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[v2] Bluetooth: avoid memcmp() out of bounds warning

Message ID 20231009203137.3125516-1-arnd@kernel.org
State New
Headers show
Series [v2] Bluetooth: avoid memcmp() out of bounds warning | expand

Commit Message

Arnd Bergmann Oct. 9, 2023, 8:31 p.m. UTC
From: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>

bacmp() is a wrapper around memcpy(), which contain compile-time
checks for buffer overflow. Since the hci_conn_request_evt() also calls
bt_dev_dbg() with an implicit NULL pointer check, the compiler is now
aware of a case where 'hdev' is NULL and treats this as meaning that
zero bytes are available:

In file included from net/bluetooth/hci_event.c:32:
In function 'bacmp',
    inlined from 'hci_conn_request_evt' at net/bluetooth/hci_event.c:3276:7:
include/net/bluetooth/bluetooth.h:364:16: error: 'memcmp' specified bound 6 exceeds source size 0 [-Werror=stringop-overread]
  364 |         return memcmp(ba1, ba2, sizeof(bdaddr_t));
      |                ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

Add another NULL pointer check before the bacmp() to ensure the compiler
understands the code flow enough to not warn about it.  Since the patch
that introduced the warning is marked for stable backports, this one
should also go that way to avoid introducing build regressions.

Fixes: d70e44fef8621 ("Bluetooth: Reject connection with the device which has same BD_ADDR")
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: "Lee, Chun-Yi" <jlee@suse.com>
Cc: Luiz Augusto von Dentz <luiz.von.dentz@intel.com>
Cc: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
---
v2: rewrite completely
---
 net/bluetooth/hci_event.c | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
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Patch

diff --git a/net/bluetooth/hci_event.c b/net/bluetooth/hci_event.c
index 6f4409b4c3648..9b34c9f8ee02c 100644
--- a/net/bluetooth/hci_event.c
+++ b/net/bluetooth/hci_event.c
@@ -3273,7 +3273,7 @@  static void hci_conn_request_evt(struct hci_dev *hdev, void *data,
 	/* Reject incoming connection from device with same BD ADDR against
 	 * CVE-2020-26555
 	 */
-	if (!bacmp(&hdev->bdaddr, &ev->bdaddr)) {
+	if (hdev && !bacmp(&hdev->bdaddr, &ev->bdaddr)) {
 		bt_dev_dbg(hdev, "Reject connection with same BD_ADDR %pMR\n",
 			   &ev->bdaddr);
 		hci_reject_conn(hdev, &ev->bdaddr);