| Message ID | 20171102134726.6925-1-arturo.buzarra@digi.com |
|---|---|
| State | New |
| Headers | show |
| Series | [jethro] bluez5: fix out-of-bounds access in SDP server (CVE-2017-1000250) | expand |
(ping) for this backport patch. Thx. -----Original Message----- From: openembedded-core-bounces@lists.openembedded.org [mailto:openembedded-core-bounces@lists.openembedded.org] On Behalf Of Arturo Buzarra Sent: Thursday, November 02, 2017 14:47 To: openembedded-core@lists.openembedded.org Subject: [OE-core] [PATCH][jethro] bluez5: fix out-of-bounds access in SDP server (CVE-2017-1000250) From: Ross Burton <ross.burton@intel.com> All versions of the SDP server in BlueZ 5.46 and earlier are vulnerable to an information disclosure vulnerability which allows remote attackers to obtain sensitive information from the bluetoothd process memory. This vulnerability lies in the processing of SDP search attribute requests. Signed-off-by: Ross Burton <ross.burton@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Richard Purdie <richard.purdie@linuxfoundation.org> (cherry picked from commit 7351e0b260876b9bbc8660c2bb4173ab4c130f8b) --- meta/recipes-connectivity/bluez5/bluez5.inc | 1 + .../bluez5/bluez5/cve-2017-1000250.patch | 34 ++++++++++++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 35 insertions(+) create mode 100644 meta/recipes-connectivity/bluez5/bluez5/cve-2017-1000250.patch diff --git a/meta/recipes-connectivity/bluez5/bluez5.inc b/meta/recipes-connectivity/bluez5/bluez5.inc index d1af31ea45..d5b86c7925 100644 --- a/meta/recipes-connectivity/bluez5/bluez5.inc +++ b/meta/recipes-connectivity/bluez5/bluez5.inc @@ -19,6 +19,7 @@ PACKAGECONFIG[experimental] = "--enable-experimental,--disable-experimental," SRC_URI = "\ ${KERNELORG_MIRROR}/linux/bluetooth/bluez-${PV}.tar.xz \ ${@bb.utils.contains('DISTRO_FEATURES', 'systemd', '', 'file://0001-Allow-using-obexd-without-systemd-in-the-user-sessio.patch', d)} \ + file://cve-2017-1000250.patch \ " S = "${WORKDIR}/bluez-${PV}" diff --git a/meta/recipes-connectivity/bluez5/bluez5/cve-2017-1000250.patch b/meta/recipes-connectivity/bluez5/bluez5/cve-2017-1000250.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..9fac961bcf --- /dev/null +++ b/meta/recipes-connectivity/bluez5/bluez5/cve-2017-1000250.patch @@ -0,0 +1,34 @@ +All versions of the SDP server in BlueZ 5.46 and earlier are vulnerable +to an information disclosure vulnerability which allows remote +attackers to obtain sensitive information from the bluetoothd process +memory. This vulnerability lies in the processing of SDP search attribute requests. + +CVE: CVE-2017-1000250 +Upstream-Status: Backport +Signed-off-by: Ross Burton <ross.burton@intel.com> + +From 9e009647b14e810e06626dde7f1bb9ea3c375d09 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Luiz Augusto von Dentz <luiz.von.dentz@intel.com> +Date: Wed, 13 Sep 2017 10:01:40 +0300 +Subject: sdp: Fix Out-of-bounds heap read in service_search_attr_req +function + +Check if there is enough data to continue otherwise return an error. +--- + src/sdpd-request.c | 2 +- + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) + +diff --git a/src/sdpd-request.c b/src/sdpd-request.c index +1eefdce..318d044 100644 +--- a/src/sdpd-request.c ++++ b/src/sdpd-request.c +@@ -917,7 +917,7 @@ static int service_search_attr_req(sdp_req_t *req, sdp_buf_t *buf) + } else { + /* continuation State exists -> get from cache */ + sdp_buf_t *pCache = sdp_get_cached_rsp(cstate); +- if (pCache) { ++ if (pCache && cstate->cStateValue.maxBytesSent < pCache->data_size) ++{ + uint16_t sent = MIN(max, pCache->data_size - cstate->cStateValue.maxBytesSent); + pResponse = pCache->data; + memcpy(buf->data, pResponse + cstate->cStateValue.maxBytesSent, +sent); +-- +cgit v1.1 -- 2.14.2 -- _______________________________________________ Openembedded-core mailing list Openembedded-core@lists.openembedded.org http://lists.openembedded.org/mailman/listinfo/openembedded-core -- _______________________________________________ Openembedded-core mailing list Openembedded-core@lists.openembedded.org http://lists.openembedded.org/mailman/listinfo/openembedded-core
diff --git a/meta/recipes-connectivity/bluez5/bluez5.inc b/meta/recipes-connectivity/bluez5/bluez5.inc index d1af31ea45..d5b86c7925 100644 --- a/meta/recipes-connectivity/bluez5/bluez5.inc +++ b/meta/recipes-connectivity/bluez5/bluez5.inc @@ -19,6 +19,7 @@ PACKAGECONFIG[experimental] = "--enable-experimental,--disable-experimental," SRC_URI = "\ ${KERNELORG_MIRROR}/linux/bluetooth/bluez-${PV}.tar.xz \ ${@bb.utils.contains('DISTRO_FEATURES', 'systemd', '', 'file://0001-Allow-using-obexd-without-systemd-in-the-user-sessio.patch', d)} \ + file://cve-2017-1000250.patch \ " S = "${WORKDIR}/bluez-${PV}" diff --git a/meta/recipes-connectivity/bluez5/bluez5/cve-2017-1000250.patch b/meta/recipes-connectivity/bluez5/bluez5/cve-2017-1000250.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..9fac961bcf --- /dev/null +++ b/meta/recipes-connectivity/bluez5/bluez5/cve-2017-1000250.patch @@ -0,0 +1,34 @@ +All versions of the SDP server in BlueZ 5.46 and earlier are vulnerable to an +information disclosure vulnerability which allows remote attackers to obtain +sensitive information from the bluetoothd process memory. This vulnerability +lies in the processing of SDP search attribute requests. + +CVE: CVE-2017-1000250 +Upstream-Status: Backport +Signed-off-by: Ross Burton <ross.burton@intel.com> + +From 9e009647b14e810e06626dde7f1bb9ea3c375d09 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Luiz Augusto von Dentz <luiz.von.dentz@intel.com> +Date: Wed, 13 Sep 2017 10:01:40 +0300 +Subject: sdp: Fix Out-of-bounds heap read in service_search_attr_req function + +Check if there is enough data to continue otherwise return an error. +--- + src/sdpd-request.c | 2 +- + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) + +diff --git a/src/sdpd-request.c b/src/sdpd-request.c +index 1eefdce..318d044 100644 +--- a/src/sdpd-request.c ++++ b/src/sdpd-request.c +@@ -917,7 +917,7 @@ static int service_search_attr_req(sdp_req_t *req, sdp_buf_t *buf) + } else { + /* continuation State exists -> get from cache */ + sdp_buf_t *pCache = sdp_get_cached_rsp(cstate); +- if (pCache) { ++ if (pCache && cstate->cStateValue.maxBytesSent < pCache->data_size) { + uint16_t sent = MIN(max, pCache->data_size - cstate->cStateValue.maxBytesSent); + pResponse = pCache->data; + memcpy(buf->data, pResponse + cstate->cStateValue.maxBytesSent, sent); +-- +cgit v1.1