| Message ID | 1393320025-2855-3-git-send-email-takahiro.akashi@linaro.org |
|---|---|
| State | New |
| Headers | show |
On Tue, Feb 25, 2014 at 09:20:24AM +0000, AKASHI Takahiro wrote: > secure_computing() should always be called first in syscall_trace(), and > if it returns non-zero, we should stop further handling. Then that system > call may eventually fail, be trapped or the process itself be killed > depending on loaded rules. [...] > diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/ptrace.c b/arch/arm64/kernel/ptrace.c > index d4ce70e..f2a74bc 100644 > --- a/arch/arm64/kernel/ptrace.c > +++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/ptrace.c > @@ -20,12 +20,14 @@ > */ > > #include <linux/audit.h> > +#include <linux/errno.h> > #include <linux/kernel.h> > #include <linux/sched.h> > #include <linux/mm.h> > #include <linux/smp.h> > #include <linux/ptrace.h> > #include <linux/user.h> > +#include <linux/seccomp.h> > #include <linux/security.h> > #include <linux/init.h> > #include <linux/signal.h> > @@ -1064,6 +1066,10 @@ asmlinkage int syscall_trace(int dir, struct pt_regs *regs) > { > unsigned long saved_reg; > > + if (!dir && secure_computing((int)regs->syscallno)) Why do you need this cast to (int)? Also, it's probably better to check for -1 explicitly here. I'm slightly surprised that we do the secure computing check first. Doesn't this allow a debugger to change the syscall to something else after we've decided that it's ok? Will -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in the body of a message to majordomo@vger.kernel.org More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html Please read the FAQ at http://www.tux.org/lkml/
On Thu, Mar 06, 2014 at 02:34:46AM +0000, AKASHI Takahiro wrote: > On 03/01/2014 02:20 AM, Will Deacon wrote: > > On Tue, Feb 25, 2014 at 09:20:24AM +0000, AKASHI Takahiro wrote: > > I'm slightly surprised that we do the secure computing check first. Doesn't > > this allow a debugger to change the syscall to something else after we've > > decided that it's ok? > > To be honest, I just followed other architectures' implementation. > Can you elaborate any use case that you have in your mind? My initial thought was that we should do the secure_computing check *after* the debugger has finished messing around with the registers. However, I suppose you'd have had to enable ptrace in your seccompd filter for that scenario to occur, so there's probably not an issue here after all. Will -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in the body of a message to majordomo@vger.kernel.org More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html Please read the FAQ at http://www.tux.org/lkml/
diff --git a/arch/arm64/Kconfig b/arch/arm64/Kconfig index a21455e..a0102f7 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/Kconfig +++ b/arch/arm64/Kconfig @@ -27,6 +27,7 @@ config ARM64 select HARDIRQS_SW_RESEND select HAVE_ARCH_AUDITSYSCALL select HAVE_ARCH_JUMP_LABEL + select HAVE_ARCH_SECCOMP_FILTER select HAVE_ARCH_TRACEHOOK select HAVE_DEBUG_BUGVERBOSE select HAVE_DEBUG_KMEMLEAK @@ -222,6 +223,22 @@ config HAVE_ARCH_TRANSPARENT_HUGEPAGE source "mm/Kconfig" +config SECCOMP + def_bool y + prompt "Enable seccomp to safely compute untrusted bytecode" + ---help--- + This kernel feature is useful for number crunching applications + that may need to compute untrusted bytecode during their + execution. By using pipes or other transports made available to + the process as file descriptors supporting the read/write + syscalls, it's possible to isolate those applications in + their own address space using seccomp. Once seccomp is + enabled via prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP), it cannot be disabled + and the task is only allowed to execute a few safe syscalls + defined by each seccomp mode. + + If unsure, say Y. Only embedded should say N here. + config XEN_DOM0 def_bool y depends on XEN diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/seccomp.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/seccomp.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..c76fac9 --- /dev/null +++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/seccomp.h @@ -0,0 +1,25 @@ +/* + * arch/arm64/include/asm/seccomp.h + * + * Copyright (C) 2014 Linaro Limited + * Author: AKASHI Takahiro <takahiro.akashi@linaro.org> + * + * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify + * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2 as + * published by the Free Software Foundation. + */ +#ifndef _ASM_SECCOMP_H +#define _ASM_SECCOMP_H + +#include <asm/unistd.h> + +#ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT +#define __NR_seccomp_read_32 __NR_compat_read +#define __NR_seccomp_write_32 __NR_compat_write +#define __NR_seccomp_exit_32 __NR_compat_exit +#define __NR_seccomp_sigreturn_32 __NR_compat_rt_sigreturn +#endif /* CONFIG_COMPAT */ + +#include <asm-generic/seccomp.h> + +#endif /* _ASM_SECCOMP_H */ diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/unistd.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/unistd.h index 4a09fdb..05f2db3 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/unistd.h +++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/unistd.h @@ -30,6 +30,9 @@ * Compat syscall numbers used by the AArch64 kernel. */ #define __NR_compat_restart_syscall 0 +#define __NR_compat_exit 1 +#define __NR_compat_read 3 +#define __NR_compat_write 4 #define __NR_compat_sigreturn 119 #define __NR_compat_rt_sigreturn 173 diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S b/arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S index 96c2d03..7f3cbaf 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S +++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S @@ -651,6 +651,10 @@ __sys_trace: mov x1, sp mov w0, #0 // trace entry bl syscall_trace +#ifdef CONFIG_SECCOMP + cmp w0, #-EPERM // check seccomp result + b.eq ret_to_user // -EPERM means 'rejected' +#endif adr lr, __sys_trace_return // return address uxtw scno, w0 // syscall number (possibly new) mov x1, sp // pointer to regs diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/ptrace.c b/arch/arm64/kernel/ptrace.c index d4ce70e..f2a74bc 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/kernel/ptrace.c +++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/ptrace.c @@ -20,12 +20,14 @@ */ #include <linux/audit.h> +#include <linux/errno.h> #include <linux/kernel.h> #include <linux/sched.h> #include <linux/mm.h> #include <linux/smp.h> #include <linux/ptrace.h> #include <linux/user.h> +#include <linux/seccomp.h> #include <linux/security.h> #include <linux/init.h> #include <linux/signal.h> @@ -1064,6 +1066,10 @@ asmlinkage int syscall_trace(int dir, struct pt_regs *regs) { unsigned long saved_reg; + if (!dir && secure_computing((int)regs->syscallno)) + /* seccomp failures shouldn't expose any additional code. */ + return -EPERM; + if (dir && test_thread_flag(TIF_SYSCALL_AUDIT)) audit_syscall_exit(regs);
secure_computing() should always be called first in syscall_trace(), and if it returns non-zero, we should stop further handling. Then that system call may eventually fail, be trapped or the process itself be killed depending on loaded rules. Signed-off-by: AKASHI Takahiro <takahiro.akashi@linaro.org> --- arch/arm64/Kconfig | 17 +++++++++++++++++ arch/arm64/include/asm/seccomp.h | 25 +++++++++++++++++++++++++ arch/arm64/include/asm/unistd.h | 3 +++ arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S | 4 ++++ arch/arm64/kernel/ptrace.c | 6 ++++++ 5 files changed, 55 insertions(+) create mode 100644 arch/arm64/include/asm/seccomp.h