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[API-NEXT,v1,8/16] linux-generic: crypto: remote extra memcpy in AES-GCM

Message ID 1495450806-27703-9-git-send-email-odpbot@yandex.ru
State Superseded
Headers show
Series [API-NEXT,v1,1/16] test: crypto: explicitly pass auth_digest_len to crypto subsystem | expand

Commit Message

Github ODP bot May 22, 2017, 10:59 a.m. UTC 
From: Dmitry Eremin-Solenikov <dmitry.ereminsolenikov@linaro.org>


There is no need to memcpy IV if it gets passed to EVP functions.

Signed-off-by: Dmitry Eremin-Solenikov <dmitry.ereminsolenikov@linaro.org>

---
/** Email created from pull request 34 (lumag:crypto-update-main-new)
 ** https://github.com/Linaro/odp/pull/34
 ** Patch: https://github.com/Linaro/odp/pull/34.patch
 ** Base sha: 826ee894aa0ebd09d42a17e1de077c46bc5b366a
 ** Merge commit sha: 225ede5cef6eb46fc9e1d1d385ac8be0b57c64f5
 **/
 platform/linux-generic/odp_crypto.c | 20 ++------------------
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 18 deletions(-)
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Patch

diff --git a/platform/linux-generic/odp_crypto.c b/platform/linux-generic/odp_crypto.c
index 156aab30..3fc3580d 100644
--- a/platform/linux-generic/odp_crypto.c
+++ b/platform/linux-generic/odp_crypto.c
@@ -275,7 +275,6 @@  odp_crypto_alg_err_t aes_gcm_encrypt(odp_crypto_op_param_t *param,
 	uint32_t plain_len   = param->cipher_range.length;
 	const uint8_t *aad_head = param->aad.ptr;
 	uint32_t aad_len = param->aad.length;
-	unsigned char iv_enc[AES_BLOCK_SIZE];
 	void *iv_ptr;
 	uint8_t *tag = data + param->hash_result_offset;
 
@@ -286,13 +285,6 @@  odp_crypto_alg_err_t aes_gcm_encrypt(odp_crypto_op_param_t *param,
 	else
 		return ODP_CRYPTO_ALG_ERR_IV_INVALID;
 
-	/*
-	 * Create a copy of the IV.  The DES library modifies IV
-	 * and if we are processing packets on parallel threads
-	 * we could get corruption.
-	 */
-	memcpy(iv_enc, iv_ptr, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
-
 	/* Adjust pointer for beginning of area to cipher/auth */
 	uint8_t *plaindata = data + param->cipher_range.offset;
 
@@ -300,7 +292,7 @@  odp_crypto_alg_err_t aes_gcm_encrypt(odp_crypto_op_param_t *param,
 	EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx = session->cipher.data.aes_gcm.ctx;
 	int cipher_len = 0;
 
-	EVP_EncryptInit_ex(ctx, NULL, NULL, NULL, iv_enc);
+	EVP_EncryptInit_ex(ctx, NULL, NULL, NULL, iv_ptr);
 
 	/* Authenticate header data (if any) without encrypting them */
 	if (aad_len > 0)
@@ -325,7 +317,6 @@  odp_crypto_alg_err_t aes_gcm_decrypt(odp_crypto_op_param_t *param,
 	uint32_t cipher_len   = param->cipher_range.length;
 	const uint8_t *aad_head = param->aad.ptr;
 	uint32_t aad_len = param->aad.length;
-	unsigned char iv_enc[AES_BLOCK_SIZE];
 	void *iv_ptr;
 	uint8_t *tag   = data + param->hash_result_offset;
 
@@ -336,20 +327,13 @@  odp_crypto_alg_err_t aes_gcm_decrypt(odp_crypto_op_param_t *param,
 	else
 		return ODP_CRYPTO_ALG_ERR_IV_INVALID;
 
-	/*
-	 * Create a copy of the IV.  The DES library modifies IV
-	 * and if we are processing packets on parallel threads
-	 * we could get corruption.
-	 */
-	memcpy(iv_enc, iv_ptr, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
-
 	/* Adjust pointer for beginning of area to cipher/auth */
 	uint8_t *cipherdata = data + param->cipher_range.offset;
 	/* Encrypt it */
 	EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx = session->cipher.data.aes_gcm.ctx;
 	int plain_len = 0;
 
-	EVP_DecryptInit_ex(ctx, NULL, NULL, NULL, iv_enc);
+	EVP_DecryptInit_ex(ctx, NULL, NULL, NULL, iv_ptr);
 
 	EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ctx, EVP_CTRL_GCM_SET_TAG,
 			    session->p.auth_digest_len, tag);