fw30-20020a170907501e00b00722e4bab163sm1215087ejc.200.2022.08.18.13.00.39 (version=TLS1_3 cipher=TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 bits=256/256); Thu, 18 Aug 2022 13:00:40 -0700 (PDT) From: Leonard Crestez To: David Ahern , Eric Dumazet , Philip Paeps Cc: Dmitry Safonov <0x7f454c46@gmail.com>, Shuah Khan , "David S. Miller" , Herbert Xu , Kuniyuki Iwashima , Hideaki YOSHIFUJI , Jakub Kicinski , Yuchung Cheng , Francesco Ruggeri , Mat Martineau , Christoph Paasch , Ivan Delalande , Caowangbao , Priyaranjan Jha , netdev@vger.kernel.org, linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org, linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Subject: [PATCH v7 13/26] tcp: authopt: Add key selection controls Date: Thu, 18 Aug 2022 22:59:47 +0300 Message-Id: <2956d99e7fbf9ff2a8cc720c67baaef35bc32343.1660852705.git.cdleonard@gmail.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.25.1 In-Reply-To: References: MIME-Version: 1.0 Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org The RFC requires that TCP can report the keyid and rnextkeyid values being sent or received, implement this via getsockopt values. The RFC also requires that user can select the sending key and that the sending key is automatically switched based on rnextkeyid. These requirements can conflict so we implement both and add a flag which specifies if user or peer request takes priority. Also add an option to control rnextkeyid explicitly from userspace. Signed-off-by: Leonard Crestez --- Documentation/networking/tcp_authopt.rst | 25 ++++++ include/net/tcp_authopt.h | 40 ++++++++- include/uapi/linux/tcp.h | 31 +++++++ net/ipv4/tcp_authopt.c | 107 ++++++++++++++++++++++- net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c | 2 +- net/ipv6/tcp_ipv6.c | 2 +- 6 files changed, 200 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-) diff --git a/Documentation/networking/tcp_authopt.rst b/Documentation/networking/tcp_authopt.rst index 72adb7a891ce..f29fdea7769f 100644 --- a/Documentation/networking/tcp_authopt.rst +++ b/Documentation/networking/tcp_authopt.rst @@ -42,10 +42,35 @@ new flags. RFC5925 requires that key ids do not overlap when tcp identifiers (addr/port) overlap. This is not enforced by linux, configuring ambiguous keys will result in packet drops and lost connections. +Key selection +------------- + +On getsockopt(TCP_AUTHOPT) information is provided about keyid/rnextkeyid in +the last send packet and about the keyid/rnextkeyd in the last valid received +packet. + +By default the sending keyid is selected to match the rnextkeyid value sent by +the remote side. If that keyid is not available (or for new connections) a +random matching key is selected. + +If the ``TCP_AUTHOPT_LOCK_KEYID`` flag is set then the sending key is selected +by the `tcp_authopt.send_local_id` field and recv_rnextkeyid is ignored. If no +key with local_id == send_local_id is configured then a random matching key is +selected. + +The current sending key is cached in the socket and will not change unless +requested by remote rnextkeyid or by setsockopt. + +The rnextkeyid value sent on the wire is usually the recv_id of the current +key used for sending. If the TCP_AUTHOPT_LOCK_RNEXTKEY flag is set in +`tcp_authopt.flags` the value of `tcp_authopt.send_rnextkeyid` is send +instead. This can be used to implement smooth rollover: the peer will switch +its keyid to the received rnextkeyid when it is available. + ABI Reference ============= .. kernel-doc:: include/uapi/linux/tcp.h :identifiers: tcp_authopt tcp_authopt_flag tcp_authopt_key tcp_authopt_key_flag tcp_authopt_alg diff --git a/include/net/tcp_authopt.h b/include/net/tcp_authopt.h index 9bc0f58a78cb..6b4329a18a1f 100644 --- a/include/net/tcp_authopt.h +++ b/include/net/tcp_authopt.h @@ -70,10 +70,45 @@ struct tcp_authopt_info { u32 dst_isn; /** @rcv_sne: Recv-side Sequence Number Extension tracking tcp_sock.rcv_nxt */ u32 rcv_sne; /** @snd_sne: Send-side Sequence Number Extension tracking tcp_sock.snd_nxt */ u32 snd_sne; + + /** + * @send_keyid: keyid currently being sent + * + * This is controlled by userspace by userspace if + * TCP_AUTHOPT_FLAG_LOCK_KEYID, otherwise we try to match recv_rnextkeyid + */ + u8 send_keyid; + /** + * @send_rnextkeyid: rnextkeyid currently being sent + * + * This is controlled by userspace if TCP_AUTHOPT_FLAG_LOCK_RNEXTKEYID is set + */ + u8 send_rnextkeyid; + /** + * @recv_keyid: last keyid received from remote + * + * This is reported to userspace but has no other special behavior attached. + */ + u8 recv_keyid; + /** + * @recv_rnextkeyid: last rnextkeyid received from remote + * + * Linux tries to honor this unless TCP_AUTHOPT_FLAG_LOCK_KEYID is set + */ + u8 recv_rnextkeyid; + + /** + * @send_key: Current key used for sending, cached. + * + * Once a key is found it only changes by user or remote request. + * + * Field is protected by the socket lock and holds a kref to the key. + */ + struct tcp_authopt_key_info __rcu *send_key; }; /* TCP authopt as found in header */ struct tcphdr_authopt { u8 num; @@ -94,22 +129,23 @@ int tcp_get_authopt_val(struct sock *sk, struct tcp_authopt *key); int tcp_set_authopt_key(struct sock *sk, sockptr_t optval, unsigned int optlen); struct tcp_authopt_key_info *__tcp_authopt_select_key( const struct sock *sk, struct tcp_authopt_info *info, const struct sock *addr_sk, - u8 *rnextkeyid); + u8 *rnextkeyid, + bool locked); static inline struct tcp_authopt_key_info *tcp_authopt_select_key( const struct sock *sk, const struct sock *addr_sk, struct tcp_authopt_info **info, u8 *rnextkeyid) { if (tcp_authopt_needed) { *info = rcu_dereference(tcp_sk(sk)->authopt_info); if (*info) - return __tcp_authopt_select_key(sk, *info, addr_sk, rnextkeyid); + return __tcp_authopt_select_key(sk, *info, addr_sk, rnextkeyid, true); } return NULL; } int tcp_authopt_hash( char *hash_location, diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/tcp.h b/include/uapi/linux/tcp.h index 76d7be6b27f4..e02176390519 100644 --- a/include/uapi/linux/tcp.h +++ b/include/uapi/linux/tcp.h @@ -346,10 +346,24 @@ struct tcp_diag_md5sig { /** * enum tcp_authopt_flag - flags for `tcp_authopt.flags` */ enum tcp_authopt_flag { + /** + * @TCP_AUTHOPT_FLAG_LOCK_KEYID: keyid controlled by sockopt + * + * If this is set `tcp_authopt.send_keyid` is used to determined sending + * key. Otherwise a key with send_id == recv_rnextkeyid is preferred. + */ + TCP_AUTHOPT_FLAG_LOCK_KEYID = (1 << 0), + /** + * @TCP_AUTHOPT_FLAG_LOCK_RNEXTKEYID: Override rnextkeyid from userspace + * + * If this is set then `tcp_authopt.send_rnextkeyid` is sent on outbound + * packets. Other the recv_id of the current sending key is sent. + */ + TCP_AUTHOPT_FLAG_LOCK_RNEXTKEYID = (1 << 1), /** * @TCP_AUTHOPT_FLAG_REJECT_UNEXPECTED: * Configure behavior of segments with TCP-AO coming from hosts for which no * key is configured. The default recommended by RFC is to silently accept * such connections. @@ -361,10 +375,27 @@ enum tcp_authopt_flag { * struct tcp_authopt - Per-socket options related to TCP Authentication Option */ struct tcp_authopt { /** @flags: Combination of &enum tcp_authopt_flag */ __u32 flags; + /** + * @send_keyid: `tcp_authopt_key.send_id` of preferred send key + * + * This is only used if `TCP_AUTHOPT_FLAG_LOCK_KEYID` is set. + */ + __u8 send_keyid; + /** + * @send_rnextkeyid: The rnextkeyid to send in packets + * + * This is controlled by the user iff TCP_AUTHOPT_FLAG_LOCK_RNEXTKEYID is + * set. Otherwise rnextkeyid is the recv_id of the current key. + */ + __u8 send_rnextkeyid; + /** @recv_keyid: A recently-received keyid value. Only for getsockopt. */ + __u8 recv_keyid; + /** @recv_rnextkeyid: A recently-received rnextkeyid value. Only for getsockopt. */ + __u8 recv_rnextkeyid; }; /** * enum tcp_authopt_key_flag - flags for `tcp_authopt.flags` * diff --git a/net/ipv4/tcp_authopt.c b/net/ipv4/tcp_authopt.c index f7635a37b972..c4c7a9a0057d 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/tcp_authopt.c +++ b/net/ipv4/tcp_authopt.c @@ -372,22 +372,89 @@ static struct tcp_authopt_key_info *tcp_authopt_lookup_send(struct netns_tcp_aut * * @sk: socket * @info: socket's tcp_authopt_info * @addr_sk: socket used for address lookup. Same as sk except for synack case * @rnextkeyid: value of rnextkeyid caller should write in packet + * @locked: If we're holding the socket lock. This is false for some timewait and reset cases * * Result is protected by RCU and can't be stored, it may only be passed to * tcp_authopt_hash and only under a single rcu_read_lock. */ struct tcp_authopt_key_info *__tcp_authopt_select_key(const struct sock *sk, struct tcp_authopt_info *info, const struct sock *addr_sk, - u8 *rnextkeyid) + u8 *rnextkeyid, + bool locked) { + struct tcp_authopt_key_info *key, *new_key = NULL; struct netns_tcp_authopt *net = sock_net_tcp_authopt(sk); - return tcp_authopt_lookup_send(net, addr_sk, -1); + /* Listen sockets don't refer to any specific connection so we don't try + * to keep using the same key and ignore any received keyids. + */ + if (sk->sk_state == TCP_LISTEN) { + int send_keyid = -1; + + if (info->flags & TCP_AUTHOPT_FLAG_LOCK_KEYID) + send_keyid = info->send_keyid; + key = tcp_authopt_lookup_send(net, addr_sk, send_keyid); + if (key) + *rnextkeyid = key->recv_id; + + return key; + } + + if (locked) { + sock_owned_by_me(sk); + key = rcu_dereference_protected(info->send_key, lockdep_sock_is_held(sk)); + if (key && (key->flags & TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_DEL) == TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_DEL) { + info->send_key = NULL; + tcp_authopt_key_put(key); + key = NULL; + } + } else { + key = NULL; + } + + /* Try to keep the same sending key unless user or peer requires a different key + * User request (via TCP_AUTHOPT_FLAG_LOCK_KEYID) always overrides peer request. + */ + if (info->flags & TCP_AUTHOPT_FLAG_LOCK_KEYID) { + int send_keyid = info->send_keyid; + + if (!key || key->send_id != send_keyid) + new_key = tcp_authopt_lookup_send(net, addr_sk, send_keyid); + } else { + if (!key || key->send_id != info->recv_rnextkeyid) + new_key = tcp_authopt_lookup_send(net, addr_sk, info->recv_rnextkeyid); + } + /* If no key found with specific send_id try anything else. */ + if (!key && !new_key) + new_key = tcp_authopt_lookup_send(net, addr_sk, -1); + + /* Update current key only if we hold the socket lock. */ + if (new_key && key != new_key) { + if (locked) { + if (kref_get_unless_zero(&new_key->ref)) { + rcu_assign_pointer(info->send_key, new_key); + tcp_authopt_key_put(key); + } + /* If key was deleted it's still valid until the end of + * the RCU grace period. + */ + } + key = new_key; + } + + if (key) { + if (info->flags & TCP_AUTHOPT_FLAG_LOCK_RNEXTKEYID) + *rnextkeyid = info->send_rnextkeyid; + else + *rnextkeyid = info->send_rnextkeyid = key->recv_id; + } + + return key; } EXPORT_SYMBOL(__tcp_authopt_select_key); static struct tcp_authopt_info *__tcp_authopt_info_get_or_create(struct sock *sk) { @@ -409,10 +476,12 @@ static struct tcp_authopt_info *__tcp_authopt_info_get_or_create(struct sock *sk return info; } #define TCP_AUTHOPT_KNOWN_FLAGS ( \ + TCP_AUTHOPT_FLAG_LOCK_KEYID | \ + TCP_AUTHOPT_FLAG_LOCK_RNEXTKEYID | \ TCP_AUTHOPT_FLAG_REJECT_UNEXPECTED) /* Like copy_from_sockptr except tolerate different optlen for compatibility reasons * * If the src is shorter then it's from an old userspace and the rest of dst is @@ -480,18 +549,23 @@ int tcp_set_authopt(struct sock *sk, sockptr_t optval, unsigned int optlen) info = __tcp_authopt_info_get_or_create(sk); if (IS_ERR(info)) return PTR_ERR(info); info->flags = opt.flags & TCP_AUTHOPT_KNOWN_FLAGS; + if (opt.flags & TCP_AUTHOPT_FLAG_LOCK_KEYID) + info->send_keyid = opt.send_keyid; + if (opt.flags & TCP_AUTHOPT_FLAG_LOCK_RNEXTKEYID) + info->send_rnextkeyid = opt.send_rnextkeyid; return 0; } int tcp_get_authopt_val(struct sock *sk, struct tcp_authopt *opt) { struct tcp_sock *tp = tcp_sk(sk); struct tcp_authopt_info *info; + struct tcp_authopt_key_info *send_key; int err; memset(opt, 0, sizeof(*opt)); sock_owned_by_me(sk); err = check_sysctl_tcp_authopt(); @@ -501,10 +575,22 @@ int tcp_get_authopt_val(struct sock *sk, struct tcp_authopt *opt) info = rcu_dereference_check(tp->authopt_info, lockdep_sock_is_held(sk)); if (!info) return -ENOENT; opt->flags = info->flags & TCP_AUTHOPT_KNOWN_FLAGS; + /* These keyids might be undefined, for example before connect. + * Reporting zero is not strictly correct because there are no reserved + * values. + */ + send_key = rcu_dereference_check(info->send_key, lockdep_sock_is_held(sk)); + if (send_key) + opt->send_keyid = send_key->send_id; + else + opt->send_keyid = 0; + opt->send_rnextkeyid = info->send_rnextkeyid; + opt->recv_keyid = info->recv_keyid; + opt->recv_rnextkeyid = info->recv_rnextkeyid; return 0; } #define TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_KNOWN_FLAGS ( \ @@ -1465,11 +1551,11 @@ int __tcp_authopt_inbound_check(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb, NET_INC_STATS(sock_net(sk), LINUX_MIB_TCPAUTHOPTFAILURE); print_tcpao_notice("TCP Authentication Unexpected: Rejected", skb); return -SKB_DROP_REASON_TCP_AOUNEXPECTED; } print_tcpao_notice("TCP Authentication Unexpected: Accepted", skb); - return 0; + goto accept; } if (opt && !key) { /* Keys are configured for peer but with different keyid than packet */ NET_INC_STATS(sock_net(sk), LINUX_MIB_TCPAUTHOPTFAILURE); print_tcpao_notice("TCP Authentication Failed", skb); @@ -1488,10 +1574,25 @@ int __tcp_authopt_inbound_check(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb, NET_INC_STATS(sock_net(sk), LINUX_MIB_TCPAUTHOPTFAILURE); print_tcpao_notice("TCP Authentication Failed", skb); return -SKB_DROP_REASON_TCP_AOFAILURE; } +accept: + /* Doing this for all valid packets will results in keyids temporarily + * flipping back and forth if packets are reordered or retransmitted + * but keys should eventually stabilize. + * + * This is connection-specific so don't store for listen sockets. + * + * We could store rnextkeyid from SYN in a request sock and use it for + * the SYNACK but we don't. + */ + if (sk->sk_state != TCP_LISTEN) { + info->recv_keyid = opt->keyid; + info->recv_rnextkeyid = opt->rnextkeyid; + } + return 1; } EXPORT_SYMBOL(__tcp_authopt_inbound_check); static int tcp_authopt_init_net(struct net *full_net) diff --git a/net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c b/net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c index acce593bb7c9..720ae16303c4 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c +++ b/net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c @@ -665,11 +665,11 @@ static int tcp_v4_authopt_handle_reply(const struct sock *sk, info = tcp_twsk(sk)->tw_authopt_info; else info = rcu_dereference_check(tcp_sk(sk)->authopt_info, lockdep_sock_is_held(sk)); if (!info) return 0; - key_info = __tcp_authopt_select_key(sk, info, sk, &rnextkeyid); + key_info = __tcp_authopt_select_key(sk, info, sk, &rnextkeyid, false); if (!key_info) return 0; *optptr = htonl((TCPOPT_AUTHOPT << 24) | (TCPOLEN_AUTHOPT_OUTPUT << 16) | (key_info->send_id << 8) | diff --git a/net/ipv6/tcp_ipv6.c b/net/ipv6/tcp_ipv6.c index 151254345dee..e983a0e680ae 100644 --- a/net/ipv6/tcp_ipv6.c +++ b/net/ipv6/tcp_ipv6.c @@ -852,11 +852,11 @@ static int tcp_v6_send_response_init_authopt(const struct sock *sk, *info = tcp_twsk(sk)->tw_authopt_info; else *info = rcu_dereference(tcp_sk(sk)->authopt_info); if (!*info) return 0; - *key = __tcp_authopt_select_key(sk, *info, sk, rnextkeyid); + *key = __tcp_authopt_select_key(sk, *info, sk, rnextkeyid, false); if (*key) return TCPOLEN_AUTHOPT_OUTPUT; return 0; } From patchwork Thu Aug 18 19:59:48 2022 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Leonard Crestez X-Patchwork-Id: 598238 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 38B28C32793 for ; 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Thu, 18 Aug 2022 13:00:42 -0700 (PDT) From: Leonard Crestez To: David Ahern , Eric Dumazet , Philip Paeps Cc: Dmitry Safonov <0x7f454c46@gmail.com>, Shuah Khan , "David S. Miller" , Herbert Xu , Kuniyuki Iwashima , Hideaki YOSHIFUJI , Jakub Kicinski , Yuchung Cheng , Francesco Ruggeri , Mat Martineau , Christoph Paasch , Ivan Delalande , Caowangbao , Priyaranjan Jha , netdev@vger.kernel.org, linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org, linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Subject: [PATCH v7 14/26] tcp: authopt: Add initial l3index support Date: Thu, 18 Aug 2022 22:59:48 +0300 Message-Id: <49b269cf4466b596de96053a80b745d8867a9712.1660852705.git.cdleonard@gmail.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.25.1 In-Reply-To: References: MIME-Version: 1.0 Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org This is a parallel feature to tcp_md5sig.tcpm_ifindex support and allows applications to server multiple VRFs with a single socket. The ifindex argument must be the ifindex of a VRF device and must match exactly, keys with ifindex == 0 (outside of VRF) will not match for connections inside a VRF. Keys without the TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_IFINDEX will ignore ifindex and match both inside and outside VRF. Signed-off-by: Leonard Crestez --- Documentation/networking/tcp_authopt.rst | 1 + include/net/tcp_authopt.h | 2 + include/uapi/linux/tcp.h | 11 ++++ net/ipv4/tcp_authopt.c | 71 ++++++++++++++++++++++-- 4 files changed, 80 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) diff --git a/Documentation/networking/tcp_authopt.rst b/Documentation/networking/tcp_authopt.rst index f29fdea7769f..f681d2221ce3 100644 --- a/Documentation/networking/tcp_authopt.rst +++ b/Documentation/networking/tcp_authopt.rst @@ -37,10 +37,11 @@ expand over time by increasing the size of `struct tcp_authopt_key` and adding new flags. * Address binding is optional, by default keys match all addresses * Local address is ignored, matching is done by remote address * Ports are ignored + * It is possible to match a specific VRF by l3index (default is to ignore) RFC5925 requires that key ids do not overlap when tcp identifiers (addr/port) overlap. This is not enforced by linux, configuring ambiguous keys will result in packet drops and lost connections. diff --git a/include/net/tcp_authopt.h b/include/net/tcp_authopt.h index 6b4329a18a1f..1630fc2aa082 100644 --- a/include/net/tcp_authopt.h +++ b/include/net/tcp_authopt.h @@ -45,10 +45,12 @@ struct tcp_authopt_key_info { u8 alg_id; /** @keylen: Same as &tcp_authopt_key.keylen */ u8 keylen; /** @key: Same as &tcp_authopt_key.key */ u8 key[TCP_AUTHOPT_MAXKEYLEN]; + /** @l3index: Same as &tcp_authopt_key.ifindex */ + int l3index; /** @addr: Same as &tcp_authopt_key.addr */ struct sockaddr_storage addr; /** @alg: Algorithm implementation matching alg_id */ struct tcp_authopt_alg_imp *alg; }; diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/tcp.h b/include/uapi/linux/tcp.h index e02176390519..a7f5f918ed5a 100644 --- a/include/uapi/linux/tcp.h +++ b/include/uapi/linux/tcp.h @@ -400,15 +400,17 @@ struct tcp_authopt { * enum tcp_authopt_key_flag - flags for `tcp_authopt.flags` * * @TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_DEL: Delete the key and ignore non-id fields * @TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_EXCLUDE_OPTS: Exclude TCP options from signature * @TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_ADDR_BIND: Key only valid for `tcp_authopt.addr` + * @TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_IFINDEX: Key only valid for `tcp_authopt.ifindex` */ enum tcp_authopt_key_flag { TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_DEL = (1 << 0), TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_EXCLUDE_OPTS = (1 << 1), TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_ADDR_BIND = (1 << 2), + TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_IFINDEX = (1 << 3), }; /** * enum tcp_authopt_alg - Algorithms for TCP Authentication Option */ @@ -450,10 +452,19 @@ struct tcp_authopt_key { * @addr: Key is only valid for this address * * Ignored unless TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_ADDR_BIND flag is set */ struct __kernel_sockaddr_storage addr; + /** + * @ifindex: ifindex of vrf (l3mdev_master) interface + * + * If the TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_IFINDEX flag is set then key only applies for + * connections through this interface. Interface must be an vrf master. + * + * This is similar to `tcp_msg5sig.tcpm_ifindex` + */ + int ifindex; }; /* setsockopt(fd, IPPROTO_TCP, TCP_ZEROCOPY_RECEIVE, ...) */ #define TCP_RECEIVE_ZEROCOPY_FLAG_TLB_CLEAN_HINT 0x1 diff --git a/net/ipv4/tcp_authopt.c b/net/ipv4/tcp_authopt.c index c4c7a9a0057d..bb26fb1c8af2 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/tcp_authopt.c +++ b/net/ipv4/tcp_authopt.c @@ -1,8 +1,9 @@ // SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later #include +#include #include #include #include #include @@ -264,10 +265,14 @@ static bool tcp_authopt_key_match_exact(struct tcp_authopt_key_info *info, { if (info->send_id != key->send_id) return false; if (info->recv_id != key->recv_id) return false; + if ((info->flags & TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_IFINDEX) != (key->flags & TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_IFINDEX)) + return false; + if ((info->flags & TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_IFINDEX) && info->l3index != key->ifindex) + return false; if ((info->flags & TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_ADDR_BIND) != (key->flags & TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_ADDR_BIND)) return false; if (info->flags & TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_ADDR_BIND) if (!ipvx_addr_match(&info->addr, &key->addr)) return false; @@ -333,10 +338,24 @@ static struct tcp_authopt_key_info *tcp_authopt_key_lookup_exact(const struct so return key_info; return NULL; } +static bool better_key_match(struct tcp_authopt_key_info *old, struct tcp_authopt_key_info *new) +{ + if (!old) + return true; + + /* l3index always overrides non-l3index */ + if (old->l3index && new->l3index == 0) + return false; + if (old->l3index == 0 && new->l3index) + return true; + + return false; +} + /** * tcp_authopt_lookup_send - lookup key for sending * * @net: Per-namespace information containing keys * @addr_sk: Socket used for destination address lookup @@ -350,20 +369,29 @@ static struct tcp_authopt_key_info *tcp_authopt_lookup_send(struct netns_tcp_aut const struct sock *addr_sk, int send_id) { struct tcp_authopt_key_info *result = NULL; struct tcp_authopt_key_info *key; + int l3index = -1; hlist_for_each_entry_rcu(key, &net->head, node, 0) { if (send_id >= 0 && key->send_id != send_id) continue; if (key->flags & TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_ADDR_BIND) if (!tcp_authopt_key_match_sk_addr(key, addr_sk)) continue; - if (result && net_ratelimit()) - pr_warn("ambiguous tcp authentication keys configured for send\n"); - result = key; + if (key->flags & TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_IFINDEX) { + if (l3index < 0) + l3index = l3mdev_master_ifindex_by_index(sock_net(addr_sk), + addr_sk->sk_bound_dev_if); + if (l3index != key->l3index) + continue; + } + if (better_key_match(result, key)) + result = key; + else if (result) + net_warn_ratelimited("ambiguous tcp authentication keys configured for send\n"); } return result; } @@ -594,19 +622,21 @@ int tcp_get_authopt_val(struct sock *sk, struct tcp_authopt *opt) } #define TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_KNOWN_FLAGS ( \ TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_DEL | \ TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_EXCLUDE_OPTS | \ - TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_ADDR_BIND) + TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_ADDR_BIND | \ + TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_IFINDEX) int tcp_set_authopt_key(struct sock *sk, sockptr_t optval, unsigned int optlen) { struct tcp_authopt_key opt; struct tcp_authopt_info *info; struct tcp_authopt_key_info *key_info, *old_key_info; struct netns_tcp_authopt *net = sock_net_tcp_authopt(sk); struct tcp_authopt_alg_imp *alg; + int l3index = 0; int err; sock_owned_by_me(sk); err = check_sysctl_tcp_authopt(); if (err) @@ -657,10 +687,24 @@ int tcp_set_authopt_key(struct sock *sk, sockptr_t optval, unsigned int optlen) return -EINVAL; err = tcp_authopt_alg_require(alg); if (err) return err; + /* check ifindex is valid (zero is always valid) */ + if (opt.flags & TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_IFINDEX && opt.ifindex) { + struct net_device *dev; + + rcu_read_lock(); + dev = dev_get_by_index_rcu(sock_net(sk), opt.ifindex); + if (dev && netif_is_l3_master(dev)) + l3index = dev->ifindex; + rcu_read_unlock(); + + if (!l3index) + return -EINVAL; + } + key_info = kmalloc(sizeof(*key_info), GFP_KERNEL | __GFP_ZERO); if (!key_info) return -ENOMEM; mutex_lock(&net->mutex); kref_init(&key_info->ref); @@ -676,10 +720,11 @@ int tcp_set_authopt_key(struct sock *sk, sockptr_t optval, unsigned int optlen) key_info->alg_id = opt.alg; key_info->alg = alg; key_info->keylen = opt.keylen; memcpy(key_info->key, opt.key, opt.keylen); memcpy(&key_info->addr, &opt.addr, sizeof(key_info->addr)); + key_info->l3index = l3index; hlist_add_head_rcu(&key_info->node, &net->head); mutex_unlock(&net->mutex); return 0; } @@ -1465,21 +1510,37 @@ static struct tcp_authopt_key_info *tcp_authopt_lookup_recv(struct sock *sk, int recv_id, bool *anykey) { struct tcp_authopt_key_info *result = NULL; struct tcp_authopt_key_info *key; + int l3index = -1; *anykey = false; /* multiple matches will cause occasional failures */ hlist_for_each_entry_rcu(key, &net->head, node, 0) { if (key->flags & TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_ADDR_BIND && !tcp_authopt_key_match_skb_addr(key, skb)) continue; + if (key->flags & TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_IFINDEX) { + if (l3index < 0) { + if (skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP)) { + l3index = inet_sdif(skb) ? inet_iif(skb) : 0; + } else if (skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IPV6)) { + l3index = inet6_sdif(skb) ? inet6_iif(skb) : 0; + } else { + WARN_ONCE(1, "unexpected skb->protocol=%x", skb->protocol); + continue; + } + } + + if (l3index != key->l3index) + continue; + } *anykey = true; if (recv_id >= 0 && key->recv_id != recv_id) continue; - if (!result) + if (better_key_match(result, key)) result = key; else if (result) net_warn_ratelimited("ambiguous tcp authentication keys configured for recv\n"); } From patchwork Thu Aug 18 19:59:49 2022 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Leonard Crestez X-Patchwork-Id: 598237 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 68BC2C32774 for ; Thu, 18 Aug 2022 20:01:11 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1345734AbiHRUBH (ORCPT ); Thu, 18 Aug 2022 16:01:07 -0400 Received: from lindbergh.monkeyblade.net ([23.128.96.19]:54908 "EHLO lindbergh.monkeyblade.net" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1345660AbiHRUAr (ORCPT ); Thu, 18 Aug 2022 16:00:47 -0400 Received: from mail-ed1-x52d.google.com (mail-ed1-x52d.google.com [IPv6:2a00:1450:4864:20::52d]) by lindbergh.monkeyblade.net (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 42B24D11D8; Thu, 18 Aug 2022 13:00:45 -0700 (PDT) Received: by mail-ed1-x52d.google.com with SMTP id o22so3188000edc.10; Thu, 18 Aug 2022 13:00:45 -0700 (PDT) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=gmail.com; s=20210112; h=content-transfer-encoding:mime-version:references:in-reply-to :message-id:date:subject:cc:to:from:from:to:cc; bh=e7myX/ND+nnIiOt3LqG3ckuwVwkBkqrIptHUR/Mrndk=; b=WVavmcDqa5JmqnC6gdXmqv8HI/orgoJQWcID3pt1S9bFMe2NAcu8/Gox8Sy7S/LUvO 9JnSJpQAPk0YsK7O0AIOIjT3Z2fmkMkrE3IwULiJHyqX/ZsR1TEq0DoqlTqq45qxRdmW /gYaT/JTB6cPJEWvr14W2M4v2vQ1jcK5ApxgppvIJOFdzROr0Zr4dTPzlrhPIzYkg17b 852Gqlkf52v0t88nEX2bey3u7JryN/18Ngr3UHgb62ucRYVMp5YvrO4vAYZF9R5DMoFD yEC5QWRppPgyylVtdjtooKj10W7QRg6hNyopbnncZoXATdpqwgnTTVkLU8f8G0Ep9Mb0 omZg== X-Google-DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=1e100.net; s=20210112; h=content-transfer-encoding:mime-version:references:in-reply-to :message-id:date:subject:cc:to:from:x-gm-message-state:from:to:cc; bh=e7myX/ND+nnIiOt3LqG3ckuwVwkBkqrIptHUR/Mrndk=; b=GIuw3eU7kWp9GhuzaMYJj28E5wWAnbao63IuH00L0h6nQTJxR40qkmlfpaK1BlsdQe MN1r0oYVQZQOHpHynpYiElTeq5L7ZboN8hH8USUkT0YPTsg756vHve8IiGe2PReV3kUS d27ElrCI8ZWVgjClZ8ql7WBtVNcd1IfvIVpQ57ugHsik1wiy5tVFlABKMFuIyO03Oa8F eiv6qT4/59exAHhnOmDDRtxHdxqTxApnX+bP/L65pkH30rODuDmDS2uLnYRNrEDsSxWt CSHehR+cuimPgdKZX6CrKILRQiEOfcHdZ89xFQYXrw6kkRGbblap5PB2p2p+5QqEfFCn t6vw== X-Gm-Message-State: ACgBeo3L4oNMVbkjE8LUVJyFypcAkekb5xeUD1W5Qh9WMqyRN7zKvzTI it9MRmuLxCJJZnBITBO4ebs= X-Google-Smtp-Source: AA6agR5ARHTZR1nGY8gbxIAeHQxGPuUjylheOU62AlIXzg+1eRstARycn9+O4biq50Ot+c7/NKqZQg== X-Received: by 2002:a05:6402:42d3:b0:435:2c49:313d with SMTP id i19-20020a05640242d300b004352c49313dmr3436835edc.86.1660852844709; Thu, 18 Aug 2022 13:00:44 -0700 (PDT) Received: from localhost.localdomain ([2a04:241e:502:a080:17c8:ba1c:b6f3:3fe0]) by smtp.gmail.com with ESMTPSA id fw30-20020a170907501e00b00722e4bab163sm1215087ejc.200.2022.08.18.13.00.43 (version=TLS1_3 cipher=TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 bits=256/256); Thu, 18 Aug 2022 13:00:44 -0700 (PDT) From: Leonard Crestez To: David Ahern , Eric Dumazet , Philip Paeps Cc: Dmitry Safonov <0x7f454c46@gmail.com>, Shuah Khan , "David S. Miller" , Herbert Xu , Kuniyuki Iwashima , Hideaki YOSHIFUJI , Jakub Kicinski , Yuchung Cheng , Francesco Ruggeri , Mat Martineau , Christoph Paasch , Ivan Delalande , Caowangbao , Priyaranjan Jha , netdev@vger.kernel.org, linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org, linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Subject: [PATCH v7 15/26] tcp: authopt: Add NOSEND/NORECV flags Date: Thu, 18 Aug 2022 22:59:49 +0300 Message-Id: <747981be06c06a5415d22cbd29a9b7c03706a913.1660852705.git.cdleonard@gmail.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.25.1 In-Reply-To: References: MIME-Version: 1.0 Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org Add flags to allow marking individual keys and invalid for send or recv. Making keys assymetric this way is not mentioned in RFC5925 but RFC8177 requires that keys inside a keychain have independent "accept" and "send" lifetimes. Flag names are negative so that the default behavior is for keys to be valid for both send and recv. Setting both NOSEND and NORECV for a certain peer address can be used on a listen socket can be used to mean "TCP-AO is required from this peer but no keys are currently valid". Signed-off-by: Leonard Crestez --- include/uapi/linux/tcp.h | 4 ++++ net/ipv4/tcp_authopt.c | 9 ++++++++- 2 files changed, 12 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/tcp.h b/include/uapi/linux/tcp.h index a7f5f918ed5a..ed27feb93b0e 100644 --- a/include/uapi/linux/tcp.h +++ b/include/uapi/linux/tcp.h @@ -401,16 +401,20 @@ struct tcp_authopt { * * @TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_DEL: Delete the key and ignore non-id fields * @TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_EXCLUDE_OPTS: Exclude TCP options from signature * @TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_ADDR_BIND: Key only valid for `tcp_authopt.addr` * @TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_IFINDEX: Key only valid for `tcp_authopt.ifindex` + * @TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_NOSEND: Key invalid for send (expired) + * @TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_NORECV: Key invalid for recv (expired) */ enum tcp_authopt_key_flag { TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_DEL = (1 << 0), TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_EXCLUDE_OPTS = (1 << 1), TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_ADDR_BIND = (1 << 2), TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_IFINDEX = (1 << 3), + TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_NOSEND = (1 << 4), + TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_NORECV = (1 << 5), }; /** * enum tcp_authopt_alg - Algorithms for TCP Authentication Option */ diff --git a/net/ipv4/tcp_authopt.c b/net/ipv4/tcp_authopt.c index bb26fb1c8af2..0ead961fcfe0 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/tcp_authopt.c +++ b/net/ipv4/tcp_authopt.c @@ -374,10 +374,12 @@ static struct tcp_authopt_key_info *tcp_authopt_lookup_send(struct netns_tcp_aut int l3index = -1; hlist_for_each_entry_rcu(key, &net->head, node, 0) { if (send_id >= 0 && key->send_id != send_id) continue; + if (key->flags & TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_NOSEND) + continue; if (key->flags & TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_ADDR_BIND) if (!tcp_authopt_key_match_sk_addr(key, addr_sk)) continue; if (key->flags & TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_IFINDEX) { if (l3index < 0) @@ -623,11 +625,13 @@ int tcp_get_authopt_val(struct sock *sk, struct tcp_authopt *opt) #define TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_KNOWN_FLAGS ( \ TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_DEL | \ TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_EXCLUDE_OPTS | \ TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_ADDR_BIND | \ - TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_IFINDEX) + TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_IFINDEX | \ + TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_NOSEND | \ + TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_NORECV) int tcp_set_authopt_key(struct sock *sk, sockptr_t optval, unsigned int optlen) { struct tcp_authopt_key opt; struct tcp_authopt_info *info; @@ -1534,10 +1538,13 @@ static struct tcp_authopt_key_info *tcp_authopt_lookup_recv(struct sock *sk, if (l3index != key->l3index) continue; } *anykey = true; + // If only keys with norecv flag are present still consider that + if (key->flags & TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_NORECV) + continue; if (recv_id >= 0 && key->recv_id != recv_id) continue; if (better_key_match(result, key)) result = key; else if (result) From patchwork Thu Aug 18 19:59:50 2022 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Leonard Crestez X-Patchwork-Id: 598937 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id E2F93C32773 for ; Thu, 18 Aug 2022 20:01:08 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1345729AbiHRUBG (ORCPT ); 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Thu, 18 Aug 2022 13:00:46 -0700 (PDT) From: Leonard Crestez To: David Ahern , Eric Dumazet , Philip Paeps Cc: Dmitry Safonov <0x7f454c46@gmail.com>, Shuah Khan , "David S. Miller" , Herbert Xu , Kuniyuki Iwashima , Hideaki YOSHIFUJI , Jakub Kicinski , Yuchung Cheng , Francesco Ruggeri , Mat Martineau , Christoph Paasch , Ivan Delalande , Caowangbao , Priyaranjan Jha , netdev@vger.kernel.org, linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org, linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Subject: [PATCH v7 16/26] tcp: authopt: Add prefixlen support Date: Thu, 18 Aug 2022 22:59:50 +0300 Message-Id: <8d9eb87eeca2d569cccd0612bfbfc8e99ec191d0.1660852705.git.cdleonard@gmail.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.25.1 In-Reply-To: References: MIME-Version: 1.0 Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org This allows making a key apply to an addr/prefix instead of just the full addr. This is enabled through a custom flag, default behavior is still full address match. This is equivalent to TCP_MD5SIG_FLAG_PREFIX from TCP_MD5SIG and has the same use-cases. Signed-off-by: Leonard Crestez --- Documentation/networking/tcp_authopt.rst | 1 + include/net/tcp_authopt.h | 2 + include/uapi/linux/tcp.h | 10 ++++ net/ipv4/tcp_authopt.c | 63 ++++++++++++++++++++++-- 4 files changed, 72 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/Documentation/networking/tcp_authopt.rst b/Documentation/networking/tcp_authopt.rst index f681d2221ce3..6520c6d02755 100644 --- a/Documentation/networking/tcp_authopt.rst +++ b/Documentation/networking/tcp_authopt.rst @@ -38,10 +38,11 @@ new flags. * Address binding is optional, by default keys match all addresses * Local address is ignored, matching is done by remote address * Ports are ignored * It is possible to match a specific VRF by l3index (default is to ignore) + * It is possible to match with a fixed prefixlen (default is full address) RFC5925 requires that key ids do not overlap when tcp identifiers (addr/port) overlap. This is not enforced by linux, configuring ambiguous keys will result in packet drops and lost connections. diff --git a/include/net/tcp_authopt.h b/include/net/tcp_authopt.h index 1630fc2aa082..4f83d8e54fef 100644 --- a/include/net/tcp_authopt.h +++ b/include/net/tcp_authopt.h @@ -47,10 +47,12 @@ struct tcp_authopt_key_info { u8 keylen; /** @key: Same as &tcp_authopt_key.key */ u8 key[TCP_AUTHOPT_MAXKEYLEN]; /** @l3index: Same as &tcp_authopt_key.ifindex */ int l3index; + /** @prefixlen: Length of addr match (default full) */ + int prefixlen; /** @addr: Same as &tcp_authopt_key.addr */ struct sockaddr_storage addr; /** @alg: Algorithm implementation matching alg_id */ struct tcp_authopt_alg_imp *alg; }; diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/tcp.h b/include/uapi/linux/tcp.h index ed27feb93b0e..b1063e1e1b9f 100644 --- a/include/uapi/linux/tcp.h +++ b/include/uapi/linux/tcp.h @@ -403,18 +403,21 @@ struct tcp_authopt { * @TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_EXCLUDE_OPTS: Exclude TCP options from signature * @TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_ADDR_BIND: Key only valid for `tcp_authopt.addr` * @TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_IFINDEX: Key only valid for `tcp_authopt.ifindex` * @TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_NOSEND: Key invalid for send (expired) * @TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_NORECV: Key invalid for recv (expired) + * @TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_PREFIXLEN: Valid value in `tcp_authopt.prefixlen`, otherwise + * match full address length */ enum tcp_authopt_key_flag { TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_DEL = (1 << 0), TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_EXCLUDE_OPTS = (1 << 1), TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_ADDR_BIND = (1 << 2), TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_IFINDEX = (1 << 3), TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_NOSEND = (1 << 4), TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_NORECV = (1 << 5), + TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_PREFIXLEN = (1 << 6), }; /** * enum tcp_authopt_alg - Algorithms for TCP Authentication Option */ @@ -465,10 +468,17 @@ struct tcp_authopt_key { * connections through this interface. Interface must be an vrf master. * * This is similar to `tcp_msg5sig.tcpm_ifindex` */ int ifindex; + /** + * @prefixlen: length of prefix to match + * + * Without the TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_PREFIXLEN flag this is ignored and a full + * address match is performed. + */ + int prefixlen; }; /* setsockopt(fd, IPPROTO_TCP, TCP_ZEROCOPY_RECEIVE, ...) */ #define TCP_RECEIVE_ZEROCOPY_FLAG_TLB_CLEAN_HINT 0x1 diff --git a/net/ipv4/tcp_authopt.c b/net/ipv4/tcp_authopt.c index 0ead961fcfe0..0b6cbd6f5491 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/tcp_authopt.c +++ b/net/ipv4/tcp_authopt.c @@ -4,10 +4,11 @@ #include #include #include #include #include +#include /* This is mainly intended to protect against local privilege escalations through * a rarely used feature so it is deliberately not namespaced. */ int sysctl_tcp_authopt; @@ -269,10 +270,14 @@ static bool tcp_authopt_key_match_exact(struct tcp_authopt_key_info *info, return false; if ((info->flags & TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_IFINDEX) != (key->flags & TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_IFINDEX)) return false; if ((info->flags & TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_IFINDEX) && info->l3index != key->ifindex) return false; + if ((info->flags & TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_PREFIXLEN) != (key->flags & TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_PREFIXLEN)) + return false; + if ((info->flags & TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_PREFIXLEN) && info->prefixlen != key->prefixlen) + return false; if ((info->flags & TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_ADDR_BIND) != (key->flags & TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_ADDR_BIND)) return false; if (info->flags & TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_ADDR_BIND) if (!ipvx_addr_match(&info->addr, &key->addr)) return false; @@ -286,17 +291,20 @@ static bool tcp_authopt_key_match_skb_addr(struct tcp_authopt_key_info *key, u16 keyaf = key->addr.ss_family; struct iphdr *iph = (struct iphdr *)skb_network_header(skb); if (keyaf == AF_INET && iph->version == 4) { struct sockaddr_in *key_addr = (struct sockaddr_in *)&key->addr; + __be32 mask = inet_make_mask(key->prefixlen); - return iph->saddr == key_addr->sin_addr.s_addr; + return (iph->saddr & mask) == key_addr->sin_addr.s_addr; } else if (keyaf == AF_INET6 && iph->version == 6) { struct ipv6hdr *ip6h = (struct ipv6hdr *)skb_network_header(skb); struct sockaddr_in6 *key_addr = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)&key->addr; - return ipv6_addr_equal(&ip6h->saddr, &key_addr->sin6_addr); + return ipv6_prefix_equal(&ip6h->saddr, + &key_addr->sin6_addr, + key->prefixlen); } /* This actually happens with ipv6-mapped-ipv4-addresses * IPv6 listen sockets will be asked to validate ipv4 packets. */ @@ -312,17 +320,20 @@ static bool tcp_authopt_key_match_sk_addr(struct tcp_authopt_key_info *key, if (keyaf != addr_sk->sk_family) return false; if (keyaf == AF_INET) { struct sockaddr_in *key_addr = (struct sockaddr_in *)&key->addr; + __be32 mask = inet_make_mask(key->prefixlen); - return addr_sk->sk_daddr == key_addr->sin_addr.s_addr; + return (addr_sk->sk_daddr & mask) == key_addr->sin_addr.s_addr; #if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6) } else if (keyaf == AF_INET6) { struct sockaddr_in6 *key_addr = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)&key->addr; - return ipv6_addr_equal(&addr_sk->sk_v6_daddr, &key_addr->sin6_addr); + return ipv6_prefix_equal(&addr_sk->sk_v6_daddr, + &key_addr->sin6_addr, + key->prefixlen); #endif } return false; } @@ -348,10 +359,16 @@ static bool better_key_match(struct tcp_authopt_key_info *old, struct tcp_authop /* l3index always overrides non-l3index */ if (old->l3index && new->l3index == 0) return false; if (old->l3index == 0 && new->l3index) return true; + /* Full address match overrides match by prefixlen */ + if (!(new->flags & TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_PREFIXLEN) && (old->flags & TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_PREFIXLEN)) + return false; + /* Longer prefixes are better matches */ + if (new->prefixlen > old->prefixlen) + return true; return false; } /** @@ -626,21 +643,32 @@ int tcp_get_authopt_val(struct sock *sk, struct tcp_authopt *opt) #define TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_KNOWN_FLAGS ( \ TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_DEL | \ TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_EXCLUDE_OPTS | \ TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_ADDR_BIND | \ TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_IFINDEX | \ + TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_PREFIXLEN | \ TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_NOSEND | \ TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_NORECV) +static bool ipv6_addr_is_prefix(struct in6_addr *addr, int plen) +{ + struct in6_addr copy; + + ipv6_addr_prefix(©, addr, plen); + + return !memcmp(©, addr, sizeof(*addr)); +} + int tcp_set_authopt_key(struct sock *sk, sockptr_t optval, unsigned int optlen) { struct tcp_authopt_key opt; struct tcp_authopt_info *info; struct tcp_authopt_key_info *key_info, *old_key_info; struct netns_tcp_authopt *net = sock_net_tcp_authopt(sk); struct tcp_authopt_alg_imp *alg; int l3index = 0; + int prefixlen; int err; sock_owned_by_me(sk); err = check_sysctl_tcp_authopt(); if (err) @@ -676,10 +704,36 @@ int tcp_set_authopt_key(struct sock *sk, sockptr_t optval, unsigned int optlen) if (opt.flags & TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_ADDR_BIND) { if (sk->sk_family != opt.addr.ss_family) return -EINVAL; } + /* check prefixlen */ + if (opt.flags & TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_PREFIXLEN) { + prefixlen = opt.prefixlen; + if (sk->sk_family == AF_INET) { + if (prefixlen < 0 || prefixlen > 32) + return -EINVAL; + if (((struct sockaddr_in *)&opt.addr)->sin_addr.s_addr & + ~inet_make_mask(prefixlen)) + return -EINVAL; + } + if (sk->sk_family == AF_INET6) { + if (prefixlen < 0 || prefixlen > 128) + return -EINVAL; + if (!ipv6_addr_is_prefix(&((struct sockaddr_in6 *)&opt.addr)->sin6_addr, + prefixlen)) + return -EINVAL; + } + } else { + if (sk->sk_family == AF_INET) + prefixlen = 32; + else if (sk->sk_family == AF_INET6) + prefixlen = 128; + else + return -EINVAL; + } + /* Initialize tcp_authopt_info if not already set */ info = __tcp_authopt_info_get_or_create(sk); if (IS_ERR(info)) return PTR_ERR(info); @@ -725,10 +779,11 @@ int tcp_set_authopt_key(struct sock *sk, sockptr_t optval, unsigned int optlen) key_info->alg = alg; key_info->keylen = opt.keylen; memcpy(key_info->key, opt.key, opt.keylen); memcpy(&key_info->addr, &opt.addr, sizeof(key_info->addr)); key_info->l3index = l3index; + key_info->prefixlen = prefixlen; hlist_add_head_rcu(&key_info->node, &net->head); mutex_unlock(&net->mutex); return 0; } From patchwork Thu Aug 18 19:59:51 2022 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Leonard Crestez X-Patchwork-Id: 598936 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 03659C32772 for ; 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Thu, 18 Aug 2022 13:00:47 -0700 (PDT) From: Leonard Crestez To: David Ahern , Eric Dumazet , Philip Paeps Cc: Dmitry Safonov <0x7f454c46@gmail.com>, Shuah Khan , "David S. Miller" , Herbert Xu , Kuniyuki Iwashima , Hideaki YOSHIFUJI , Jakub Kicinski , Yuchung Cheng , Francesco Ruggeri , Mat Martineau , Christoph Paasch , Ivan Delalande , Caowangbao , Priyaranjan Jha , netdev@vger.kernel.org, linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org, linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Subject: [PATCH v7 17/26] tcp: authopt: Add v4mapped ipv6 address support Date: Thu, 18 Aug 2022 22:59:51 +0300 Message-Id: X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.25.1 In-Reply-To: References: MIME-Version: 1.0 Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org Keys that are added with v4mapped ipv6 addresses will now be used for ipv4 packets. This outward behavior is similar to how MD5 support currently works. The implementation is different - v4mapped keys are still stored with ipv6 addresses. Signed-off-by: Leonard Crestez --- net/ipv4/tcp_authopt.c | 35 +++++++++++++++++++++++++---------- 1 file changed, 25 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-) diff --git a/net/ipv4/tcp_authopt.c b/net/ipv4/tcp_authopt.c index 0b6cbd6f5491..06f8df1d80c9 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/tcp_authopt.c +++ b/net/ipv4/tcp_authopt.c @@ -301,27 +301,30 @@ static bool tcp_authopt_key_match_skb_addr(struct tcp_authopt_key_info *key, struct sockaddr_in6 *key_addr = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)&key->addr; return ipv6_prefix_equal(&ip6h->saddr, &key_addr->sin6_addr, key->prefixlen); + } else if (keyaf == AF_INET6 && iph->version == 4) { + struct sockaddr_in6 *key_addr = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)&key->addr; + + /* handle ipv6-mapped-ipv4-addresses */ + if (ipv6_addr_v4mapped(&key_addr->sin6_addr)) { + __be32 mask = inet_make_mask(key->prefixlen); + __be32 ipv4 = key_addr->sin6_addr.s6_addr32[3]; + + return (ipv4 & mask) == ipv4; + } } - /* This actually happens with ipv6-mapped-ipv4-addresses - * IPv6 listen sockets will be asked to validate ipv4 packets. - */ return false; } static bool tcp_authopt_key_match_sk_addr(struct tcp_authopt_key_info *key, const struct sock *addr_sk) { u16 keyaf = key->addr.ss_family; - /* This probably can't happen even with ipv4-mapped-ipv6 */ - if (keyaf != addr_sk->sk_family) - return false; - if (keyaf == AF_INET) { struct sockaddr_in *key_addr = (struct sockaddr_in *)&key->addr; __be32 mask = inet_make_mask(key->prefixlen); return (addr_sk->sk_daddr & mask) == key_addr->sin_addr.s_addr; @@ -330,10 +333,16 @@ static bool tcp_authopt_key_match_sk_addr(struct tcp_authopt_key_info *key, struct sockaddr_in6 *key_addr = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)&key->addr; return ipv6_prefix_equal(&addr_sk->sk_v6_daddr, &key_addr->sin6_addr, key->prefixlen); + } else if (keyaf == AF_INET6 && addr_sk->sk_family == AF_INET) { + struct sockaddr_in6 *key_addr = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)&key->addr; + __be32 mask = inet_make_mask(key->prefixlen); + __be32 ipv4 = key_addr->sin6_addr.s6_addr32[3]; + + return (addr_sk->sk_daddr & mask) == ipv4; #endif } return false; } @@ -1399,14 +1408,20 @@ static int __tcp_authopt_calc_mac(struct sock *sk, char *macbuf) { struct tcp_authopt_alg_pool *mac_pool; u8 traffic_key[TCP_AUTHOPT_MAX_TRAFFIC_KEY_LEN]; int err; - bool ipv6 = (sk->sk_family != AF_INET); + bool ipv6; - if (sk->sk_family != AF_INET && sk->sk_family != AF_INET6) - return -EINVAL; +#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6) + if (input) + ipv6 = (skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IPV6)); + else + ipv6 = (sk->sk_family == AF_INET6) && !ipv6_addr_v4mapped(&sk->sk_v6_daddr); +#else + ipv6 = false; +#endif err = tcp_authopt_get_traffic_key(sk, skb, key, info, input, ipv6, traffic_key); if (err) return err; From patchwork Thu Aug 18 19:59:52 2022 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Leonard Crestez X-Patchwork-Id: 598236 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 7D41BC3F6B0 for ; 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Thu, 18 Aug 2022 13:00:49 -0700 (PDT) From: Leonard Crestez To: David Ahern , Eric Dumazet , Philip Paeps Cc: Dmitry Safonov <0x7f454c46@gmail.com>, Shuah Khan , "David S. Miller" , Herbert Xu , Kuniyuki Iwashima , Hideaki YOSHIFUJI , Jakub Kicinski , Yuchung Cheng , Francesco Ruggeri , Mat Martineau , Christoph Paasch , Ivan Delalande , Caowangbao , Priyaranjan Jha , netdev@vger.kernel.org, linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org, linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Subject: [PATCH v7 18/26] tcp: authopt: Add /proc/net/tcp_authopt listing all keys Date: Thu, 18 Aug 2022 22:59:52 +0300 Message-Id: <07670e63c786e9e46ba52aaecb81ad7e1418767e.1660852705.git.cdleonard@gmail.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.25.1 In-Reply-To: References: MIME-Version: 1.0 Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org This provides a very brief summary of all keys for debugging purposes. Signed-off-by: Leonard Crestez --- Documentation/networking/tcp_authopt.rst | 10 +++ net/ipv4/tcp_authopt.c | 102 ++++++++++++++++++++++- 2 files changed, 111 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/Documentation/networking/tcp_authopt.rst b/Documentation/networking/tcp_authopt.rst index 6520c6d02755..eaf389f99139 100644 --- a/Documentation/networking/tcp_authopt.rst +++ b/Documentation/networking/tcp_authopt.rst @@ -69,10 +69,20 @@ The rnextkeyid value sent on the wire is usually the recv_id of the current key used for sending. If the TCP_AUTHOPT_LOCK_RNEXTKEY flag is set in `tcp_authopt.flags` the value of `tcp_authopt.send_rnextkeyid` is send instead. This can be used to implement smooth rollover: the peer will switch its keyid to the received rnextkeyid when it is available. +Proc interface +-------------- + +The ``/proc/net/tcp_authopt`` file contains a tab-separated table of keys. The +first line contains column names. The number of columns might increase in the +future if more matching criteria are added. Here is an example of the table:: + + flags send_id recv_id alg addr l3index + 0x44 0 0 1 10.10.2.2/31 0 + ABI Reference ============= .. kernel-doc:: include/uapi/linux/tcp.h :identifiers: tcp_authopt tcp_authopt_flag tcp_authopt_key tcp_authopt_key_flag tcp_authopt_alg diff --git a/net/ipv4/tcp_authopt.c b/net/ipv4/tcp_authopt.c index 06f8df1d80c9..0a273ad239ec 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/tcp_authopt.c +++ b/net/ipv4/tcp_authopt.c @@ -5,10 +5,11 @@ #include #include #include #include #include +#include /* This is mainly intended to protect against local privilege escalations through * a rarely used feature so it is deliberately not namespaced. */ int sysctl_tcp_authopt; @@ -1731,26 +1732,125 @@ int __tcp_authopt_inbound_check(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb, return 1; } EXPORT_SYMBOL(__tcp_authopt_inbound_check); +#ifdef CONFIG_PROC_FS +struct tcp_authopt_iter_state { + struct seq_net_private p; +}; + +static struct tcp_authopt_key_info *tcp_authopt_get_key_index(struct netns_tcp_authopt *net, + int index) +{ + struct tcp_authopt_key_info *key; + + hlist_for_each_entry(key, &net->head, node) { + if (--index < 0) + return key; + } + + return NULL; +} + +static void *tcp_authopt_seq_start(struct seq_file *seq, loff_t *pos) + __acquires(RCU) +{ + struct netns_tcp_authopt *net = &seq_file_net(seq)->tcp_authopt; + + rcu_read_lock(); + if (*pos == 0) + return SEQ_START_TOKEN; + else + return tcp_authopt_get_key_index(net, *pos - 1); +} + +static void tcp_authopt_seq_stop(struct seq_file *seq, void *v) + __releases(RCU) +{ + rcu_read_unlock(); +} + +static void *tcp_authopt_seq_next(struct seq_file *seq, void *v, loff_t *pos) +{ + struct netns_tcp_authopt *net = &seq_file_net(seq)->tcp_authopt; + void *ret; + + ret = tcp_authopt_get_key_index(net, *pos); + ++*pos; + + return ret; +} + +static int tcp_authopt_seq_show(struct seq_file *seq, void *v) +{ + struct tcp_authopt_key_info *key = v; + + /* FIXME: Document somewhere */ + /* Key is deliberately inaccessible */ + if (v == SEQ_START_TOKEN) { + seq_puts(seq, "flags\tsend_id\trecv_id\talg\taddr\tl3index\n"); + return 0; + } + + seq_printf(seq, "0x%x\t%d\t%d\t%d", + key->flags, key->send_id, key->recv_id, (int)key->alg_id); + if (key->flags & TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_ADDR_BIND) { + if (key->addr.ss_family == AF_INET6) + seq_printf(seq, "\t%pI6", &((struct sockaddr_in6 *)&key->addr)->sin6_addr); + else + seq_printf(seq, "\t%pI4", &((struct sockaddr_in *)&key->addr)->sin_addr); + if (key->flags & TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_PREFIXLEN) + seq_printf(seq, "/%d", key->prefixlen); + } else { + seq_puts(seq, "\t*"); + } + seq_printf(seq, "\t%d", key->l3index); + seq_puts(seq, "\n"); + + return 0; +} + +static const struct seq_operations tcp_authopt_seq_ops = { + .start = tcp_authopt_seq_start, + .next = tcp_authopt_seq_next, + .stop = tcp_authopt_seq_stop, + .show = tcp_authopt_seq_show, +}; +#endif /* CONFIG_PROC_FS */ + +static int __net_init tcp_authopt_proc_init_net(struct net *net) +{ + if (!proc_create_net("tcp_authopt", 0400, net->proc_net, + &tcp_authopt_seq_ops, + sizeof(struct tcp_authopt_iter_state))) + return -ENOMEM; + return 0; +} + +static void __net_exit tcp_authopt_proc_exit_net(struct net *net) +{ + remove_proc_entry("tcp_authopt", net->proc_net); +} + static int tcp_authopt_init_net(struct net *full_net) { struct netns_tcp_authopt *net = &full_net->tcp_authopt; mutex_init(&net->mutex); INIT_HLIST_HEAD(&net->head); - return 0; + return tcp_authopt_proc_init_net(full_net); } static void tcp_authopt_exit_net(struct net *full_net) { struct netns_tcp_authopt *net = &full_net->tcp_authopt; struct tcp_authopt_key_info *key; struct hlist_node *n; + tcp_authopt_proc_exit_net(full_net); mutex_lock(&net->mutex); hlist_for_each_entry_safe(key, n, &net->head, node) { hlist_del_rcu(&key->node); tcp_authopt_key_put(key); From patchwork Thu Aug 18 19:59:53 2022 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Leonard Crestez X-Patchwork-Id: 598935 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id B5693C3F6B0 for ; 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Thu, 18 Aug 2022 13:00:51 -0700 (PDT) From: Leonard Crestez To: David Ahern , Eric Dumazet , Philip Paeps Cc: Dmitry Safonov <0x7f454c46@gmail.com>, Shuah Khan , "David S. Miller" , Herbert Xu , Kuniyuki Iwashima , Hideaki YOSHIFUJI , Jakub Kicinski , Yuchung Cheng , Francesco Ruggeri , Mat Martineau , Christoph Paasch , Ivan Delalande , Caowangbao , Priyaranjan Jha , netdev@vger.kernel.org, linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org, linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Subject: [PATCH v7 19/26] selftests: nettest: Rename md5_prefix to key_addr_prefix Date: Thu, 18 Aug 2022 22:59:53 +0300 Message-Id: <5a4ba7da8e1f28997e5bc46a83a862e2f4084f1d.1660852705.git.cdleonard@gmail.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.25.1 In-Reply-To: References: MIME-Version: 1.0 Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org This is in preparation for reusing the same option for TCP-AO Reviewed-by: David Ahern Signed-off-by: Leonard Crestez --- tools/testing/selftests/net/nettest.c | 50 +++++++++++++-------------- 1 file changed, 25 insertions(+), 25 deletions(-) diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/net/nettest.c b/tools/testing/selftests/net/nettest.c index d9a6fd2cd9d3..3841e5fec7c7 100644 --- a/tools/testing/selftests/net/nettest.c +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/net/nettest.c @@ -94,17 +94,17 @@ struct sock_args { const char *clientns; const char *serverns; const char *password; const char *client_pw; - /* prefix for MD5 password */ - const char *md5_prefix_str; + /* prefix for MD5/AO*/ + const char *key_addr_prefix_str; union { struct sockaddr_in v4; struct sockaddr_in6 v6; - } md5_prefix; - unsigned int prefix_len; + } key_addr; + unsigned int key_addr_prefix_len; /* 0: default, -1: force off, +1: force on */ int bind_key_ifindex; /* expected addresses and device index for connection */ const char *expected_dev; @@ -264,16 +264,16 @@ static int tcp_md5sig(int sd, void *addr, socklen_t alen, struct sock_args *args int rc; md5sig.tcpm_keylen = keylen; memcpy(md5sig.tcpm_key, args->password, keylen); - if (args->prefix_len) { + if (args->key_addr_prefix_len) { opt = TCP_MD5SIG_EXT; md5sig.tcpm_flags |= TCP_MD5SIG_FLAG_PREFIX; - md5sig.tcpm_prefixlen = args->prefix_len; - addr = &args->md5_prefix; + md5sig.tcpm_prefixlen = args->key_addr_prefix_len; + addr = &args->key_addr; } memcpy(&md5sig.tcpm_addr, addr, alen); if ((args->ifindex && args->bind_key_ifindex >= 0) || args->bind_key_ifindex >= 1) { opt = TCP_MD5SIG_EXT; @@ -309,17 +309,17 @@ static int tcp_md5_remote(int sd, struct sock_args *args) int alen; switch (args->version) { case AF_INET: sin.sin_port = htons(args->port); - sin.sin_addr = args->md5_prefix.v4.sin_addr; + sin.sin_addr = args->key_addr.v4.sin_addr; addr = &sin; alen = sizeof(sin); break; case AF_INET6: sin6.sin6_port = htons(args->port); - sin6.sin6_addr = args->md5_prefix.v6.sin6_addr; + sin6.sin6_addr = args->key_addr.v6.sin6_addr; addr = &sin6; alen = sizeof(sin6); break; default: log_error("unknown address family\n"); @@ -705,11 +705,11 @@ enum addr_type { ADDR_TYPE_LOCAL, ADDR_TYPE_REMOTE, ADDR_TYPE_MCAST, ADDR_TYPE_EXPECTED_LOCAL, ADDR_TYPE_EXPECTED_REMOTE, - ADDR_TYPE_MD5_PREFIX, + ADDR_TYPE_KEY_PREFIX, }; static int convert_addr(struct sock_args *args, const char *_str, enum addr_type atype) { @@ -745,32 +745,32 @@ static int convert_addr(struct sock_args *args, const char *_str, break; case ADDR_TYPE_EXPECTED_REMOTE: desc = "expected remote"; addr = &args->expected_raddr; break; - case ADDR_TYPE_MD5_PREFIX: - desc = "md5 prefix"; + case ADDR_TYPE_KEY_PREFIX: + desc = "key addr prefix"; if (family == AF_INET) { - args->md5_prefix.v4.sin_family = AF_INET; - addr = &args->md5_prefix.v4.sin_addr; + args->key_addr.v4.sin_family = AF_INET; + addr = &args->key_addr.v4.sin_addr; } else if (family == AF_INET6) { - args->md5_prefix.v6.sin6_family = AF_INET6; - addr = &args->md5_prefix.v6.sin6_addr; + args->key_addr.v6.sin6_family = AF_INET6; + addr = &args->key_addr.v6.sin6_addr; } else return 1; sep = strchr(str, '/'); if (sep) { *sep = '\0'; sep++; if (str_to_uint(sep, 1, pfx_len_max, - &args->prefix_len) != 0) { - fprintf(stderr, "Invalid port\n"); + &args->key_addr_prefix_len) != 0) { + fprintf(stderr, "Invalid prefix\n"); return 1; } } else { - args->prefix_len = 0; + args->key_addr_prefix_len = 0; } break; default: log_error("unknown address type\n"); exit(1); @@ -835,13 +835,13 @@ static int validate_addresses(struct sock_args *args) if (args->remote_addr_str && convert_addr(args, args->remote_addr_str, ADDR_TYPE_REMOTE) < 0) return 1; - if (args->md5_prefix_str && - convert_addr(args, args->md5_prefix_str, - ADDR_TYPE_MD5_PREFIX) < 0) + if (args->key_addr_prefix_str && + convert_addr(args, args->key_addr_prefix_str, + ADDR_TYPE_KEY_PREFIX) < 0) return 1; if (args->expected_laddr_str && convert_addr(args, args->expected_laddr_str, ADDR_TYPE_EXPECTED_LOCAL)) @@ -2020,11 +2020,11 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[]) break; case 'X': args.client_pw = optarg; break; case 'm': - args.md5_prefix_str = optarg; + args.key_addr_prefix_str = optarg; break; case 'S': args.use_setsockopt = 1; break; case 'f': @@ -2079,17 +2079,17 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[]) return 1; } } if (args.password && - ((!args.has_remote_ip && !args.md5_prefix_str) || + ((!args.has_remote_ip && !args.key_addr_prefix_str) || args.type != SOCK_STREAM)) { log_error("MD5 passwords apply to TCP only and require a remote ip for the password\n"); return 1; } - if (args.md5_prefix_str && !args.password) { + if (args.key_addr_prefix_str && !args.password) { log_error("Prefix range for MD5 protection specified without a password\n"); return 1; } if (iter == 0) { From patchwork Thu Aug 18 19:59:54 2022 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Leonard Crestez X-Patchwork-Id: 598235 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 2ED7EC32772 for ; Thu, 18 Aug 2022 20:03:17 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1345107AbiHRUDO (ORCPT ); Thu, 18 Aug 2022 16:03:14 -0400 Received: from lindbergh.monkeyblade.net ([23.128.96.19]:57326 "EHLO lindbergh.monkeyblade.net" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1345830AbiHRUCY (ORCPT ); Thu, 18 Aug 2022 16:02:24 -0400 Received: from mail-ej1-x62f.google.com (mail-ej1-x62f.google.com [IPv6:2a00:1450:4864:20::62f]) by lindbergh.monkeyblade.net (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 75DCAD1E16; 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Miller" , Herbert Xu , Kuniyuki Iwashima , Hideaki YOSHIFUJI , Jakub Kicinski , Yuchung Cheng , Francesco Ruggeri , Mat Martineau , Christoph Paasch , Ivan Delalande , Caowangbao , Priyaranjan Jha , netdev@vger.kernel.org, linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org, linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Subject: [PATCH v7 20/26] selftests: nettest: Initial tcp_authopt support Date: Thu, 18 Aug 2022 22:59:54 +0300 Message-Id: <9f9cbf15ca0651ccc177080434739e15cea4c47a.1660852705.git.cdleonard@gmail.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.25.1 In-Reply-To: References: MIME-Version: 1.0 Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org Add support for configuring TCP Authentication Option. Only a single key is supported with default options. Reviewed-by: David Ahern Signed-off-by: Leonard Crestez --- tools/testing/selftests/net/nettest.c | 156 ++++++++++++++++++++++++-- 1 file changed, 145 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-) diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/net/nettest.c b/tools/testing/selftests/net/nettest.c index 3841e5fec7c7..9615489230f8 100644 --- a/tools/testing/selftests/net/nettest.c +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/net/nettest.c @@ -27,10 +27,11 @@ #include #include #include #include #include +#include #include #include #include @@ -104,10 +105,12 @@ struct sock_args { } key_addr; unsigned int key_addr_prefix_len; /* 0: default, -1: force off, +1: force on */ int bind_key_ifindex; + const char *authopt_password; + /* expected addresses and device index for connection */ const char *expected_dev; const char *expected_server_dev; int expected_ifindex; @@ -254,10 +257,75 @@ static int switch_ns(const char *ns) close(fd); return ret; } +/* Fill key identification fields: address and ifindex */ +static void tcp_authopt_key_fill_id(struct tcp_authopt_key *key, struct sock_args *args) +{ + if (args->key_addr_prefix_str) { + key->flags |= TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_ADDR_BIND; + switch (args->version) { + case AF_INET: + memcpy(&key->addr, &args->key_addr.v4, sizeof(args->key_addr.v4)); + break; + case AF_INET6: + memcpy(&key->addr, &args->key_addr.v6, sizeof(args->key_addr.v6)); + break; + default: + log_error("unknown address family\n"); + exit(1); + } + if (args->key_addr_prefix_len) { + key->flags |= TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_PREFIXLEN; + key->prefixlen = args->key_addr_prefix_len; + } + } + + if ((args->ifindex && args->bind_key_ifindex >= 0) || args->bind_key_ifindex >= 1) { + key->flags |= TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_IFINDEX; + key->ifindex = args->ifindex; + log_msg("TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_IFINDEX set ifindex=%d\n", key->ifindex); + } else { + log_msg("TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_IFINDEX off\n", key->ifindex); + } +} + +static int tcp_del_authopt(int sd, struct sock_args *args) +{ + struct tcp_authopt_key key; + int rc; + + memset(&key, 0, sizeof(key)); + key.flags |= TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_DEL; + tcp_authopt_key_fill_id(&key, args); + + rc = setsockopt(sd, IPPROTO_TCP, TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY, &key, sizeof(key)); + if (rc < 0) + log_err_errno("setsockopt(TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY) del fail"); + + return rc; +} + +static int tcp_set_authopt(int sd, struct sock_args *args) +{ + struct tcp_authopt_key key; + int rc; + + memset(&key, 0, sizeof(key)); + strcpy((char *)key.key, args->authopt_password); + key.keylen = strlen(args->authopt_password); + key.alg = TCP_AUTHOPT_ALG_HMAC_SHA_1_96; + tcp_authopt_key_fill_id(&key, args); + + rc = setsockopt(sd, IPPROTO_TCP, TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY, &key, sizeof(key)); + if (rc < 0) + log_err_errno("setsockopt(TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY) add fail"); + + return rc; +} + static int tcp_md5sig(int sd, void *addr, socklen_t alen, struct sock_args *args) { int keylen = strlen(args->password); struct tcp_md5sig md5sig = {}; int opt = TCP_MD5SIG; @@ -1541,10 +1609,15 @@ static int do_server(struct sock_args *args, int ipc_fd) if (args->password && tcp_md5_remote(lsd, args)) { close(lsd); goto err_exit; } + if (args->authopt_password && tcp_set_authopt(lsd, args)) { + close(lsd); + goto err_exit; + } + ipc_write(ipc_fd, 1); while (1) { log_msg("waiting for client connection.\n"); FD_ZERO(&rfds); FD_SET(lsd, &rfds); @@ -1663,10 +1736,13 @@ static int connectsock(void *addr, socklen_t alen, struct sock_args *args) goto out; if (args->password && tcp_md5sig(sd, addr, alen, args)) goto err; + if (args->authopt_password && tcp_set_authopt(sd, args)) + goto err; + if (args->bind_test_only) goto out; if (connect(sd, addr, alen) < 0) { if (errno != EINPROGRESS) { @@ -1852,11 +1928,11 @@ static int ipc_parent(int cpid, int fd, struct sock_args *args) wait(&status); return client_status; } -#define GETOPT_STR "sr:l:c:p:t:g:P:DRn:M:X:m:d:I:BN:O:SCi6xL:0:1:2:3:Fbqf" +#define GETOPT_STR "sr:l:c:p:t:g:P:DRn:M:X:m:A:d:I:BN:O:SCi6xL:0:1:2:3:Fbqf" #define OPT_FORCE_BIND_KEY_IFINDEX 1001 #define OPT_NO_BIND_KEY_IFINDEX 1002 static struct option long_opts[] = { {"force-bind-key-ifindex", 0, 0, OPT_FORCE_BIND_KEY_IFINDEX}, @@ -1897,14 +1973,15 @@ static void print_usage(char *prog) " -L len send random message of given length\n" " -n num number of times to send message\n" "\n" " -M password use MD5 sum protection\n" " -X password MD5 password for client mode\n" - " -m prefix/len prefix and length to use for MD5 key\n" - " --no-bind-key-ifindex: Force TCP_MD5SIG_FLAG_IFINDEX off\n" - " --force-bind-key-ifindex: Force TCP_MD5SIG_FLAG_IFINDEX on\n" + " -m prefix/len prefix and length to use for MD5/AO key\n" + " --no-bind-key-ifindex: Force disable binding key to ifindex\n" + " --force-bind-key-ifindex: Force enable binding key to ifindex\n" " (default: only if -I is passed)\n" + " -A password use RFC5925 TCP Authentication Option with password\n" "\n" " -g grp multicast group (e.g., 239.1.1.1)\n" " -i interactive mode (default is echo and terminate)\n" "\n" " -0 addr Expected local address\n" @@ -1915,17 +1992,64 @@ static void print_usage(char *prog) " -b Bind test only.\n" " -q Be quiet. Run test without printing anything.\n" , prog, DEFAULT_PORT); } -int main(int argc, char *argv[]) +/* Needs explicit cleanup because keys are global per-namespace */ +void cleanup_tcp_authopt(struct sock_args *args) +{ + int fd; + + if (!args->authopt_password) + return; + + fd = socket(AF_INET, SOCK_STREAM, 0); + if (fd < 0) { + log_err_errno("Failed to create socket"); + return; + } + tcp_del_authopt(fd, args); + close(fd); +} + +static bool cleanup_done; +static struct sock_args args = { + .version = AF_INET, + .type = SOCK_STREAM, + .port = DEFAULT_PORT, +}; + +void cleanup(void) +{ + if (cleanup_done) + return; + cleanup_done = true; + cleanup_tcp_authopt(&args); +} + +void signal_handler(int num) +{ + cleanup(); +} + +void atexit_handler(void) +{ + cleanup(); +} + +/* Explicit cleanup is required for TCP-AO because keys are global. */ +static void register_cleanup(void) { - struct sock_args args = { - .version = AF_INET, - .type = SOCK_STREAM, - .port = DEFAULT_PORT, + struct sigaction sa = { + .sa_handler = signal_handler, }; + sigaction(SIGINT, &sa, NULL); + atexit(atexit_handler); +} + +int main(int argc, char *argv[]) +{ struct protoent *pe; int both_mode = 0; unsigned int tmp; int forever = 0; int fd[2]; @@ -2022,10 +2146,13 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[]) args.client_pw = optarg; break; case 'm': args.key_addr_prefix_str = optarg; break; + case 'A': + args.authopt_password = optarg; + break; case 'S': args.use_setsockopt = 1; break; case 'f': args.use_freebind = 1; @@ -2085,12 +2212,17 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[]) args.type != SOCK_STREAM)) { log_error("MD5 passwords apply to TCP only and require a remote ip for the password\n"); return 1; } - if (args.key_addr_prefix_str && !args.password) { - log_error("Prefix range for MD5 protection specified without a password\n"); + if (args.key_addr_prefix_str && !args.password && !args.authopt_password) { + log_error("Prefix range for authentication requires -M or -A\n"); + return 1; + } + + if (args.key_addr_prefix_len && args.authopt_password) { + log_error("TCP-AO does not support prefix match, only full address\n"); return 1; } if (iter == 0) { fprintf(stderr, "Invalid number of messages to send\n"); @@ -2113,10 +2245,12 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[]) fprintf(stderr, "Local (server mode) or remote IP (client IP) required\n"); return 1; } + register_cleanup(); + if (interactive) { prog_timeout = 0; msg = NULL; } From patchwork Thu Aug 18 19:59:55 2022 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Leonard Crestez X-Patchwork-Id: 598934 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 85F33C00140 for ; Thu, 18 Aug 2022 20:04:17 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1345831AbiHRUEQ (ORCPT ); Thu, 18 Aug 2022 16:04:16 -0400 Received: from lindbergh.monkeyblade.net ([23.128.96.19]:55358 "EHLO lindbergh.monkeyblade.net" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1345847AbiHRUCe (ORCPT ); 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Thu, 18 Aug 2022 13:00:55 -0700 (PDT) From: Leonard Crestez To: David Ahern , Eric Dumazet , Philip Paeps Cc: Dmitry Safonov <0x7f454c46@gmail.com>, Shuah Khan , "David S. Miller" , Herbert Xu , Kuniyuki Iwashima , Hideaki YOSHIFUJI , Jakub Kicinski , Yuchung Cheng , Francesco Ruggeri , Mat Martineau , Christoph Paasch , Ivan Delalande , Caowangbao , Priyaranjan Jha , netdev@vger.kernel.org, linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org, linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Subject: [PATCH v7 21/26] selftests: net/fcnal: Initial tcp_authopt support Date: Thu, 18 Aug 2022 22:59:55 +0300 Message-Id: X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.25.1 In-Reply-To: References: MIME-Version: 1.0 Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org Tests are mostly copied from tcp_md5 with minor changes. It covers VRF support but only based on binding multiple servers: not multiple keys bound to different interfaces. Also add a specific -t tcp_authopt to run only these tests specifically. Signed-off-by: Leonard Crestez --- tools/testing/selftests/net/fcnal-test.sh | 329 +++++++++++++++++++++- 1 file changed, 327 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/net/fcnal-test.sh b/tools/testing/selftests/net/fcnal-test.sh index 03b586760164..6b443aa0d89e 100755 --- a/tools/testing/selftests/net/fcnal-test.sh +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/net/fcnal-test.sh @@ -830,10 +830,330 @@ ipv4_ping() } ################################################################################ # IPv4 TCP +# +# TCP Authentication Option Tests +# + +# try to enable tcp_authopt sysctl +enable_tcp_authopt() +{ + if [[ -e /proc/sys/net/ipv4/tcp_authopt ]]; then + sysctl -w net.ipv4.tcp_authopt=1 + fi +} + +# check if tcp_authopt is compiled with a client-side bind test +has_tcp_authopt() +{ + run_cmd_nsb nettest -b -A ${MD5_PW} -r ${NSA_IP} +} + +# Verify /proc/net/tcp_authopt is empty in all namespaces +check_tcp_authopt_key_leak() +{ + local ns cnt + + for ns in $NSA $NSB $NSC; do + if ! ip netns list | grep -q $ns; then + continue + fi + cnt=$(ip netns exec "$ns" cat /proc/net/tcp_authopt | wc -l) + if [[ $cnt != 1 ]]; then + echo "FAIL: leaked tcp_authopt keys in netns $ns" + ip netns exec $ns cat /proc/net/tcp_authopt + return 1 + fi + done +} + +log_check_tcp_authopt_key_leak() +{ + check_tcp_authopt_key_leak + log_test $? 0 "TCP-AO: Key leak check" +} + +ipv4_tcp_authopt_novrf() +{ + enable_tcp_authopt + if ! has_tcp_authopt; then + echo "TCP-AO appears to be missing, skip" + return 0 + fi + + log_start + run_cmd nettest -s -A ${MD5_PW} -m ${NSB_IP} & + sleep 1 + run_cmd_nsb nettest -r ${NSA_IP} -A ${MD5_PW} + log_test $? 0 "AO: Single address config" + + log_start + run_cmd nettest -s & + sleep 1 + run_cmd_nsb nettest -r ${NSA_IP} -A ${MD5_PW} + log_test $? 2 "AO: Server no config, client uses password" + + log_start + run_cmd nettest -s -A ${MD5_PW} -m ${NSB_IP} & + sleep 1 + run_cmd_nsb nettest -r ${NSA_IP} -A ${MD5_WRONG_PW} + log_test $? 2 "AO: Client uses wrong password" + log_check_tcp_authopt_key_leak + + log_start + run_cmd nettest -s -A ${MD5_PW} -m ${NSB_LO_IP} & + sleep 1 + run_cmd_nsb nettest -r ${NSA_IP} -A ${MD5_PW} + log_test $? 2 "AO: Client address does not match address configured on server" + log_check_tcp_authopt_key_leak + + # client in prefix + log_start + run_cmd nettest -s -A ${MD5_PW} -m ${NS_NET} & + sleep 1 + run_cmd_nsb nettest -r ${NSA_IP} -A ${MD5_PW} + log_test $? 0 "AO: Prefix config" + + # client in prefix, wrong password + log_start + show_hint "Should timeout since client uses wrong password" + run_cmd nettest -s -A ${MD5_PW} -m ${NS_NET} & + sleep 1 + run_cmd_nsb nettest -r ${NSA_IP} -A ${MD5_WRONG_PW} + log_test $? 2 "AO: Prefix config, client uses wrong password" + log_check_tcp_authopt_key_leak + + # client outside of prefix + log_start + show_hint "Should timeout due to MD5 mismatch" + run_cmd nettest -s -A ${MD5_PW} -m ${NS_NET} & + sleep 1 + run_cmd_nsb nettest -c ${NSB_LO_IP} -r ${NSA_IP} -A ${MD5_PW} + log_test $? 2 "AO: Prefix config, client address not in configured prefix" + log_check_tcp_authopt_key_leak +} + +ipv6_tcp_authopt_novrf() +{ + enable_tcp_authopt + if ! has_tcp_authopt; then + echo "TCP-AO appears to be missing, skip" + return 0 + fi + + log_start + run_cmd nettest -6 -s -A ${MD5_PW} & + sleep 1 + run_cmd_nsb nettest -6 -r ${NSA_IP6} -A ${MD5_PW} + log_test $? 0 "AO: Simple correct config" + + log_start + run_cmd nettest -6 -s + sleep 1 + run_cmd_nsb nettest -6 -r ${NSA_IP6} -A ${MD5_PW} + log_test $? 2 "AO: Server no config, client uses password" + + log_start + run_cmd nettest -6 -s -A ${MD5_PW} -m ${NSB_IP6} & + sleep 1 + run_cmd_nsb nettest -6 -r ${NSA_IP6} -A ${MD5_WRONG_PW} + log_test $? 2 "AO: Client uses wrong password" + + log_start + run_cmd nettest -6 -s -A ${MD5_PW} -m ${NSB_LO_IP6} & + sleep 1 + run_cmd_nsb nettest -6 -r ${NSA_IP6} -A ${MD5_PW} + log_test $? 2 "AO: Client address does not match address configured on server" +} + +ipv4_tcp_authopt_vrf() +{ + enable_tcp_authopt + if ! has_tcp_authopt; then + echo "TCP-AO appears to be missing, skip" + return 0 + fi + + log_start + run_cmd nettest -s -I ${VRF} -A ${MD5_PW} & + sleep 1 + run_cmd_nsb nettest -r ${NSA_IP} -A ${MD5_PW} + log_test $? 0 "AO: VRF: Simple config" + + # + # duplicate config between default VRF and a VRF + # + + log_start + run_cmd nettest -s -I ${VRF} -A ${MD5_PW} -m ${NSB_IP} & + run_cmd nettest -s -A ${MD5_WRONG_PW} -m ${NSB_IP} & + sleep 1 + run_cmd_nsb nettest -r ${NSA_IP} -A ${MD5_PW} + log_test $? 0 "AO: VRF: Servers in default VRF and VRF, client in VRF" + + log_start + run_cmd nettest -s -I ${VRF} -A ${MD5_PW} -m ${NSB_IP} & + run_cmd nettest -s -A ${MD5_WRONG_PW} -m ${NSB_IP} & + sleep 1 + run_cmd_nsc nettest -r ${NSA_IP} -A ${MD5_WRONG_PW} + log_test $? 0 "AO: VRF: Servers in default VRF and VRF, client in default VRF" + + log_start + show_hint "Should timeout since client in default VRF uses VRF password" + run_cmd nettest -s -I ${VRF} -A ${MD5_PW} -m ${NSB_IP} & + run_cmd nettest -s -A ${MD5_WRONG_PW} -m ${NSB_IP} & + sleep 1 + run_cmd_nsc nettest -r ${NSA_IP} -A ${MD5_PW} + log_test $? 2 "AO: VRF: Servers in default VRF and VRF, conn in default VRF with VRF pw" + + log_start + show_hint "Should timeout since client in VRF uses default VRF password" + run_cmd nettest -s -I ${VRF} -A ${MD5_PW} -m ${NSB_IP} & + run_cmd nettest -s -A ${MD5_WRONG_PW} -m ${NSB_IP} & + sleep 1 + run_cmd_nsb nettest -r ${NSA_IP} -A ${MD5_WRONG_PW} + log_test $? 2 "AO: VRF: Servers in default VRF and VRF, conn in VRF with default VRF pw" + + test_ipv4_tcp_authopt_vrf__global_server__bind_ifindex0 +} + +test_ipv4_tcp_authopt_vrf__global_server__bind_ifindex0() +{ + # This particular test needs tcp_l3mdev_accept=1 for Global server to accept VRF connections + local old_tcp_l3mdev_accept + old_tcp_l3mdev_accept=$(get_sysctl net.ipv4.tcp_l3mdev_accept) + set_sysctl net.ipv4.tcp_l3mdev_accept=1 + + log_start + run_cmd nettest -s -A ${MD5_PW} --force-bind-key-ifindex & + sleep 1 + run_cmd_nsb nettest -r ${NSA_IP} -A ${MD5_PW} + log_test $? 2 "AO: VRF: Global server, Key bound to ifindex=0 rejects VRF connection" + + log_start + run_cmd nettest -s -A ${MD5_PW} --force-bind-key-ifindex & + sleep 1 + run_cmd_nsc nettest -r ${NSA_IP} -A ${MD5_PW} + log_test $? 0 "AO: VRF: Global server, key bound to ifindex=0 accepts non-VRF connection" + log_start + + run_cmd nettest -s -A ${MD5_PW} --no-bind-key-ifindex & + sleep 1 + run_cmd_nsb nettest -r ${NSA_IP} -A ${MD5_PW} + log_test $? 0 "AO: VRF: Global server, key not bound to ifindex accepts VRF connection" + + log_start + run_cmd nettest -s -A ${MD5_PW} --no-bind-key-ifindex & + sleep 1 + run_cmd_nsc nettest -r ${NSA_IP} -A ${MD5_PW} + log_test $? 0 "AO: VRF: Global server, key not bound to ifindex accepts non-VRF connection" + + # restore value + set_sysctl net.ipv4.tcp_l3mdev_accept="$old_tcp_l3mdev_accept" +} + +ipv6_tcp_authopt_vrf() +{ + enable_tcp_authopt + if ! has_tcp_authopt; then + echo "TCP-AO appears to be missing, skip" + return 0 + fi + + log_start + run_cmd nettest -6 -s -I ${VRF} -A ${MD5_PW} & + sleep 1 + run_cmd_nsb nettest -6 -r ${NSA_IP6} -A ${MD5_PW} + log_test $? 0 "AO: VRF: Simple config" + + # + # duplicate config between default VRF and a VRF + # + + log_start + run_cmd nettest -6 -s -I ${VRF} -A ${MD5_PW} -m ${NSB_IP6} & + run_cmd nettest -6 -s -A ${MD5_WRONG_PW} -m ${NSB_IP6} & + sleep 1 + run_cmd_nsb nettest -6 -r ${NSA_IP6} -A ${MD5_PW} + log_test $? 0 "AO: VRF: Servers in default VRF and VRF, client in VRF" + + log_start + run_cmd nettest -6 -s -I ${VRF} -A ${MD5_PW} -m ${NSB_IP6} & + run_cmd nettest -6 -s -A ${MD5_WRONG_PW} -m ${NSB_IP6} & + sleep 1 + run_cmd_nsc nettest -6 -r ${NSA_IP6} -A ${MD5_WRONG_PW} + log_test $? 0 "AO: VRF: Servers in default VRF and VRF, client in default VRF" + + log_start + show_hint "Should timeout since client in default VRF uses VRF password" + run_cmd nettest -6 -s -I ${VRF} -A ${MD5_PW} -m ${NSB_IP6} & + run_cmd nettest -6 -s -A ${MD5_WRONG_PW} -m ${NSB_IP6} & + sleep 1 + run_cmd_nsc nettest -6 -r ${NSA_IP6} -A ${MD5_PW} + log_test $? 2 "AO: VRF: Servers in default VRF and VRF, conn in default VRF with VRF pw" + + log_start + show_hint "Should timeout since client in VRF uses default VRF password" + run_cmd nettest -6 -s -I ${VRF} -A ${MD5_PW} -m ${NSB_IP6} & + run_cmd nettest -6 -s -A ${MD5_WRONG_PW} -m ${NSB_IP6} & + sleep 1 + run_cmd_nsb nettest -6 -r ${NSA_IP6} -A ${MD5_WRONG_PW} + log_test $? 2 "AO: VRF: Servers in default VRF and VRF, conn in VRF with default VRF pw" + + log_start + run_cmd nettest -6 -s -I ${VRF} -A ${MD5_PW} -m ${NS_NET6} & + run_cmd nettest -6 -s -A ${MD5_WRONG_PW} -m ${NS_NET6} & + sleep 1 + run_cmd_nsb nettest -6 -r ${NSA_IP6} -A ${MD5_PW} + log_test $? 0 "AO: VRF: Prefix config in default VRF and VRF, conn in VRF" + + log_start + run_cmd nettest -6 -s -I ${VRF} -A ${MD5_PW} -m ${NS_NET6} & + run_cmd nettest -6 -s -A ${MD5_WRONG_PW} -m ${NS_NET6} & + sleep 1 + run_cmd_nsc nettest -6 -r ${NSA_IP6} -A ${MD5_WRONG_PW} + log_test $? 0 "AO: VRF: Prefix config in default VRF and VRF, conn in default VRF" + + log_start + show_hint "Should timeout since client in default VRF uses VRF password" + run_cmd nettest -6 -s -I ${VRF} -A ${MD5_PW} -m ${NS_NET6} & + run_cmd nettest -6 -s -A ${MD5_WRONG_PW} -m ${NS_NET6} & + sleep 1 + run_cmd_nsc nettest -6 -r ${NSA_IP6} -A ${MD5_PW} + log_test $? 2 "AO: VRF: Prefix config in def VRF and VRF, conn in def VRF with VRF pw" + + log_start + show_hint "Should timeout since client in VRF uses default VRF password" + run_cmd nettest -6 -s -I ${VRF} -A ${MD5_PW} -m ${NS_NET6} & + run_cmd nettest -6 -s -A ${MD5_WRONG_PW} -m ${NS_NET6} & + sleep 1 + run_cmd_nsb nettest -6 -r ${NSA_IP6} -A ${MD5_WRONG_PW} + log_test $? 2 "AO: VRF: Prefix config in dev VRF and VRF, conn in VRF with def VRF pw" +} + +only_tcp_authopt() +{ + log_section "TCP Authentication Option" + + setup + set_sysctl net.ipv4.tcp_l3mdev_accept=0 + log_subsection "TCP-AO IPv4 no VRF" + ipv4_tcp_authopt_novrf + log_subsection "TCP-AO IPv6 no VRF" + ipv6_tcp_authopt_novrf + + setup "yes" + setup_vrf_dup + set_sysctl net.ipv4.tcp_l3mdev_accept=0 + log_subsection "TCP-AO IPv4 VRF" + ipv4_tcp_authopt_vrf + log_subsection "TCP-AO IPv6 VRF" + ipv6_tcp_authopt_vrf +} + # # MD5 tests without VRF # ipv4_tcp_md5_novrf() { @@ -1215,10 +1535,11 @@ ipv4_tcp_novrf() show_hint "Should fail 'Connection refused'" run_cmd nettest -d ${NSA_DEV} -r ${a} log_test_addr ${a} $? 1 "No server, device client, local conn" ipv4_tcp_md5_novrf + ipv4_tcp_authopt_novrf } ipv4_tcp_vrf() { local a @@ -1267,13 +1588,14 @@ ipv4_tcp_vrf() run_cmd nettest -s & sleep 1 run_cmd nettest -r ${a} -d ${NSA_DEV} log_test_addr ${a} $? 1 "Global server, local connection" - # run MD5 tests + # run MD5+AO tests setup_vrf_dup ipv4_tcp_md5 + ipv6_tcp_md5_vrf cleanup_vrf_dup # # enable VRF global server # @@ -2748,10 +3070,11 @@ ipv6_tcp_novrf() run_cmd nettest -6 -d ${NSA_DEV} -r ${a} log_test_addr ${a} $? 1 "No server, device client, local conn" done ipv6_tcp_md5_novrf + ipv6_tcp_authopt_novrf } ipv6_tcp_vrf() { local a @@ -2816,13 +3139,14 @@ ipv6_tcp_vrf() run_cmd nettest -6 -s & sleep 1 run_cmd nettest -6 -r ${a} -d ${NSA_DEV} log_test_addr ${a} $? 1 "Global server, local connection" - # run MD5 tests + # run MD5+AO tests setup_vrf_dup ipv6_tcp_md5 + ipv6_tcp_authopt_vrf cleanup_vrf_dup # # enable VRF global server # @@ -4191,10 +4515,11 @@ do ipv6_bind|bind6) ipv6_addr_bind;; ipv6_runtime) ipv6_runtime;; ipv6_netfilter) ipv6_netfilter;; use_cases) use_cases;; + tcp_authopt) only_tcp_authopt;; # setup namespaces and config, but do not run any tests setup) setup; exit 0;; vrf_setup) setup "yes"; exit 0;; esac From patchwork Thu Aug 18 19:59:56 2022 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Leonard Crestez X-Patchwork-Id: 598234 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 7D1B1C32773 for ; Thu, 18 Aug 2022 20:04:22 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1345874AbiHRUEU (ORCPT ); Thu, 18 Aug 2022 16:04:20 -0400 Received: from lindbergh.monkeyblade.net ([23.128.96.19]:57664 "EHLO lindbergh.monkeyblade.net" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1345854AbiHRUCe (ORCPT ); Thu, 18 Aug 2022 16:02:34 -0400 Received: from mail-ed1-x529.google.com (mail-ed1-x529.google.com [IPv6:2a00:1450:4864:20::529]) by lindbergh.monkeyblade.net (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 83A84D126F; Thu, 18 Aug 2022 13:00:58 -0700 (PDT) Received: by mail-ed1-x529.google.com with SMTP id z20so3182136edb.9; Thu, 18 Aug 2022 13:00:58 -0700 (PDT) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=gmail.com; s=20210112; h=content-transfer-encoding:mime-version:references:in-reply-to :message-id:date:subject:cc:to:from:from:to:cc; bh=YA6frCx1hRCNBxDfW475JeOMBGqfBd7hA2JFkcsGOKA=; b=mkZSNqIYhTtwxHezi9sMuoD5x30JnV73z7lmwKVXbPaUYeZbvchcRPtVnFL48GC3cp +qcb9LQpYjCvJ396qP5v87TF6jtuooEWjGrgxSawRtBDQv4SoIN1JUqF0Rhj858WJYEN aTdTHppTLzZ2OB4F+89mJwSZLULZ616fGHSQ4OWHP3ItDfwYG9bjs5lUbzWUoF9/oc7t brJrtU0PFZol/c4TvEuzaAL4Q/zGld3Ohn4zIBiMLidf6wa+uD5jZpLZK0X2i13C0ZFY J2FGyShNuNYpZ9BbNBkD9/rWZyU+txNRs3l29Hlz9hrKPjJxkCSoVQdksWZssEWZ87Za FCJQ== X-Google-DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=1e100.net; s=20210112; h=content-transfer-encoding:mime-version:references:in-reply-to :message-id:date:subject:cc:to:from:x-gm-message-state:from:to:cc; bh=YA6frCx1hRCNBxDfW475JeOMBGqfBd7hA2JFkcsGOKA=; b=pyvqdx9T94nnT5uURfl2YLn9SwoMjCnjvxqHalmWJYpCKJ4afdNwSoSLkMtykiXHHO pRfKvl3hT4naxdNOyF3easqoKrJwogxnIMeO2PHY4Qp1O3d7H+8zdT0PsYeQTJXpgbOz V3ikX5Bi+NPJiS9T4hNA4FfJaxUYtxz1bJPYqJSUb7K0svfeGd45owTcGL/CvVGEnXLq 05adXv3uR/pQwTYiHzRNE3p8wN0tH70t5svhvNgoelf/9d3k/qenBkLDaquZPvwA5dGc DL6NxdvaXpyUXoh7tLgJmxbFQCeQ3bYVZ6ZxwEo0rpusNH3FchbZU4N75/G5IUsjHxw0 D/CA== X-Gm-Message-State: ACgBeo0e4kNxKTgHiv24A87pCCxgjtUY0TsNJZucymHNer0jyVIX4TJt 53nRzOmaq8guRkSSdL1HMVI= X-Google-Smtp-Source: AA6agR68lPrtwvGaLYpYwAp9y0gV+9Xwu4oXIHhBDoCunekonePkexA0cBl4olfpVWtrspAXfl76EQ== X-Received: by 2002:a05:6402:51ce:b0:43e:74bc:dce with SMTP id r14-20020a05640251ce00b0043e74bc0dcemr3499322edd.225.1660852857863; Thu, 18 Aug 2022 13:00:57 -0700 (PDT) Received: from localhost.localdomain ([2a04:241e:502:a080:17c8:ba1c:b6f3:3fe0]) by smtp.gmail.com with ESMTPSA id fw30-20020a170907501e00b00722e4bab163sm1215087ejc.200.2022.08.18.13.00.56 (version=TLS1_3 cipher=TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 bits=256/256); Thu, 18 Aug 2022 13:00:57 -0700 (PDT) From: Leonard Crestez To: David Ahern , Eric Dumazet , Philip Paeps Cc: Dmitry Safonov <0x7f454c46@gmail.com>, Shuah Khan , "David S. Miller" , Herbert Xu , Kuniyuki Iwashima , Hideaki YOSHIFUJI , Jakub Kicinski , Yuchung Cheng , Francesco Ruggeri , Mat Martineau , Christoph Paasch , Ivan Delalande , Caowangbao , Priyaranjan Jha , netdev@vger.kernel.org, linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org, linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Subject: [PATCH v7 22/26] tcp: authopt: Try to respect rnextkeyid from SYN on SYNACK Date: Thu, 18 Aug 2022 22:59:56 +0300 Message-Id: <4e54cde5124488ca725b4d057d1c3411e5befa1a.1660852705.git.cdleonard@gmail.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.25.1 In-Reply-To: References: MIME-Version: 1.0 Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org According to the RFC we should use the key that the peer suggests via rnextkeyid. This is currently done by storing recv_rnextkeyid in tcp_authopt_info but this does not work for the SYNACK case because the tcp_request_sock does not hold an info pointer for reasons of memory usage. Handle this by storing recv_rnextkeyid inside tcp_request_sock. This doesn't increase the memory usage because there are unused bytes at the end. Signed-off-by: Leonard Crestez --- include/linux/tcp.h | 6 ++++++ net/ipv4/tcp_authopt.c | 26 ++++++++++++++++++++------ net/ipv4/tcp_input.c | 12 ++++++++++++ 3 files changed, 38 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) diff --git a/include/linux/tcp.h b/include/linux/tcp.h index 551942883f06..6a4ff0ed55c6 100644 --- a/include/linux/tcp.h +++ b/include/linux/tcp.h @@ -125,10 +125,13 @@ struct tcp_options_received { u8 saw_unknown:1, /* Received unknown option */ unused:7; u8 num_sacks; /* Number of SACK blocks */ u16 user_mss; /* mss requested by user in ioctl */ u16 mss_clamp; /* Maximal mss, negotiated at connection setup */ +#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_TCP_AUTHOPT) + u8 rnextkeyid; +#endif }; static inline void tcp_clear_options(struct tcp_options_received *rx_opt) { rx_opt->tstamp_ok = rx_opt->sack_ok = 0; @@ -163,10 +166,13 @@ struct tcp_request_sock { u32 rcv_nxt; /* the ack # by SYNACK. For * FastOpen it's the seq# * after data-in-SYN. */ u8 syn_tos; +#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_TCP_AUTHOPT) + u8 recv_rnextkeyid; +#endif }; static inline struct tcp_request_sock *tcp_rsk(const struct request_sock *req) { return (struct tcp_request_sock *)req; diff --git a/net/ipv4/tcp_authopt.c b/net/ipv4/tcp_authopt.c index 0a273ad239ec..de1390273ef3 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/tcp_authopt.c +++ b/net/ipv4/tcp_authopt.c @@ -1,7 +1,9 @@ // SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later +#include "linux/tcp.h" +#include "net/tcp_states.h" #include #include #include #include #include @@ -444,21 +446,33 @@ struct tcp_authopt_key_info *__tcp_authopt_select_key(const struct sock *sk, { struct tcp_authopt_key_info *key, *new_key = NULL; struct netns_tcp_authopt *net = sock_net_tcp_authopt(sk); /* Listen sockets don't refer to any specific connection so we don't try - * to keep using the same key and ignore any received keyids. + * to keep using the same key. + * The rnextkeyid is stored in tcp_request_sock */ if (sk->sk_state == TCP_LISTEN) { - int send_keyid = -1; - + int send_id = -1; + struct tcp_request_sock *rsk; + + if (WARN_ONCE(addr_sk->sk_state != TCP_NEW_SYN_RECV, "bad socket state")) + return NULL; + rsk = tcp_rsk((struct request_sock *)addr_sk); + /* Forcing a specific send_keyid on a listen socket forces it for + * all clients so is unlikely to be useful. + */ if (info->flags & TCP_AUTHOPT_FLAG_LOCK_KEYID) - send_keyid = info->send_keyid; - key = tcp_authopt_lookup_send(net, addr_sk, send_keyid); + send_id = info->send_keyid; + else + send_id = rsk->recv_rnextkeyid; + key = tcp_authopt_lookup_send(net, addr_sk, send_id); + /* If no key found with specific send_id try anything else. */ + if (!key) + key = tcp_authopt_lookup_send(net, addr_sk, -1); if (key) *rnextkeyid = key->recv_id; - return key; } if (locked) { sock_owned_by_me(sk); diff --git a/net/ipv4/tcp_input.c b/net/ipv4/tcp_input.c index d901e27801d1..579562de4551 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/tcp_input.c +++ b/net/ipv4/tcp_input.c @@ -4107,10 +4107,18 @@ void tcp_parse_options(const struct net *net, /* * The MD5 Hash has already been * checked (see tcp_v{4,6}_do_rcv()). */ break; +#endif +#ifdef CONFIG_TCP_AUTHOPT + case TCPOPT_AUTHOPT: + /* Hash has already been checked. + * We parse rnextkeyid here so we can match it on synack + */ + opt_rx->rnextkeyid = ptr[1]; + break; #endif case TCPOPT_FASTOPEN: tcp_parse_fastopen_option( opsize - TCPOLEN_FASTOPEN_BASE, ptr, th->syn, foc, false); @@ -6963,10 +6971,14 @@ int tcp_conn_request(struct request_sock_ops *rsk_ops, tcp_clear_options(&tmp_opt); if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SMC) && want_cookie) tmp_opt.smc_ok = 0; +#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_TCP_AUTHOPT) + tcp_rsk(req)->recv_rnextkeyid = tmp_opt.rnextkeyid; +#endif + tmp_opt.tstamp_ok = tmp_opt.saw_tstamp; tcp_openreq_init(req, &tmp_opt, skb, sk); inet_rsk(req)->no_srccheck = inet_sk(sk)->transparent; /* Note: tcp_v6_init_req() might override ir_iif for link locals */ From patchwork Thu Aug 18 19:59:57 2022 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Leonard Crestez X-Patchwork-Id: 598933 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 58E07C32773 for ; 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Thu, 18 Aug 2022 13:00:59 -0700 (PDT) From: Leonard Crestez To: David Ahern , Eric Dumazet , Philip Paeps Cc: Dmitry Safonov <0x7f454c46@gmail.com>, Shuah Khan , "David S. Miller" , Herbert Xu , Kuniyuki Iwashima , Hideaki YOSHIFUJI , Jakub Kicinski , Yuchung Cheng , Francesco Ruggeri , Mat Martineau , Christoph Paasch , Ivan Delalande , Caowangbao , Priyaranjan Jha , netdev@vger.kernel.org, linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org, linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Subject: [PATCH v7 23/26] tcp: authopt: tcp_authopt_lookup_send: Add anykey output param Date: Thu, 18 Aug 2022 22:59:57 +0300 Message-Id: X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.25.1 In-Reply-To: References: MIME-Version: 1.0 Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org The anykey param can be used to distinguish between "no keys configured" and "no keys valid". The former case should result in unsigned traffic while the latter should result in an error. Signed-off-by: Leonard Crestez --- net/ipv4/tcp_authopt.c | 28 ++++++++++++++++++---------- 1 file changed, 18 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-) diff --git a/net/ipv4/tcp_authopt.c b/net/ipv4/tcp_authopt.c index de1390273ef3..9aa3aea25a97 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/tcp_authopt.c +++ b/net/ipv4/tcp_authopt.c @@ -387,38 +387,42 @@ static bool better_key_match(struct tcp_authopt_key_info *old, struct tcp_authop * tcp_authopt_lookup_send - lookup key for sending * * @net: Per-namespace information containing keys * @addr_sk: Socket used for destination address lookup * @send_id: Optional send_id. If >= 0 then only return keys that match + * @anykey: Set to true if any keys are present for the peer * * If anykey is false then authentication is not required for peer. * * If anykey is true but no key was found then all our keys must be expired and sending should fail. */ static struct tcp_authopt_key_info *tcp_authopt_lookup_send(struct netns_tcp_authopt *net, const struct sock *addr_sk, - int send_id) + int send_id, + bool *anykey) { struct tcp_authopt_key_info *result = NULL; struct tcp_authopt_key_info *key; int l3index = -1; hlist_for_each_entry_rcu(key, &net->head, node, 0) { - if (send_id >= 0 && key->send_id != send_id) - continue; - if (key->flags & TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_NOSEND) - continue; if (key->flags & TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_ADDR_BIND) if (!tcp_authopt_key_match_sk_addr(key, addr_sk)) continue; if (key->flags & TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_IFINDEX) { if (l3index < 0) l3index = l3mdev_master_ifindex_by_index(sock_net(addr_sk), addr_sk->sk_bound_dev_if); if (l3index != key->l3index) continue; } + if (anykey) + *anykey = true; + if (key->flags & TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_NOSEND) + continue; + if (send_id >= 0 && key->send_id != send_id) + continue; if (better_key_match(result, key)) result = key; else if (result) net_warn_ratelimited("ambiguous tcp authentication keys configured for send\n"); } @@ -463,14 +467,14 @@ struct tcp_authopt_key_info *__tcp_authopt_select_key(const struct sock *sk, */ if (info->flags & TCP_AUTHOPT_FLAG_LOCK_KEYID) send_id = info->send_keyid; else send_id = rsk->recv_rnextkeyid; - key = tcp_authopt_lookup_send(net, addr_sk, send_id); + key = tcp_authopt_lookup_send(net, addr_sk, send_id, NULL); /* If no key found with specific send_id try anything else. */ if (!key) - key = tcp_authopt_lookup_send(net, addr_sk, -1); + key = tcp_authopt_lookup_send(net, addr_sk, -1, NULL); if (key) *rnextkeyid = key->recv_id; return key; } @@ -491,18 +495,22 @@ struct tcp_authopt_key_info *__tcp_authopt_select_key(const struct sock *sk, */ if (info->flags & TCP_AUTHOPT_FLAG_LOCK_KEYID) { int send_keyid = info->send_keyid; if (!key || key->send_id != send_keyid) - new_key = tcp_authopt_lookup_send(net, addr_sk, send_keyid); + new_key = tcp_authopt_lookup_send(net, addr_sk, + send_keyid, + NULL); } else { if (!key || key->send_id != info->recv_rnextkeyid) - new_key = tcp_authopt_lookup_send(net, addr_sk, info->recv_rnextkeyid); + new_key = tcp_authopt_lookup_send(net, addr_sk, + info->recv_rnextkeyid, + NULL); } /* If no key found with specific send_id try anything else. */ if (!key && !new_key) - new_key = tcp_authopt_lookup_send(net, addr_sk, -1); + new_key = tcp_authopt_lookup_send(net, addr_sk, -1, NULL); /* Update current key only if we hold the socket lock. */ if (new_key && key != new_key) { if (locked) { if (kref_get_unless_zero(&new_key->ref)) { From patchwork Thu Aug 18 19:59:58 2022 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Leonard Crestez X-Patchwork-Id: 598233 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 3BC50C00140 for ; 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Thu, 18 Aug 2022 13:01:01 -0700 (PDT) From: Leonard Crestez To: David Ahern , Eric Dumazet , Philip Paeps Cc: Dmitry Safonov <0x7f454c46@gmail.com>, Shuah Khan , "David S. Miller" , Herbert Xu , Kuniyuki Iwashima , Hideaki YOSHIFUJI , Jakub Kicinski , Yuchung Cheng , Francesco Ruggeri , Mat Martineau , Christoph Paasch , Ivan Delalande , Caowangbao , Priyaranjan Jha , netdev@vger.kernel.org, linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org, linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Subject: [PATCH v7 24/26] tcp: authopt: Initial support for TCP_AUTHOPT_FLAG_ACTIVE Date: Thu, 18 Aug 2022 22:59:58 +0300 Message-Id: <90190ecf8d995e662e43da21f33147ffcb4e5ad5.1660852705.git.cdleonard@gmail.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.25.1 In-Reply-To: References: MIME-Version: 1.0 Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org This can be used to determine if tcp authentication option is actually active on the current connection. TCP Authentication can be enabled but inactive on a socket if keys are only configured for destinations other than the peer. A listen socket with authentication enabled will return other sockets with authentication enabled on accept(). If no key is configured for the peer of an accepted socket then authentication will be inactive. Signed-off-by: Leonard Crestez --- include/uapi/linux/tcp.h | 13 +++++++++++++ net/ipv4/tcp_authopt.c | 22 +++++++++++++++++++--- 2 files changed, 32 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/tcp.h b/include/uapi/linux/tcp.h index b1063e1e1b9f..5ca8aa9d5e43 100644 --- a/include/uapi/linux/tcp.h +++ b/include/uapi/linux/tcp.h @@ -367,10 +367,23 @@ enum tcp_authopt_flag { * Configure behavior of segments with TCP-AO coming from hosts for which no * key is configured. The default recommended by RFC is to silently accept * such connections. */ TCP_AUTHOPT_FLAG_REJECT_UNEXPECTED = (1 << 2), + /** + * @TCP_AUTHOPT_FLAG_ACTIVE: If authentication is active for a specific socket. + * + * TCP Authentication can be enabled but inactive on a socket if keys are + * only configured for destinations other than the peer. + * + * A listen socket with authentication enabled will return other sockets + * with authentication enabled on accept(). If no key is configured for the + * peer of an accepted socket then authentication will be inactive. + * + * This flag is readonly and the value is determined at connection establishment time. + */ + TCP_AUTHOPT_FLAG_ACTIVE = (1 << 3), }; /** * struct tcp_authopt - Per-socket options related to TCP Authentication Option */ diff --git a/net/ipv4/tcp_authopt.c b/net/ipv4/tcp_authopt.c index 9aa3aea25a97..bbdc5f68ab56 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/tcp_authopt.c +++ b/net/ipv4/tcp_authopt.c @@ -554,15 +554,23 @@ static struct tcp_authopt_info *__tcp_authopt_info_get_or_create(struct sock *sk rcu_assign_pointer(tp->authopt_info, info); return info; } -#define TCP_AUTHOPT_KNOWN_FLAGS ( \ +/* Flags fully controlled by user: */ +#define TCP_AUTHOPT_USER_FLAGS ( \ TCP_AUTHOPT_FLAG_LOCK_KEYID | \ TCP_AUTHOPT_FLAG_LOCK_RNEXTKEYID | \ TCP_AUTHOPT_FLAG_REJECT_UNEXPECTED) +/* All known flags */ +#define TCP_AUTHOPT_KNOWN_FLAGS ( \ + TCP_AUTHOPT_FLAG_LOCK_KEYID | \ + TCP_AUTHOPT_FLAG_LOCK_RNEXTKEYID | \ + TCP_AUTHOPT_FLAG_REJECT_UNEXPECTED | \ + TCP_AUTHOPT_FLAG_ACTIVE) + /* Like copy_from_sockptr except tolerate different optlen for compatibility reasons * * If the src is shorter then it's from an old userspace and the rest of dst is * filled with zeros. * @@ -627,11 +635,11 @@ int tcp_set_authopt(struct sock *sk, sockptr_t optval, unsigned int optlen) info = __tcp_authopt_info_get_or_create(sk); if (IS_ERR(info)) return PTR_ERR(info); - info->flags = opt.flags & TCP_AUTHOPT_KNOWN_FLAGS; + info->flags = opt.flags & TCP_AUTHOPT_USER_FLAGS; if (opt.flags & TCP_AUTHOPT_FLAG_LOCK_KEYID) info->send_keyid = opt.send_keyid; if (opt.flags & TCP_AUTHOPT_FLAG_LOCK_RNEXTKEYID) info->send_rnextkeyid = opt.send_rnextkeyid; @@ -641,10 +649,11 @@ int tcp_set_authopt(struct sock *sk, sockptr_t optval, unsigned int optlen) int tcp_get_authopt_val(struct sock *sk, struct tcp_authopt *opt) { struct tcp_sock *tp = tcp_sk(sk); struct tcp_authopt_info *info; struct tcp_authopt_key_info *send_key; + bool anykey = false; int err; memset(opt, 0, sizeof(*opt)); sock_owned_by_me(sk); err = check_sysctl_tcp_authopt(); @@ -653,11 +662,18 @@ int tcp_get_authopt_val(struct sock *sk, struct tcp_authopt *opt) info = rcu_dereference_check(tp->authopt_info, lockdep_sock_is_held(sk)); if (!info) return -ENOENT; - opt->flags = info->flags & TCP_AUTHOPT_KNOWN_FLAGS; + opt->flags = info->flags & TCP_AUTHOPT_USER_FLAGS; + + rcu_read_lock(); + tcp_authopt_lookup_send(sock_net_tcp_authopt(sk), sk, -1, &anykey); + if (anykey) + opt->flags |= TCP_AUTHOPT_FLAG_ACTIVE; + rcu_read_unlock(); + /* These keyids might be undefined, for example before connect. * Reporting zero is not strictly correct because there are no reserved * values. */ send_key = rcu_dereference_check(info->send_key, lockdep_sock_is_held(sk)); From patchwork Thu Aug 18 19:59:59 2022 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Leonard Crestez X-Patchwork-Id: 598932 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 3E21DC32773 for ; Thu, 18 Aug 2022 20:05:40 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S241215AbiHRUFi (ORCPT ); Thu, 18 Aug 2022 16:05:38 -0400 Received: from lindbergh.monkeyblade.net ([23.128.96.19]:59870 "EHLO lindbergh.monkeyblade.net" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1345636AbiHRUDg (ORCPT ); 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Thu, 18 Aug 2022 13:01:02 -0700 (PDT) From: Leonard Crestez To: David Ahern , Eric Dumazet , Philip Paeps Cc: Dmitry Safonov <0x7f454c46@gmail.com>, Shuah Khan , "David S. Miller" , Herbert Xu , Kuniyuki Iwashima , Hideaki YOSHIFUJI , Jakub Kicinski , Yuchung Cheng , Francesco Ruggeri , Mat Martineau , Christoph Paasch , Ivan Delalande , Caowangbao , Priyaranjan Jha , netdev@vger.kernel.org, linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org, linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Subject: [PATCH v7 25/26] tcp: authopt: If no keys are valid for send report an error Date: Thu, 18 Aug 2022 22:59:59 +0300 Message-Id: <1ebffe1a92b0d36488168aa273ac87fa3866d9ca.1660852705.git.cdleonard@gmail.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.25.1 In-Reply-To: References: MIME-Version: 1.0 Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org If this is not treated specially then when all keys are removed or expired then TCP will start sending unsigned packets which is undesirable. Instead try to report an error on key selection and propagate it to userspace. The error is assigned to sk_err and propagate it as soon as possible. In theory we could try to make the error "soft" and even let the connection continue if userspace adds a new key but the advantages are unclear. Since userspace is responsible for managing keys it can also avoid sending unsigned packets by always closing the socket before removing the active last key. The specific error reported is ENOKEY. This requires changes inside TCP option write code to support aborting the actual packet send, until this point this did not happen in any scenario. Signed-off-by: Leonard Crestez --- net/ipv4/tcp_authopt.c | 9 +++++++-- net/ipv4/tcp_output.c | 20 ++++++++++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 27 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/net/ipv4/tcp_authopt.c b/net/ipv4/tcp_authopt.c index bbdc5f68ab56..933a4bbddb70 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/tcp_authopt.c +++ b/net/ipv4/tcp_authopt.c @@ -448,10 +448,11 @@ struct tcp_authopt_key_info *__tcp_authopt_select_key(const struct sock *sk, u8 *rnextkeyid, bool locked) { struct tcp_authopt_key_info *key, *new_key = NULL; struct netns_tcp_authopt *net = sock_net_tcp_authopt(sk); + bool anykey = false; /* Listen sockets don't refer to any specific connection so we don't try * to keep using the same key. * The rnextkeyid is stored in tcp_request_sock */ @@ -470,11 +471,13 @@ struct tcp_authopt_key_info *__tcp_authopt_select_key(const struct sock *sk, else send_id = rsk->recv_rnextkeyid; key = tcp_authopt_lookup_send(net, addr_sk, send_id, NULL); /* If no key found with specific send_id try anything else. */ if (!key) - key = tcp_authopt_lookup_send(net, addr_sk, -1, NULL); + key = tcp_authopt_lookup_send(net, addr_sk, -1, &anykey); + if (!key && anykey) + return ERR_PTR(-ENOKEY); if (key) *rnextkeyid = key->recv_id; return key; } @@ -506,11 +509,13 @@ struct tcp_authopt_key_info *__tcp_authopt_select_key(const struct sock *sk, info->recv_rnextkeyid, NULL); } /* If no key found with specific send_id try anything else. */ if (!key && !new_key) - new_key = tcp_authopt_lookup_send(net, addr_sk, -1, NULL); + new_key = tcp_authopt_lookup_send(net, addr_sk, -1, &anykey); + if (!new_key && anykey) + return ERR_PTR(-ENOKEY); /* Update current key only if we hold the socket lock. */ if (new_key && key != new_key) { if (locked) { if (kref_get_unless_zero(&new_key->ref)) { diff --git a/net/ipv4/tcp_output.c b/net/ipv4/tcp_output.c index 74c3ef86f0bc..a1c2d4d2c426 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/tcp_output.c +++ b/net/ipv4/tcp_output.c @@ -411,10 +411,11 @@ static inline bool tcp_urg_mode(const struct tcp_sock *tp) #define OPTION_SACK_ADVERTISE BIT(0) #define OPTION_TS BIT(1) #define OPTION_MD5 BIT(2) #define OPTION_WSCALE BIT(3) #define OPTION_AUTHOPT BIT(4) +#define OPTION_AUTHOPT_FAIL BIT(5) #define OPTION_FAST_OPEN_COOKIE BIT(8) #define OPTION_SMC BIT(9) #define OPTION_MPTCP BIT(10) static void smc_options_write(__be32 *ptr, u16 *options) @@ -783,10 +784,14 @@ static int tcp_authopt_init_options(const struct sock *sk, { #ifdef CONFIG_TCP_AUTHOPT struct tcp_authopt_key_info *key; key = tcp_authopt_select_key(sk, addr_sk, &opts->authopt_info, &opts->authopt_rnextkeyid); + if (IS_ERR(key)) { + opts->options |= OPTION_AUTHOPT_FAIL; + return TCPOLEN_AUTHOPT_OUTPUT; + } if (key) { opts->options |= OPTION_AUTHOPT; opts->authopt_key = key; return TCPOLEN_AUTHOPT_OUTPUT; } @@ -1342,10 +1347,18 @@ static int __tcp_transmit_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb, * release the following packet. */ if (tcp_skb_pcount(skb) > 1) tcb->tcp_flags |= TCPHDR_PSH; } +#ifdef CONFIG_TCP_AUTHOPT + if (opts.options & OPTION_AUTHOPT_FAIL) { + rcu_read_unlock(); + sk->sk_err = ENOKEY; + sk_error_report(sk); + return -ENOKEY; + } +#endif tcp_header_size = tcp_options_size + sizeof(struct tcphdr); /* if no packet is in qdisc/device queue, then allow XPS to select * another queue. We can be called from tcp_tsq_handler() * which holds one reference to sk. @@ -3652,10 +3665,17 @@ struct sk_buff *tcp_make_synack(const struct sock *sk, struct dst_entry *dst, /* bpf program will be interested in the tcp_flags */ TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->tcp_flags = TCPHDR_SYN | TCPHDR_ACK; tcp_header_size = tcp_synack_options(sk, req, mss, skb, &opts, md5, foc, synack_type, syn_skb) + sizeof(*th); +#ifdef CONFIG_TCP_AUTHOPT + if (opts.options & OPTION_AUTHOPT_FAIL) { + rcu_read_unlock(); + kfree_skb(skb); + return NULL; + } +#endif skb_push(skb, tcp_header_size); skb_reset_transport_header(skb); th = (struct tcphdr *)skb->data; From patchwork Thu Aug 18 20:00:00 2022 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Leonard Crestez X-Patchwork-Id: 598232 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 8AF79C32773 for ; Thu, 18 Aug 2022 20:06:18 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1345724AbiHRUGQ (ORCPT ); Thu, 18 Aug 2022 16:06:16 -0400 Received: from lindbergh.monkeyblade.net ([23.128.96.19]:34684 "EHLO lindbergh.monkeyblade.net" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1345707AbiHRUEP (ORCPT ); Thu, 18 Aug 2022 16:04:15 -0400 Received: from mail-ej1-x631.google.com (mail-ej1-x631.google.com [IPv6:2a00:1450:4864:20::631]) by lindbergh.monkeyblade.net (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 23464D25D5; Thu, 18 Aug 2022 13:01:07 -0700 (PDT) Received: by mail-ej1-x631.google.com with SMTP id w19so5178946ejc.7; Thu, 18 Aug 2022 13:01:07 -0700 (PDT) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=gmail.com; s=20210112; h=content-transfer-encoding:mime-version:references:in-reply-to :message-id:date:subject:cc:to:from:from:to:cc; bh=snEf9OD+gQs4ZebjjnqGpAcw3jq2Lx6aCo0inZJ5Zo4=; b=QwN2QCrSjmsdi98whEUUFujiZDlZK1nzjGSWCJW0jYDdiQkr+L3GLfC5fbl3nYYA0j t2JvtzU7ufiA/qttGmoNuJ3minGhGHoMCZj5RwI/W3tTeejJMW7nXMvlkBUHCIh3QxgD Ggn6N46x9LNBwBmi0jUI6MHSl8y+kiuh9FeOp4SUrYRnSQPZ1FF7iJHso0hqYukM7Jc4 hEcaH7X6S7NxBtvcWn8hl2XQFq1/OUckfcVFi7DURKdnj+kfuU0HjbsWXwbwI+QINgyO H9D4SypAl5KR4efFILgyf/w33OJvTjjHobo4bLeVu2JKhFpPyDHHqDNSIkjGbj2e/Gf3 i+Xg== X-Google-DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=1e100.net; s=20210112; h=content-transfer-encoding:mime-version:references:in-reply-to :message-id:date:subject:cc:to:from:x-gm-message-state:from:to:cc; bh=snEf9OD+gQs4ZebjjnqGpAcw3jq2Lx6aCo0inZJ5Zo4=; b=tjMSLw78ZpDAvzpXuCsw56vR6QYl3Nh1uNzqzwxwuYOb7aTiaCS3W7ftPfsL5kmZhD SCVzpm+He9XZ6BiwcuyZrL1VMleybdGtzjd5iIURN58S56h9FmLIOurrPRXy0IUkhd1w CuJdXPuunVlbmG2fC0lCfbIpgwveaRRPWt5+i8FA4hRqESXxf3ifPaLhz5r7cCoi7JhI rI1rd9oIlpKiQc7R1ZygFBA4iHL+8KqIN2N44KsRzOn+B+MbqOFaS6JQW5vTUu+7KmOx EWBd3u1ZJiNkyXpyJyxIgcu5an3IwIGrTbIdv4iIaqp7VFZ5t6AYmseEmPWSXhJEFJyJ SUEQ== X-Gm-Message-State: ACgBeo2/fVRSe14ExdzpXsJUeFYSbDAByPKCoKAq8fPWrS0Wxk1EVcgN YZpr2QaI1WUmSGW6fT1uzkc= X-Google-Smtp-Source: AA6agR5pu60HdIqBlook7t+r1LQxKBqXsv/pbYMnQ1gFBZ+l+8hPH31KNXIEok2B2uOJPIhdrVdn8w== X-Received: by 2002:a17:907:b02:b0:731:3f2d:f09 with SMTP id h2-20020a1709070b0200b007313f2d0f09mr2902611ejl.122.1660852865525; Thu, 18 Aug 2022 13:01:05 -0700 (PDT) Received: from localhost.localdomain ([2a04:241e:502:a080:17c8:ba1c:b6f3:3fe0]) by smtp.gmail.com with ESMTPSA id fw30-20020a170907501e00b00722e4bab163sm1215087ejc.200.2022.08.18.13.01.03 (version=TLS1_3 cipher=TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 bits=256/256); Thu, 18 Aug 2022 13:01:04 -0700 (PDT) From: Leonard Crestez To: David Ahern , Eric Dumazet , Philip Paeps Cc: Dmitry Safonov <0x7f454c46@gmail.com>, Shuah Khan , "David S. Miller" , Herbert Xu , Kuniyuki Iwashima , Hideaki YOSHIFUJI , Jakub Kicinski , Yuchung Cheng , Francesco Ruggeri , Mat Martineau , Christoph Paasch , Ivan Delalande , Caowangbao , Priyaranjan Jha , netdev@vger.kernel.org, linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org, linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Subject: [PATCH v7 26/26] tcp: authopt: Initial implementation of TCP_REPAIR_AUTHOPT Date: Thu, 18 Aug 2022 23:00:00 +0300 Message-Id: <817b877b44d6946bc9285d1518dda48787555644.1660852705.git.cdleonard@gmail.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.25.1 In-Reply-To: References: MIME-Version: 1.0 Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org In order to support TCP_REPAIR for connections using RFC5925 Authentication Option add a sockopt to get/set ISN and SNE values. The TCP_REPAIR_AUTHOxpTP sockopt is only allowed when the socket is already in "repair" mode, this behavior is shared with other sockopts relevant to TCP_REPAIR. The setsockopt further requires the TCP_ESTABLISHED state, this is because it relies on snd_nxt which is only initialized after connect(). For SNE restoration we provide a full 64-bit sequence number on "get" and handle any recent 64-bit sequence number on "set", where recent means "within ~2GB to the current window". Linux tracks snd_sne and rcv_sne as the extension of snd_nxt and rcv_nxt but this is an implementation detail and snd_nxt doesn't even seem to be one of the values that can be read by userspace. Handling SNE with 64-bit values means userspace doesn't need to worry about matching snd_nxt. Signed-off-by: Leonard Crestez --- include/net/tcp_authopt.h | 2 ++ include/uapi/linux/tcp.h | 19 +++++++++++ net/ipv4/tcp.c | 23 ++++++++++++++ net/ipv4/tcp_authopt.c | 66 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 4 files changed, 110 insertions(+) diff --git a/include/net/tcp_authopt.h b/include/net/tcp_authopt.h index 4f83d8e54fef..fda6dc4b5d57 100644 --- a/include/net/tcp_authopt.h +++ b/include/net/tcp_authopt.h @@ -231,10 +231,12 @@ static inline void tcp_authopt_update_snd_sne(struct tcp_sock *tp, u32 seq) lockdep_sock_is_held((struct sock *)tp)); if (info) __tcp_authopt_update_snd_sne(tp, info, seq); } } +int tcp_get_authopt_repair_val(struct sock *sk, struct tcp_authopt_repair *opt); +int tcp_set_authopt_repair(struct sock *sk, sockptr_t optval, unsigned int optlen); #else static inline void tcp_authopt_clear(struct sock *sk) { } static inline int tcp_authopt_openreq(struct sock *newsk, diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/tcp.h b/include/uapi/linux/tcp.h index 5ca8aa9d5e43..ee6836f87cf8 100644 --- a/include/uapi/linux/tcp.h +++ b/include/uapi/linux/tcp.h @@ -128,10 +128,11 @@ enum { #define TCP_CM_INQ TCP_INQ #define TCP_TX_DELAY 37 /* delay outgoing packets by XX usec */ #define TCP_AUTHOPT 38 /* TCP Authentication Option (RFC5925) */ #define TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY 39 /* TCP Authentication Option Key (RFC5925) */ +#define TCP_REPAIR_AUTHOPT 40 #define TCP_REPAIR_ON 1 #define TCP_REPAIR_OFF 0 #define TCP_REPAIR_OFF_NO_WP -1 /* Turn off without window probes */ @@ -490,10 +491,28 @@ struct tcp_authopt_key { * address match is performed. */ int prefixlen; }; +/** + * struct tcp_authopt_repair - TCP_REPAIR information related to Authentication Option + * @src_isn: Local Initial Sequence Number + * @dst_isn: Remote Initial Sequence Number + * @snd_sne: Sequence Number Extension for Send (upper 32 bits of snd_seq) + * @rcv_sne: Sequence Number Extension for Recv (upper 32 bits of rcv_seq) + * @snd_seq: Recent Send Sequence Number (lower 32 bits of snd_sne) + * @rcv_seq: Recent Recv Sequence Number (lower 32 bits of rcv_sne) + */ +struct tcp_authopt_repair { + __u32 src_isn; + __u32 dst_isn; + __u32 snd_sne; + __u32 rcv_sne; + __u32 snd_seq; + __u32 rcv_seq; +}; + /* setsockopt(fd, IPPROTO_TCP, TCP_ZEROCOPY_RECEIVE, ...) */ #define TCP_RECEIVE_ZEROCOPY_FLAG_TLB_CLEAN_HINT 0x1 struct tcp_zerocopy_receive { __u64 address; /* in: address of mapping */ diff --git a/net/ipv4/tcp.c b/net/ipv4/tcp.c index 205534d501ec..ad0af4efd265 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/tcp.c +++ b/net/ipv4/tcp.c @@ -3715,10 +3715,13 @@ static int do_tcp_setsockopt(struct sock *sk, int level, int optname, err = tcp_set_authopt(sk, optval, optlen); break; case TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY: err = tcp_set_authopt_key(sk, optval, optlen); break; + case TCP_REPAIR_AUTHOPT: + err = tcp_set_authopt_repair(sk, optval, optlen); + break; #endif case TCP_USER_TIMEOUT: /* Cap the max time in ms TCP will retry or probe the window * before giving up and aborting (ETIMEDOUT) a connection. */ @@ -4387,10 +4390,30 @@ static int do_tcp_getsockopt(struct sock *sk, int level, return -EFAULT; if (copy_to_user(optval, &info, len)) return -EFAULT; return 0; } + case TCP_REPAIR_AUTHOPT: { + struct tcp_authopt_repair val; + int err; + + if (get_user(len, optlen)) + return -EFAULT; + + lock_sock(sk); + err = tcp_get_authopt_repair_val(sk, &val); + release_sock(sk); + + if (err) + return err; + len = min_t(unsigned int, len, sizeof(val)); + if (put_user(len, optlen)) + return -EFAULT; + if (copy_to_user(optval, &val, len)) + return -EFAULT; + return 0; + } #endif default: return -ENOPROTOOPT; } diff --git a/net/ipv4/tcp_authopt.c b/net/ipv4/tcp_authopt.c index 933a4bbddb70..a77067c0498b 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/tcp_authopt.c +++ b/net/ipv4/tcp_authopt.c @@ -1775,10 +1775,76 @@ int __tcp_authopt_inbound_check(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb, return 1; } EXPORT_SYMBOL(__tcp_authopt_inbound_check); +int tcp_get_authopt_repair_val(struct sock *sk, struct tcp_authopt_repair *opt) +{ + struct tcp_sock *tp = tcp_sk(sk); + struct tcp_authopt_info *info; + int err; + + memset(opt, 0, sizeof(*opt)); + sock_owned_by_me(sk); + err = check_sysctl_tcp_authopt(); + if (err) + return err; + if (!tp->repair) + return -EPERM; + + info = rcu_dereference_check(tp->authopt_info, lockdep_sock_is_held(sk)); + if (!info) + return -ENOENT; + + opt->dst_isn = info->dst_isn; + opt->src_isn = info->src_isn; + opt->rcv_sne = info->rcv_sne; + opt->snd_sne = info->snd_sne; + opt->rcv_seq = tp->rcv_nxt; + opt->snd_seq = tp->snd_nxt; + + return 0; +} + +int tcp_set_authopt_repair(struct sock *sk, sockptr_t optval, unsigned int optlen) +{ + struct tcp_sock *tp = tcp_sk(sk); + struct tcp_authopt_info *info; + struct tcp_authopt_repair val; + int err; + + sock_owned_by_me(sk); + err = check_sysctl_tcp_authopt(); + if (err) + return err; + + if (optlen != sizeof(val)) + return -EFAULT; + if (copy_from_sockptr(&val, optval, sizeof(val))) + return -EFAULT; + + /* tcp_authopt repair relies on fields that are only initialized after + * tcp_connect. Doing this setsockopt before connect() can't be correct + * so return an error. + */ + if (sk->sk_state != TCP_ESTABLISHED) + return -EPERM; + + info = rcu_dereference_check(tp->authopt_info, lockdep_sock_is_held(sk)); + if (!info) + return -ENOENT; + if (!tp->repair) + return -EPERM; + + info->dst_isn = val.dst_isn; + info->src_isn = val.src_isn; + info->rcv_sne = compute_sne(val.rcv_sne, val.rcv_seq, tp->rcv_nxt); + info->snd_sne = compute_sne(val.snd_sne, val.snd_seq, tp->snd_nxt); + + return 0; +} + #ifdef CONFIG_PROC_FS struct tcp_authopt_iter_state { struct seq_net_private p; };