@@ -2699,28 +2699,6 @@ static bool is_ctx_reg(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int regno)
return reg->type == PTR_TO_CTX;
}
-static bool is_sk_reg(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int regno)
-{
- const struct bpf_reg_state *reg = reg_state(env, regno);
-
- return type_is_sk_pointer(reg->type);
-}
-
-static bool is_pkt_reg(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int regno)
-{
- const struct bpf_reg_state *reg = reg_state(env, regno);
-
- return type_is_pkt_pointer(reg->type);
-}
-
-static bool is_flow_key_reg(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int regno)
-{
- const struct bpf_reg_state *reg = reg_state(env, regno);
-
- /* Separate to is_ctx_reg() since we still want to allow BPF_ST here. */
- return reg->type == PTR_TO_FLOW_KEYS;
-}
-
static int check_pkt_ptr_alignment(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
const struct bpf_reg_state *reg,
int off, int size, bool strict)
@@ -3298,10 +3276,7 @@ static int check_xadd(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int insn_idx, struct bpf_ins
return -EACCES;
}
- if (is_ctx_reg(env, insn->dst_reg) ||
- is_pkt_reg(env, insn->dst_reg) ||
- is_flow_key_reg(env, insn->dst_reg) ||
- is_sk_reg(env, insn->dst_reg)) {
+ if (reg_state(env, insn->dst_reg)->type != PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE) {
verbose(env, "BPF_XADD stores into R%d %s is not allowed\n",
insn->dst_reg,
reg_type_str[reg_state(env, insn->dst_reg)->type]);
At the moment, check_xadd() uses a blacklist to decide whether a given pointer type should be usable with the XADD instruction. Out of all the pointer types that check_mem_access() accepts, only four are currently let through by check_xadd(): PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE PTR_TO_CTX rejected PTR_TO_STACK PTR_TO_PACKET rejected PTR_TO_PACKET_META rejected PTR_TO_FLOW_KEYS rejected PTR_TO_SOCKET rejected PTR_TO_SOCK_COMMON rejected PTR_TO_TCP_SOCK rejected PTR_TO_XDP_SOCK rejected PTR_TO_TP_BUFFER PTR_TO_BTF_ID Looking at the currently permitted ones: - PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE: This makes sense and is the primary usecase for XADD. - PTR_TO_STACK: This doesn't make much sense, there is no concurrency on the BPF stack. It also causes confusion further down, because the first check_mem_access() won't check whether the stack slot being read from is STACK_SPILL and the second check_mem_access() assumes in check_stack_write() that the value being written is a normal scalar. This means that unprivileged users can leak kernel pointers. - PTR_TO_TP_BUFFER: This is a local output buffer without concurrency. - PTR_TO_BTF_ID: This is read-only, XADD can't work. When the verifier tries to verify XADD on such memory, the first check_ptr_to_btf_access() invocation gets confused by value_regno not being a valid array index and writes to out-of-bounds memory. Limit XADD to PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE, since everything else at least doesn't make sense, and is sometimes broken on top of that. Fixes: 17a5267067f3 ("bpf: verifier (add verifier core)") Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com> --- I'm just sending this on the public list, since the worst-case impact for non-root users is leaking kernel pointers to userspace. In a context where you can reach BPF (no sandboxing), I don't think that kernel ASLR is very effective at the moment anyway. This breaks ten unit tests that assume that XADD is possible on the stack, and I'm not sure how all of them should be fixed up; I'd appreciate it if someone else could figure out how to fix them. I think some of them might be using XADD to cast pointers to numbers, or something like that? But I'm not sure. Or is XADD on the stack actually something you want to support for some reason, meaning that that part would have to be fixed differently? kernel/bpf/verifier.c | 27 +-------------------------- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 26 deletions(-) base-commit: 87b0f983f66f23762921129fd35966eddc3f2dae