Message ID | 20240123131204.1166101-1-xiubli@redhat.com |
---|---|
Headers | show |
Series | libceph: fix sparse-read failure bug | expand |
On Tue, 2024-01-23 at 21:12 +0800, xiubli@redhat.com wrote: > From: Xiubo Li <xiubli@redhat.com> > > Once this happens that means there have bugs. > > URL: https://tracker.ceph.com/issues/63586 > Signed-off-by: Xiubo Li <xiubli@redhat.com> > --- > net/ceph/osd_client.c | 13 +++++++++++-- > 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) > > diff --git a/net/ceph/osd_client.c b/net/ceph/osd_client.c > index 9be80d01c1dc..6beab9be51e2 100644 > --- a/net/ceph/osd_client.c > +++ b/net/ceph/osd_client.c > @@ -5857,8 +5857,8 @@ static int osd_sparse_read(struct ceph_connection *con, > struct ceph_osd *o = con->private; > struct ceph_sparse_read *sr = &o->o_sparse_read; > u32 count = sr->sr_count; > - u64 eoff, elen; > - int ret; > + u64 eoff, elen, len = 0; > + int i, ret; > > switch (sr->sr_state) { > case CEPH_SPARSE_READ_HDR: > @@ -5909,6 +5909,13 @@ static int osd_sparse_read(struct ceph_connection *con, > /* Convert sr_datalen to host-endian */ > sr->sr_datalen = le32_to_cpu((__force __le32)sr->sr_datalen); > sr->sr_state = CEPH_SPARSE_READ_DATA; > + for (i = 0; i < count; i++) > + len += sr->sr_extent[i].len; > + if (sr->sr_datalen != len) { > + pr_warn_ratelimited("data len %u != extent len %llu\n", > + sr->sr_datalen, len); > + return -EREMOTEIO; > + } > fallthrough; > case CEPH_SPARSE_READ_DATA: > if (sr->sr_index >= count) { > @@ -5919,6 +5926,8 @@ static int osd_sparse_read(struct ceph_connection *con, > eoff = sr->sr_extent[sr->sr_index].off; > elen = sr->sr_extent[sr->sr_index].len; > > + sr->sr_datalen -= elen; > + > dout("[%d] ext %d off 0x%llx len 0x%llx\n", > o->o_osd, sr->sr_index, eoff, elen); > Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org>
On 1/23/24 22:47, Jeff Layton wrote: > On Tue, 2024-01-23 at 21:12 +0800, xiubli@redhat.com wrote: >> From: Xiubo Li <xiubli@redhat.com> >> >> A short read may occur while reading the message footer from the >> socket. Later, when the socket is ready for another read, the >> messenger shoudl invoke all read_partial* handlers, except the >> read_partial_sparse_msg_data(). The contract between the messenger >> and these handlers is that the handlers should bail if the area >> of the message is responsible for is already processed. So, >> in this case, it's expected that read_sparse_msg_data() would bail, >> allowing the messenger to invoke read_partial() for the footer and >> pick up where it left off. >> >> However read_partial_sparse_msg_data() violates that contract and >> ends up calling into the state machine in the OSD client. The >> sparse-read state machine just assumes that it's a new op and >> interprets some piece of the footer as the sparse-read extents/data >> and then returns bogus extents/data length, etc. >> >> This will just reuse the 'total_resid' to determine whether should >> the read_partial_sparse_msg_data() bail out or not. Because once >> it reaches to zero that means all the extents and data have been >> successfully received in last read, else it could break out when >> partially reading any of the extents and data. And then the >> osd_sparse_read() could continue where it left off. >> > Thanks for the detailed description. That really helps! > I just copied from Ilya's comments and with some changes. >> URL: https://tracker.ceph.com/issues/63586 >> Signed-off-by: Xiubo Li <xiubli@redhat.com> >> --- >> include/linux/ceph/messenger.h | 2 +- >> net/ceph/messenger_v1.c | 25 +++++++++++++------------ >> net/ceph/messenger_v2.c | 4 ++-- >> net/ceph/osd_client.c | 9 +++------ >> 4 files changed, 19 insertions(+), 21 deletions(-) >> >> diff --git a/include/linux/ceph/messenger.h b/include/linux/ceph/messenger.h >> index 2eaaabbe98cb..1717cc57cdac 100644 >> --- a/include/linux/ceph/messenger.h >> +++ b/include/linux/ceph/messenger.h >> @@ -283,7 +283,7 @@ struct ceph_msg { >> struct kref kref; >> bool more_to_follow; >> bool needs_out_seq; >> - bool sparse_read; >> + u64 sparse_read_total; >> int front_alloc_len; >> >> struct ceph_msgpool *pool; >> diff --git a/net/ceph/messenger_v1.c b/net/ceph/messenger_v1.c >> index 4cb60bacf5f5..4c76c8390de1 100644 >> --- a/net/ceph/messenger_v1.c >> +++ b/net/ceph/messenger_v1.c >> @@ -160,8 +160,9 @@ static size_t sizeof_footer(struct ceph_connection *con) >> static void prepare_message_data(struct ceph_msg *msg, u32 data_len) >> { >> /* Initialize data cursor if it's not a sparse read */ >> - if (!msg->sparse_read) >> - ceph_msg_data_cursor_init(&msg->cursor, msg, data_len); >> + u64 len = msg->sparse_read_total ? : data_len; >> + >> + ceph_msg_data_cursor_init(&msg->cursor, msg, len); >> } >> >> /* >> @@ -1036,7 +1037,7 @@ static int read_partial_sparse_msg_data(struct ceph_connection *con) >> if (do_datacrc) >> crc = con->in_data_crc; >> >> - do { >> + while (cursor->total_resid) { >> if (con->v1.in_sr_kvec.iov_base) >> ret = read_partial_message_chunk(con, >> &con->v1.in_sr_kvec, >> @@ -1044,23 +1045,23 @@ static int read_partial_sparse_msg_data(struct ceph_connection *con) >> &crc); >> else if (cursor->sr_resid > 0) >> ret = read_partial_sparse_msg_extent(con, &crc); >> - >> - if (ret <= 0) { >> - if (do_datacrc) >> - con->in_data_crc = crc; >> - return ret; >> - } >> + if (ret <= 0) >> + break; >> >> memset(&con->v1.in_sr_kvec, 0, sizeof(con->v1.in_sr_kvec)); >> ret = con->ops->sparse_read(con, cursor, >> (char **)&con->v1.in_sr_kvec.iov_base); >> + if (ret <= 0) { >> + ret = ret ? : 1; /* must return > 0 to indicate success */ > nit: this syntax is a gcc-ism (AIUI) and is not preferred. It'd be > better spell it out in this case (particularly since it's only 4 extra > chars: > > ret = ret ? ret : 1; Sure. Thanks Jeff. - Xiubo >> + break; >> + } >> con->v1.in_sr_len = ret; >> - } while (ret > 0); >> + } >> >> if (do_datacrc) >> con->in_data_crc = crc; >> >> - return ret < 0 ? ret : 1; /* must return > 0 to indicate success */ >> + return ret; >> } >> >> static int read_partial_msg_data(struct ceph_connection *con) >> @@ -1253,7 +1254,7 @@ static int read_partial_message(struct ceph_connection *con) >> if (!m->num_data_items) >> return -EIO; >> >> - if (m->sparse_read) >> + if (m->sparse_read_total) >> ret = read_partial_sparse_msg_data(con); >> else if (ceph_test_opt(from_msgr(con->msgr), RXBOUNCE)) >> ret = read_partial_msg_data_bounce(con); >> diff --git a/net/ceph/messenger_v2.c b/net/ceph/messenger_v2.c >> index f8ec60e1aba3..a0ca5414b333 100644 >> --- a/net/ceph/messenger_v2.c >> +++ b/net/ceph/messenger_v2.c >> @@ -1128,7 +1128,7 @@ static int decrypt_tail(struct ceph_connection *con) >> struct sg_table enc_sgt = {}; >> struct sg_table sgt = {}; >> struct page **pages = NULL; >> - bool sparse = con->in_msg->sparse_read; >> + bool sparse = !!con->in_msg->sparse_read_total; >> int dpos = 0; >> int tail_len; >> int ret; >> @@ -2060,7 +2060,7 @@ static int prepare_read_tail_plain(struct ceph_connection *con) >> } >> >> if (data_len(msg)) { >> - if (msg->sparse_read) >> + if (msg->sparse_read_total) >> con->v2.in_state = IN_S_PREPARE_SPARSE_DATA; >> else >> con->v2.in_state = IN_S_PREPARE_READ_DATA; >> diff --git a/net/ceph/osd_client.c b/net/ceph/osd_client.c >> index 6beab9be51e2..1a5b1e1e24ca 100644 >> --- a/net/ceph/osd_client.c >> +++ b/net/ceph/osd_client.c >> @@ -5510,7 +5510,7 @@ static struct ceph_msg *get_reply(struct ceph_connection *con, >> } >> >> m = ceph_msg_get(req->r_reply); >> - m->sparse_read = (bool)srlen; >> + m->sparse_read_total = srlen; >> >> dout("get_reply tid %lld %p\n", tid, m); >> >> @@ -5777,11 +5777,8 @@ static int prep_next_sparse_read(struct ceph_connection *con, >> } >> >> if (o->o_sparse_op_idx < 0) { >> - u64 srlen = sparse_data_requested(req); >> - >> - dout("%s: [%d] starting new sparse read req. srlen=0x%llx\n", >> - __func__, o->o_osd, srlen); >> - ceph_msg_data_cursor_init(cursor, con->in_msg, srlen); >> + dout("%s: [%d] starting new sparse read req\n", >> + __func__, o->o_osd); >> } else { >> u64 end; >> > The patch itself looks fine though. > > Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org> >
From: Xiubo Li <xiubli@redhat.com> V5: - remove sr_total_resid and reuse total_resid instead. V4: - remove the sr_resid_elen field - improved the 'read_partial_sparse_msg_data()' V3: - rename read_sparse_msg_XX to read_partial_sparse_msg_XX - fix the sparse-read bug in the messager v1 code. V2: - fix the sparse-read bug in the sparse-read code instead Xiubo Li (3): libceph: fail the sparse-read if there still has data in socket libceph: rename read_sparse_msg_XX to read_partial_sparse_msg_XX libceph: just wait for more data to be available on the socket include/linux/ceph/messenger.h | 2 +- net/ceph/messenger_v1.c | 33 +++++++++++++++++---------------- net/ceph/messenger_v2.c | 4 ++-- net/ceph/osd_client.c | 22 ++++++++++++++-------- 4 files changed, 34 insertions(+), 27 deletions(-)