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[81.2.106.35]) by smtp.gmail.com with ESMTPSA id q12sm4190917wre.4.2017.10.17.04.17.35 for (version=TLS1_2 cipher=ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256 bits=128/128); Tue, 17 Oct 2017 04:17:36 -0700 (PDT) From: Ross Burton To: openembedded-core@lists.openembedded.org Date: Tue, 17 Oct 2017 12:17:29 +0100 Message-Id: <20171017111729.24886-1-ross.burton@intel.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.11.0 Subject: [OE-core] [PATCH][jethro] wpa_supplicant: fix WPA2 key replay security bug X-BeenThere: openembedded-core@lists.openembedded.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.12 Precedence: list List-Id: Patches and discussions about the oe-core layer List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , MIME-Version: 1.0 Sender: openembedded-core-bounces@lists.openembedded.org Errors-To: openembedded-core-bounces@lists.openembedded.org WPA2 is vulnerable to replay attacks which result in unauthenticated users having access to the network. * CVE-2017-13077: reinstallation of the pairwise key in the Four-way handshake * CVE-2017-13078: reinstallation of the group key in the Four-way handshake * CVE-2017-13079: reinstallation of the integrity group key in the Four-way handshake * CVE-2017-13080: reinstallation of the group key in the Group Key handshake * CVE-2017-13081: reinstallation of the integrity group key in the Group Key handshake * CVE-2017-13082: accepting a retransmitted Fast BSS Transition Reassociation Request and reinstalling the pairwise key while processing it * CVE-2017-13086: reinstallation of the Tunneled Direct-Link Setup (TDLS) PeerKey (TPK) key in the TDLS handshake * CVE-2017-13087: reinstallation of the group key (GTK) when processing a Wireless Network Management (WNM) Sleep Mode Response frame * CVE-2017-13088: reinstallation of the integrity group key (IGTK) when processing a Wireless Network Management (WNM) Sleep Mode Response frame Backport patches from upstream to resolve these CVEs. Signed-off-by: Ross Burton --- .../wpa-supplicant/key-replay-cve-multiple.patch | 943 +++++++++++++++++++++ .../wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant_2.4.bb | 1 + 2 files changed, 944 insertions(+) create mode 100644 meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant/key-replay-cve-multiple.patch -- 2.11.0 -- _______________________________________________ Openembedded-core mailing list Openembedded-core@lists.openembedded.org http://lists.openembedded.org/mailman/listinfo/openembedded-core diff --git a/meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant/key-replay-cve-multiple.patch b/meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant/key-replay-cve-multiple.patch new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..1bdb9022b14 --- /dev/null +++ b/meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant/key-replay-cve-multiple.patch @@ -0,0 +1,943 @@ +The WPA2 four-way handshake protocol is vulnerable to replay attacks which can +result in unauthenticated clients gaining access to the network. + +Backport a number of patches from upstream to fix this. + +CVE: CVE-2017-13077 +CVE: CVE-2017-13078 +CVE: CVE-2017-13079 +CVE: CVE-2017-13080 +CVE: CVE-2017-13081 +CVE: CVE-2017-13082 +CVE: CVE-2017-13086 +CVE: CVE-2017-13087 +CVE: CVE-2017-13088 + +Upstream-Status: Backport +Signed-off-by: Ross Burton + +From 859e243137203d2389e20103a9947cf76082022e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Haiqing Bai +Date: Fri, 13 Oct 2017 09:37:06 +0800 +Subject: [PATCH 1/7] hostapd: Avoid key reinstallation in FT handshake + +Do not reinstall TK to the driver during Reassociation Response frame +processing if the first attempt of setting the TK succeeded. This avoids +issues related to clearing the TX/RX PN that could result in reusing +same PN values for transmitted frames (e.g., due to CCM nonce reuse and +also hitting replay protection on the receiver) and accepting replayed +frames on RX side. + +This issue was introduced by the commit +0e84c25434e6a1f283c7b4e62e483729085b78d2 ('FT: Fix PTK configuration in +authenticator') which allowed wpa_ft_install_ptk() to be called multiple +times with the same PTK. While the second configuration attempt is +needed with some drivers, it must be done only if the first attempt +failed. + +Signed-off-by: Mathy Vanhoef + +Upstream-Status: Backport + +Signed-off-by: Haiqing Bai +--- + src/ap/wpa_auth.c | 11 ++++++++++- + src/ap/wpa_auth.h | 3 ++- + src/ap/wpa_auth_ft.c | 10 ++++++++++ + src/ap/wpa_auth_i.h | 1 + + 4 files changed, 23 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/src/ap/wpa_auth.c b/src/ap/wpa_auth.c +index 9c5f609..0ebbdb5 100644 +--- a/src/ap/wpa_auth.c ++++ b/src/ap/wpa_auth.c +@@ -1715,6 +1715,9 @@ int wpa_auth_sm_event(struct wpa_state_machine *sm, wpa_event event) + #else /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R */ + break; + #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R */ ++ case WPA_DRV_STA_REMOVED: ++ sm->tk_already_set = FALSE; ++ return 0; + } + + #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R +@@ -3168,7 +3171,13 @@ int wpa_auth_sta_wpa_version(struct wpa_state_machine *sm) + return sm->wpa; + } + +- ++int wpa_auth_sta_ft_tk_already_set(struct wpa_state_machine *sm) ++{ ++ if (!sm || !wpa_key_mgmt_ft(sm->wpa_key_mgmt)) ++ return 0; ++ return sm->tk_already_set; ++} ++ + int wpa_auth_sta_clear_pmksa(struct wpa_state_machine *sm, + struct rsn_pmksa_cache_entry *entry) + { +diff --git a/src/ap/wpa_auth.h b/src/ap/wpa_auth.h +index 2788e65..8dee180 100644 +--- a/src/ap/wpa_auth.h ++++ b/src/ap/wpa_auth.h +@@ -253,7 +253,7 @@ void wpa_receive(struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth, + u8 *data, size_t data_len); + typedef enum { + WPA_AUTH, WPA_ASSOC, WPA_DISASSOC, WPA_DEAUTH, WPA_REAUTH, +- WPA_REAUTH_EAPOL, WPA_ASSOC_FT ++ WPA_REAUTH_EAPOL, WPA_ASSOC_FT, WPA_DRV_STA_REMOVED + } wpa_event; + void wpa_remove_ptk(struct wpa_state_machine *sm); + int wpa_auth_sm_event(struct wpa_state_machine *sm, wpa_event event); +@@ -266,6 +266,7 @@ int wpa_auth_pairwise_set(struct wpa_state_machine *sm); + int wpa_auth_get_pairwise(struct wpa_state_machine *sm); + int wpa_auth_sta_key_mgmt(struct wpa_state_machine *sm); + int wpa_auth_sta_wpa_version(struct wpa_state_machine *sm); ++int wpa_auth_sta_ft_tk_already_set(struct wpa_state_machine *sm); + int wpa_auth_sta_clear_pmksa(struct wpa_state_machine *sm, + struct rsn_pmksa_cache_entry *entry); + struct rsn_pmksa_cache_entry * +diff --git a/src/ap/wpa_auth_ft.c b/src/ap/wpa_auth_ft.c +index ef3249a..17e6039 100644 +--- a/src/ap/wpa_auth_ft.c ++++ b/src/ap/wpa_auth_ft.c +@@ -779,6 +779,14 @@ void wpa_ft_install_ptk(struct wpa_state_machine *sm) + return; + } + ++ if (sm->tk_already_set) { ++ /* Must avoid TK reconfiguration to prevent clearing of TX/RX ++ * PN in the driver */ ++ wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, ++ "FT: Do not re-install same PTK to the driver"); ++ return; ++ } ++ + /* FIX: add STA entry to kernel/driver here? The set_key will fail + * most likely without this.. At the moment, STA entry is added only + * after association has been completed. This function will be called +@@ -791,6 +799,7 @@ void wpa_ft_install_ptk(struct wpa_state_machine *sm) + + /* FIX: MLME-SetProtection.Request(TA, Tx_Rx) */ + sm->pairwise_set = TRUE; ++ sm->tk_already_set = TRUE; + } + + +@@ -897,6 +906,7 @@ static int wpa_ft_process_auth_req(struct wpa_state_machine *sm, + + sm->pairwise = pairwise; + sm->PTK_valid = TRUE; ++ sm->tk_already_set = FALSE; + wpa_ft_install_ptk(sm); + + buflen = 2 + sizeof(struct rsn_mdie) + 2 + sizeof(struct rsn_ftie) + +diff --git a/src/ap/wpa_auth_i.h b/src/ap/wpa_auth_i.h +index 7b2cd3e..0f3d504 100644 +--- a/src/ap/wpa_auth_i.h ++++ b/src/ap/wpa_auth_i.h +@@ -64,6 +64,7 @@ struct wpa_state_machine { + struct wpa_ptk PTK; + Boolean PTK_valid; + Boolean pairwise_set; ++ Boolean tk_already_set; + int keycount; + Boolean Pair; + struct wpa_key_replay_counter { +-- +1.9.1 + +From 0779537c11d18045d0f09ce3dd7f535bdb245de3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Haiqing Bai +Date: Fri, 13 Oct 2017 10:00:48 +0800 +Subject: [PATCH 2/7] Prevent reinstallation of an already in-use group key + +Track the current GTK and IGTK that is in use and when receiving a +(possibly retransmitted) Group Message 1 or WNM-Sleep Mode Response, do +not install the given key if it is already in use. This prevents an +attacker from trying to trick the client into resetting or lowering the +sequence counter associated to the group key. + +Signed-off-by: Mathy Vanhoef + +Upstream-Status: Backport + +Signed-off-by: Haiqing Bai +--- + src/common/wpa_common.h | 11 +++++ + src/rsn_supp/wpa.c | 118 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------------------- + src/rsn_supp/wpa_i.h | 4 ++ + 3 files changed, 87 insertions(+), 46 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/src/common/wpa_common.h b/src/common/wpa_common.h +index 091e317..66f9977 100644 +--- a/src/common/wpa_common.h ++++ b/src/common/wpa_common.h +@@ -224,6 +224,17 @@ struct wpa_ptk { + size_t tk_len; + }; + ++struct wpa_gtk { ++ u8 gtk[WPA_GTK_MAX_LEN]; ++ size_t gtk_len; ++}; ++ ++#ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W ++struct wpa_igtk { ++ u8 igtk[WPA_IGTK_MAX_LEN]; ++ size_t igtk_len; ++}; ++#endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */ + + /* WPA IE version 1 + * 00-50-f2:1 (OUI:OUI type) +diff --git a/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c b/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c +index 8adeef4..2c4d9a4 100644 +--- a/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c ++++ b/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c +@@ -686,6 +686,15 @@ static int wpa_supplicant_install_gtk(struct wpa_sm *sm, + const u8 *_gtk = gd->gtk; + u8 gtk_buf[32]; + ++ /* Detect possible key reinstallation */ ++ if (sm->gtk.gtk_len == (size_t) gd->gtk_len && ++ os_memcmp(sm->gtk.gtk, gd->gtk, sm->gtk.gtk_len) == 0) { ++ wpa_dbg(sm->ctx->msg_ctx, MSG_DEBUG, ++ "WPA: Not reinstalling already in-use GTK to the driver (keyidx=%d tx=%d len=%d)", ++ gd->keyidx, gd->tx, gd->gtk_len); ++ return 0; ++ } ++ + wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "WPA: Group Key", gd->gtk, gd->gtk_len); + wpa_dbg(sm->ctx->msg_ctx, MSG_DEBUG, + "WPA: Installing GTK to the driver (keyidx=%d tx=%d len=%d)", +@@ -720,6 +729,9 @@ static int wpa_supplicant_install_gtk(struct wpa_sm *sm, + } + os_memset(gtk_buf, 0, sizeof(gtk_buf)); + ++ sm->gtk.gtk_len = gd->gtk_len; ++ os_memcpy(sm->gtk.gtk, gd->gtk, sm->gtk.gtk_len); ++ + return 0; + } + +@@ -790,6 +802,46 @@ static int wpa_supplicant_pairwise_gtk(struct wpa_sm *sm, + return 0; + } + ++#ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W ++static int wpa_supplicant_install_igtk(struct wpa_sm *sm, ++ const struct wpa_igtk_kde *igtk) ++{ ++ size_t len = wpa_cipher_key_len(sm->mgmt_group_cipher); ++ u16 keyidx = WPA_GET_LE16(igtk->keyid); ++ ++ /* Detect possible key reinstallation */ ++ if (sm->igtk.igtk_len == len && ++ os_memcmp(sm->igtk.igtk, igtk->igtk, sm->igtk.igtk_len) == 0) { ++ wpa_dbg(sm->ctx->msg_ctx, MSG_DEBUG, ++ "WPA: Not reinstalling already in-use IGTK to the driver (keyidx=%d)", ++ keyidx); ++ return 0; ++ } ++ ++ wpa_dbg(sm->ctx->msg_ctx, MSG_DEBUG, ++ "WPA: IGTK keyid %d pn %02x%02x%02x%02x%02x%02x", ++ keyidx, MAC2STR(igtk->pn)); ++ wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "WPA: IGTK", igtk->igtk, len); ++ if (keyidx > 4095) { ++ wpa_msg(sm->ctx->msg_ctx, MSG_WARNING, ++ "WPA: Invalid IGTK KeyID %d", keyidx); ++ return -1; ++ } ++ if (wpa_sm_set_key(sm, wpa_cipher_to_alg(sm->mgmt_group_cipher), ++ broadcast_ether_addr, ++ keyidx, 0, igtk->pn, sizeof(igtk->pn), ++ igtk->igtk, len) < 0) { ++ wpa_msg(sm->ctx->msg_ctx, MSG_WARNING, ++ "WPA: Failed to configure IGTK to the driver"); ++ return -1; ++ } ++ ++ sm->igtk.igtk_len = len; ++ os_memcpy(sm->igtk.igtk, igtk->igtk, sm->igtk.igtk_len); ++ ++ return 0; ++} ++#endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */ + + static int ieee80211w_set_keys(struct wpa_sm *sm, + struct wpa_eapol_ie_parse *ie) +@@ -801,30 +853,14 @@ static int ieee80211w_set_keys(struct wpa_sm *sm, + if (ie->igtk) { + size_t len; + const struct wpa_igtk_kde *igtk; +- u16 keyidx; ++ + len = wpa_cipher_key_len(sm->mgmt_group_cipher); + if (ie->igtk_len != WPA_IGTK_KDE_PREFIX_LEN + len) + return -1; ++ + igtk = (const struct wpa_igtk_kde *) ie->igtk; +- keyidx = WPA_GET_LE16(igtk->keyid); +- wpa_dbg(sm->ctx->msg_ctx, MSG_DEBUG, "WPA: IGTK keyid %d " +- "pn %02x%02x%02x%02x%02x%02x", +- keyidx, MAC2STR(igtk->pn)); +- wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "WPA: IGTK", +- igtk->igtk, len); +- if (keyidx > 4095) { +- wpa_msg(sm->ctx->msg_ctx, MSG_WARNING, +- "WPA: Invalid IGTK KeyID %d", keyidx); +- return -1; +- } +- if (wpa_sm_set_key(sm, wpa_cipher_to_alg(sm->mgmt_group_cipher), +- broadcast_ether_addr, +- keyidx, 0, igtk->pn, sizeof(igtk->pn), +- igtk->igtk, len) < 0) { +- wpa_msg(sm->ctx->msg_ctx, MSG_WARNING, +- "WPA: Failed to configure IGTK to the driver"); +- return -1; +- } ++ if (wpa_supplicant_install_igtk(sm, igtk) < 0) ++ return -1; + } + + return 0; +@@ -2228,7 +2264,7 @@ void wpa_sm_deinit(struct wpa_sm *sm) + */ + void wpa_sm_notify_assoc(struct wpa_sm *sm, const u8 *bssid) + { +- int clear_ptk = 1; ++ int clear_keys = 1; + + if (sm == NULL) + return; +@@ -2254,11 +2290,11 @@ void wpa_sm_notify_assoc(struct wpa_sm *sm, const u8 *bssid) + /* Prepare for the next transition */ + wpa_ft_prepare_auth_request(sm, NULL); + +- clear_ptk = 0; ++ clear_keys = 0; + } + #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R */ + +- if (clear_ptk) { ++ if (clear_keys) { + /* + * IEEE 802.11, 8.4.10: Delete PTK SA on (re)association if + * this is not part of a Fast BSS Transition. +@@ -2268,6 +2304,10 @@ void wpa_sm_notify_assoc(struct wpa_sm *sm, const u8 *bssid) + os_memset(&sm->ptk, 0, sizeof(sm->ptk)); + sm->tptk_set = 0; + os_memset(&sm->tptk, 0, sizeof(sm->tptk)); ++ os_memset(&sm->gtk, 0, sizeof(sm->gtk)); ++#ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W ++ os_memset(&sm->igtk, 0, sizeof(sm->igtk)); ++#endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */ + } + + #ifdef CONFIG_TDLS +@@ -2784,6 +2824,10 @@ void wpa_sm_drop_sa(struct wpa_sm *sm) + os_memset(sm->pmk, 0, sizeof(sm->pmk)); + os_memset(&sm->ptk, 0, sizeof(sm->ptk)); + os_memset(&sm->tptk, 0, sizeof(sm->tptk)); ++ os_memset(&sm->gtk, 0, sizeof(sm->gtk)); ++#ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W ++ os_memset(&sm->igtk, 0, sizeof(sm->igtk)); ++#endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */ + #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R + os_memset(sm->xxkey, 0, sizeof(sm->xxkey)); + os_memset(sm->pmk_r0, 0, sizeof(sm->pmk_r0)); +@@ -2856,29 +2900,11 @@ int wpa_wnmsleep_install_key(struct wpa_sm *sm, u8 subelem_id, u8 *buf) + os_memset(&gd, 0, sizeof(gd)); + #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W + } else if (subelem_id == WNM_SLEEP_SUBELEM_IGTK) { +- struct wpa_igtk_kde igd; +- u16 keyidx; +- +- os_memset(&igd, 0, sizeof(igd)); +- keylen = wpa_cipher_key_len(sm->mgmt_group_cipher); +- os_memcpy(igd.keyid, buf + 2, 2); +- os_memcpy(igd.pn, buf + 4, 6); +- +- keyidx = WPA_GET_LE16(igd.keyid); +- os_memcpy(igd.igtk, buf + 10, keylen); +- +- wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "Install IGTK (WNM SLEEP)", +- igd.igtk, keylen); +- if (wpa_sm_set_key(sm, wpa_cipher_to_alg(sm->mgmt_group_cipher), +- broadcast_ether_addr, +- keyidx, 0, igd.pn, sizeof(igd.pn), +- igd.igtk, keylen) < 0) { +- wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "Failed to install the IGTK in " +- "WNM mode"); +- os_memset(&igd, 0, sizeof(igd)); +- return -1; +- } +- os_memset(&igd, 0, sizeof(igd)); ++ const struct wpa_igtk_kde *igtk; ++ ++ igtk = (const struct wpa_igtk_kde *) (buf + 2); ++ if (wpa_supplicant_install_igtk(sm, igtk) < 0) ++ return -1; + #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */ + } else { + wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "Unknown element id"); +diff --git a/src/rsn_supp/wpa_i.h b/src/rsn_supp/wpa_i.h +index 965a9c1..27b6123 100644 +--- a/src/rsn_supp/wpa_i.h ++++ b/src/rsn_supp/wpa_i.h +@@ -30,6 +30,10 @@ struct wpa_sm { + u8 rx_replay_counter[WPA_REPLAY_COUNTER_LEN]; + int rx_replay_counter_set; + u8 request_counter[WPA_REPLAY_COUNTER_LEN]; ++ struct wpa_gtk gtk; ++#ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W ++ struct wpa_igtk igtk; ++#endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */ + + struct eapol_sm *eapol; /* EAPOL state machine from upper level code */ + +-- +1.9.1 + +From 6e891ae64e9ec9edb17be8ca26dcf109e3250541 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Haiqing Bai +Date: Fri, 13 Oct 2017 10:24:29 +0800 +Subject: [PATCH 3/7] Extend protection of GTK/IGTK reinstallation of WNM-Sleep + Mode cases + +This extends the protection to track last configured GTK/IGTK value +separately from EAPOL-Key frames and WNM-Sleep Mode frames to cover a +corner case where these two different mechanisms may get used when the +GTK/IGTK has changed and tracking a single value is not sufficient to +detect a possible key reconfiguration. + +Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen + +Upstream-Status: Backport + +Signed-off-by: Haiqing Bai +--- + src/rsn_supp/wpa.c | 56 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---------------- + src/rsn_supp/wpa_i.h | 2 ++ + 2 files changed, 41 insertions(+), 17 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c b/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c +index 2c4d9a4..19cc78b 100644 +--- a/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c ++++ b/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c +@@ -681,14 +681,17 @@ struct wpa_gtk_data { + + static int wpa_supplicant_install_gtk(struct wpa_sm *sm, + const struct wpa_gtk_data *gd, +- const u8 *key_rsc) ++ const u8 *key_rsc, int wnm_sleep) + { + const u8 *_gtk = gd->gtk; + u8 gtk_buf[32]; + + /* Detect possible key reinstallation */ +- if (sm->gtk.gtk_len == (size_t) gd->gtk_len && +- os_memcmp(sm->gtk.gtk, gd->gtk, sm->gtk.gtk_len) == 0) { ++ if ((sm->gtk.gtk_len == (size_t) gd->gtk_len && ++ os_memcmp(sm->gtk.gtk, gd->gtk, sm->gtk.gtk_len) == 0) || ++ (sm->gtk_wnm_sleep.gtk_len == (size_t) gd->gtk_len && ++ os_memcmp(sm->gtk_wnm_sleep.gtk, gd->gtk, ++ sm->gtk_wnm_sleep.gtk_len) == 0)) { + wpa_dbg(sm->ctx->msg_ctx, MSG_DEBUG, + "WPA: Not reinstalling already in-use GTK to the driver (keyidx=%d tx=%d len=%d)", + gd->keyidx, gd->tx, gd->gtk_len); +@@ -729,13 +732,18 @@ static int wpa_supplicant_install_gtk(struct wpa_sm *sm, + } + os_memset(gtk_buf, 0, sizeof(gtk_buf)); + +- sm->gtk.gtk_len = gd->gtk_len; +- os_memcpy(sm->gtk.gtk, gd->gtk, sm->gtk.gtk_len); ++ if (wnm_sleep) { ++ sm->gtk_wnm_sleep.gtk_len = gd->gtk_len; ++ os_memcpy(sm->gtk_wnm_sleep.gtk, gd->gtk, ++ sm->gtk_wnm_sleep.gtk_len); ++ } else { ++ sm->gtk.gtk_len = gd->gtk_len; ++ os_memcpy(sm->gtk.gtk, gd->gtk, sm->gtk.gtk_len); ++ } + + return 0; + } + +- + static int wpa_supplicant_gtk_tx_bit_workaround(const struct wpa_sm *sm, + int tx) + { +@@ -789,7 +797,7 @@ static int wpa_supplicant_pairwise_gtk(struct wpa_sm *sm, + (wpa_supplicant_check_group_cipher(sm, sm->group_cipher, + gtk_len, gtk_len, + &gd.key_rsc_len, &gd.alg) || +- wpa_supplicant_install_gtk(sm, &gd, key->key_rsc))) { ++ wpa_supplicant_install_gtk(sm, &gd, key->key_rsc, 0))) { + wpa_dbg(sm->ctx->msg_ctx, MSG_DEBUG, + "RSN: Failed to install GTK"); + os_memset(&gd, 0, sizeof(gd)); +@@ -804,14 +812,18 @@ static int wpa_supplicant_pairwise_gtk(struct wpa_sm *sm, + + #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W + static int wpa_supplicant_install_igtk(struct wpa_sm *sm, +- const struct wpa_igtk_kde *igtk) ++ const struct wpa_igtk_kde *igtk, ++ int wnm_sleep) + { + size_t len = wpa_cipher_key_len(sm->mgmt_group_cipher); + u16 keyidx = WPA_GET_LE16(igtk->keyid); + + /* Detect possible key reinstallation */ +- if (sm->igtk.igtk_len == len && +- os_memcmp(sm->igtk.igtk, igtk->igtk, sm->igtk.igtk_len) == 0) { ++ if ((sm->igtk.igtk_len == len && ++ os_memcmp(sm->igtk.igtk, igtk->igtk, sm->igtk.igtk_len) == 0) || ++ (sm->igtk_wnm_sleep.igtk_len == len && ++ os_memcmp(sm->igtk_wnm_sleep.igtk, igtk->igtk, ++ sm->igtk_wnm_sleep.igtk_len) == 0)) { + wpa_dbg(sm->ctx->msg_ctx, MSG_DEBUG, + "WPA: Not reinstalling already in-use IGTK to the driver (keyidx=%d)", + keyidx); +@@ -836,9 +848,15 @@ static int wpa_supplicant_install_igtk(struct wpa_sm *sm, + return -1; + } + +- sm->igtk.igtk_len = len; +- os_memcpy(sm->igtk.igtk, igtk->igtk, sm->igtk.igtk_len); +- ++ if (wnm_sleep) { ++ sm->igtk_wnm_sleep.igtk_len = len; ++ os_memcpy(sm->igtk_wnm_sleep.igtk, igtk->igtk, ++ sm->igtk_wnm_sleep.igtk_len); ++ } else { ++ sm->igtk.igtk_len = len; ++ os_memcpy(sm->igtk.igtk, igtk->igtk, sm->igtk.igtk_len); ++ } ++ + return 0; + } + #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */ +@@ -859,7 +877,7 @@ static int ieee80211w_set_keys(struct wpa_sm *sm, + return -1; + + igtk = (const struct wpa_igtk_kde *) ie->igtk; +- if (wpa_supplicant_install_igtk(sm, igtk) < 0) ++ if (wpa_supplicant_install_igtk(sm, igtk, 0) < 0) + return -1; + } + +@@ -1502,7 +1520,7 @@ static void wpa_supplicant_process_1_of_2(struct wpa_sm *sm, + if (ret) + goto failed; + +- if (wpa_supplicant_install_gtk(sm, &gd, key->key_rsc) || ++ if (wpa_supplicant_install_gtk(sm, &gd, key->key_rsc, 0) || + wpa_supplicant_send_2_of_2(sm, key, ver, key_info)) + goto failed; + os_memset(&gd, 0, sizeof(gd)); +@@ -2305,8 +2323,10 @@ void wpa_sm_notify_assoc(struct wpa_sm *sm, const u8 *bssid) + sm->tptk_set = 0; + os_memset(&sm->tptk, 0, sizeof(sm->tptk)); + os_memset(&sm->gtk, 0, sizeof(sm->gtk)); ++ os_memset(&sm->gtk_wnm_sleep, 0, sizeof(sm->gtk_wnm_sleep)); + #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W + os_memset(&sm->igtk, 0, sizeof(sm->igtk)); ++ os_memset(&sm->igtk_wnm_sleep, 0, sizeof(sm->igtk_wnm_sleep)); + #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */ + } + +@@ -2825,8 +2845,10 @@ void wpa_sm_drop_sa(struct wpa_sm *sm) + os_memset(&sm->ptk, 0, sizeof(sm->ptk)); + os_memset(&sm->tptk, 0, sizeof(sm->tptk)); + os_memset(&sm->gtk, 0, sizeof(sm->gtk)); ++ os_memset(&sm->gtk_wnm_sleep, 0, sizeof(sm->gtk_wnm_sleep)); + #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W + os_memset(&sm->igtk, 0, sizeof(sm->igtk)); ++ os_memset(&sm->igtk_wnm_sleep, 0, sizeof(sm->igtk_wnm_sleep)); + #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */ + #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R + os_memset(sm->xxkey, 0, sizeof(sm->xxkey)); +@@ -2891,7 +2913,7 @@ int wpa_wnmsleep_install_key(struct wpa_sm *sm, u8 subelem_id, u8 *buf) + + wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "Install GTK (WNM SLEEP)", + gd.gtk, gd.gtk_len); +- if (wpa_supplicant_install_gtk(sm, &gd, key_rsc)) { ++ if (wpa_supplicant_install_gtk(sm, &gd, key_rsc, 1)) { + os_memset(&gd, 0, sizeof(gd)); + wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "Failed to install the GTK in " + "WNM mode"); +@@ -2903,7 +2925,7 @@ int wpa_wnmsleep_install_key(struct wpa_sm *sm, u8 subelem_id, u8 *buf) + const struct wpa_igtk_kde *igtk; + + igtk = (const struct wpa_igtk_kde *) (buf + 2); +- if (wpa_supplicant_install_igtk(sm, igtk) < 0) ++ if (wpa_supplicant_install_igtk(sm, igtk, 1) < 0) + return -1; + #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */ + } else { +diff --git a/src/rsn_supp/wpa_i.h b/src/rsn_supp/wpa_i.h +index 27b6123..51753ee 100644 +--- a/src/rsn_supp/wpa_i.h ++++ b/src/rsn_supp/wpa_i.h +@@ -31,8 +31,10 @@ struct wpa_sm { + int rx_replay_counter_set; + u8 request_counter[WPA_REPLAY_COUNTER_LEN]; + struct wpa_gtk gtk; ++ struct wpa_gtk gtk_wnm_sleep; + #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W + struct wpa_igtk igtk; ++ struct wpa_igtk igtk_wnm_sleep; + #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */ + + struct eapol_sm *eapol; /* EAPOL state machine from upper level code */ +-- +1.9.1 + +From 20280c8155506da6f1fc46f4fb345bc1ddaf1684 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Haiqing Bai +Date: Fri, 13 Oct 2017 10:32:52 +0800 +Subject: [PATCH 4/7] Prevent installation of an all-zero TK + +Properly track whether a PTK has already been installed to the driver +and the TK part cleared from memory. This prevents an attacker from +trying to trick the client into installing an all-zero TK. + +Signed-off-by: Mathy Vanhoef + +Upstream-Status: Backport + +Signed-off-by: Haiqing Bai +--- + src/common/wpa_common.h | 1 + + src/rsn_supp/wpa.c | 7 +++++++ + 2 files changed, 8 insertions(+) + +diff --git a/src/common/wpa_common.h b/src/common/wpa_common.h +index 66f9977..5632d37 100644 +--- a/src/common/wpa_common.h ++++ b/src/common/wpa_common.h +@@ -222,6 +222,7 @@ struct wpa_ptk { + size_t kck_len; + size_t kek_len; + size_t tk_len; ++ int installed; /* 1 if key has already been installed to driver */ + }; + + struct wpa_gtk { +diff --git a/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c b/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c +index 19cc78b..97de8d3 100644 +--- a/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c ++++ b/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c +@@ -594,6 +594,12 @@ static int wpa_supplicant_install_ptk(struct wpa_sm *sm, + const u8 *key_rsc; + u8 null_rsc[8] = { 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0 }; + ++ if (sm->ptk.installed) { ++ wpa_dbg(sm->ctx->msg_ctx, MSG_DEBUG, ++ "WPA: Do not re-install same PTK to the driver"); ++ return 0; ++ } ++ + wpa_dbg(sm->ctx->msg_ctx, MSG_DEBUG, + "WPA: Installing PTK to the driver"); + +@@ -632,6 +638,7 @@ static int wpa_supplicant_install_ptk(struct wpa_sm *sm, + + /* TK is not needed anymore in supplicant */ + os_memset(sm->ptk.tk, 0, WPA_TK_MAX_LEN); ++ sm->ptk.installed = 1; + + if (sm->wpa_ptk_rekey) { + eloop_cancel_timeout(wpa_sm_rekey_ptk, sm, NULL); +-- +1.9.1 + +From 39c0043c282ea1901eb37c902f663c8ab019fc63 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Haiqing Bai +Date: Fri, 13 Oct 2017 10:40:31 +0800 +Subject: [PATCH 5/7] Fix PTK rekeying to generate a new ANonce + +The Authenticator state machine path for PTK rekeying ended up bypassing +the AUTHENTICATION2 state where a new ANonce is generated when going +directly to the PTKSTART state since there is no need to try to +determine the PMK again in such a case. This is far from ideal since the +new PTK would depend on a new nonce only from the supplicant. + +Fix this by generating a new ANonce when moving to the PTKSTART state +for the purpose of starting new 4-way handshake to rekey PTK. + +Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen + +Upstream-Status: Backport + +Signed-off-by: Haiqing Bai +--- + src/ap/wpa_auth.c | 22 +++++++++++++++++++--- + 1 file changed, 19 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/src/ap/wpa_auth.c b/src/ap/wpa_auth.c +index 0ebbdb5..5084b74 100644 +--- a/src/ap/wpa_auth.c ++++ b/src/ap/wpa_auth.c +@@ -1858,6 +1858,19 @@ SM_STATE(WPA_PTK, AUTHENTICATION2) + sm->TimeoutCtr = 0; + } + ++static int wpa_auth_sm_ptk_update(struct wpa_state_machine *sm) ++{ ++ if (random_get_bytes(sm->ANonce, WPA_NONCE_LEN)) { ++ wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR, ++ "WPA: Failed to get random data for ANonce"); ++ sm->Disconnect = TRUE; ++ return -1; ++ } ++ wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "WPA: Assign new ANonce", sm->ANonce, ++ WPA_NONCE_LEN); ++ sm->TimeoutCtr = 0; ++ return 0; ++} + + SM_STATE(WPA_PTK, INITPMK) + { +@@ -2377,9 +2390,12 @@ SM_STEP(WPA_PTK) + SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK, AUTHENTICATION); + else if (sm->ReAuthenticationRequest) + SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK, AUTHENTICATION2); +- else if (sm->PTKRequest) +- SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK, PTKSTART); +- else switch (sm->wpa_ptk_state) { ++ else if (sm->PTKRequest) { ++ if (wpa_auth_sm_ptk_update(sm) < 0) ++ SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK, DISCONNECTED); ++ else ++ SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK, PTKSTART); ++ } else switch (sm->wpa_ptk_state) { + case WPA_PTK_INITIALIZE: + break; + case WPA_PTK_DISCONNECT: +-- +1.9.1 + +From e1b4fa806a88ade798722fccf16ee07f6df1413a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Haiqing Bai +Date: Fri, 13 Oct 2017 10:55:03 +0800 +Subject: [PATCH 6/7] TDLS: Reject TPK-TK reconfiguration + +Do not try to reconfigure the same TPK-TK to the driver after it has +been successfully configured. This is an explicit check to avoid issues +related to resetting the TX/RX packet number. There was already a check +for this for TPK M2 (retries of that message are ignored completely), so +that behavior does not get modified. + +For TPK M3, the TPK-TK could have been reconfigured, but that was +followed by immediate teardown of the link due to an issue in updating +the STA entry. Furthermore, for TDLS with any real security (i.e., +ignoring open/WEP), the TPK message exchange is protected on the AP path +and simple replay attacks are not feasible. + +As an additional corner case, make sure the local nonce gets updated if +the peer uses a very unlikely "random nonce" of all zeros. + +Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen + +Upstream-Status: Backport + +Signed-off-by: Haiqing Bai +--- + src/rsn_supp/tdls.c | 36 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-- + 1 file changed, 34 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/src/rsn_supp/tdls.c b/src/rsn_supp/tdls.c +index c1d7749..8633b8f 100644 +--- a/src/rsn_supp/tdls.c ++++ b/src/rsn_supp/tdls.c +@@ -111,6 +111,7 @@ struct wpa_tdls_peer { + u8 tk[16]; /* TPK-TK; assuming only CCMP will be used */ + } tpk; + int tpk_set; ++ int tk_set; /* TPK-TK configured to the driver */ + int tpk_success; + int tpk_in_progress; + +@@ -191,6 +192,20 @@ static int wpa_tdls_set_key(struct wpa_sm *sm, struct wpa_tdls_peer *peer) + u8 rsc[6]; + enum wpa_alg alg; + ++ if (peer->tk_set) { ++ /* ++ * This same TPK-TK has already been configured to the driver ++ * and this new configuration attempt (likely due to an ++ * unexpected retransmitted frame) would result in clearing ++ * the TX/RX sequence number which can break security, so must ++ * not allow that to happen. ++ */ ++ wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "TDLS: TPK-TK for the peer " MACSTR ++ " has already been configured to the driver - do not reconfigure", ++ MAC2STR(peer->addr)); ++ return -1; ++ } ++ + os_memset(rsc, 0, 6); + + switch (peer->cipher) { +@@ -208,12 +223,15 @@ static int wpa_tdls_set_key(struct wpa_sm *sm, struct wpa_tdls_peer *peer) + return -1; + } + ++ wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "TDLS: Configure pairwise key for peer " MACSTR, ++ MAC2STR(peer->addr)); + if (wpa_sm_set_key(sm, alg, peer->addr, -1, 1, + rsc, sizeof(rsc), peer->tpk.tk, key_len) < 0) { + wpa_printf(MSG_WARNING, "TDLS: Failed to set TPK to the " + "driver"); + return -1; + } ++ peer->tk_set = 1; + return 0; + } + +@@ -689,7 +707,7 @@ static void wpa_tdls_peer_clear(struct wpa_sm *sm, struct wpa_tdls_peer *peer) + peer->cipher = 0; + peer->qos_info = 0; + peer->wmm_capable = 0; +- peer->tpk_set = peer->tpk_success = 0; ++ peer->tk_set = peer->tpk_set = peer->tpk_success = 0; + peer->chan_switch_enabled = 0; + os_memset(&peer->tpk, 0, sizeof(peer->tpk)); + os_memset(peer->inonce, 0, WPA_NONCE_LEN); +@@ -1152,6 +1170,7 @@ skip_rsnie: + wpa_tdls_peer_free(sm, peer); + return -1; + } ++ peer->tk_set = 0; /* A new nonce results in a new TK */ + wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "TDLS: Initiator Nonce for TPK handshake", + peer->inonce, WPA_NONCE_LEN); + os_memcpy(ftie->Snonce, peer->inonce, WPA_NONCE_LEN); +@@ -1747,6 +1766,17 @@ static int wpa_tdls_addset_peer(struct wpa_sm *sm, struct wpa_tdls_peer *peer, + peer->supp_oper_classes_len); + } + ++static int tdls_nonce_set(const u8 *nonce) ++{ ++ int i; ++ ++ for (i = 0; i < WPA_NONCE_LEN; i++) { ++ if (nonce[i]) ++ return 1; ++ } ++ ++ return 0; ++} + + static int wpa_tdls_process_tpk_m1(struct wpa_sm *sm, const u8 *src_addr, + const u8 *buf, size_t len) +@@ -2001,7 +2031,8 @@ skip_rsn: + peer->rsnie_i_len = kde.rsn_ie_len; + peer->cipher = cipher; + +- if (os_memcmp(peer->inonce, ftie->Snonce, WPA_NONCE_LEN) != 0) { ++ if (os_memcmp(peer->inonce, ftie->Snonce, WPA_NONCE_LEN) != 0 || ++ !tdls_nonce_set(peer->inonce)) { + /* + * There is no point in updating the RNonce for every obtained + * TPK M1 frame (e.g., retransmission due to timeout) with the +@@ -2017,6 +2048,7 @@ skip_rsn: + "TDLS: Failed to get random data for responder nonce"); + goto error; + } ++ peer->tk_set = 0; /* A new nonce results in a new TK */ + } + + #if 0 +-- +1.9.1 + +From 6d966716df42d379c0aaa1b833f070b93a29aaec Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Haiqing Bai +Date: Fri, 13 Oct 2017 11:07:21 +0800 +Subject: [PATCH 7/7] FT: Do not allow multiple Reassociation Response frames + +The driver is expected to not report a second association event without +the station having explicitly request a new association. As such, this +case should not be reachable. However, since reconfiguring the same +pairwise or group keys to the driver could result in nonce reuse issues, +be extra careful here and do an additional state check to avoid this +even if the local driver ends up somehow accepting an unexpected +Reassociation Response frame. + +Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen + +Upstream-Status: Backport + +Signed-off-by: Haiqing Bai +--- + src/rsn_supp/wpa.c | 3 +++ + src/rsn_supp/wpa_ft.c | 8 ++++++++ + src/rsn_supp/wpa_i.h | 1 + + 3 files changed, 12 insertions(+) + +diff --git a/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c b/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c +index 97de8d3..b9c1ab5 100644 +--- a/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c ++++ b/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c +@@ -2366,6 +2366,9 @@ void wpa_sm_notify_disassoc(struct wpa_sm *sm) + #ifdef CONFIG_TDLS + wpa_tdls_disassoc(sm); + #endif /* CONFIG_TDLS */ ++#ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R ++ sm->ft_reassoc_completed = 0; ++#endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R */ + + /* Keys are not needed in the WPA state machine anymore */ + wpa_sm_drop_sa(sm); +diff --git a/src/rsn_supp/wpa_ft.c b/src/rsn_supp/wpa_ft.c +index 06dea05..e8834dd 100644 +--- a/src/rsn_supp/wpa_ft.c ++++ b/src/rsn_supp/wpa_ft.c +@@ -153,6 +153,7 @@ static u8 * wpa_ft_gen_req_ies(struct wpa_sm *sm, size_t *len, + u16 capab; + + sm->ft_completed = 0; ++ sm->ft_reassoc_completed = 0; + + buf_len = 2 + sizeof(struct rsn_mdie) + 2 + sizeof(struct rsn_ftie) + + 2 + sm->r0kh_id_len + ric_ies_len + 100; +@@ -683,6 +684,11 @@ int wpa_ft_validate_reassoc_resp(struct wpa_sm *sm, const u8 *ies, + return -1; + } + ++ if (sm->ft_reassoc_completed) { ++ wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "FT: Reassociation has already been completed for this FT protocol instance - ignore unexpected retransmission"); ++ return 0; ++ } ++ + if (wpa_ft_parse_ies(ies, ies_len, &parse) < 0) { + wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "FT: Failed to parse IEs"); + return -1; +@@ -783,6 +789,8 @@ int wpa_ft_validate_reassoc_resp(struct wpa_sm *sm, const u8 *ies, + return -1; + } + ++ sm->ft_reassoc_completed = 1; ++ + if (wpa_ft_process_gtk_subelem(sm, parse.gtk, parse.gtk_len) < 0) + return -1; + +diff --git a/src/rsn_supp/wpa_i.h b/src/rsn_supp/wpa_i.h +index 51753ee..85cc862 100644 +--- a/src/rsn_supp/wpa_i.h ++++ b/src/rsn_supp/wpa_i.h +@@ -127,6 +127,7 @@ struct wpa_sm { + size_t r0kh_id_len; + u8 r1kh_id[FT_R1KH_ID_LEN]; + int ft_completed; ++ int ft_reassoc_completed; + int over_the_ds_in_progress; + u8 target_ap[ETH_ALEN]; /* over-the-DS target AP */ + int set_ptk_after_assoc; +-- +1.9.1 + diff --git a/meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant_2.4.bb b/meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant_2.4.bb index 6e4d0281125..fe2ff0f30b4 100644 --- a/meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant_2.4.bb +++ b/meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant_2.4.bb @@ -33,6 +33,7 @@ SRC_URI = "http://hostap.epitest.fi/releases/wpa_supplicant-${PV}.tar.gz \ file://0004-EAP-pwd-server-Fix-Total-Length-parsing-for-fragment.patch \ file://0005-EAP-pwd-peer-Fix-asymmetric-fragmentation-behavior.patch \ file://0001-NFC-Fix-payload-length-validation-in-NDEF-record-par.patch \ + file://key-replay-cve-multiple.patch \ " SRC_URI[md5sum] = "f0037dbe03897dcaf2ad2722e659095d" SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "058dc832c096139a059e6df814080f50251a8d313c21b13364c54a1e70109122"