From patchwork Wed Jan 31 16:53:31 2018 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Julien Grall X-Patchwork-Id: 126373 Delivered-To: patch@linaro.org Received: by 10.46.124.24 with SMTP id x24csp906127ljc; Wed, 31 Jan 2018 08:56:05 -0800 (PST) X-Google-Smtp-Source: AH8x226gsYn46g3d2gU0zpwZcvzKvDI5CfUOuK+nXNPYaEHK4tDR+MuhqgZ1wmeSIIMMde+/Rsnd X-Received: by 10.36.142.7 with SMTP id h7mr17936766ite.14.1517417765582; Wed, 31 Jan 2018 08:56:05 -0800 (PST) ARC-Seal: i=1; a=rsa-sha256; t=1517417765; cv=none; d=google.com; s=arc-20160816; b=eJAzsW0imQel+y+CpHqzzkFwtYFziONwyuLm04VWD12q7S05FqKfn7moUmN+9ZCuN9 kz7Bx3NfRSY6CQo4HUr/vGLp85WanqBMJ1U4oYCcYLPB4vCeqIkvwqhTUOBL50bV6imd SiDgZXPgnrwcB8O63mJhwV9aVOPBqMyGxc+Ds5KBnJpR2viJ2GXh65Vqr/SEb/0pMYKo ryjUoOWVZitsLTz9kS9e+ViK+XB7+cjl5BcRRVopknJfI1eh7u2d5FSGO0QsK+n4zpZd k5lIngoBvc+4bzBobzC+JDUGfOy+/86o4jd6MZETKOGQ++ze1XP/Fr/HOAQ1BCg8mdEG MAKA== ARC-Message-Signature: i=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=google.com; s=arc-20160816; h=sender:errors-to:content-transfer-encoding:mime-version :list-subscribe:list-help:list-post:list-unsubscribe:list-id :precedence:subject:cc:references:in-reply-to:message-id:date:to :from:dkim-signature:arc-authentication-results; bh=JjUN8zz5ih2/MCEUQfIvB3eidrWdjtcb0wOBkp62zWY=; b=D5Mxy3CxDMxVFEQgKZccRhmY7MlmZNDvSxWszjCt7A4T+aCTGWtXxabLtl6QxeYEYF tocjsTCn2YkKtgIdskvxU++SFvw6MCIOS0NQdLKGWcZYe05VrUGhemgu52tVvRPi+mRQ tEh3fUBu6+QsFIVtOSZDQ9J9jDyM3r1JFte2bvvHzT8qlFmMyNm9pnensAb+QKChhs7C e0gGJWSFlkm7kQRgl/5Z8cHN9Lh8d76Vjli9BIvsN8X7izw8uKvftfF6WiqM98CMvAbH ymMTZUjUqdyQ3K+D5FkNQPXo8ALlJ3VoFAwae/AXIUYk01cl5nsOYlpOCA9gbghOrQev grUQ== ARC-Authentication-Results: i=1; mx.google.com; dkim=neutral (body hash did not verify) header.i=@linaro.org header.s=google header.b=RI5pZJgi; spf=pass (google.com: best guess record for domain of xen-devel-bounces@lists.xenproject.org designates 192.237.175.120 as permitted sender) smtp.mailfrom=xen-devel-bounces@lists.xenproject.org; dmarc=fail (p=NONE sp=NONE dis=NONE) header.from=linaro.org Return-Path: Received: from lists.xenproject.org (lists.xenproject.org. [192.237.175.120]) by mx.google.com with ESMTPS id o130si110500ith.68.2018.01.31.08.56.05 (version=TLS1_2 cipher=ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256 bits=128/128); Wed, 31 Jan 2018 08:56:05 -0800 (PST) Received-SPF: pass (google.com: best guess record for domain of xen-devel-bounces@lists.xenproject.org designates 192.237.175.120 as permitted sender) client-ip=192.237.175.120; Authentication-Results: mx.google.com; dkim=neutral (body hash did not verify) header.i=@linaro.org header.s=google header.b=RI5pZJgi; spf=pass (google.com: best guess record for domain of xen-devel-bounces@lists.xenproject.org designates 192.237.175.120 as permitted sender) smtp.mailfrom=xen-devel-bounces@lists.xenproject.org; dmarc=fail (p=NONE sp=NONE dis=NONE) header.from=linaro.org Received: from localhost ([127.0.0.1] helo=lists.xenproject.org) by lists.xenproject.org with esmtp (Exim 4.84_2) (envelope-from ) id 1egvdr-00042q-3p; Wed, 31 Jan 2018 16:53:47 +0000 Received: from us1-rack-dfw2.inumbo.com ([104.130.134.6]) by lists.xenproject.org with esmtp (Exim 4.84_2) (envelope-from ) id 1egvdp-000427-EN for xen-devel@lists.xen.org; Wed, 31 Jan 2018 16:53:45 +0000 X-Inumbo-ID: 435a8ef1-06a7-11e8-ba59-bc764e045a96 Received: from mail-wm0-x243.google.com (unknown [2a00:1450:400c:c09::243]) by us1-rack-dfw2.inumbo.com (Halon) with ESMTPS id 435a8ef1-06a7-11e8-ba59-bc764e045a96; Wed, 31 Jan 2018 17:53:30 +0100 (CET) Received: by mail-wm0-x243.google.com with SMTP id v123so307773wmd.5 for ; Wed, 31 Jan 2018 08:53:44 -0800 (PST) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=linaro.org; s=google; h=from:to:cc:subject:date:message-id:in-reply-to:references; bh=Cub161RLdKHZHHDZ93E4AXR8p3rYsl29M8+ULXfv41M=; b=RI5pZJgiJ8IAZXzvV5YHN8vChGcaSsHYmjf78ZKJUCdQF6ZhOmE1wJS6PaH6Fd28Nd U+wy22/eSoLmMF++C26bsp7h/WEZaHD0sUv64IKKJNDthnaLiMeL2fft6T5ScEBwReYx KTk1XeJGOQZkMlG4tHEb/JrN07KR1tDrr90yo= X-Google-DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=1e100.net; s=20161025; h=x-gm-message-state:from:to:cc:subject:date:message-id:in-reply-to :references; bh=Cub161RLdKHZHHDZ93E4AXR8p3rYsl29M8+ULXfv41M=; b=XurgJ+H60Jkj17nOlKgUo3ONTDRzv7nUoiQ0lnmY0BuIVmsUR7R3PHKMg+gpId7TBF OE1BVkxvaDlB9TYl/CVrf/laHt6DI1jGrhyU/vGISBfFiEzHs7F7Vawy0nfcY2L5wH9p F4dhspIXu2nnQlZ5DY6teq+boirVaLQKio8IovYSQybzILbBuxbrCTlJmNFxGpjSRZrU t5q8j4WvldNOB1N+v2Q5g+PTCsDjuuGZ42HMELxYn6a+Rr+fWJhYlhXdFXHJhZut3SqE oJINIHxBROlO2aMdeDTBNlCdR+UFbHq44+5sjmSwLkVf4iyP0+AWQjmFb+j9qI9vSTxa FUSw== X-Gm-Message-State: AKwxyteuZu4TEdTORsPrnJBfmRqc0lLIGFCVD1RfvTKI1dD7UgksKmAm DYc2rjiUssfMDlsfCvQg63+XnnBDrdk= X-Received: by 10.28.53.138 with SMTP id c132mr22242818wma.108.1517417622988; Wed, 31 Jan 2018 08:53:42 -0800 (PST) Received: from e108454-lin.cambridge.arm.com ([2001:41d0:1:6c23::1]) by smtp.gmail.com with ESMTPSA id h194sm223745wma.8.2018.01.31.08.53.42 (version=TLS1_2 cipher=ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256 bits=128/128); Wed, 31 Jan 2018 08:53:42 -0800 (PST) From: Julien Grall X-Google-Original-From: Julien Grall To: xen-devel@lists.xen.org Date: Wed, 31 Jan 2018 16:53:31 +0000 Message-Id: <20180131165334.23175-5-julien.grall@arm.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.11.0 In-Reply-To: <20180131165334.23175-1-julien.grall@arm.com> References: <20180131165334.23175-1-julien.grall@arm.com> Cc: sstabellini@kernel.org, Julien Grall , andre.przywara@linaro.org Subject: [Xen-devel] [PATCH v2 4/7] xen/arm32: Add skeleton to harden branch predictor aliasing attacks X-BeenThere: xen-devel@lists.xenproject.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.18 Precedence: list List-Id: Xen developer discussion List-Unsubscribe: , List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , MIME-Version: 1.0 Errors-To: xen-devel-bounces@lists.xenproject.org Sender: "Xen-devel" From: Julien Grall Aliasing attacked against CPU branch predictors can allow an attacker to redirect speculative control flow on some CPUs and potentially divulge information from one context to another. This patch adds initiatial skeleton code behind a new Kconfig option to enable implementation-specific mitigations against these attacks for CPUs that are affected. Most of mitigations will have to be applied when entering to the hypervisor from the guest context. Because the attack is against branch predictor, it is not possible to safely use branch instruction before the mitigation is applied. Therefore this has to be done in the vector entry before jump to the helper handling a given exception. However, on arm32, each vector contain a single instruction. This means that the hardened vector tables may rely on the state of registers that does not hold when in the hypervisor (e.g SP is 8 bytes aligned). Therefore hypervisor code running with guest vectors table should be minimized and always have IRQs and SErrors masked to reduce the risk to use them. This patch provides an infrastructure to switch vector tables before entering to the guest and when leaving it. Note that alternative could have been used, but older Xen (4.8 or earlier) doesn't have support. So avoid using alternative to ease backporting. This is part of XSA-254. Signed-off-by: Julien Grall Reviewed-by: Stefano Stabellini --- Changes in v2: - Clarify the commit message --- xen/arch/arm/Kconfig | 3 +++ xen/arch/arm/arm32/entry.S | 41 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++- xen/arch/arm/cpuerrata.c | 30 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 3 files changed, 73 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/xen/arch/arm/Kconfig b/xen/arch/arm/Kconfig index 06fd85cc77..2782ee6589 100644 --- a/xen/arch/arm/Kconfig +++ b/xen/arch/arm/Kconfig @@ -191,6 +191,9 @@ config HARDEN_BRANCH_PREDICTOR config ARM64_HARDEN_BRANCH_PREDICTOR def_bool y if ARM_64 && HARDEN_BRANCH_PREDICTOR +config ARM32_HARDEN_BRANCH_PREDICTOR + def_bool y if ARM_32 && HARDEN_BRANCH_PREDICTOR + source "common/Kconfig" source "drivers/Kconfig" diff --git a/xen/arch/arm/arm32/entry.S b/xen/arch/arm/arm32/entry.S index 64876c1184..828e52c25c 100644 --- a/xen/arch/arm/arm32/entry.S +++ b/xen/arch/arm/arm32/entry.S @@ -34,6 +34,20 @@ blne save_guest_regs save_guest_regs: +#ifdef CONFIG_ARM32_HARDEN_BRANCH_PREDICTOR + /* + * Restore vectors table to the default as it may have been + * changed when returning to the guest (see + * return_to_hypervisor). We need to do that early (e.g before + * any interrupts are unmasked) because hardened vectors requires + * SP to be 8 bytes aligned. This does not hold when running in + * the hypervisor. + */ + ldr r1, =hyp_traps_vector + mcr p15, 4, r1, c12, c0, 0 + isb +#endif + ldr r11, =0xffffffff /* Clobber SP which is only valid for hypervisor frames. */ str r11, [sp, #UREGS_sp] SAVE_ONE_BANKED(SP_usr) @@ -179,12 +193,37 @@ return_to_guest: RESTORE_ONE_BANKED(R11_fiq); RESTORE_ONE_BANKED(R12_fiq); /* Fall thru */ return_to_hypervisor: - cpsid i + cpsid ai ldr lr, [sp, #UREGS_lr] ldr r11, [sp, #UREGS_pc] msr ELR_hyp, r11 ldr r11, [sp, #UREGS_cpsr] msr SPSR_hyp, r11 +#ifdef CONFIG_ARM32_HARDEN_BRANCH_PREDICTOR + /* + * Hardening branch predictor may require to setup a different + * vector tables before returning to the guests. Those vectors + * may rely on the state of registers that does not hold when + * running in the hypervisor (e.g SP is 8 bytes aligned). So setup + * HVBAR very late. + * + * Default vectors table will be restored on exit (see + * save_guest_regs). + */ + mov r9, #0 /* vector tables = NULL */ + /* + * Load vector tables pointer from the per-cpu bp_harden_vecs + * when returning to the guest only. + */ + and r11, #PSR_MODE_MASK + cmp r11, #PSR_MODE_HYP + ldrne r11, =per_cpu__bp_harden_vecs + mrcne p15, 4, r10, c13, c0, 2 /* r10 = per-cpu offset (HTPIDR) */ + addne r11, r11, r10 /* r11 = offset of the vector tables */ + ldrne r9, [r11] /* r9 = vector tables */ + cmp r9, #0 /* Only update HVBAR when the vector */ + mcrne p15, 4, r9, c12, c0, 0 /* tables is not NULL. */ +#endif pop {r0-r12} add sp, #(UREGS_SP_usr - UREGS_sp); /* SP, LR, SPSR, PC */ clrex diff --git a/xen/arch/arm/cpuerrata.c b/xen/arch/arm/cpuerrata.c index f1ea7f3c5b..0a138fa735 100644 --- a/xen/arch/arm/cpuerrata.c +++ b/xen/arch/arm/cpuerrata.c @@ -170,6 +170,36 @@ static int enable_psci_bp_hardening(void *data) #endif /* CONFIG_ARM64_HARDEN_BRANCH_PREDICTOR */ +/* Hardening Branch predictor code for Arm32 */ +#ifdef CONFIG_ARM32_HARDEN_BRANCH_PREDICTOR + +/* + * Per-CPU vector tables to use when returning to the guests. They will + * only be used on platform requiring to harden the branch predictor. + */ +DEFINE_PER_CPU_READ_MOSTLY(const char *, bp_harden_vecs); + +extern char hyp_traps_vector_bp_inv[]; + +static void __maybe_unused +install_bp_hardening_vecs(const struct arm_cpu_capabilities *entry, + const char *hyp_vecs, const char *desc) +{ + /* + * Enable callbacks are called on every CPU based on the + * capabilities. So double-check whether the CPU matches the + * entry. + */ + if ( !entry->matches(entry) ) + return; + + printk(XENLOG_INFO "CPU%u will %s on guest exit\n", + smp_processor_id(), desc); + this_cpu(bp_harden_vecs) = hyp_vecs; +} + +#endif + #define MIDR_RANGE(model, min, max) \ .matches = is_affected_midr_range, \ .midr_model = model, \