@@ -467,28 +467,41 @@ static void ghes_clear_estatus(struct ghes *ghes,
}
/*
- * Called as task_work before returning to user-space.
- * Ensure any queued work has been done before we return to the context that
- * triggered the notification.
+ * struct ghes_task_work - for synchronous RAS event
+ *
+ * @twork: callback_head for task work
+ * @pfn: page frame number of corrupted page
+ * @flags: work control flags
+ *
+ * Structure to pass task work to be handled before
+ * returning to user-space via task_work_add().
*/
-static void ghes_kick_task_work(struct callback_head *head)
+struct ghes_task_work {
+ struct callback_head twork;
+ u64 pfn;
+ int flags;
+};
+
+static void memory_failure_cb(struct callback_head *twork)
{
- struct acpi_hest_generic_status *estatus;
- struct ghes_estatus_node *estatus_node;
- u32 node_len;
+ struct ghes_task_work *twcb = container_of(twork, struct ghes_task_work, twork);
+ int ret;
- estatus_node = container_of(head, struct ghes_estatus_node, task_work);
- if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_ACPI_APEI_MEMORY_FAILURE))
- memory_failure_queue_kick(estatus_node->task_work_cpu);
+ ret = memory_failure(twcb->pfn, twcb->flags);
+ gen_pool_free(ghes_estatus_pool, (unsigned long)twcb, sizeof(*twcb));
- estatus = GHES_ESTATUS_FROM_NODE(estatus_node);
- node_len = GHES_ESTATUS_NODE_LEN(cper_estatus_len(estatus));
- gen_pool_free(ghes_estatus_pool, (unsigned long)estatus_node, node_len);
+ if (!ret || ret == -EHWPOISON || ret == -EOPNOTSUPP)
+ return;
+
+ pr_err("%#llx: Sending SIGBUS to %s:%d due to hardware memory corruption\n",
+ twcb->pfn, current->comm, task_pid_nr(current));
+ force_sig(SIGBUS);
}
static bool ghes_do_memory_failure(u64 physical_addr, int flags)
{
unsigned long pfn;
+ struct ghes_task_work *twcb;
if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_ACPI_APEI_MEMORY_FAILURE))
return false;
@@ -501,6 +514,18 @@ static bool ghes_do_memory_failure(u64 physical_addr, int flags)
return false;
}
+ if (flags == MF_ACTION_REQUIRED && current->mm) {
+ twcb = (void *)gen_pool_alloc(ghes_estatus_pool, sizeof(*twcb));
+ if (!twcb)
+ return false;
+
+ twcb->pfn = pfn;
+ twcb->flags = flags;
+ init_task_work(&twcb->twork, memory_failure_cb);
+ task_work_add(current, &twcb->twork, TWA_RESUME);
+ return true;
+ }
+
memory_failure_queue(pfn, flags);
return true;
}
@@ -745,7 +770,7 @@ int cxl_cper_kfifo_get(struct cxl_cper_work_data *wd)
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_NS_GPL(cxl_cper_kfifo_get, CXL);
-static bool ghes_do_proc(struct ghes *ghes,
+static void ghes_do_proc(struct ghes *ghes,
const struct acpi_hest_generic_status *estatus)
{
int sev, sec_sev;
@@ -810,8 +835,6 @@ static bool ghes_do_proc(struct ghes *ghes,
current->comm, task_pid_nr(current));
force_sig(SIGBUS);
}
-
- return queued;
}
static void __ghes_print_estatus(const char *pfx,
@@ -1113,9 +1136,7 @@ static void ghes_proc_in_irq(struct irq_work *irq_work)
struct ghes_estatus_node *estatus_node;
struct acpi_hest_generic *generic;
struct acpi_hest_generic_status *estatus;
- bool task_work_pending;
u32 len, node_len;
- int ret;
llnode = llist_del_all(&ghes_estatus_llist);
/*
@@ -1130,25 +1151,16 @@ static void ghes_proc_in_irq(struct irq_work *irq_work)
estatus = GHES_ESTATUS_FROM_NODE(estatus_node);
len = cper_estatus_len(estatus);
node_len = GHES_ESTATUS_NODE_LEN(len);
- task_work_pending = ghes_do_proc(estatus_node->ghes, estatus);
+
+ ghes_do_proc(estatus_node->ghes, estatus);
+
if (!ghes_estatus_cached(estatus)) {
generic = estatus_node->generic;
if (ghes_print_estatus(NULL, generic, estatus))
ghes_estatus_cache_add(generic, estatus);
}
-
- if (task_work_pending && current->mm) {
- estatus_node->task_work.func = ghes_kick_task_work;
- estatus_node->task_work_cpu = smp_processor_id();
- ret = task_work_add(current, &estatus_node->task_work,
- TWA_RESUME);
- if (ret)
- estatus_node->task_work.func = NULL;
- }
-
- if (!estatus_node->task_work.func)
- gen_pool_free(ghes_estatus_pool,
- (unsigned long)estatus_node, node_len);
+ gen_pool_free(ghes_estatus_pool, (unsigned long)estatus_node,
+ node_len);
llnode = next;
}
@@ -1209,7 +1221,6 @@ static int ghes_in_nmi_queue_one_entry(struct ghes *ghes,
estatus_node->ghes = ghes;
estatus_node->generic = ghes->generic;
- estatus_node->task_work.func = NULL;
estatus = GHES_ESTATUS_FROM_NODE(estatus_node);
if (__ghes_read_estatus(estatus, buf_paddr, fixmap_idx, len)) {
@@ -35,9 +35,6 @@ struct ghes_estatus_node {
struct llist_node llnode;
struct acpi_hest_generic *generic;
struct ghes *ghes;
-
- int task_work_cpu;
- struct callback_head task_work;
};
struct ghes_estatus_cache {
@@ -3924,7 +3924,6 @@ enum mf_flags {
int mf_dax_kill_procs(struct address_space *mapping, pgoff_t index,
unsigned long count, int mf_flags);
extern int memory_failure(unsigned long pfn, int flags);
-extern void memory_failure_queue_kick(int cpu);
extern int unpoison_memory(unsigned long pfn);
extern atomic_long_t num_poisoned_pages __read_mostly;
extern int soft_offline_page(unsigned long pfn, int flags);
@@ -2496,19 +2496,6 @@ static void memory_failure_work_func(struct work_struct *work)
}
}
-/*
- * Process memory_failure work queued on the specified CPU.
- * Used to avoid return-to-userspace racing with the memory_failure workqueue.
- */
-void memory_failure_queue_kick(int cpu)
-{
- struct memory_failure_cpu *mf_cpu;
-
- mf_cpu = &per_cpu(memory_failure_cpu, cpu);
- cancel_work_sync(&mf_cpu->work);
- memory_failure_work_func(&mf_cpu->work);
-}
-
static int __init memory_failure_init(void)
{
struct memory_failure_cpu *mf_cpu;
The memory uncorrected error could be signaled by asynchronous interrupt (specifically, SPI in arm64 platform), e.g. when an error is detected by a background scrubber, or signaled by synchronous exception (specifically, data abort exception in arm64 platform), e.g. when a CPU tries to access a poisoned cache line. Currently, both synchronous and asynchronous error use memory_failure_queue() to schedule memory_failure() to exectute in a kworker context. As a result, when a user-space process is accessing a poisoned data, a data abort is taken and the memory_failure() is executed in the kworker context, memory_failure(): - will send wrong si_code by SIGBUS signal in early_kill mode, and - can not kill the user-space in some cases resulting a synchronous error infinite loop Issue 1: send wrong si_code in early_kill mode Since commit a70297d22132 ("ACPI: APEI: set memory failure flags as MF_ACTION_REQUIRED on synchronous events")', the flag MF_ACTION_REQUIRED could be used to determine whether a synchronous exception occurs on ARM64 platform. When a synchronous exception is detected, the kernel is expected to terminate the current process which has accessed poisoned page. This is done by sending a SIGBUS signal with an error code BUS_MCEERR_AR, indicating an action-required machine check error on read. However, when kill_proc() is called to terminate the processes who have the poisoned page mapped, it sends the incorrect SIGBUS error code BUS_MCEERR_AO because the context in which it operates is not the one where the error was triggered. To reproduce this problem: #sysctl -w vm.memory_failure_early_kill=1 vm.memory_failure_early_kill = 1 # STEP2: inject an UCE error and consume it to trigger a synchronous error #einj_mem_uc single 0: single vaddr = 0xffffb0d75400 paddr = 4092d55b400 injecting ... triggering ... signal 7 code 5 addr 0xffffb0d75000 page not present Test passed The si_code (code 5) from einj_mem_uc indicates that it is BUS_MCEERR_AO error and it is not the fact. After this patch: # STEP1: enable early kill mode #sysctl -w vm.memory_failure_early_kill=1 vm.memory_failure_early_kill = 1 # STEP2: inject an UCE error and consume it to trigger a synchronous error #einj_mem_uc single 0: single vaddr = 0xffffb0d75400 paddr = 4092d55b400 injecting ... triggering ... signal 7 code 4 addr 0xffffb0d75000 page not present Test passed The si_code (code 4) from einj_mem_uc indicates that it is a BUS_MCEERR_AR error as we expected. Issue 2: a synchronous error infinite loop If a user-space process, e.g. devmem, accesses a poisoned page for which the HWPoison flag is set, kill_accessing_process() is called to send SIGBUS to current processs with error info. Because the memory_failure() is executed in the kworker context, it will just do nothing but return EFAULT. So, devmem will access the posioned page and trigger an exception again, resulting in a synchronous error infinite loop. Such exception loop may cause platform firmware to exceed some threshold and reboot when Linux could have recovered from this error. To reproduce this problem: # STEP 1: inject an UCE error, and kernel will set HWPosion flag for related page #einj_mem_uc single 0: single vaddr = 0xffffb0d75400 paddr = 4092d55b400 injecting ... triggering ... signal 7 code 4 addr 0xffffb0d75000 page not present Test passed # STEP 2: access the same page and it will trigger a synchronous error infinite loop devmem 0x4092d55b400 To fix above two issues, queue memory_failure() as a task_work so that it runs in the context of the process that is actually consuming the poisoned data. Signed-off-by: Shuai Xue <xueshuai@linux.alibaba.com> Tested-by: Ma Wupeng <mawupeng1@huawei.com> Reviewed-by: Kefeng Wang <wangkefeng.wang@huawei.com> Reviewed-by: Xiaofei Tan <tanxiaofei@huawei.com> Reviewed-by: Baolin Wang <baolin.wang@linux.alibaba.com> Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Jonathan Cameron <Jonathan.Cameron@huawei.com> --- drivers/acpi/apei/ghes.c | 77 +++++++++++++++++++++++----------------- include/acpi/ghes.h | 3 -- include/linux/mm.h | 1 - mm/memory-failure.c | 13 ------- 4 files changed, 44 insertions(+), 50 deletions(-)