diff mbox series

[62/64] netlink: Avoid false-positive memcpy() warning

Message ID 20210727205855.411487-63-keescook@chromium.org
State New
Headers show
Series Introduce strict memcpy() bounds checking | expand

Commit Message

Kees Cook July 27, 2021, 8:58 p.m. UTC
In preparation for FORTIFY_SOURCE performing compile-time and run-time
field bounds checking for memcpy(), memmove(), and memset(), avoid
intentionally writing across neighboring fields.

Add a flexible array member to mark the end of struct nlmsghdr, and
split the memcpy() to avoid false positive memcpy() warning:

memcpy: detected field-spanning write (size 32) of single field (size 16)

Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
---
 include/uapi/linux/netlink.h | 1 +
 net/netlink/af_netlink.c     | 4 +++-
 2 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

Comments

gregkh@linuxfoundation.org July 28, 2021, 5:49 a.m. UTC | #1
On Tue, Jul 27, 2021 at 01:58:53PM -0700, Kees Cook wrote:
> In preparation for FORTIFY_SOURCE performing compile-time and run-time
> field bounds checking for memcpy(), memmove(), and memset(), avoid
> intentionally writing across neighboring fields.
> 
> Add a flexible array member to mark the end of struct nlmsghdr, and
> split the memcpy() to avoid false positive memcpy() warning:
> 
> memcpy: detected field-spanning write (size 32) of single field (size 16)
> 
> Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
> ---
>  include/uapi/linux/netlink.h | 1 +
>  net/netlink/af_netlink.c     | 4 +++-
>  2 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
> 
> diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/netlink.h b/include/uapi/linux/netlink.h
> index 4c0cde075c27..ddeaa748df5e 100644
> --- a/include/uapi/linux/netlink.h
> +++ b/include/uapi/linux/netlink.h
> @@ -47,6 +47,7 @@ struct nlmsghdr {
>  	__u16		nlmsg_flags;	/* Additional flags */
>  	__u32		nlmsg_seq;	/* Sequence number */
>  	__u32		nlmsg_pid;	/* Sending process port ID */
> +	__u8		contents[];

Is this ok to change a public, userspace visable, structure?

Nothing breaks?

thanks,

greg k-h
Rasmus Villemoes July 28, 2021, 11:24 a.m. UTC | #2
On 28/07/2021 07.49, Greg Kroah-Hartman wrote:
> On Tue, Jul 27, 2021 at 01:58:53PM -0700, Kees Cook wrote:
>> In preparation for FORTIFY_SOURCE performing compile-time and run-time
>> field bounds checking for memcpy(), memmove(), and memset(), avoid
>> intentionally writing across neighboring fields.
>>
>> Add a flexible array member to mark the end of struct nlmsghdr, and
>> split the memcpy() to avoid false positive memcpy() warning:
>>
>> memcpy: detected field-spanning write (size 32) of single field (size 16)
>>
>> Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
>> ---
>>  include/uapi/linux/netlink.h | 1 +
>>  net/netlink/af_netlink.c     | 4 +++-
>>  2 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
>>
>> diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/netlink.h b/include/uapi/linux/netlink.h
>> index 4c0cde075c27..ddeaa748df5e 100644
>> --- a/include/uapi/linux/netlink.h
>> +++ b/include/uapi/linux/netlink.h
>> @@ -47,6 +47,7 @@ struct nlmsghdr {
>>  	__u16		nlmsg_flags;	/* Additional flags */
>>  	__u32		nlmsg_seq;	/* Sequence number */
>>  	__u32		nlmsg_pid;	/* Sending process port ID */
>> +	__u8		contents[];
> 
> Is this ok to change a public, userspace visable, structure?

At least it should keep using a nlmsg_ prefix for consistency and reduce
risk of collision with somebody having defined an object-like contents
macro. But there's no guarantees in any case, of course.

Rasmus
Kees Cook July 30, 2021, 1:39 a.m. UTC | #3
On Wed, Jul 28, 2021 at 01:24:01PM +0200, Rasmus Villemoes wrote:
> On 28/07/2021 07.49, Greg Kroah-Hartman wrote:
> > On Tue, Jul 27, 2021 at 01:58:53PM -0700, Kees Cook wrote:
> >> In preparation for FORTIFY_SOURCE performing compile-time and run-time
> >> field bounds checking for memcpy(), memmove(), and memset(), avoid
> >> intentionally writing across neighboring fields.
> >>
> >> Add a flexible array member to mark the end of struct nlmsghdr, and
> >> split the memcpy() to avoid false positive memcpy() warning:
> >>
> >> memcpy: detected field-spanning write (size 32) of single field (size 16)
> >>
> >> Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
> >> ---
> >>  include/uapi/linux/netlink.h | 1 +
> >>  net/netlink/af_netlink.c     | 4 +++-
> >>  2 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
> >>
> >> diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/netlink.h b/include/uapi/linux/netlink.h
> >> index 4c0cde075c27..ddeaa748df5e 100644
> >> --- a/include/uapi/linux/netlink.h
> >> +++ b/include/uapi/linux/netlink.h
> >> @@ -47,6 +47,7 @@ struct nlmsghdr {
> >>  	__u16		nlmsg_flags;	/* Additional flags */
> >>  	__u32		nlmsg_seq;	/* Sequence number */
> >>  	__u32		nlmsg_pid;	/* Sending process port ID */
> >> +	__u8		contents[];
> > 
> > Is this ok to change a public, userspace visable, structure?
> 
> At least it should keep using a nlmsg_ prefix for consistency and reduce
> risk of collision with somebody having defined an object-like contents
> macro. But there's no guarantees in any case, of course.

Ah, good call. I've adjusted this and added a comment.

Thanks!

-Kees
diff mbox series

Patch

diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/netlink.h b/include/uapi/linux/netlink.h
index 4c0cde075c27..ddeaa748df5e 100644
--- a/include/uapi/linux/netlink.h
+++ b/include/uapi/linux/netlink.h
@@ -47,6 +47,7 @@  struct nlmsghdr {
 	__u16		nlmsg_flags;	/* Additional flags */
 	__u32		nlmsg_seq;	/* Sequence number */
 	__u32		nlmsg_pid;	/* Sending process port ID */
+	__u8		contents[];
 };
 
 /* Flags values */
diff --git a/net/netlink/af_netlink.c b/net/netlink/af_netlink.c
index 24b7cf447bc5..f2dd99e96822 100644
--- a/net/netlink/af_netlink.c
+++ b/net/netlink/af_netlink.c
@@ -2447,7 +2447,9 @@  void netlink_ack(struct sk_buff *in_skb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh, int err,
 			  NLMSG_ERROR, payload, flags);
 	errmsg = nlmsg_data(rep);
 	errmsg->error = err;
-	memcpy(&errmsg->msg, nlh, payload > sizeof(*errmsg) ? nlh->nlmsg_len : sizeof(*nlh));
+	memcpy(&errmsg->msg, nlh, sizeof(*nlh));
+	if (payload > sizeof(*errmsg))
+		memcpy(errmsg->msg.contents, nlh->contents, nlh->nlmsg_len - sizeof(*nlh));
 
 	if (nlk_has_extack && extack) {
 		if (extack->_msg) {