@@ -297,7 +297,8 @@ create_elf_tables(struct linux_binprm *bprm, const struct elfhdr *exec,
ei_index = elf_info - (elf_addr_t *)mm->saved_auxv;
sp = STACK_ADD(p, ei_index);
- items = (argc + 1) + (envc + 1) + 1;
+ /* Make room for extra pointer when argc == 0. See below. */
+ items = (min(argc, 1) + 1) + (envc + 1) + 1;
bprm->p = STACK_ROUND(sp, items);
/* Point sp at the lowest address on the stack */
@@ -326,6 +327,13 @@ create_elf_tables(struct linux_binprm *bprm, const struct elfhdr *exec,
/* Populate list of argv pointers back to argv strings. */
p = mm->arg_end = mm->arg_start;
+ /*
+ * Include an extra NULL pointer in argv when argc == 0 so
+ * that argv[1] != envp[0] to help userspace programs from
+ * mishandling argc == 0. See fs/exec.c bprm_stack_limits().
+ */
+ if (argc == 0 && put_user(0, sp++))
+ return -EFAULT;
while (argc-- > 0) {
size_t len;
if (put_user((elf_addr_t)p, sp++))
@@ -495,8 +495,13 @@ static int bprm_stack_limits(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
* the stack. They aren't stored until much later when we can't
* signal to the parent that the child has run out of stack space.
* Instead, calculate it here so it's possible to fail gracefully.
+ *
+ * In the case of argc < 1, make sure there is a NULL pointer gap
+ * between argv and envp to ensure confused userspace programs don't
+ * start processing from argv[1], thinking argc can never be 0,
+ * to block them from walking envp by accident. See fs/binfmt_elf.c.
*/
- ptr_size = (bprm->argc + bprm->envc) * sizeof(void *);
+ ptr_size = (min(bprm->argc, 1) + bprm->envc) * sizeof(void *);
if (limit <= ptr_size)
return -E2BIG;
limit -= ptr_size;
Quoting Ariadne Conill: "In several other operating systems, it is a hard requirement that the first argument to execve(2) be the name of a program, thus prohibiting a scenario where argc < 1. POSIX 2017 also recommends this behaviour, but it is not an explicit requirement[1]: The argument arg0 should point to a filename string that is associated with the process being started by one of the exec functions. ... Interestingly, Michael Kerrisk opened an issue about this in 2008[2], but there was no consensus to support fixing this issue then. Hopefully now that CVE-2021-4034 shows practical exploitative use[3] of this bug in a shellcode, we can reconsider." An examination of existing[4] users of execve(..., NULL, NULL) shows mostly test code, or example rootkit code. While rejecting a NULL argv would be preferred, it looks like the main cause of userspace confusion is an assumption that argc >= 1, and buggy programs may skip argv[0] when iterating. To protect against userspace bugs of this nature, insert an extra NULL pointer in argv when argc == 0, so that argv[1] != envp[0]. Note that this is only done in the argc == 0 case because some userspace programs expect to find envp at exactly argv[argc]. The overlap of these two misguided assumptions is believed to be zero. [1] https://pubs.opengroup.org/onlinepubs/9699919799/functions/exec.html [2] https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=8408 [3] https://www.qualys.com/2022/01/25/cve-2021-4034/pwnkit.txt [4] https://codesearch.debian.net/search?q=execve%5C+*%5C%28%5B%5E%2C%5D%2B%2C+*NULL&literal=0 Reported-by: Ariadne Conill <ariadne@dereferenced.org> Reported-by: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com> Cc: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org> Cc: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org> Cc: Rich Felker <dalias@libc.org> Cc: Eric Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com> Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> --- fs/binfmt_elf.c | 10 +++++++++- fs/exec.c | 7 ++++++- 2 files changed, 15 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)