new file mode 100644
@@ -0,0 +1,943 @@
+The WPA2 four-way handshake protocol is vulnerable to replay attacks which can
+result in unauthenticated clients gaining access to the network.
+
+Backport a number of patches from upstream to fix this.
+
+CVE: CVE-2017-13077
+CVE: CVE-2017-13078
+CVE: CVE-2017-13079
+CVE: CVE-2017-13080
+CVE: CVE-2017-13081
+CVE: CVE-2017-13082
+CVE: CVE-2017-13086
+CVE: CVE-2017-13087
+CVE: CVE-2017-13088
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport
+Signed-off-by: Ross Burton <ross.burton@intel.com>
+
+From 859e243137203d2389e20103a9947cf76082022e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Haiqing Bai <Haiqing.Bai@windriver.com>
+Date: Fri, 13 Oct 2017 09:37:06 +0800
+Subject: [PATCH 1/7] hostapd: Avoid key reinstallation in FT handshake
+
+Do not reinstall TK to the driver during Reassociation Response frame
+processing if the first attempt of setting the TK succeeded. This avoids
+issues related to clearing the TX/RX PN that could result in reusing
+same PN values for transmitted frames (e.g., due to CCM nonce reuse and
+also hitting replay protection on the receiver) and accepting replayed
+frames on RX side.
+
+This issue was introduced by the commit
+0e84c25434e6a1f283c7b4e62e483729085b78d2 ('FT: Fix PTK configuration in
+authenticator') which allowed wpa_ft_install_ptk() to be called multiple
+times with the same PTK. While the second configuration attempt is
+needed with some drivers, it must be done only if the first attempt
+failed.
+
+Signed-off-by: Mathy Vanhoef <Mathy.Vanhoef@cs.kuleuven.be>
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport
+
+Signed-off-by: Haiqing Bai <Haiqing.Bai@windriver.com>
+---
+ src/ap/wpa_auth.c | 11 ++++++++++-
+ src/ap/wpa_auth.h | 3 ++-
+ src/ap/wpa_auth_ft.c | 10 ++++++++++
+ src/ap/wpa_auth_i.h | 1 +
+ 4 files changed, 23 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/src/ap/wpa_auth.c b/src/ap/wpa_auth.c
+index 9c5f609..0ebbdb5 100644
+--- a/src/ap/wpa_auth.c
++++ b/src/ap/wpa_auth.c
+@@ -1715,6 +1715,9 @@ int wpa_auth_sm_event(struct wpa_state_machine *sm, wpa_event event)
+ #else /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R */
+ break;
+ #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R */
++ case WPA_DRV_STA_REMOVED:
++ sm->tk_already_set = FALSE;
++ return 0;
+ }
+
+ #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R
+@@ -3168,7 +3171,13 @@ int wpa_auth_sta_wpa_version(struct wpa_state_machine *sm)
+ return sm->wpa;
+ }
+
+-
++int wpa_auth_sta_ft_tk_already_set(struct wpa_state_machine *sm)
++{
++ if (!sm || !wpa_key_mgmt_ft(sm->wpa_key_mgmt))
++ return 0;
++ return sm->tk_already_set;
++}
++
+ int wpa_auth_sta_clear_pmksa(struct wpa_state_machine *sm,
+ struct rsn_pmksa_cache_entry *entry)
+ {
+diff --git a/src/ap/wpa_auth.h b/src/ap/wpa_auth.h
+index 2788e65..8dee180 100644
+--- a/src/ap/wpa_auth.h
++++ b/src/ap/wpa_auth.h
+@@ -253,7 +253,7 @@ void wpa_receive(struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth,
+ u8 *data, size_t data_len);
+ typedef enum {
+ WPA_AUTH, WPA_ASSOC, WPA_DISASSOC, WPA_DEAUTH, WPA_REAUTH,
+- WPA_REAUTH_EAPOL, WPA_ASSOC_FT
++ WPA_REAUTH_EAPOL, WPA_ASSOC_FT, WPA_DRV_STA_REMOVED
+ } wpa_event;
+ void wpa_remove_ptk(struct wpa_state_machine *sm);
+ int wpa_auth_sm_event(struct wpa_state_machine *sm, wpa_event event);
+@@ -266,6 +266,7 @@ int wpa_auth_pairwise_set(struct wpa_state_machine *sm);
+ int wpa_auth_get_pairwise(struct wpa_state_machine *sm);
+ int wpa_auth_sta_key_mgmt(struct wpa_state_machine *sm);
+ int wpa_auth_sta_wpa_version(struct wpa_state_machine *sm);
++int wpa_auth_sta_ft_tk_already_set(struct wpa_state_machine *sm);
+ int wpa_auth_sta_clear_pmksa(struct wpa_state_machine *sm,
+ struct rsn_pmksa_cache_entry *entry);
+ struct rsn_pmksa_cache_entry *
+diff --git a/src/ap/wpa_auth_ft.c b/src/ap/wpa_auth_ft.c
+index ef3249a..17e6039 100644
+--- a/src/ap/wpa_auth_ft.c
++++ b/src/ap/wpa_auth_ft.c
+@@ -779,6 +779,14 @@ void wpa_ft_install_ptk(struct wpa_state_machine *sm)
+ return;
+ }
+
++ if (sm->tk_already_set) {
++ /* Must avoid TK reconfiguration to prevent clearing of TX/RX
++ * PN in the driver */
++ wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG,
++ "FT: Do not re-install same PTK to the driver");
++ return;
++ }
++
+ /* FIX: add STA entry to kernel/driver here? The set_key will fail
+ * most likely without this.. At the moment, STA entry is added only
+ * after association has been completed. This function will be called
+@@ -791,6 +799,7 @@ void wpa_ft_install_ptk(struct wpa_state_machine *sm)
+
+ /* FIX: MLME-SetProtection.Request(TA, Tx_Rx) */
+ sm->pairwise_set = TRUE;
++ sm->tk_already_set = TRUE;
+ }
+
+
+@@ -897,6 +906,7 @@ static int wpa_ft_process_auth_req(struct wpa_state_machine *sm,
+
+ sm->pairwise = pairwise;
+ sm->PTK_valid = TRUE;
++ sm->tk_already_set = FALSE;
+ wpa_ft_install_ptk(sm);
+
+ buflen = 2 + sizeof(struct rsn_mdie) + 2 + sizeof(struct rsn_ftie) +
+diff --git a/src/ap/wpa_auth_i.h b/src/ap/wpa_auth_i.h
+index 7b2cd3e..0f3d504 100644
+--- a/src/ap/wpa_auth_i.h
++++ b/src/ap/wpa_auth_i.h
+@@ -64,6 +64,7 @@ struct wpa_state_machine {
+ struct wpa_ptk PTK;
+ Boolean PTK_valid;
+ Boolean pairwise_set;
++ Boolean tk_already_set;
+ int keycount;
+ Boolean Pair;
+ struct wpa_key_replay_counter {
+--
+1.9.1
+
+From 0779537c11d18045d0f09ce3dd7f535bdb245de3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Haiqing Bai <Haiqing.Bai@windriver.com>
+Date: Fri, 13 Oct 2017 10:00:48 +0800
+Subject: [PATCH 2/7] Prevent reinstallation of an already in-use group key
+
+Track the current GTK and IGTK that is in use and when receiving a
+(possibly retransmitted) Group Message 1 or WNM-Sleep Mode Response, do
+not install the given key if it is already in use. This prevents an
+attacker from trying to trick the client into resetting or lowering the
+sequence counter associated to the group key.
+
+Signed-off-by: Mathy Vanhoef <Mathy.Vanhoef@cs.kuleuven.be>
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport
+
+Signed-off-by: Haiqing Bai <Haiqing.Bai@windriver.com>
+---
+ src/common/wpa_common.h | 11 +++++
+ src/rsn_supp/wpa.c | 118 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------------------
+ src/rsn_supp/wpa_i.h | 4 ++
+ 3 files changed, 87 insertions(+), 46 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/src/common/wpa_common.h b/src/common/wpa_common.h
+index 091e317..66f9977 100644
+--- a/src/common/wpa_common.h
++++ b/src/common/wpa_common.h
+@@ -224,6 +224,17 @@ struct wpa_ptk {
+ size_t tk_len;
+ };
+
++struct wpa_gtk {
++ u8 gtk[WPA_GTK_MAX_LEN];
++ size_t gtk_len;
++};
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W
++struct wpa_igtk {
++ u8 igtk[WPA_IGTK_MAX_LEN];
++ size_t igtk_len;
++};
++#endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */
+
+ /* WPA IE version 1
+ * 00-50-f2:1 (OUI:OUI type)
+diff --git a/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c b/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c
+index 8adeef4..2c4d9a4 100644
+--- a/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c
++++ b/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c
+@@ -686,6 +686,15 @@ static int wpa_supplicant_install_gtk(struct wpa_sm *sm,
+ const u8 *_gtk = gd->gtk;
+ u8 gtk_buf[32];
+
++ /* Detect possible key reinstallation */
++ if (sm->gtk.gtk_len == (size_t) gd->gtk_len &&
++ os_memcmp(sm->gtk.gtk, gd->gtk, sm->gtk.gtk_len) == 0) {
++ wpa_dbg(sm->ctx->msg_ctx, MSG_DEBUG,
++ "WPA: Not reinstalling already in-use GTK to the driver (keyidx=%d tx=%d len=%d)",
++ gd->keyidx, gd->tx, gd->gtk_len);
++ return 0;
++ }
++
+ wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "WPA: Group Key", gd->gtk, gd->gtk_len);
+ wpa_dbg(sm->ctx->msg_ctx, MSG_DEBUG,
+ "WPA: Installing GTK to the driver (keyidx=%d tx=%d len=%d)",
+@@ -720,6 +729,9 @@ static int wpa_supplicant_install_gtk(struct wpa_sm *sm,
+ }
+ os_memset(gtk_buf, 0, sizeof(gtk_buf));
+
++ sm->gtk.gtk_len = gd->gtk_len;
++ os_memcpy(sm->gtk.gtk, gd->gtk, sm->gtk.gtk_len);
++
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+@@ -790,6 +802,46 @@ static int wpa_supplicant_pairwise_gtk(struct wpa_sm *sm,
+ return 0;
+ }
+
++#ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W
++static int wpa_supplicant_install_igtk(struct wpa_sm *sm,
++ const struct wpa_igtk_kde *igtk)
++{
++ size_t len = wpa_cipher_key_len(sm->mgmt_group_cipher);
++ u16 keyidx = WPA_GET_LE16(igtk->keyid);
++
++ /* Detect possible key reinstallation */
++ if (sm->igtk.igtk_len == len &&
++ os_memcmp(sm->igtk.igtk, igtk->igtk, sm->igtk.igtk_len) == 0) {
++ wpa_dbg(sm->ctx->msg_ctx, MSG_DEBUG,
++ "WPA: Not reinstalling already in-use IGTK to the driver (keyidx=%d)",
++ keyidx);
++ return 0;
++ }
++
++ wpa_dbg(sm->ctx->msg_ctx, MSG_DEBUG,
++ "WPA: IGTK keyid %d pn %02x%02x%02x%02x%02x%02x",
++ keyidx, MAC2STR(igtk->pn));
++ wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "WPA: IGTK", igtk->igtk, len);
++ if (keyidx > 4095) {
++ wpa_msg(sm->ctx->msg_ctx, MSG_WARNING,
++ "WPA: Invalid IGTK KeyID %d", keyidx);
++ return -1;
++ }
++ if (wpa_sm_set_key(sm, wpa_cipher_to_alg(sm->mgmt_group_cipher),
++ broadcast_ether_addr,
++ keyidx, 0, igtk->pn, sizeof(igtk->pn),
++ igtk->igtk, len) < 0) {
++ wpa_msg(sm->ctx->msg_ctx, MSG_WARNING,
++ "WPA: Failed to configure IGTK to the driver");
++ return -1;
++ }
++
++ sm->igtk.igtk_len = len;
++ os_memcpy(sm->igtk.igtk, igtk->igtk, sm->igtk.igtk_len);
++
++ return 0;
++}
++#endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */
+
+ static int ieee80211w_set_keys(struct wpa_sm *sm,
+ struct wpa_eapol_ie_parse *ie)
+@@ -801,30 +853,14 @@ static int ieee80211w_set_keys(struct wpa_sm *sm,
+ if (ie->igtk) {
+ size_t len;
+ const struct wpa_igtk_kde *igtk;
+- u16 keyidx;
++
+ len = wpa_cipher_key_len(sm->mgmt_group_cipher);
+ if (ie->igtk_len != WPA_IGTK_KDE_PREFIX_LEN + len)
+ return -1;
++
+ igtk = (const struct wpa_igtk_kde *) ie->igtk;
+- keyidx = WPA_GET_LE16(igtk->keyid);
+- wpa_dbg(sm->ctx->msg_ctx, MSG_DEBUG, "WPA: IGTK keyid %d "
+- "pn %02x%02x%02x%02x%02x%02x",
+- keyidx, MAC2STR(igtk->pn));
+- wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "WPA: IGTK",
+- igtk->igtk, len);
+- if (keyidx > 4095) {
+- wpa_msg(sm->ctx->msg_ctx, MSG_WARNING,
+- "WPA: Invalid IGTK KeyID %d", keyidx);
+- return -1;
+- }
+- if (wpa_sm_set_key(sm, wpa_cipher_to_alg(sm->mgmt_group_cipher),
+- broadcast_ether_addr,
+- keyidx, 0, igtk->pn, sizeof(igtk->pn),
+- igtk->igtk, len) < 0) {
+- wpa_msg(sm->ctx->msg_ctx, MSG_WARNING,
+- "WPA: Failed to configure IGTK to the driver");
+- return -1;
+- }
++ if (wpa_supplicant_install_igtk(sm, igtk) < 0)
++ return -1;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+@@ -2228,7 +2264,7 @@ void wpa_sm_deinit(struct wpa_sm *sm)
+ */
+ void wpa_sm_notify_assoc(struct wpa_sm *sm, const u8 *bssid)
+ {
+- int clear_ptk = 1;
++ int clear_keys = 1;
+
+ if (sm == NULL)
+ return;
+@@ -2254,11 +2290,11 @@ void wpa_sm_notify_assoc(struct wpa_sm *sm, const u8 *bssid)
+ /* Prepare for the next transition */
+ wpa_ft_prepare_auth_request(sm, NULL);
+
+- clear_ptk = 0;
++ clear_keys = 0;
+ }
+ #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R */
+
+- if (clear_ptk) {
++ if (clear_keys) {
+ /*
+ * IEEE 802.11, 8.4.10: Delete PTK SA on (re)association if
+ * this is not part of a Fast BSS Transition.
+@@ -2268,6 +2304,10 @@ void wpa_sm_notify_assoc(struct wpa_sm *sm, const u8 *bssid)
+ os_memset(&sm->ptk, 0, sizeof(sm->ptk));
+ sm->tptk_set = 0;
+ os_memset(&sm->tptk, 0, sizeof(sm->tptk));
++ os_memset(&sm->gtk, 0, sizeof(sm->gtk));
++#ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W
++ os_memset(&sm->igtk, 0, sizeof(sm->igtk));
++#endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */
+ }
+
+ #ifdef CONFIG_TDLS
+@@ -2784,6 +2824,10 @@ void wpa_sm_drop_sa(struct wpa_sm *sm)
+ os_memset(sm->pmk, 0, sizeof(sm->pmk));
+ os_memset(&sm->ptk, 0, sizeof(sm->ptk));
+ os_memset(&sm->tptk, 0, sizeof(sm->tptk));
++ os_memset(&sm->gtk, 0, sizeof(sm->gtk));
++#ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W
++ os_memset(&sm->igtk, 0, sizeof(sm->igtk));
++#endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */
+ #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R
+ os_memset(sm->xxkey, 0, sizeof(sm->xxkey));
+ os_memset(sm->pmk_r0, 0, sizeof(sm->pmk_r0));
+@@ -2856,29 +2900,11 @@ int wpa_wnmsleep_install_key(struct wpa_sm *sm, u8 subelem_id, u8 *buf)
+ os_memset(&gd, 0, sizeof(gd));
+ #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W
+ } else if (subelem_id == WNM_SLEEP_SUBELEM_IGTK) {
+- struct wpa_igtk_kde igd;
+- u16 keyidx;
+-
+- os_memset(&igd, 0, sizeof(igd));
+- keylen = wpa_cipher_key_len(sm->mgmt_group_cipher);
+- os_memcpy(igd.keyid, buf + 2, 2);
+- os_memcpy(igd.pn, buf + 4, 6);
+-
+- keyidx = WPA_GET_LE16(igd.keyid);
+- os_memcpy(igd.igtk, buf + 10, keylen);
+-
+- wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "Install IGTK (WNM SLEEP)",
+- igd.igtk, keylen);
+- if (wpa_sm_set_key(sm, wpa_cipher_to_alg(sm->mgmt_group_cipher),
+- broadcast_ether_addr,
+- keyidx, 0, igd.pn, sizeof(igd.pn),
+- igd.igtk, keylen) < 0) {
+- wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "Failed to install the IGTK in "
+- "WNM mode");
+- os_memset(&igd, 0, sizeof(igd));
+- return -1;
+- }
+- os_memset(&igd, 0, sizeof(igd));
++ const struct wpa_igtk_kde *igtk;
++
++ igtk = (const struct wpa_igtk_kde *) (buf + 2);
++ if (wpa_supplicant_install_igtk(sm, igtk) < 0)
++ return -1;
+ #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */
+ } else {
+ wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "Unknown element id");
+diff --git a/src/rsn_supp/wpa_i.h b/src/rsn_supp/wpa_i.h
+index 965a9c1..27b6123 100644
+--- a/src/rsn_supp/wpa_i.h
++++ b/src/rsn_supp/wpa_i.h
+@@ -30,6 +30,10 @@ struct wpa_sm {
+ u8 rx_replay_counter[WPA_REPLAY_COUNTER_LEN];
+ int rx_replay_counter_set;
+ u8 request_counter[WPA_REPLAY_COUNTER_LEN];
++ struct wpa_gtk gtk;
++#ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W
++ struct wpa_igtk igtk;
++#endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */
+
+ struct eapol_sm *eapol; /* EAPOL state machine from upper level code */
+
+--
+1.9.1
+
+From 6e891ae64e9ec9edb17be8ca26dcf109e3250541 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Haiqing Bai <Haiqing.Bai@windriver.com>
+Date: Fri, 13 Oct 2017 10:24:29 +0800
+Subject: [PATCH 3/7] Extend protection of GTK/IGTK reinstallation of WNM-Sleep
+ Mode cases
+
+This extends the protection to track last configured GTK/IGTK value
+separately from EAPOL-Key frames and WNM-Sleep Mode frames to cover a
+corner case where these two different mechanisms may get used when the
+GTK/IGTK has changed and tracking a single value is not sufficient to
+detect a possible key reconfiguration.
+
+Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport
+
+Signed-off-by: Haiqing Bai <Haiqing.Bai@windriver.com>
+---
+ src/rsn_supp/wpa.c | 56 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----------------
+ src/rsn_supp/wpa_i.h | 2 ++
+ 2 files changed, 41 insertions(+), 17 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c b/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c
+index 2c4d9a4..19cc78b 100644
+--- a/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c
++++ b/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c
+@@ -681,14 +681,17 @@ struct wpa_gtk_data {
+
+ static int wpa_supplicant_install_gtk(struct wpa_sm *sm,
+ const struct wpa_gtk_data *gd,
+- const u8 *key_rsc)
++ const u8 *key_rsc, int wnm_sleep)
+ {
+ const u8 *_gtk = gd->gtk;
+ u8 gtk_buf[32];
+
+ /* Detect possible key reinstallation */
+- if (sm->gtk.gtk_len == (size_t) gd->gtk_len &&
+- os_memcmp(sm->gtk.gtk, gd->gtk, sm->gtk.gtk_len) == 0) {
++ if ((sm->gtk.gtk_len == (size_t) gd->gtk_len &&
++ os_memcmp(sm->gtk.gtk, gd->gtk, sm->gtk.gtk_len) == 0) ||
++ (sm->gtk_wnm_sleep.gtk_len == (size_t) gd->gtk_len &&
++ os_memcmp(sm->gtk_wnm_sleep.gtk, gd->gtk,
++ sm->gtk_wnm_sleep.gtk_len) == 0)) {
+ wpa_dbg(sm->ctx->msg_ctx, MSG_DEBUG,
+ "WPA: Not reinstalling already in-use GTK to the driver (keyidx=%d tx=%d len=%d)",
+ gd->keyidx, gd->tx, gd->gtk_len);
+@@ -729,13 +732,18 @@ static int wpa_supplicant_install_gtk(struct wpa_sm *sm,
+ }
+ os_memset(gtk_buf, 0, sizeof(gtk_buf));
+
+- sm->gtk.gtk_len = gd->gtk_len;
+- os_memcpy(sm->gtk.gtk, gd->gtk, sm->gtk.gtk_len);
++ if (wnm_sleep) {
++ sm->gtk_wnm_sleep.gtk_len = gd->gtk_len;
++ os_memcpy(sm->gtk_wnm_sleep.gtk, gd->gtk,
++ sm->gtk_wnm_sleep.gtk_len);
++ } else {
++ sm->gtk.gtk_len = gd->gtk_len;
++ os_memcpy(sm->gtk.gtk, gd->gtk, sm->gtk.gtk_len);
++ }
+
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+-
+ static int wpa_supplicant_gtk_tx_bit_workaround(const struct wpa_sm *sm,
+ int tx)
+ {
+@@ -789,7 +797,7 @@ static int wpa_supplicant_pairwise_gtk(struct wpa_sm *sm,
+ (wpa_supplicant_check_group_cipher(sm, sm->group_cipher,
+ gtk_len, gtk_len,
+ &gd.key_rsc_len, &gd.alg) ||
+- wpa_supplicant_install_gtk(sm, &gd, key->key_rsc))) {
++ wpa_supplicant_install_gtk(sm, &gd, key->key_rsc, 0))) {
+ wpa_dbg(sm->ctx->msg_ctx, MSG_DEBUG,
+ "RSN: Failed to install GTK");
+ os_memset(&gd, 0, sizeof(gd));
+@@ -804,14 +812,18 @@ static int wpa_supplicant_pairwise_gtk(struct wpa_sm *sm,
+
+ #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W
+ static int wpa_supplicant_install_igtk(struct wpa_sm *sm,
+- const struct wpa_igtk_kde *igtk)
++ const struct wpa_igtk_kde *igtk,
++ int wnm_sleep)
+ {
+ size_t len = wpa_cipher_key_len(sm->mgmt_group_cipher);
+ u16 keyidx = WPA_GET_LE16(igtk->keyid);
+
+ /* Detect possible key reinstallation */
+- if (sm->igtk.igtk_len == len &&
+- os_memcmp(sm->igtk.igtk, igtk->igtk, sm->igtk.igtk_len) == 0) {
++ if ((sm->igtk.igtk_len == len &&
++ os_memcmp(sm->igtk.igtk, igtk->igtk, sm->igtk.igtk_len) == 0) ||
++ (sm->igtk_wnm_sleep.igtk_len == len &&
++ os_memcmp(sm->igtk_wnm_sleep.igtk, igtk->igtk,
++ sm->igtk_wnm_sleep.igtk_len) == 0)) {
+ wpa_dbg(sm->ctx->msg_ctx, MSG_DEBUG,
+ "WPA: Not reinstalling already in-use IGTK to the driver (keyidx=%d)",
+ keyidx);
+@@ -836,9 +848,15 @@ static int wpa_supplicant_install_igtk(struct wpa_sm *sm,
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+- sm->igtk.igtk_len = len;
+- os_memcpy(sm->igtk.igtk, igtk->igtk, sm->igtk.igtk_len);
+-
++ if (wnm_sleep) {
++ sm->igtk_wnm_sleep.igtk_len = len;
++ os_memcpy(sm->igtk_wnm_sleep.igtk, igtk->igtk,
++ sm->igtk_wnm_sleep.igtk_len);
++ } else {
++ sm->igtk.igtk_len = len;
++ os_memcpy(sm->igtk.igtk, igtk->igtk, sm->igtk.igtk_len);
++ }
++
+ return 0;
+ }
+ #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */
+@@ -859,7 +877,7 @@ static int ieee80211w_set_keys(struct wpa_sm *sm,
+ return -1;
+
+ igtk = (const struct wpa_igtk_kde *) ie->igtk;
+- if (wpa_supplicant_install_igtk(sm, igtk) < 0)
++ if (wpa_supplicant_install_igtk(sm, igtk, 0) < 0)
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+@@ -1502,7 +1520,7 @@ static void wpa_supplicant_process_1_of_2(struct wpa_sm *sm,
+ if (ret)
+ goto failed;
+
+- if (wpa_supplicant_install_gtk(sm, &gd, key->key_rsc) ||
++ if (wpa_supplicant_install_gtk(sm, &gd, key->key_rsc, 0) ||
+ wpa_supplicant_send_2_of_2(sm, key, ver, key_info))
+ goto failed;
+ os_memset(&gd, 0, sizeof(gd));
+@@ -2305,8 +2323,10 @@ void wpa_sm_notify_assoc(struct wpa_sm *sm, const u8 *bssid)
+ sm->tptk_set = 0;
+ os_memset(&sm->tptk, 0, sizeof(sm->tptk));
+ os_memset(&sm->gtk, 0, sizeof(sm->gtk));
++ os_memset(&sm->gtk_wnm_sleep, 0, sizeof(sm->gtk_wnm_sleep));
+ #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W
+ os_memset(&sm->igtk, 0, sizeof(sm->igtk));
++ os_memset(&sm->igtk_wnm_sleep, 0, sizeof(sm->igtk_wnm_sleep));
+ #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */
+ }
+
+@@ -2825,8 +2845,10 @@ void wpa_sm_drop_sa(struct wpa_sm *sm)
+ os_memset(&sm->ptk, 0, sizeof(sm->ptk));
+ os_memset(&sm->tptk, 0, sizeof(sm->tptk));
+ os_memset(&sm->gtk, 0, sizeof(sm->gtk));
++ os_memset(&sm->gtk_wnm_sleep, 0, sizeof(sm->gtk_wnm_sleep));
+ #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W
+ os_memset(&sm->igtk, 0, sizeof(sm->igtk));
++ os_memset(&sm->igtk_wnm_sleep, 0, sizeof(sm->igtk_wnm_sleep));
+ #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */
+ #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R
+ os_memset(sm->xxkey, 0, sizeof(sm->xxkey));
+@@ -2891,7 +2913,7 @@ int wpa_wnmsleep_install_key(struct wpa_sm *sm, u8 subelem_id, u8 *buf)
+
+ wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "Install GTK (WNM SLEEP)",
+ gd.gtk, gd.gtk_len);
+- if (wpa_supplicant_install_gtk(sm, &gd, key_rsc)) {
++ if (wpa_supplicant_install_gtk(sm, &gd, key_rsc, 1)) {
+ os_memset(&gd, 0, sizeof(gd));
+ wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "Failed to install the GTK in "
+ "WNM mode");
+@@ -2903,7 +2925,7 @@ int wpa_wnmsleep_install_key(struct wpa_sm *sm, u8 subelem_id, u8 *buf)
+ const struct wpa_igtk_kde *igtk;
+
+ igtk = (const struct wpa_igtk_kde *) (buf + 2);
+- if (wpa_supplicant_install_igtk(sm, igtk) < 0)
++ if (wpa_supplicant_install_igtk(sm, igtk, 1) < 0)
+ return -1;
+ #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */
+ } else {
+diff --git a/src/rsn_supp/wpa_i.h b/src/rsn_supp/wpa_i.h
+index 27b6123..51753ee 100644
+--- a/src/rsn_supp/wpa_i.h
++++ b/src/rsn_supp/wpa_i.h
+@@ -31,8 +31,10 @@ struct wpa_sm {
+ int rx_replay_counter_set;
+ u8 request_counter[WPA_REPLAY_COUNTER_LEN];
+ struct wpa_gtk gtk;
++ struct wpa_gtk gtk_wnm_sleep;
+ #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W
+ struct wpa_igtk igtk;
++ struct wpa_igtk igtk_wnm_sleep;
+ #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */
+
+ struct eapol_sm *eapol; /* EAPOL state machine from upper level code */
+--
+1.9.1
+
+From 20280c8155506da6f1fc46f4fb345bc1ddaf1684 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Haiqing Bai <Haiqing.Bai@windriver.com>
+Date: Fri, 13 Oct 2017 10:32:52 +0800
+Subject: [PATCH 4/7] Prevent installation of an all-zero TK
+
+Properly track whether a PTK has already been installed to the driver
+and the TK part cleared from memory. This prevents an attacker from
+trying to trick the client into installing an all-zero TK.
+
+Signed-off-by: Mathy Vanhoef <Mathy.Vanhoef@cs.kuleuven.be>
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport
+
+Signed-off-by: Haiqing Bai <Haiqing.Bai@windriver.com>
+---
+ src/common/wpa_common.h | 1 +
+ src/rsn_supp/wpa.c | 7 +++++++
+ 2 files changed, 8 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/src/common/wpa_common.h b/src/common/wpa_common.h
+index 66f9977..5632d37 100644
+--- a/src/common/wpa_common.h
++++ b/src/common/wpa_common.h
+@@ -222,6 +222,7 @@ struct wpa_ptk {
+ size_t kck_len;
+ size_t kek_len;
+ size_t tk_len;
++ int installed; /* 1 if key has already been installed to driver */
+ };
+
+ struct wpa_gtk {
+diff --git a/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c b/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c
+index 19cc78b..97de8d3 100644
+--- a/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c
++++ b/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c
+@@ -594,6 +594,12 @@ static int wpa_supplicant_install_ptk(struct wpa_sm *sm,
+ const u8 *key_rsc;
+ u8 null_rsc[8] = { 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0 };
+
++ if (sm->ptk.installed) {
++ wpa_dbg(sm->ctx->msg_ctx, MSG_DEBUG,
++ "WPA: Do not re-install same PTK to the driver");
++ return 0;
++ }
++
+ wpa_dbg(sm->ctx->msg_ctx, MSG_DEBUG,
+ "WPA: Installing PTK to the driver");
+
+@@ -632,6 +638,7 @@ static int wpa_supplicant_install_ptk(struct wpa_sm *sm,
+
+ /* TK is not needed anymore in supplicant */
+ os_memset(sm->ptk.tk, 0, WPA_TK_MAX_LEN);
++ sm->ptk.installed = 1;
+
+ if (sm->wpa_ptk_rekey) {
+ eloop_cancel_timeout(wpa_sm_rekey_ptk, sm, NULL);
+--
+1.9.1
+
+From 39c0043c282ea1901eb37c902f663c8ab019fc63 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Haiqing Bai <Haiqing.Bai@windriver.com>
+Date: Fri, 13 Oct 2017 10:40:31 +0800
+Subject: [PATCH 5/7] Fix PTK rekeying to generate a new ANonce
+
+The Authenticator state machine path for PTK rekeying ended up bypassing
+the AUTHENTICATION2 state where a new ANonce is generated when going
+directly to the PTKSTART state since there is no need to try to
+determine the PMK again in such a case. This is far from ideal since the
+new PTK would depend on a new nonce only from the supplicant.
+
+Fix this by generating a new ANonce when moving to the PTKSTART state
+for the purpose of starting new 4-way handshake to rekey PTK.
+
+Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport
+
+Signed-off-by: Haiqing Bai <Haiqing.Bai@windriver.com>
+---
+ src/ap/wpa_auth.c | 22 +++++++++++++++++++---
+ 1 file changed, 19 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/src/ap/wpa_auth.c b/src/ap/wpa_auth.c
+index 0ebbdb5..5084b74 100644
+--- a/src/ap/wpa_auth.c
++++ b/src/ap/wpa_auth.c
+@@ -1858,6 +1858,19 @@ SM_STATE(WPA_PTK, AUTHENTICATION2)
+ sm->TimeoutCtr = 0;
+ }
+
++static int wpa_auth_sm_ptk_update(struct wpa_state_machine *sm)
++{
++ if (random_get_bytes(sm->ANonce, WPA_NONCE_LEN)) {
++ wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR,
++ "WPA: Failed to get random data for ANonce");
++ sm->Disconnect = TRUE;
++ return -1;
++ }
++ wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "WPA: Assign new ANonce", sm->ANonce,
++ WPA_NONCE_LEN);
++ sm->TimeoutCtr = 0;
++ return 0;
++}
+
+ SM_STATE(WPA_PTK, INITPMK)
+ {
+@@ -2377,9 +2390,12 @@ SM_STEP(WPA_PTK)
+ SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK, AUTHENTICATION);
+ else if (sm->ReAuthenticationRequest)
+ SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK, AUTHENTICATION2);
+- else if (sm->PTKRequest)
+- SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK, PTKSTART);
+- else switch (sm->wpa_ptk_state) {
++ else if (sm->PTKRequest) {
++ if (wpa_auth_sm_ptk_update(sm) < 0)
++ SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK, DISCONNECTED);
++ else
++ SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK, PTKSTART);
++ } else switch (sm->wpa_ptk_state) {
+ case WPA_PTK_INITIALIZE:
+ break;
+ case WPA_PTK_DISCONNECT:
+--
+1.9.1
+
+From e1b4fa806a88ade798722fccf16ee07f6df1413a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Haiqing Bai <Haiqing.Bai@windriver.com>
+Date: Fri, 13 Oct 2017 10:55:03 +0800
+Subject: [PATCH 6/7] TDLS: Reject TPK-TK reconfiguration
+
+Do not try to reconfigure the same TPK-TK to the driver after it has
+been successfully configured. This is an explicit check to avoid issues
+related to resetting the TX/RX packet number. There was already a check
+for this for TPK M2 (retries of that message are ignored completely), so
+that behavior does not get modified.
+
+For TPK M3, the TPK-TK could have been reconfigured, but that was
+followed by immediate teardown of the link due to an issue in updating
+the STA entry. Furthermore, for TDLS with any real security (i.e.,
+ignoring open/WEP), the TPK message exchange is protected on the AP path
+and simple replay attacks are not feasible.
+
+As an additional corner case, make sure the local nonce gets updated if
+the peer uses a very unlikely "random nonce" of all zeros.
+
+Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport
+
+Signed-off-by: Haiqing Bai <Haiqing.Bai@windriver.com>
+---
+ src/rsn_supp/tdls.c | 36 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--
+ 1 file changed, 34 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/src/rsn_supp/tdls.c b/src/rsn_supp/tdls.c
+index c1d7749..8633b8f 100644
+--- a/src/rsn_supp/tdls.c
++++ b/src/rsn_supp/tdls.c
+@@ -111,6 +111,7 @@ struct wpa_tdls_peer {
+ u8 tk[16]; /* TPK-TK; assuming only CCMP will be used */
+ } tpk;
+ int tpk_set;
++ int tk_set; /* TPK-TK configured to the driver */
+ int tpk_success;
+ int tpk_in_progress;
+
+@@ -191,6 +192,20 @@ static int wpa_tdls_set_key(struct wpa_sm *sm, struct wpa_tdls_peer *peer)
+ u8 rsc[6];
+ enum wpa_alg alg;
+
++ if (peer->tk_set) {
++ /*
++ * This same TPK-TK has already been configured to the driver
++ * and this new configuration attempt (likely due to an
++ * unexpected retransmitted frame) would result in clearing
++ * the TX/RX sequence number which can break security, so must
++ * not allow that to happen.
++ */
++ wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "TDLS: TPK-TK for the peer " MACSTR
++ " has already been configured to the driver - do not reconfigure",
++ MAC2STR(peer->addr));
++ return -1;
++ }
++
+ os_memset(rsc, 0, 6);
+
+ switch (peer->cipher) {
+@@ -208,12 +223,15 @@ static int wpa_tdls_set_key(struct wpa_sm *sm, struct wpa_tdls_peer *peer)
+ return -1;
+ }
+
++ wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "TDLS: Configure pairwise key for peer " MACSTR,
++ MAC2STR(peer->addr));
+ if (wpa_sm_set_key(sm, alg, peer->addr, -1, 1,
+ rsc, sizeof(rsc), peer->tpk.tk, key_len) < 0) {
+ wpa_printf(MSG_WARNING, "TDLS: Failed to set TPK to the "
+ "driver");
+ return -1;
+ }
++ peer->tk_set = 1;
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+@@ -689,7 +707,7 @@ static void wpa_tdls_peer_clear(struct wpa_sm *sm, struct wpa_tdls_peer *peer)
+ peer->cipher = 0;
+ peer->qos_info = 0;
+ peer->wmm_capable = 0;
+- peer->tpk_set = peer->tpk_success = 0;
++ peer->tk_set = peer->tpk_set = peer->tpk_success = 0;
+ peer->chan_switch_enabled = 0;
+ os_memset(&peer->tpk, 0, sizeof(peer->tpk));
+ os_memset(peer->inonce, 0, WPA_NONCE_LEN);
+@@ -1152,6 +1170,7 @@ skip_rsnie:
+ wpa_tdls_peer_free(sm, peer);
+ return -1;
+ }
++ peer->tk_set = 0; /* A new nonce results in a new TK */
+ wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "TDLS: Initiator Nonce for TPK handshake",
+ peer->inonce, WPA_NONCE_LEN);
+ os_memcpy(ftie->Snonce, peer->inonce, WPA_NONCE_LEN);
+@@ -1747,6 +1766,17 @@ static int wpa_tdls_addset_peer(struct wpa_sm *sm, struct wpa_tdls_peer *peer,
+ peer->supp_oper_classes_len);
+ }
+
++static int tdls_nonce_set(const u8 *nonce)
++{
++ int i;
++
++ for (i = 0; i < WPA_NONCE_LEN; i++) {
++ if (nonce[i])
++ return 1;
++ }
++
++ return 0;
++}
+
+ static int wpa_tdls_process_tpk_m1(struct wpa_sm *sm, const u8 *src_addr,
+ const u8 *buf, size_t len)
+@@ -2001,7 +2031,8 @@ skip_rsn:
+ peer->rsnie_i_len = kde.rsn_ie_len;
+ peer->cipher = cipher;
+
+- if (os_memcmp(peer->inonce, ftie->Snonce, WPA_NONCE_LEN) != 0) {
++ if (os_memcmp(peer->inonce, ftie->Snonce, WPA_NONCE_LEN) != 0 ||
++ !tdls_nonce_set(peer->inonce)) {
+ /*
+ * There is no point in updating the RNonce for every obtained
+ * TPK M1 frame (e.g., retransmission due to timeout) with the
+@@ -2017,6 +2048,7 @@ skip_rsn:
+ "TDLS: Failed to get random data for responder nonce");
+ goto error;
+ }
++ peer->tk_set = 0; /* A new nonce results in a new TK */
+ }
+
+ #if 0
+--
+1.9.1
+
+From 6d966716df42d379c0aaa1b833f070b93a29aaec Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Haiqing Bai <Haiqing.Bai@windriver.com>
+Date: Fri, 13 Oct 2017 11:07:21 +0800
+Subject: [PATCH 7/7] FT: Do not allow multiple Reassociation Response frames
+
+The driver is expected to not report a second association event without
+the station having explicitly request a new association. As such, this
+case should not be reachable. However, since reconfiguring the same
+pairwise or group keys to the driver could result in nonce reuse issues,
+be extra careful here and do an additional state check to avoid this
+even if the local driver ends up somehow accepting an unexpected
+Reassociation Response frame.
+
+Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport
+
+Signed-off-by: Haiqing Bai <Haiqing.Bai@windriver.com>
+---
+ src/rsn_supp/wpa.c | 3 +++
+ src/rsn_supp/wpa_ft.c | 8 ++++++++
+ src/rsn_supp/wpa_i.h | 1 +
+ 3 files changed, 12 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c b/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c
+index 97de8d3..b9c1ab5 100644
+--- a/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c
++++ b/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c
+@@ -2366,6 +2366,9 @@ void wpa_sm_notify_disassoc(struct wpa_sm *sm)
+ #ifdef CONFIG_TDLS
+ wpa_tdls_disassoc(sm);
+ #endif /* CONFIG_TDLS */
++#ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R
++ sm->ft_reassoc_completed = 0;
++#endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R */
+
+ /* Keys are not needed in the WPA state machine anymore */
+ wpa_sm_drop_sa(sm);
+diff --git a/src/rsn_supp/wpa_ft.c b/src/rsn_supp/wpa_ft.c
+index 06dea05..e8834dd 100644
+--- a/src/rsn_supp/wpa_ft.c
++++ b/src/rsn_supp/wpa_ft.c
+@@ -153,6 +153,7 @@ static u8 * wpa_ft_gen_req_ies(struct wpa_sm *sm, size_t *len,
+ u16 capab;
+
+ sm->ft_completed = 0;
++ sm->ft_reassoc_completed = 0;
+
+ buf_len = 2 + sizeof(struct rsn_mdie) + 2 + sizeof(struct rsn_ftie) +
+ 2 + sm->r0kh_id_len + ric_ies_len + 100;
+@@ -683,6 +684,11 @@ int wpa_ft_validate_reassoc_resp(struct wpa_sm *sm, const u8 *ies,
+ return -1;
+ }
+
++ if (sm->ft_reassoc_completed) {
++ wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "FT: Reassociation has already been completed for this FT protocol instance - ignore unexpected retransmission");
++ return 0;
++ }
++
+ if (wpa_ft_parse_ies(ies, ies_len, &parse) < 0) {
+ wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "FT: Failed to parse IEs");
+ return -1;
+@@ -783,6 +789,8 @@ int wpa_ft_validate_reassoc_resp(struct wpa_sm *sm, const u8 *ies,
+ return -1;
+ }
+
++ sm->ft_reassoc_completed = 1;
++
+ if (wpa_ft_process_gtk_subelem(sm, parse.gtk, parse.gtk_len) < 0)
+ return -1;
+
+diff --git a/src/rsn_supp/wpa_i.h b/src/rsn_supp/wpa_i.h
+index 51753ee..85cc862 100644
+--- a/src/rsn_supp/wpa_i.h
++++ b/src/rsn_supp/wpa_i.h
+@@ -127,6 +127,7 @@ struct wpa_sm {
+ size_t r0kh_id_len;
+ u8 r1kh_id[FT_R1KH_ID_LEN];
+ int ft_completed;
++ int ft_reassoc_completed;
+ int over_the_ds_in_progress;
+ u8 target_ap[ETH_ALEN]; /* over-the-DS target AP */
+ int set_ptk_after_assoc;
+--
+1.9.1
+
@@ -33,6 +33,7 @@ SRC_URI = "http://hostap.epitest.fi/releases/wpa_supplicant-${PV}.tar.gz \
file://0004-EAP-pwd-server-Fix-Total-Length-parsing-for-fragment.patch \
file://0005-EAP-pwd-peer-Fix-asymmetric-fragmentation-behavior.patch \
file://0001-NFC-Fix-payload-length-validation-in-NDEF-record-par.patch \
+ file://key-replay-cve-multiple.patch \
"
SRC_URI[md5sum] = "f0037dbe03897dcaf2ad2722e659095d"
SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "058dc832c096139a059e6df814080f50251a8d313c21b13364c54a1e70109122"
WPA2 is vulnerable to replay attacks which result in unauthenticated users having access to the network. * CVE-2017-13077: reinstallation of the pairwise key in the Four-way handshake * CVE-2017-13078: reinstallation of the group key in the Four-way handshake * CVE-2017-13079: reinstallation of the integrity group key in the Four-way handshake * CVE-2017-13080: reinstallation of the group key in the Group Key handshake * CVE-2017-13081: reinstallation of the integrity group key in the Group Key handshake * CVE-2017-13082: accepting a retransmitted Fast BSS Transition Reassociation Request and reinstalling the pairwise key while processing it * CVE-2017-13086: reinstallation of the Tunneled Direct-Link Setup (TDLS) PeerKey (TPK) key in the TDLS handshake * CVE-2017-13087: reinstallation of the group key (GTK) when processing a Wireless Network Management (WNM) Sleep Mode Response frame * CVE-2017-13088: reinstallation of the integrity group key (IGTK) when processing a Wireless Network Management (WNM) Sleep Mode Response frame Backport patches from upstream to resolve these CVEs. Signed-off-by: Ross Burton <ross.burton@intel.com> --- .../wpa-supplicant/key-replay-cve-multiple.patch | 943 +++++++++++++++++++++ .../wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant_2.4.bb | 1 + 2 files changed, 944 insertions(+) create mode 100644 meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant/key-replay-cve-multiple.patch -- 2.11.0 -- _______________________________________________ Openembedded-core mailing list Openembedded-core@lists.openembedded.org http://lists.openembedded.org/mailman/listinfo/openembedded-core