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[5.4,278/314] arm64: hw_breakpoint: Dont invoke overflow handler on uaccess watchpoints

Message ID 20200623195352.242359665@linuxfoundation.org
State New
Headers show
Series None | expand

Commit Message

Greg Kroah-Hartman June 23, 2020, 7:57 p.m. UTC
From: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>

[ Upstream commit 24ebec25fb270100e252b19c288e21bd7d8cc7f7 ]

Unprivileged memory accesses generated by the so-called "translated"
instructions (e.g. STTR) at EL1 can cause EL0 watchpoints to fire
unexpectedly if kernel debugging is enabled. In such cases, the
hw_breakpoint logic will invoke the user overflow handler which will
typically raise a SIGTRAP back to the current task. This is futile when
returning back to the kernel because (a) the signal won't have been
delivered and (b) userspace can't handle the thing anyway.

Avoid invoking the user overflow handler for watchpoints triggered by
kernel uaccess routines, and instead single-step over the faulting
instruction as we would if no overflow handler had been installed.

(Fixes tag identifies the introduction of unprivileged memory accesses,
 which exposed this latent bug in the hw_breakpoint code)

Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Cc: James Morse <james.morse@arm.com>
Fixes: 57f4959bad0a ("arm64: kernel: Add support for User Access Override")
Reported-by: Luis Machado <luis.machado@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 arch/arm64/kernel/hw_breakpoint.c | 44 ++++++++++++++++++-------------
 1 file changed, 26 insertions(+), 18 deletions(-)
diff mbox series

Patch

diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/hw_breakpoint.c b/arch/arm64/kernel/hw_breakpoint.c
index 38ee1514cd9cd..b4a1607958246 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/kernel/hw_breakpoint.c
+++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/hw_breakpoint.c
@@ -730,6 +730,27 @@  static u64 get_distance_from_watchpoint(unsigned long addr, u64 val,
 		return 0;
 }
 
+static int watchpoint_report(struct perf_event *wp, unsigned long addr,
+			     struct pt_regs *regs)
+{
+	int step = is_default_overflow_handler(wp);
+	struct arch_hw_breakpoint *info = counter_arch_bp(wp);
+
+	info->trigger = addr;
+
+	/*
+	 * If we triggered a user watchpoint from a uaccess routine, then
+	 * handle the stepping ourselves since userspace really can't help
+	 * us with this.
+	 */
+	if (!user_mode(regs) && info->ctrl.privilege == AARCH64_BREAKPOINT_EL0)
+		step = 1;
+	else
+		perf_bp_event(wp, regs);
+
+	return step;
+}
+
 static int watchpoint_handler(unsigned long addr, unsigned int esr,
 			      struct pt_regs *regs)
 {
@@ -739,7 +760,6 @@  static int watchpoint_handler(unsigned long addr, unsigned int esr,
 	u64 val;
 	struct perf_event *wp, **slots;
 	struct debug_info *debug_info;
-	struct arch_hw_breakpoint *info;
 	struct arch_hw_breakpoint_ctrl ctrl;
 
 	slots = this_cpu_ptr(wp_on_reg);
@@ -777,25 +797,13 @@  static int watchpoint_handler(unsigned long addr, unsigned int esr,
 		if (dist != 0)
 			continue;
 
-		info = counter_arch_bp(wp);
-		info->trigger = addr;
-		perf_bp_event(wp, regs);
-
-		/* Do we need to handle the stepping? */
-		if (is_default_overflow_handler(wp))
-			step = 1;
+		step = watchpoint_report(wp, addr, regs);
 	}
-	if (min_dist > 0 && min_dist != -1) {
-		/* No exact match found. */
-		wp = slots[closest_match];
-		info = counter_arch_bp(wp);
-		info->trigger = addr;
-		perf_bp_event(wp, regs);
 
-		/* Do we need to handle the stepping? */
-		if (is_default_overflow_handler(wp))
-			step = 1;
-	}
+	/* No exact match found? */
+	if (min_dist > 0 && min_dist != -1)
+		step = watchpoint_report(slots[closest_match], addr, regs);
+
 	rcu_read_unlock();
 
 	if (!step)