diff mbox series

[v5,04/12] integrity: restrict INTEGRITY_KEYRING_MACHINE to restrict_link_by_ca

Message ID 20210907160110.2699645-5-eric.snowberg@oracle.com
State New
Headers show
Series Enroll kernel keys thru MOK | expand

Commit Message

Eric Snowberg Sept. 7, 2021, 4:01 p.m. UTC
Set the restriction check for INTEGRITY_KEYRING_MACHINE keys to
restrict_link_by_ca.  This will only allow CA keys into the machine
keyring.

Signed-off-by: Eric Snowberg <eric.snowberg@oracle.com>
---
v1: Initial version
v2: Added !IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_INTEGRITY_TRUSTED_KEYRING check so mok
    keyring gets created even when it isn't enabled
v3: Rename restrict_link_by_system_trusted_or_ca to restrict_link_by_ca
v4: removed unnecessary restriction->check set
v5: Rename to machine keyring
---
 security/integrity/digsig.c | 8 ++++++--
 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

Comments

Jarkko Sakkinen Sept. 9, 2021, 1:49 p.m. UTC | #1
On Tue, 2021-09-07 at 12:01 -0400, Eric Snowberg wrote:
> Set the restriction check for INTEGRITY_KEYRING_MACHINE keys to

> restrict_link_by_ca.  This will only allow CA keys into the machine

> keyring.

> 

> Signed-off-by: Eric Snowberg <eric.snowberg@oracle.com>

> ---

> v1: Initial version

> v2: Added !IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_INTEGRITY_TRUSTED_KEYRING check so mok

>     keyring gets created even when it isn't enabled

> v3: Rename restrict_link_by_system_trusted_or_ca to restrict_link_by_ca

> v4: removed unnecessary restriction->check set

> v5: Rename to machine keyring

> ---

>  security/integrity/digsig.c | 8 ++++++--

>  1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

> 

> diff --git a/security/integrity/digsig.c b/security/integrity/digsig.c

> index 5a75ac2c4dbe..2b75bbbd9e0e 100644

> --- a/security/integrity/digsig.c

> +++ b/security/integrity/digsig.c

> @@ -132,14 +132,18 @@ int __init integrity_init_keyring(const unsigned int id)

>  		goto out;

>  	}

>  

> -	if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_INTEGRITY_TRUSTED_KEYRING))

> +	if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_INTEGRITY_TRUSTED_KEYRING) && id != INTEGRITY_KEYRING_MACHINE)

>  		return 0;

>  

>  	restriction = kzalloc(sizeof(struct key_restriction), GFP_KERNEL);

>  	if (!restriction)

>  		return -ENOMEM;

>  

> -	restriction->check = restrict_link_to_ima;

> +	if (id == INTEGRITY_KEYRING_MACHINE)

> +		restriction->check = restrict_link_by_ca;

> +	else

> +		restriction->check = restrict_link_to_ima;

> +

>  	if (id != INTEGRITY_KEYRING_MACHINE)

>  		perm |= KEY_USR_WRITE;

>  


03 and 04 look sane. As said, the patches seem to be already in nice shape.

/Jarkko
Mimi Zohar Sept. 9, 2021, 5:25 p.m. UTC | #2
On Tue, 2021-09-07 at 12:01 -0400, Eric Snowberg wrote:
> Set the restriction check for INTEGRITY_KEYRING_MACHINE keys to

> restrict_link_by_ca.  This will only allow CA keys into the machine

> keyring.

> 

> Signed-off-by: Eric Snowberg <eric.snowberg@oracle.com>


Normally the new function, in this case the restriction, and usage
should be defined together.  Any reason why 3/12 and 4/12 are two
separate patches?  I would squash them together.

> ---

> v1: Initial version

> v2: Added !IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_INTEGRITY_TRUSTED_KEYRING check so mok

>     keyring gets created even when it isn't enabled

> v3: Rename restrict_link_by_system_trusted_or_ca to restrict_link_by_ca

> v4: removed unnecessary restriction->check set

> v5: Rename to machine keyring

> ---

>  security/integrity/digsig.c | 8 ++++++--

>  1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

> 

> diff --git a/security/integrity/digsig.c b/security/integrity/digsig.c

> index 5a75ac2c4dbe..2b75bbbd9e0e 100644

> --- a/security/integrity/digsig.c

> +++ b/security/integrity/digsig.c

> @@ -132,14 +132,18 @@ int __init integrity_init_keyring(const unsigned int id)

>  		goto out;

>  	}

>  

> -	if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_INTEGRITY_TRUSTED_KEYRING))

> +	if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_INTEGRITY_TRUSTED_KEYRING) && id != INTEGRITY_KEYRING_MACHINE)


Over 80 chars, please split the line.

thanks,

Mimi

>  		return 0;

>  

>  	restriction = kzalloc(sizeof(struct key_restriction), GFP_KERNEL);

>  	if (!restriction)

>  		return -ENOMEM;

>  

> -	restriction->check = restrict_link_to_ima;

> +	if (id == INTEGRITY_KEYRING_MACHINE)

> +		restriction->check = restrict_link_by_ca;

> +	else

> +		restriction->check = restrict_link_to_ima;

> +

>  	if (id != INTEGRITY_KEYRING_MACHINE)

>  		perm |= KEY_USR_WRITE;

>
Eric Snowberg Sept. 9, 2021, 5:53 p.m. UTC | #3
> On Sep 9, 2021, at 11:25 AM, Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com> wrote:

> 

> On Tue, 2021-09-07 at 12:01 -0400, Eric Snowberg wrote:

>> Set the restriction check for INTEGRITY_KEYRING_MACHINE keys to

>> restrict_link_by_ca.  This will only allow CA keys into the machine

>> keyring.

>> 

>> Signed-off-by: Eric Snowberg <eric.snowberg@oracle.com>

> 

> Normally the new function, in this case the restriction, and usage

> should be defined together.  Any reason why 3/12 and 4/12 are two

> separate patches?  


I split them since they cross subsystems.

> I would squash them together.


But I can squash them together in the next round.

> 

>> ---

>> v1: Initial version

>> v2: Added !IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_INTEGRITY_TRUSTED_KEYRING check so mok

>>    keyring gets created even when it isn't enabled

>> v3: Rename restrict_link_by_system_trusted_or_ca to restrict_link_by_ca

>> v4: removed unnecessary restriction->check set

>> v5: Rename to machine keyring

>> ---

>> security/integrity/digsig.c | 8 ++++++--

>> 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

>> 

>> diff --git a/security/integrity/digsig.c b/security/integrity/digsig.c

>> index 5a75ac2c4dbe..2b75bbbd9e0e 100644

>> --- a/security/integrity/digsig.c

>> +++ b/security/integrity/digsig.c

>> @@ -132,14 +132,18 @@ int __init integrity_init_keyring(const unsigned int id)

>> 		goto out;

>> 	}

>> 

>> -	if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_INTEGRITY_TRUSTED_KEYRING))

>> +	if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_INTEGRITY_TRUSTED_KEYRING) && id != INTEGRITY_KEYRING_MACHINE)

> 

> Over 80 chars, please split the line


I thought the 80 char limit was relaxed?  But if it hasn’t
I can change this too.  Thanks.
Mimi Zohar Sept. 9, 2021, 6:19 p.m. UTC | #4
On Thu, 2021-09-09 at 11:53 -0600, Eric Snowberg wrote:
> > On Sep 9, 2021, at 11:25 AM, Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com> wrote:

> > 

> > On Tue, 2021-09-07 at 12:01 -0400, Eric Snowberg wrote:

> >> Set the restriction check for INTEGRITY_KEYRING_MACHINE keys to

> >> restrict_link_by_ca.  This will only allow CA keys into the machine

> >> keyring.

> >> 

> >> Signed-off-by: Eric Snowberg <eric.snowberg@oracle.com>

> > 

> > Normally the new function, in this case the restriction, and usage

> > should be defined together.  Any reason why 3/12 and 4/12 are two

> > separate patches?  

> 

> I split them since they cross subsystems.


That makes sense.

thanks,

Mimi
diff mbox series

Patch

diff --git a/security/integrity/digsig.c b/security/integrity/digsig.c
index 5a75ac2c4dbe..2b75bbbd9e0e 100644
--- a/security/integrity/digsig.c
+++ b/security/integrity/digsig.c
@@ -132,14 +132,18 @@  int __init integrity_init_keyring(const unsigned int id)
 		goto out;
 	}
 
-	if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_INTEGRITY_TRUSTED_KEYRING))
+	if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_INTEGRITY_TRUSTED_KEYRING) && id != INTEGRITY_KEYRING_MACHINE)
 		return 0;
 
 	restriction = kzalloc(sizeof(struct key_restriction), GFP_KERNEL);
 	if (!restriction)
 		return -ENOMEM;
 
-	restriction->check = restrict_link_to_ima;
+	if (id == INTEGRITY_KEYRING_MACHINE)
+		restriction->check = restrict_link_by_ca;
+	else
+		restriction->check = restrict_link_to_ima;
+
 	if (id != INTEGRITY_KEYRING_MACHINE)
 		perm |= KEY_USR_WRITE;