[bpf-next,1/2] bpf: allow rewriting to ports under ip_unprivileged_port_start

Message ID 20210121012241.2109147-1-sdf@google.com
State New
Headers show
Series
  • [bpf-next,1/2] bpf: allow rewriting to ports under ip_unprivileged_port_start
Related show

Commit Message

Stanislav Fomichev Jan. 21, 2021, 1:22 a.m.
At the moment, BPF_CGROUP_INET{4,6}_BIND hooks can rewrite user_port
to the privileged ones (< ip_unprivileged_port_start), but it will
be rejected later on in the __inet_bind or __inet6_bind.

Let's export 'port_changed' event from the BPF program and bypass
ip_unprivileged_port_start range check when we've seen that
the program explicitly overrode the port. This is accomplished
by generating instructions to set ctx->port_changed along with
updating ctx->user_port.

Signed-off-by: Stanislav Fomichev <sdf@google.com>
---
 include/linux/bpf-cgroup.h | 30 ++++++++++++++++++++----------
 include/linux/filter.h     |  1 +
 include/net/inet_common.h  |  3 +++
 kernel/bpf/cgroup.c        |  8 +++++++-
 net/core/filter.c          | 13 +++++++++++++
 net/ipv4/af_inet.c         |  9 ++++++---
 net/ipv6/af_inet6.c        |  6 ++++--
 7 files changed, 54 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-)

Comments

Andrey Ignatov Jan. 22, 2021, 7:37 p.m. | #1
Stanislav Fomichev <sdf@google.com> [Wed, 2021-01-20 18:09 -0800]:
> At the moment, BPF_CGROUP_INET{4,6}_BIND hooks can rewrite user_port

> to the privileged ones (< ip_unprivileged_port_start), but it will

> be rejected later on in the __inet_bind or __inet6_bind.

>

> Let's export 'port_changed' event from the BPF program and bypass

> ip_unprivileged_port_start range check when we've seen that

> the program explicitly overrode the port. This is accomplished

> by generating instructions to set ctx->port_changed along with

> updating ctx->user_port.

> 

> Signed-off-by: Stanislav Fomichev <sdf@google.com>

> ---

...
> @@ -244,17 +245,27 @@ int bpf_percpu_cgroup_storage_update(struct bpf_map *map, void *key,

>  	if (cgroup_bpf_enabled(type))	{				       \

>  		lock_sock(sk);						       \

>  		__ret = __cgroup_bpf_run_filter_sock_addr(sk, uaddr, type,     \

> -							  t_ctx);	       \

> +							  t_ctx, NULL);	       \

>  		release_sock(sk);					       \

>  	}								       \

>  	__ret;								       \

>  })

>  

> -#define BPF_CGROUP_RUN_PROG_INET4_BIND_LOCK(sk, uaddr)			       \

> -	BPF_CGROUP_RUN_SA_PROG_LOCK(sk, uaddr, BPF_CGROUP_INET4_BIND, NULL)

> -

> -#define BPF_CGROUP_RUN_PROG_INET6_BIND_LOCK(sk, uaddr)			       \

> -	BPF_CGROUP_RUN_SA_PROG_LOCK(sk, uaddr, BPF_CGROUP_INET6_BIND, NULL)

> +#define BPF_CGROUP_RUN_PROG_INET_BIND_LOCK(sk, uaddr, type, flags)	       \

> +({									       \

> +	bool port_changed = false;					       \


I see the discussion with Martin in [0] on the program overriding the
port but setting exactly same value as it already contains. Commenting
on this patch since the code is here.

From what I understand there is no use-case to support overriding the
port w/o changing the value to just bypass the capability. In this case
the code can be simplified.

Here instead of introducing port_changed you can just remember the
original ((struct sockaddr_in *)uaddr)->sin_port or
((struct sockaddr_in6 *)uaddr)->sin6_port (they have same offset/size so
it can be simplified same way as in sock_addr_convert_ctx_access() for
user_port) ...

> +	int __ret = 0;							       \

> +	if (cgroup_bpf_enabled(type))	{				       \

> +		lock_sock(sk);						       \

> +		__ret = __cgroup_bpf_run_filter_sock_addr(sk, uaddr, type,     \

> +							  NULL,		       \

> +							  &port_changed);      \

> +		release_sock(sk);					       \

> +		if (port_changed)					       \


... and then just compare the original and the new ports here.

The benefits will be:
* no need to introduce port_changed field in struct bpf_sock_addr_kern;
* no need to do change program instructions;
* no need to think about compiler optimizing out those instructions;
* no need to think about multiple programs coordination, the flag will
  be set only if port has actually changed what is easy to reason about
  from user perspective.

wdyt?

> +			*flags |= BIND_NO_CAP_NET_BIND_SERVICE;		       \

> +	}								       \

> +	__ret;								       \

> +})

>  

>  #define BPF_CGROUP_PRE_CONNECT_ENABLED(sk)				       \

>  	((cgroup_bpf_enabled(BPF_CGROUP_INET4_CONNECT) ||		       \

> @@ -453,8 +464,7 @@ static inline int bpf_percpu_cgroup_storage_update(struct bpf_map *map,

>  #define BPF_CGROUP_RUN_PROG_INET_EGRESS(sk,skb) ({ 0; })

>  #define BPF_CGROUP_RUN_PROG_INET_SOCK(sk) ({ 0; })

>  #define BPF_CGROUP_RUN_PROG_INET_SOCK_RELEASE(sk) ({ 0; })

> -#define BPF_CGROUP_RUN_PROG_INET4_BIND_LOCK(sk, uaddr) ({ 0; })

> -#define BPF_CGROUP_RUN_PROG_INET6_BIND_LOCK(sk, uaddr) ({ 0; })

> +#define BPF_CGROUP_RUN_PROG_INET_BIND_LOCK(sk, uaddr, type, flags) ({ 0; })

>  #define BPF_CGROUP_RUN_PROG_INET4_POST_BIND(sk) ({ 0; })

>  #define BPF_CGROUP_RUN_PROG_INET6_POST_BIND(sk) ({ 0; })

>  #define BPF_CGROUP_RUN_PROG_INET4_CONNECT(sk, uaddr) ({ 0; })

...

[0] https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20210121223330.pyk4ljtjirm2zlay@kafai-mbp/

-- 
Andrey Ignatov
Stanislav Fomichev Jan. 22, 2021, 7:53 p.m. | #2
On Fri, Jan 22, 2021 at 11:37 AM Andrey Ignatov <rdna@fb.com> wrote:
>

> Stanislav Fomichev <sdf@google.com> [Wed, 2021-01-20 18:09 -0800]:

> > At the moment, BPF_CGROUP_INET{4,6}_BIND hooks can rewrite user_port

> > to the privileged ones (< ip_unprivileged_port_start), but it will

> > be rejected later on in the __inet_bind or __inet6_bind.

> >

> > Let's export 'port_changed' event from the BPF program and bypass

> > ip_unprivileged_port_start range check when we've seen that

> > the program explicitly overrode the port. This is accomplished

> > by generating instructions to set ctx->port_changed along with

> > updating ctx->user_port.

> >

> > Signed-off-by: Stanislav Fomichev <sdf@google.com>

> > ---

> ...

> > @@ -244,17 +245,27 @@ int bpf_percpu_cgroup_storage_update(struct bpf_map *map, void *key,

> >       if (cgroup_bpf_enabled(type))   {                                      \

> >               lock_sock(sk);                                                 \

> >               __ret = __cgroup_bpf_run_filter_sock_addr(sk, uaddr, type,     \

> > -                                                       t_ctx);              \

> > +                                                       t_ctx, NULL);        \

> >               release_sock(sk);                                              \

> >       }                                                                      \

> >       __ret;                                                                 \

> >  })

> >

> > -#define BPF_CGROUP_RUN_PROG_INET4_BIND_LOCK(sk, uaddr)                              \

> > -     BPF_CGROUP_RUN_SA_PROG_LOCK(sk, uaddr, BPF_CGROUP_INET4_BIND, NULL)

> > -

> > -#define BPF_CGROUP_RUN_PROG_INET6_BIND_LOCK(sk, uaddr)                              \

> > -     BPF_CGROUP_RUN_SA_PROG_LOCK(sk, uaddr, BPF_CGROUP_INET6_BIND, NULL)

> > +#define BPF_CGROUP_RUN_PROG_INET_BIND_LOCK(sk, uaddr, type, flags)          \

> > +({                                                                          \

> > +     bool port_changed = false;                                             \

>

> I see the discussion with Martin in [0] on the program overriding the

> port but setting exactly same value as it already contains. Commenting

> on this patch since the code is here.

>

> From what I understand there is no use-case to support overriding the

> port w/o changing the value to just bypass the capability. In this case

> the code can be simplified.

>

> Here instead of introducing port_changed you can just remember the

> original ((struct sockaddr_in *)uaddr)->sin_port or

> ((struct sockaddr_in6 *)uaddr)->sin6_port (they have same offset/size so

> it can be simplified same way as in sock_addr_convert_ctx_access() for

> user_port) ...

>

> > +     int __ret = 0;                                                         \

> > +     if (cgroup_bpf_enabled(type))   {                                      \

> > +             lock_sock(sk);                                                 \

> > +             __ret = __cgroup_bpf_run_filter_sock_addr(sk, uaddr, type,     \

> > +                                                       NULL,                \

> > +                                                       &port_changed);      \

> > +             release_sock(sk);                                              \

> > +             if (port_changed)                                              \

>

> ... and then just compare the original and the new ports here.

>

> The benefits will be:

> * no need to introduce port_changed field in struct bpf_sock_addr_kern;

> * no need to do change program instructions;

> * no need to think about compiler optimizing out those instructions;

> * no need to think about multiple programs coordination, the flag will

>   be set only if port has actually changed what is easy to reason about

>   from user perspective.

>

> wdyt?

Martin mentioned in another email that we might want to do that when
we rewrite only the address portion of it.
I think it makes sense. Imagine doing 1.1.1.1:50 -> 2.2.2.2:50 it
seems like it should also work, right?
And in this case, we need to store and compare addresses as well and
it becomes messy :-/
It also seems like it would be nice to have this 'bypass
cap_net_bind_service" without changing the address while we are at it.
Andrey Ignatov Jan. 22, 2021, 8:08 p.m. | #3
Stanislav Fomichev <sdf@google.com> [Fri, 2021-01-22 11:54 -0800]:
> On Fri, Jan 22, 2021 at 11:37 AM Andrey Ignatov <rdna@fb.com> wrote:

> >

> > Stanislav Fomichev <sdf@google.com> [Wed, 2021-01-20 18:09 -0800]:

> > > At the moment, BPF_CGROUP_INET{4,6}_BIND hooks can rewrite user_port

> > > to the privileged ones (< ip_unprivileged_port_start), but it will

> > > be rejected later on in the __inet_bind or __inet6_bind.

> > >

> > > Let's export 'port_changed' event from the BPF program and bypass

> > > ip_unprivileged_port_start range check when we've seen that

> > > the program explicitly overrode the port. This is accomplished

> > > by generating instructions to set ctx->port_changed along with

> > > updating ctx->user_port.

> > >

> > > Signed-off-by: Stanislav Fomichev <sdf@google.com>

> > > ---

> > ...

> > > @@ -244,17 +245,27 @@ int bpf_percpu_cgroup_storage_update(struct bpf_map *map, void *key,

> > >       if (cgroup_bpf_enabled(type))   {                                      \

> > >               lock_sock(sk);                                                 \

> > >               __ret = __cgroup_bpf_run_filter_sock_addr(sk, uaddr, type,     \

> > > -                                                       t_ctx);              \

> > > +                                                       t_ctx, NULL);        \

> > >               release_sock(sk);                                              \

> > >       }                                                                      \

> > >       __ret;                                                                 \

> > >  })

> > >

> > > -#define BPF_CGROUP_RUN_PROG_INET4_BIND_LOCK(sk, uaddr)                              \

> > > -     BPF_CGROUP_RUN_SA_PROG_LOCK(sk, uaddr, BPF_CGROUP_INET4_BIND, NULL)

> > > -

> > > -#define BPF_CGROUP_RUN_PROG_INET6_BIND_LOCK(sk, uaddr)                              \

> > > -     BPF_CGROUP_RUN_SA_PROG_LOCK(sk, uaddr, BPF_CGROUP_INET6_BIND, NULL)

> > > +#define BPF_CGROUP_RUN_PROG_INET_BIND_LOCK(sk, uaddr, type, flags)          \

> > > +({                                                                          \

> > > +     bool port_changed = false;                                             \

> >

> > I see the discussion with Martin in [0] on the program overriding the

> > port but setting exactly same value as it already contains. Commenting

> > on this patch since the code is here.

> >

> > From what I understand there is no use-case to support overriding the

> > port w/o changing the value to just bypass the capability. In this case

> > the code can be simplified.

> >

> > Here instead of introducing port_changed you can just remember the

> > original ((struct sockaddr_in *)uaddr)->sin_port or

> > ((struct sockaddr_in6 *)uaddr)->sin6_port (they have same offset/size so

> > it can be simplified same way as in sock_addr_convert_ctx_access() for

> > user_port) ...

> >

> > > +     int __ret = 0;                                                         \

> > > +     if (cgroup_bpf_enabled(type))   {                                      \

> > > +             lock_sock(sk);                                                 \

> > > +             __ret = __cgroup_bpf_run_filter_sock_addr(sk, uaddr, type,     \

> > > +                                                       NULL,                \

> > > +                                                       &port_changed);      \

> > > +             release_sock(sk);                                              \

> > > +             if (port_changed)                                              \

> >

> > ... and then just compare the original and the new ports here.

> >

> > The benefits will be:

> > * no need to introduce port_changed field in struct bpf_sock_addr_kern;

> > * no need to do change program instructions;

> > * no need to think about compiler optimizing out those instructions;

> > * no need to think about multiple programs coordination, the flag will

> >   be set only if port has actually changed what is easy to reason about

> >   from user perspective.

> >

> > wdyt?

> Martin mentioned in another email that we might want to do that when

> we rewrite only the address portion of it.

> I think it makes sense. Imagine doing 1.1.1.1:50 -> 2.2.2.2:50 it

> seems like it should also work, right?

> And in this case, we need to store and compare addresses as well and

> it becomes messy :-/


Why does address matter? CAP_NET_BIND_SERVICE is only about ports, not
addresses.

IMO address change should not matter to bypass CAP_NET_BIND_SERVICE in
this case and correspondingly there should not be a need to compare
addresses, only port should be enough.

> It also seems like it would be nice to have this 'bypass

> cap_net_bind_service" without changing the address while we are at it.


Yeah, this part determines the behaviour. I guess it should be use-case
driven. So far it seems to be more like "nice to have" rather than a
real-use case exists, but I could miss it, please correct me if it's the
case.

-- 
Andrey Ignatov

Patch

diff --git a/include/linux/bpf-cgroup.h b/include/linux/bpf-cgroup.h
index 0748fd87969e..874ed865bea1 100644
--- a/include/linux/bpf-cgroup.h
+++ b/include/linux/bpf-cgroup.h
@@ -125,7 +125,8 @@  int __cgroup_bpf_run_filter_sk(struct sock *sk,
 int __cgroup_bpf_run_filter_sock_addr(struct sock *sk,
 				      struct sockaddr *uaddr,
 				      enum bpf_attach_type type,
-				      void *t_ctx);
+				      void *t_ctx,
+				      bool *port_changed);
 
 int __cgroup_bpf_run_filter_sock_ops(struct sock *sk,
 				     struct bpf_sock_ops_kern *sock_ops,
@@ -234,7 +235,7 @@  int bpf_percpu_cgroup_storage_update(struct bpf_map *map, void *key,
 	int __ret = 0;							       \
 	if (cgroup_bpf_enabled(type))					       \
 		__ret = __cgroup_bpf_run_filter_sock_addr(sk, uaddr, type,     \
-							  NULL);	       \
+							  NULL, NULL);	       \
 	__ret;								       \
 })
 
@@ -244,17 +245,27 @@  int bpf_percpu_cgroup_storage_update(struct bpf_map *map, void *key,
 	if (cgroup_bpf_enabled(type))	{				       \
 		lock_sock(sk);						       \
 		__ret = __cgroup_bpf_run_filter_sock_addr(sk, uaddr, type,     \
-							  t_ctx);	       \
+							  t_ctx, NULL);	       \
 		release_sock(sk);					       \
 	}								       \
 	__ret;								       \
 })
 
-#define BPF_CGROUP_RUN_PROG_INET4_BIND_LOCK(sk, uaddr)			       \
-	BPF_CGROUP_RUN_SA_PROG_LOCK(sk, uaddr, BPF_CGROUP_INET4_BIND, NULL)
-
-#define BPF_CGROUP_RUN_PROG_INET6_BIND_LOCK(sk, uaddr)			       \
-	BPF_CGROUP_RUN_SA_PROG_LOCK(sk, uaddr, BPF_CGROUP_INET6_BIND, NULL)
+#define BPF_CGROUP_RUN_PROG_INET_BIND_LOCK(sk, uaddr, type, flags)	       \
+({									       \
+	bool port_changed = false;					       \
+	int __ret = 0;							       \
+	if (cgroup_bpf_enabled(type))	{				       \
+		lock_sock(sk);						       \
+		__ret = __cgroup_bpf_run_filter_sock_addr(sk, uaddr, type,     \
+							  NULL,		       \
+							  &port_changed);      \
+		release_sock(sk);					       \
+		if (port_changed)					       \
+			*flags |= BIND_NO_CAP_NET_BIND_SERVICE;		       \
+	}								       \
+	__ret;								       \
+})
 
 #define BPF_CGROUP_PRE_CONNECT_ENABLED(sk)				       \
 	((cgroup_bpf_enabled(BPF_CGROUP_INET4_CONNECT) ||		       \
@@ -453,8 +464,7 @@  static inline int bpf_percpu_cgroup_storage_update(struct bpf_map *map,
 #define BPF_CGROUP_RUN_PROG_INET_EGRESS(sk,skb) ({ 0; })
 #define BPF_CGROUP_RUN_PROG_INET_SOCK(sk) ({ 0; })
 #define BPF_CGROUP_RUN_PROG_INET_SOCK_RELEASE(sk) ({ 0; })
-#define BPF_CGROUP_RUN_PROG_INET4_BIND_LOCK(sk, uaddr) ({ 0; })
-#define BPF_CGROUP_RUN_PROG_INET6_BIND_LOCK(sk, uaddr) ({ 0; })
+#define BPF_CGROUP_RUN_PROG_INET_BIND_LOCK(sk, uaddr, type, flags) ({ 0; })
 #define BPF_CGROUP_RUN_PROG_INET4_POST_BIND(sk) ({ 0; })
 #define BPF_CGROUP_RUN_PROG_INET6_POST_BIND(sk) ({ 0; })
 #define BPF_CGROUP_RUN_PROG_INET4_CONNECT(sk, uaddr) ({ 0; })
diff --git a/include/linux/filter.h b/include/linux/filter.h
index 5b3137d7b690..9bee8c057dd2 100644
--- a/include/linux/filter.h
+++ b/include/linux/filter.h
@@ -1258,6 +1258,7 @@  struct bpf_sock_addr_kern {
 	 */
 	u64 tmp_reg;
 	void *t_ctx;	/* Attach type specific context. */
+	u32 port_changed;
 };
 
 struct bpf_sock_ops_kern {
diff --git a/include/net/inet_common.h b/include/net/inet_common.h
index cb2818862919..9ba935c15869 100644
--- a/include/net/inet_common.h
+++ b/include/net/inet_common.h
@@ -41,6 +41,9 @@  int inet_bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *uaddr, int addr_len);
 #define BIND_WITH_LOCK			(1 << 1)
 /* Called from BPF program. */
 #define BIND_FROM_BPF			(1 << 2)
+/* Skip CAP_NET_BIND_SERVICE check. */
+#define BIND_NO_CAP_NET_BIND_SERVICE	(1 << 3)
+
 int __inet_bind(struct sock *sk, struct sockaddr *uaddr, int addr_len,
 		u32 flags);
 int inet_getname(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *uaddr,
diff --git a/kernel/bpf/cgroup.c b/kernel/bpf/cgroup.c
index da649f20d6b2..f5d6205f1717 100644
--- a/kernel/bpf/cgroup.c
+++ b/kernel/bpf/cgroup.c
@@ -1055,6 +1055,8 @@  EXPORT_SYMBOL(__cgroup_bpf_run_filter_sk);
  * @uaddr: sockaddr struct provided by user
  * @type: The type of program to be exectuted
  * @t_ctx: Pointer to attach type specific context
+ * @port_changed: Pointer to bool which will be set to 'true' when BPF
+ *                program updates user_port
  *
  * socket is expected to be of type INET or INET6.
  *
@@ -1064,7 +1066,8 @@  EXPORT_SYMBOL(__cgroup_bpf_run_filter_sk);
 int __cgroup_bpf_run_filter_sock_addr(struct sock *sk,
 				      struct sockaddr *uaddr,
 				      enum bpf_attach_type type,
-				      void *t_ctx)
+				      void *t_ctx,
+				      bool *port_changed)
 {
 	struct bpf_sock_addr_kern ctx = {
 		.sk = sk,
@@ -1089,6 +1092,9 @@  int __cgroup_bpf_run_filter_sock_addr(struct sock *sk,
 	cgrp = sock_cgroup_ptr(&sk->sk_cgrp_data);
 	ret = BPF_PROG_RUN_ARRAY(cgrp->bpf.effective[type], &ctx, BPF_PROG_RUN);
 
+	if (port_changed)
+		*port_changed = ctx.port_changed;
+
 	return ret == 1 ? 0 : -EPERM;
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(__cgroup_bpf_run_filter_sock_addr);
diff --git a/net/core/filter.c b/net/core/filter.c
index 9ab94e90d660..b3dd02eb9551 100644
--- a/net/core/filter.c
+++ b/net/core/filter.c
@@ -9028,6 +9028,19 @@  static u32 sock_addr_convert_ctx_access(enum bpf_access_type type,
 			     offsetof(struct sockaddr_in6, sin6_port));
 		BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof_field(struct sockaddr_in, sin_port) !=
 			     sizeof_field(struct sockaddr_in6, sin6_port));
+
+		/* Set bpf_sock_addr_kern->port_changed=1 whenever
+		 * the port is updated from the BPF program.
+		 */
+		if (type == BPF_WRITE) {
+			*insn++ = BPF_ST_MEM(BPF_FIELD_SIZEOF(struct bpf_sock_addr_kern,
+							      port_changed),
+					     si->dst_reg,
+					     offsetof(struct bpf_sock_addr_kern,
+						      port_changed),
+					     1);
+		}
+
 		/* Account for sin6_port being smaller than user_port. */
 		port_size = min(port_size, BPF_LDST_BYTES(si));
 		SOCK_ADDR_LOAD_OR_STORE_NESTED_FIELD_SIZE_OFF(
diff --git a/net/ipv4/af_inet.c b/net/ipv4/af_inet.c
index 6ba2930ff49b..aaa94bea19c3 100644
--- a/net/ipv4/af_inet.c
+++ b/net/ipv4/af_inet.c
@@ -438,6 +438,7 @@  EXPORT_SYMBOL(inet_release);
 int inet_bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *uaddr, int addr_len)
 {
 	struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
+	u32 flags = BIND_WITH_LOCK;
 	int err;
 
 	/* If the socket has its own bind function then use it. (RAW) */
@@ -450,11 +451,12 @@  int inet_bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *uaddr, int addr_len)
 	/* BPF prog is run before any checks are done so that if the prog
 	 * changes context in a wrong way it will be caught.
 	 */
-	err = BPF_CGROUP_RUN_PROG_INET4_BIND_LOCK(sk, uaddr);
+	err = BPF_CGROUP_RUN_PROG_INET_BIND_LOCK(sk, uaddr,
+						 BPF_CGROUP_INET4_BIND, &flags);
 	if (err)
 		return err;
 
-	return __inet_bind(sk, uaddr, addr_len, BIND_WITH_LOCK);
+	return __inet_bind(sk, uaddr, addr_len, flags);
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(inet_bind);
 
@@ -499,7 +501,8 @@  int __inet_bind(struct sock *sk, struct sockaddr *uaddr, int addr_len,
 
 	snum = ntohs(addr->sin_port);
 	err = -EACCES;
-	if (snum && inet_port_requires_bind_service(net, snum) &&
+	if (!(flags & BIND_NO_CAP_NET_BIND_SERVICE) &&
+	    snum && inet_port_requires_bind_service(net, snum) &&
 	    !ns_capable(net->user_ns, CAP_NET_BIND_SERVICE))
 		goto out;
 
diff --git a/net/ipv6/af_inet6.c b/net/ipv6/af_inet6.c
index b9c654836b72..3e523c4f5226 100644
--- a/net/ipv6/af_inet6.c
+++ b/net/ipv6/af_inet6.c
@@ -439,6 +439,7 @@  static int __inet6_bind(struct sock *sk, struct sockaddr *uaddr, int addr_len,
 int inet6_bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *uaddr, int addr_len)
 {
 	struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
+	u32 flags = BIND_WITH_LOCK;
 	int err = 0;
 
 	/* If the socket has its own bind function then use it. */
@@ -451,11 +452,12 @@  int inet6_bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *uaddr, int addr_len)
 	/* BPF prog is run before any checks are done so that if the prog
 	 * changes context in a wrong way it will be caught.
 	 */
-	err = BPF_CGROUP_RUN_PROG_INET6_BIND_LOCK(sk, uaddr);
+	err = BPF_CGROUP_RUN_PROG_INET_BIND_LOCK(sk, uaddr,
+						 BPF_CGROUP_INET6_BIND, &flags);
 	if (err)
 		return err;
 
-	return __inet6_bind(sk, uaddr, addr_len, BIND_WITH_LOCK);
+	return __inet6_bind(sk, uaddr, addr_len, flags);
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(inet6_bind);