diff mbox series

[PATCHv3,03/11] arm64/kvm: hide ptrauth from guests

Message ID 20180417183735.56985-4-mark.rutland@arm.com
State Superseded
Headers show
Series ARMv8.3 pointer authentication userspace support | expand

Commit Message

Mark Rutland April 17, 2018, 6:37 p.m. UTC
In subsequent patches we're going to expose ptrauth to the host kernel
and userspace, but things are a bit trickier for guest kernels. For the
time being, let's hide ptrauth from KVM guests.

Regardless of how well-behaved the guest kernel is, guest userspace
could attempt to use ptrauth instructions, triggering a trap to EL2,
resulting in noise from kvm_handle_unknown_ec(). So let's write up a
handler for the PAC trap, which silently injects an UNDEF into the
guest, as if the feature were really missing.

Signed-off-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>

Cc: Christoffer Dall <cdall@kernel.org>
Cc: Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com>
Cc: kvmarm@lists.cs.columbia.edu
---
 arch/arm64/kvm/handle_exit.c | 18 ++++++++++++++++++
 arch/arm64/kvm/sys_regs.c    |  9 +++++++++
 2 files changed, 27 insertions(+)

-- 
2.11.0

Comments

Andrew Jones April 18, 2018, 1:19 p.m. UTC | #1
On Tue, Apr 17, 2018 at 07:37:27PM +0100, Mark Rutland wrote:
> In subsequent patches we're going to expose ptrauth to the host kernel

> and userspace, but things are a bit trickier for guest kernels. For the

> time being, let's hide ptrauth from KVM guests.

> 

> Regardless of how well-behaved the guest kernel is, guest userspace

> could attempt to use ptrauth instructions, triggering a trap to EL2,

> resulting in noise from kvm_handle_unknown_ec(). So let's write up a

> handler for the PAC trap, which silently injects an UNDEF into the

> guest, as if the feature were really missing.

> 

> Signed-off-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>

> Cc: Christoffer Dall <cdall@kernel.org>

> Cc: Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com>

> Cc: kvmarm@lists.cs.columbia.edu

> ---

>  arch/arm64/kvm/handle_exit.c | 18 ++++++++++++++++++

>  arch/arm64/kvm/sys_regs.c    |  9 +++++++++

>  2 files changed, 27 insertions(+)

> 

> diff --git a/arch/arm64/kvm/handle_exit.c b/arch/arm64/kvm/handle_exit.c

> index e5e741bfffe1..5114ad691eae 100644

> --- a/arch/arm64/kvm/handle_exit.c

> +++ b/arch/arm64/kvm/handle_exit.c

> @@ -173,6 +173,23 @@ static int handle_sve(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct kvm_run *run)

>  	return 1;

>  }

>  

> +/*

> + * Guest usage of a ptrauth instruction (which the guest EL1 did not turn into

> + * a NOP), or guest EL1 access to a ptrauth register.

> + */

> +static int kvm_handle_ptrauth(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct kvm_run *run)

> +{

> +	/*

> +	 * We don't currently suport ptrauth in a guest, and we mask the ID

> +	 * registers to prevent well-behaved guests from trying to make use of

> +	 * it.

> +	 *

> +	 * Inject an UNDEF, as if the feature really isn't present.

> +	 */

> +	kvm_inject_undefined(vcpu);

> +	return 1;

> +}

> +

>  static exit_handle_fn arm_exit_handlers[] = {

>  	[0 ... ESR_ELx_EC_MAX]	= kvm_handle_unknown_ec,

>  	[ESR_ELx_EC_WFx]	= kvm_handle_wfx,

> @@ -195,6 +212,7 @@ static exit_handle_fn arm_exit_handlers[] = {

>  	[ESR_ELx_EC_BKPT32]	= kvm_handle_guest_debug,

>  	[ESR_ELx_EC_BRK64]	= kvm_handle_guest_debug,

>  	[ESR_ELx_EC_FP_ASIMD]	= handle_no_fpsimd,

> +	[ESR_ELx_EC_PAC]	= kvm_handle_ptrauth,

>  };

>  

>  static exit_handle_fn kvm_get_exit_handler(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)

> diff --git a/arch/arm64/kvm/sys_regs.c b/arch/arm64/kvm/sys_regs.c

> index 806b0b126a64..eee399c35e84 100644

> --- a/arch/arm64/kvm/sys_regs.c

> +++ b/arch/arm64/kvm/sys_regs.c

> @@ -1000,6 +1000,15 @@ static u64 read_id_reg(struct sys_reg_desc const *r, bool raz)

>  				    task_pid_nr(current));

>  

>  		val &= ~(0xfUL << ID_AA64PFR0_SVE_SHIFT);

> +	} else if (id == SYS_ID_AA64ISAR1_EL1) {

> +		const u64 ptrauth_mask = (0xfUL << ID_AA64ISAR1_APA_SHIFT) |

> +					 (0xfUL << ID_AA64ISAR1_API_SHIFT) |

> +					 (0xfUL << ID_AA64ISAR1_GPA_SHIFT) |

> +					 (0xfUL << ID_AA64ISAR1_GPI_SHIFT);

> +		if (val & ptrauth_mask)

> +			pr_err_once("kvm [%i]: ptrauth unsupported for guests, suppressing\n",

> +					task_pid_nr(current));


Marc just changed the equivalent SVE pr_err_once() to kvm_debug().
So we probably want to do the same here.

> +		val &= ~ptrauth_mask;

>  	} else if (id == SYS_ID_AA64MMFR1_EL1) {

>  		if (val & (0xfUL << ID_AA64MMFR1_LOR_SHIFT))

>  			pr_err_once("kvm [%i]: LORegions unsupported for guests, suppressing\n",

> -- 

> 2.11.0

>


Otherwise
 
Reviewed-by: Andrew Jones <drjones@redhat.com>
Mark Rutland April 18, 2018, 1:47 p.m. UTC | #2
On Wed, Apr 18, 2018 at 03:19:26PM +0200, Andrew Jones wrote:
> On Tue, Apr 17, 2018 at 07:37:27PM +0100, Mark Rutland wrote:

> > @@ -1000,6 +1000,15 @@ static u64 read_id_reg(struct sys_reg_desc const *r, bool raz)

> >  				    task_pid_nr(current));

> >  

> >  		val &= ~(0xfUL << ID_AA64PFR0_SVE_SHIFT);

> > +	} else if (id == SYS_ID_AA64ISAR1_EL1) {

> > +		const u64 ptrauth_mask = (0xfUL << ID_AA64ISAR1_APA_SHIFT) |

> > +					 (0xfUL << ID_AA64ISAR1_API_SHIFT) |

> > +					 (0xfUL << ID_AA64ISAR1_GPA_SHIFT) |

> > +					 (0xfUL << ID_AA64ISAR1_GPI_SHIFT);

> > +		if (val & ptrauth_mask)

> > +			pr_err_once("kvm [%i]: ptrauth unsupported for guests, suppressing\n",

> > +					task_pid_nr(current));

> 

> Marc just changed the equivalent SVE pr_err_once() to kvm_debug().

> So we probably want to do the same here.


Good point. Done.

> > +		val &= ~ptrauth_mask;

> >  	} else if (id == SYS_ID_AA64MMFR1_EL1) {

> >  		if (val & (0xfUL << ID_AA64MMFR1_LOR_SHIFT))

> >  			pr_err_once("kvm [%i]: LORegions unsupported for guests, suppressing\n",

> > -- 

> > 2.11.0

> >

> 

> Otherwise

>  

> Reviewed-by: Andrew Jones <drjones@redhat.com>


Cheers!

Mark.
Christoffer Dall April 27, 2018, 9:51 a.m. UTC | #3
On Tue, Apr 17, 2018 at 07:37:27PM +0100, Mark Rutland wrote:
> In subsequent patches we're going to expose ptrauth to the host kernel

> and userspace, but things are a bit trickier for guest kernels. For the

> time being, let's hide ptrauth from KVM guests.

> 

> Regardless of how well-behaved the guest kernel is, guest userspace

> could attempt to use ptrauth instructions, triggering a trap to EL2,

> resulting in noise from kvm_handle_unknown_ec(). So let's write up a

> handler for the PAC trap, which silently injects an UNDEF into the

> guest, as if the feature were really missing.

> 

> Signed-off-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>

> Cc: Christoffer Dall <cdall@kernel.org>

> Cc: Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com>

> Cc: kvmarm@lists.cs.columbia.edu

> ---

>  arch/arm64/kvm/handle_exit.c | 18 ++++++++++++++++++

>  arch/arm64/kvm/sys_regs.c    |  9 +++++++++

>  2 files changed, 27 insertions(+)

> 

> diff --git a/arch/arm64/kvm/handle_exit.c b/arch/arm64/kvm/handle_exit.c

> index e5e741bfffe1..5114ad691eae 100644

> --- a/arch/arm64/kvm/handle_exit.c

> +++ b/arch/arm64/kvm/handle_exit.c

> @@ -173,6 +173,23 @@ static int handle_sve(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct kvm_run *run)

>  	return 1;

>  }

>  

> +/*

> + * Guest usage of a ptrauth instruction (which the guest EL1 did not turn into

> + * a NOP), or guest EL1 access to a ptrauth register.

> + */

> +static int kvm_handle_ptrauth(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct kvm_run *run)

> +{

> +	/*

> +	 * We don't currently suport ptrauth in a guest, and we mask the ID

> +	 * registers to prevent well-behaved guests from trying to make use of

> +	 * it.

> +	 *

> +	 * Inject an UNDEF, as if the feature really isn't present.

> +	 */

> +	kvm_inject_undefined(vcpu);

> +	return 1;

> +}

> +

>  static exit_handle_fn arm_exit_handlers[] = {

>  	[0 ... ESR_ELx_EC_MAX]	= kvm_handle_unknown_ec,

>  	[ESR_ELx_EC_WFx]	= kvm_handle_wfx,

> @@ -195,6 +212,7 @@ static exit_handle_fn arm_exit_handlers[] = {

>  	[ESR_ELx_EC_BKPT32]	= kvm_handle_guest_debug,

>  	[ESR_ELx_EC_BRK64]	= kvm_handle_guest_debug,

>  	[ESR_ELx_EC_FP_ASIMD]	= handle_no_fpsimd,

> +	[ESR_ELx_EC_PAC]	= kvm_handle_ptrauth,

>  };

>  

>  static exit_handle_fn kvm_get_exit_handler(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)

> diff --git a/arch/arm64/kvm/sys_regs.c b/arch/arm64/kvm/sys_regs.c

> index 806b0b126a64..eee399c35e84 100644

> --- a/arch/arm64/kvm/sys_regs.c

> +++ b/arch/arm64/kvm/sys_regs.c

> @@ -1000,6 +1000,15 @@ static u64 read_id_reg(struct sys_reg_desc const *r, bool raz)

>  				    task_pid_nr(current));

>  

>  		val &= ~(0xfUL << ID_AA64PFR0_SVE_SHIFT);

> +	} else if (id == SYS_ID_AA64ISAR1_EL1) {

> +		const u64 ptrauth_mask = (0xfUL << ID_AA64ISAR1_APA_SHIFT) |

> +					 (0xfUL << ID_AA64ISAR1_API_SHIFT) |

> +					 (0xfUL << ID_AA64ISAR1_GPA_SHIFT) |

> +					 (0xfUL << ID_AA64ISAR1_GPI_SHIFT);

> +		if (val & ptrauth_mask)

> +			pr_err_once("kvm [%i]: ptrauth unsupported for guests, suppressing\n",

> +					task_pid_nr(current));

> +		val &= ~ptrauth_mask;

>  	} else if (id == SYS_ID_AA64MMFR1_EL1) {

>  		if (val & (0xfUL << ID_AA64MMFR1_LOR_SHIFT))

>  			pr_err_once("kvm [%i]: LORegions unsupported for guests, suppressing\n",

> -- 

> 2.11.0

> 


With the change to the debugging print:

Reviewed-by: Christoffer Dall <christoffer.dall@arm.com>
diff mbox series

Patch

diff --git a/arch/arm64/kvm/handle_exit.c b/arch/arm64/kvm/handle_exit.c
index e5e741bfffe1..5114ad691eae 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/kvm/handle_exit.c
+++ b/arch/arm64/kvm/handle_exit.c
@@ -173,6 +173,23 @@  static int handle_sve(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct kvm_run *run)
 	return 1;
 }
 
+/*
+ * Guest usage of a ptrauth instruction (which the guest EL1 did not turn into
+ * a NOP), or guest EL1 access to a ptrauth register.
+ */
+static int kvm_handle_ptrauth(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct kvm_run *run)
+{
+	/*
+	 * We don't currently suport ptrauth in a guest, and we mask the ID
+	 * registers to prevent well-behaved guests from trying to make use of
+	 * it.
+	 *
+	 * Inject an UNDEF, as if the feature really isn't present.
+	 */
+	kvm_inject_undefined(vcpu);
+	return 1;
+}
+
 static exit_handle_fn arm_exit_handlers[] = {
 	[0 ... ESR_ELx_EC_MAX]	= kvm_handle_unknown_ec,
 	[ESR_ELx_EC_WFx]	= kvm_handle_wfx,
@@ -195,6 +212,7 @@  static exit_handle_fn arm_exit_handlers[] = {
 	[ESR_ELx_EC_BKPT32]	= kvm_handle_guest_debug,
 	[ESR_ELx_EC_BRK64]	= kvm_handle_guest_debug,
 	[ESR_ELx_EC_FP_ASIMD]	= handle_no_fpsimd,
+	[ESR_ELx_EC_PAC]	= kvm_handle_ptrauth,
 };
 
 static exit_handle_fn kvm_get_exit_handler(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
diff --git a/arch/arm64/kvm/sys_regs.c b/arch/arm64/kvm/sys_regs.c
index 806b0b126a64..eee399c35e84 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/kvm/sys_regs.c
+++ b/arch/arm64/kvm/sys_regs.c
@@ -1000,6 +1000,15 @@  static u64 read_id_reg(struct sys_reg_desc const *r, bool raz)
 				    task_pid_nr(current));
 
 		val &= ~(0xfUL << ID_AA64PFR0_SVE_SHIFT);
+	} else if (id == SYS_ID_AA64ISAR1_EL1) {
+		const u64 ptrauth_mask = (0xfUL << ID_AA64ISAR1_APA_SHIFT) |
+					 (0xfUL << ID_AA64ISAR1_API_SHIFT) |
+					 (0xfUL << ID_AA64ISAR1_GPA_SHIFT) |
+					 (0xfUL << ID_AA64ISAR1_GPI_SHIFT);
+		if (val & ptrauth_mask)
+			pr_err_once("kvm [%i]: ptrauth unsupported for guests, suppressing\n",
+					task_pid_nr(current));
+		val &= ~ptrauth_mask;
 	} else if (id == SYS_ID_AA64MMFR1_EL1) {
 		if (val & (0xfUL << ID_AA64MMFR1_LOR_SHIFT))
 			pr_err_once("kvm [%i]: LORegions unsupported for guests, suppressing\n",