[2/2] KVM: arm/arm64: vgic: fix possible spectre-v1 write in vgic_mmio_write_apr()

Message ID 20180710180123.56461-3-mark.rutland@arm.com
State Accepted
Commit 6b8b9a48545e08345b8ff77c9fd51b1aebdbefb3
Headers show
  • arm64: spectre-v1 write fixes (CVE-2018-3693)
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Commit Message

Mark Rutland July 10, 2018, 6:01 p.m.
It's possible for userspace to control n. Sanitize n when using it as an
array index, to inhibit the potential spectre-v1 write gadget.

Note that while it appears that n must be bound to the interval [0,3]
due to the way it is extracted from addr, we cannot guarantee that
compiler transformations (and/or future refactoring) will ensure this is
the case, and given this is a slow path it's better to always perform
the masking.

Found by smatch.

Signed-off-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>

Cc: Christoffer Dall <christoffer.dall@arm.com>
Cc: Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com>
Cc: kvmarm@lists.cs.columbia.edu
 virt/kvm/arm/vgic/vgic-mmio-v2.c | 3 +++
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)



diff --git a/virt/kvm/arm/vgic/vgic-mmio-v2.c b/virt/kvm/arm/vgic/vgic-mmio-v2.c
index ffc587bf4742..64e571cc02df 100644
--- a/virt/kvm/arm/vgic/vgic-mmio-v2.c
+++ b/virt/kvm/arm/vgic/vgic-mmio-v2.c
@@ -352,6 +352,9 @@  static void vgic_mmio_write_apr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
 		if (n > vgic_v3_max_apr_idx(vcpu))
+		n = array_index_nospec(n, 4);
 		/* GICv3 only uses ICH_AP1Rn for memory mapped (GICv2) guests */
 		vgicv3->vgic_ap1r[n] = val;