@@ -851,6 +851,7 @@ bool esas2r_process_fs_ioctl(struct esas2r_adapter *a,
struct esas2r_ioctlfs_command *fsc = &fs->command;
u8 func = 0;
u32 datalen;
+ u8 command = fsc->command;
fs->status = ATTO_STS_FAILED;
fs->driver_error = RS_PENDING;
@@ -860,18 +861,18 @@ bool esas2r_process_fs_ioctl(struct esas2r_adapter *a,
return false;
}
- if (fsc->command >= cmdcnt) {
+ if (command >= cmdcnt) {
fs->status = ATTO_STS_INV_FUNC;
return false;
}
- func = cmd_to_fls_func[fsc->command];
+ func = cmd_to_fls_func[command];
if (func == 0xFF) {
fs->status = ATTO_STS_INV_FUNC;
return false;
}
- if (fsc->command != ESAS2R_FS_CMD_CANCEL) {
+ if (command != ESAS2R_FS_CMD_CANCEL) {
if ((a->pcid->device != ATTO_DID_MV_88RC9580
|| fs->adap_type != ESAS2R_FS_AT_ESASRAID2)
&& (a->pcid->device != ATTO_DID_MV_88RC9580TS
In esas2r_read_fs(): struct esas2r_ioctl_fs *fs = (struct esas2r_ioctl_fs *)a->fs_api_buffer; Because "a->fs_api_buffer" is mapped to coherent DMA (allocated in esas2r_write_fs()), "fs" is also mapped to DMA. Then esas2r_read_fs() calls esas2r_process_fs_ioctl() with "fs". In esas2r_process_fs_ioctl(): fsc = &fs->command; ... if (fsc->command >= cmdcnt) { fs->status = ATTO_STS_INV_FUNC; return false; } func = cmd_to_fls_func[fsc->command]; if (func == 0xFF) { fs->status = ATTO_STS_INV_FUNC; return false; } Because "fs" is mapped to DMA, its data can be modified at anytime by malicious or malfunctioning hardware. In this case, the check "if (fsc->command >= cmdcnt)" can be passed, and then "fsc->command" can be modified by hardware to cause buffer overflow. To fix this problem, "fsc->command" is assigned to a local variable, and then this local variable is used to replace "fsc->command". Signed-off-by: Jia-Ju Bai <baijiaju@tsinghua.edu.cn> --- drivers/scsi/esas2r/esas2r_flash.c | 7 ++++--- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)