Message ID | 1488290169-10701-1-git-send-email-ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org |
---|---|
State | Accepted |
Commit | 413edd470932d8e542325fa205b1e4f5e163a85c |
Headers | show |
On 02/28/17 14:56, Ard Biesheuvel wrote: > Using DxeServices::SetMemorySpaceAttributes to set cacheability > attributes has the side effect of stripping permission attributes, > given that those are bits in the same bitfield, and so setting the > Attributes argument to EFI_MEMORY_WB implies not setting EFI_MEMORY_XP > or EFI_MEMORY_RO attributes. > > In fact, the situation is even worse, given that the descriptor returned > by DxeServices::GetMemorySpaceDescriptor does not reflect the permission > attributes that may have been set by the preceding call to > DxeServices::AddMemorySpace if PcdDxeNxMemoryProtectionPolicy has been > configured to map EfiConventionalMemory with non-executable permissions. > > Note that this applies equally to the non-executable stack and to PE/COFF > sections that may have been mapped with R-X or RW- permissions. This is > due to the ambiguity in the meaning of the EFI_MEMORY_RO/EFI_MEMORY_XP > attributes when used in the GCD memory map, i.e., between signifying > that an underlying RAM region has the controls to be configures as s/configures/configured/ > read-only or non-executable, and signifying that the contents of a > certain UEFI memory region allow them to be mapped with certain > restricted permissions. > > So let's check the policy in PcdDxeNxMemoryProtectionPolicy directly, > and set the EFI_MEMORY_XP attribute if appropriate for > EfiConventionalMemory regions. > > Contributed-under: TianoCore Contribution Agreement 1.0 > Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> > --- > ArmVirtPkg/HighMemDxe/HighMemDxe.c | 18 ++++++++++++++++-- > ArmVirtPkg/HighMemDxe/HighMemDxe.inf | 1 + > 2 files changed, 17 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) > > diff --git a/ArmVirtPkg/HighMemDxe/HighMemDxe.c b/ArmVirtPkg/HighMemDxe/HighMemDxe.c > index 22f738279b20..853660437cb0 100644 > --- a/ArmVirtPkg/HighMemDxe/HighMemDxe.c > +++ b/ArmVirtPkg/HighMemDxe/HighMemDxe.c > @@ -37,6 +37,7 @@ InitializeHighMemDxe ( > UINTN AddressCells, SizeCells; > UINT64 CurBase; > UINT64 CurSize; > + UINT64 Attributes; > > Status = gBS->LocateProtocol (&gFdtClientProtocolGuid, NULL, > (VOID **)&FdtClient); > @@ -77,8 +78,21 @@ InitializeHighMemDxe ( > continue; > } > > - Status = gDS->SetMemorySpaceAttributes (CurBase, CurSize, > - EFI_MEMORY_WB); > + // > + // Take care not to strip any permission attributes that will have been > + // set by DxeCore on the region we just added if a strict permission > + // policy is in effect for EfiConventionalMemory regions. > + // Unfortunately, we cannot interrogate the GCD memory space map for > + // those permissions, since they are not recorded there (for historical > + // reasons), so check the policy directly. > + // > + Attributes = EFI_MEMORY_WB; > + if ((PcdGet64 (PcdDxeNxMemoryProtectionPolicy) & > + (1UL << (UINT32)EfiConventionalMemory)) != 0) { I think you should be using 1ULL here as constant, for consistency, as in ARM and (somewhat uselessly here) in Ia32 builds, 1UL won't have type UINT64 (= unsigned long long). But then again, 1ULL cannot be portably shifted with << (we can only do that up to UINTN), so ultimately I suggest LShiftU64() here. Or else, if we're sure that it's going to fit in a UINT32, use "1U". With those fixed up: Reviewed-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com> Thanks, Laszlo > + Attributes |= EFI_MEMORY_XP; > + } > + > + Status = gDS->SetMemorySpaceAttributes (CurBase, CurSize, Attributes); > > if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) { > DEBUG ((EFI_D_ERROR, > diff --git a/ArmVirtPkg/HighMemDxe/HighMemDxe.inf b/ArmVirtPkg/HighMemDxe/HighMemDxe.inf > index 3661cfd8c80c..89c743ebe058 100644 > --- a/ArmVirtPkg/HighMemDxe/HighMemDxe.inf > +++ b/ArmVirtPkg/HighMemDxe/HighMemDxe.inf > @@ -45,6 +45,7 @@ [Protocols] > > [Pcd] > gArmTokenSpaceGuid.PcdSystemMemoryBase > + gEfiMdeModulePkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdDxeNxMemoryProtectionPolicy > > [Depex] > gEfiCpuArchProtocolGuid AND gFdtClientProtocolGuid > _______________________________________________ edk2-devel mailing list edk2-devel@lists.01.org https://lists.01.org/mailman/listinfo/edk2-devel
On 28 February 2017 at 21:14, Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com> wrote: > On 02/28/17 14:56, Ard Biesheuvel wrote: >> Using DxeServices::SetMemorySpaceAttributes to set cacheability >> attributes has the side effect of stripping permission attributes, >> given that those are bits in the same bitfield, and so setting the >> Attributes argument to EFI_MEMORY_WB implies not setting EFI_MEMORY_XP >> or EFI_MEMORY_RO attributes. >> >> In fact, the situation is even worse, given that the descriptor returned >> by DxeServices::GetMemorySpaceDescriptor does not reflect the permission >> attributes that may have been set by the preceding call to >> DxeServices::AddMemorySpace if PcdDxeNxMemoryProtectionPolicy has been >> configured to map EfiConventionalMemory with non-executable permissions. >> >> Note that this applies equally to the non-executable stack and to PE/COFF >> sections that may have been mapped with R-X or RW- permissions. This is >> due to the ambiguity in the meaning of the EFI_MEMORY_RO/EFI_MEMORY_XP >> attributes when used in the GCD memory map, i.e., between signifying >> that an underlying RAM region has the controls to be configures as > > s/configures/configured/ > >> read-only or non-executable, and signifying that the contents of a >> certain UEFI memory region allow them to be mapped with certain >> restricted permissions. >> >> So let's check the policy in PcdDxeNxMemoryProtectionPolicy directly, >> and set the EFI_MEMORY_XP attribute if appropriate for >> EfiConventionalMemory regions. >> >> Contributed-under: TianoCore Contribution Agreement 1.0 >> Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> >> --- >> ArmVirtPkg/HighMemDxe/HighMemDxe.c | 18 ++++++++++++++++-- >> ArmVirtPkg/HighMemDxe/HighMemDxe.inf | 1 + >> 2 files changed, 17 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) >> >> diff --git a/ArmVirtPkg/HighMemDxe/HighMemDxe.c b/ArmVirtPkg/HighMemDxe/HighMemDxe.c >> index 22f738279b20..853660437cb0 100644 >> --- a/ArmVirtPkg/HighMemDxe/HighMemDxe.c >> +++ b/ArmVirtPkg/HighMemDxe/HighMemDxe.c >> @@ -37,6 +37,7 @@ InitializeHighMemDxe ( >> UINTN AddressCells, SizeCells; >> UINT64 CurBase; >> UINT64 CurSize; >> + UINT64 Attributes; >> >> Status = gBS->LocateProtocol (&gFdtClientProtocolGuid, NULL, >> (VOID **)&FdtClient); >> @@ -77,8 +78,21 @@ InitializeHighMemDxe ( >> continue; >> } >> >> - Status = gDS->SetMemorySpaceAttributes (CurBase, CurSize, >> - EFI_MEMORY_WB); >> + // >> + // Take care not to strip any permission attributes that will have been >> + // set by DxeCore on the region we just added if a strict permission >> + // policy is in effect for EfiConventionalMemory regions. >> + // Unfortunately, we cannot interrogate the GCD memory space map for >> + // those permissions, since they are not recorded there (for historical >> + // reasons), so check the policy directly. >> + // >> + Attributes = EFI_MEMORY_WB; >> + if ((PcdGet64 (PcdDxeNxMemoryProtectionPolicy) & >> + (1UL << (UINT32)EfiConventionalMemory)) != 0) { > > I think you should be using 1ULL here as constant, for consistency, as > in ARM and (somewhat uselessly here) in Ia32 builds, 1UL won't have type > UINT64 (= unsigned long long). > > But then again, 1ULL cannot be portably shifted with << (we can only do > that up to UINTN), so ultimately I suggest LShiftU64() here. > > Or else, if we're sure that it's going to fit in a UINT32, use "1U". > I opted for this solution, given that the RHS is a constant < 32 (EfiConventionalMemory) > With those fixed up: > > Reviewed-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com> > Pushed, thanks. _______________________________________________ edk2-devel mailing list edk2-devel@lists.01.org https://lists.01.org/mailman/listinfo/edk2-devel
diff --git a/ArmVirtPkg/HighMemDxe/HighMemDxe.c b/ArmVirtPkg/HighMemDxe/HighMemDxe.c index 22f738279b20..853660437cb0 100644 --- a/ArmVirtPkg/HighMemDxe/HighMemDxe.c +++ b/ArmVirtPkg/HighMemDxe/HighMemDxe.c @@ -37,6 +37,7 @@ InitializeHighMemDxe ( UINTN AddressCells, SizeCells; UINT64 CurBase; UINT64 CurSize; + UINT64 Attributes; Status = gBS->LocateProtocol (&gFdtClientProtocolGuid, NULL, (VOID **)&FdtClient); @@ -77,8 +78,21 @@ InitializeHighMemDxe ( continue; } - Status = gDS->SetMemorySpaceAttributes (CurBase, CurSize, - EFI_MEMORY_WB); + // + // Take care not to strip any permission attributes that will have been + // set by DxeCore on the region we just added if a strict permission + // policy is in effect for EfiConventionalMemory regions. + // Unfortunately, we cannot interrogate the GCD memory space map for + // those permissions, since they are not recorded there (for historical + // reasons), so check the policy directly. + // + Attributes = EFI_MEMORY_WB; + if ((PcdGet64 (PcdDxeNxMemoryProtectionPolicy) & + (1UL << (UINT32)EfiConventionalMemory)) != 0) { + Attributes |= EFI_MEMORY_XP; + } + + Status = gDS->SetMemorySpaceAttributes (CurBase, CurSize, Attributes); if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) { DEBUG ((EFI_D_ERROR, diff --git a/ArmVirtPkg/HighMemDxe/HighMemDxe.inf b/ArmVirtPkg/HighMemDxe/HighMemDxe.inf index 3661cfd8c80c..89c743ebe058 100644 --- a/ArmVirtPkg/HighMemDxe/HighMemDxe.inf +++ b/ArmVirtPkg/HighMemDxe/HighMemDxe.inf @@ -45,6 +45,7 @@ [Protocols] [Pcd] gArmTokenSpaceGuid.PcdSystemMemoryBase + gEfiMdeModulePkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdDxeNxMemoryProtectionPolicy [Depex] gEfiCpuArchProtocolGuid AND gFdtClientProtocolGuid
Using DxeServices::SetMemorySpaceAttributes to set cacheability attributes has the side effect of stripping permission attributes, given that those are bits in the same bitfield, and so setting the Attributes argument to EFI_MEMORY_WB implies not setting EFI_MEMORY_XP or EFI_MEMORY_RO attributes. In fact, the situation is even worse, given that the descriptor returned by DxeServices::GetMemorySpaceDescriptor does not reflect the permission attributes that may have been set by the preceding call to DxeServices::AddMemorySpace if PcdDxeNxMemoryProtectionPolicy has been configured to map EfiConventionalMemory with non-executable permissions. Note that this applies equally to the non-executable stack and to PE/COFF sections that may have been mapped with R-X or RW- permissions. This is due to the ambiguity in the meaning of the EFI_MEMORY_RO/EFI_MEMORY_XP attributes when used in the GCD memory map, i.e., between signifying that an underlying RAM region has the controls to be configures as read-only or non-executable, and signifying that the contents of a certain UEFI memory region allow them to be mapped with certain restricted permissions. So let's check the policy in PcdDxeNxMemoryProtectionPolicy directly, and set the EFI_MEMORY_XP attribute if appropriate for EfiConventionalMemory regions. Contributed-under: TianoCore Contribution Agreement 1.0 Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> --- ArmVirtPkg/HighMemDxe/HighMemDxe.c | 18 ++++++++++++++++-- ArmVirtPkg/HighMemDxe/HighMemDxe.inf | 1 + 2 files changed, 17 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) -- 2.7.4 _______________________________________________ edk2-devel mailing list edk2-devel@lists.01.org https://lists.01.org/mailman/listinfo/edk2-devel