From patchwork Mon Oct 24 06:30:52 2022 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Ard Biesheuvel X-Patchwork-Id: 618371 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 6A830FA373D for ; Mon, 24 Oct 2022 06:31:30 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S230016AbiJXGb3 (ORCPT ); Mon, 24 Oct 2022 02:31:29 -0400 Received: from lindbergh.monkeyblade.net ([23.128.96.19]:58048 "EHLO lindbergh.monkeyblade.net" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S230329AbiJXGb0 (ORCPT ); Mon, 24 Oct 2022 02:31:26 -0400 Received: from sin.source.kernel.org (sin.source.kernel.org [IPv6:2604:1380:40e1:4800::1]) by lindbergh.monkeyblade.net (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 2C48D5C9DE for ; Sun, 23 Oct 2022 23:31:24 -0700 (PDT) Received: from smtp.kernel.org (relay.kernel.org [52.25.139.140]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by sin.source.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 18467CE112B for ; Mon, 24 Oct 2022 06:31:22 +0000 (UTC) Received: by smtp.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 9FCCCC43470; Mon, 24 Oct 2022 06:31:18 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=kernel.org; s=k20201202; t=1666593080; bh=UkgyRCJRGUSc6ldPkNqhte+/X5NspoCGab34b/RchSo=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References:From; b=C/2k22lGlViPPxdAYwBMrQLPxDZeaf3yV/S39d6HbDkPoyfRc8fmI/XERbHTNWFF1 dViy6GaouiMUfm6FcynM3B/pLEFbPXgoM7h38NQ9Qv8W94cpzEU7pmSBUi4CFtt8CA 33ecINUIzIt14xOEXVxXP92yKXFItOx4A0hSjRG42I7ccBaKEp8DFHC37if9pTg9Pr EBPDCfPkOeSOgLUWPDOeQQ7gSItO6eg8h80dguykltUByzR0Tk1p0tuSCdn9rSU+8v 5ksODpZEHFXz9oNT6cdSP8e0LYjknxPe3jS8IKeVVpzNLqPPH1y3N0Vt0RcH+mjma5 ITkq0IP04W49w== From: Ard Biesheuvel To: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org Cc: herbert@gondor.apana.org.au, ebiggers@kernel.org, keescook@chromium.org, jason@zx2c4.com, nikunj@amd.com, Ard Biesheuvel Subject: [PATCH v4 3/3] crypto: aesgcm - Provide minimal library implementation Date: Mon, 24 Oct 2022 08:30:52 +0200 Message-Id: <20221024063052.109148-4-ardb@kernel.org> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.35.1 In-Reply-To: <20221024063052.109148-1-ardb@kernel.org> References: <20221024063052.109148-1-ardb@kernel.org> MIME-Version: 1.0 X-Developer-Signature: v=1; a=openpgp-sha256; l=27641; i=ardb@kernel.org; h=from:subject; bh=UkgyRCJRGUSc6ldPkNqhte+/X5NspoCGab34b/RchSo=; b=owEB7QES/pANAwAKAcNPIjmS2Y8kAcsmYgBjVjEb2nFW+EY92Lahpmo5xeregVdpJ4ITAW+dABrn f3UAMzKJAbMEAAEKAB0WIQT72WJ8QGnJQhU3VynDTyI5ktmPJAUCY1YxGwAKCRDDTyI5ktmPJKMMC/ 0XI8BgMlar2Kp7RvqBe0vfl265Mnek5P+h0HPI/e5gRrpHyo0pvBBYJZvgUu8C/pC9gh8j/hE4Hx8e iC/DGHLbZvci1UsEGyIwi5E5ZWMEpsP7NUuwXzL7Ab42bWYGANFT6rGWwAVn4RgOEceb/yhT7acdUX ew3J2PRc1FTpUNnB01T07RkSWrB6MDIVV+X/rdb0087UV9YDDOMd3hzX2m8QXyeenIiEkogGsPHo61 Zx8fzdek981mgvZYJf2MOVUxyTy/asddnBfqFKygrxXSUAnCBkc6GG2nvj5RLQwlzEVAx/rL3ZRcoU obcVUpAfrcxa9ppncdGl1T55CwR1QPWtqUvZacNKFRbi4SxociMxM/WPYLpF9vMtMbP281NCXe1tkg d6nbdv3ti2yjjxcXe8JJoCEPzFT60yhAQLS+O/qK4QhWbwJSalsgWxF5U1Ttl/c7jxU4kNgTO7alsC 3xNaTTxBkVfA/bRc6hxss2aLUkls+rNmy5679l1+g47gE= X-Developer-Key: i=ardb@kernel.org; a=openpgp; fpr=F43D03328115A198C90016883D200E9CA6329909 Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org Implement a minimal library version of AES-GCM based on the existing library implementations of AES and multiplication in GF(2^128). Using these primitives, GCM can be implemented in a straight-forward manner. GCM has a couple of sharp edges, i.e., the amount of input data processed with the same initialization vector (IV) should be capped to protect the counter from 32-bit rollover (or carry), and the size of the authentication tag should be fixed for a given key. [0] The former concern is addressed trivially, given that the function call API uses 32-bit signed types for the input lengths. It is still up to the caller to avoid IV reuse in general, but this is not something we can police at the implementation level. As for the latter concern, let's make the authentication tag size part of the key schedule, and only permit it to be configured as part of the key expansion routine. Note that table based AES implementations are susceptible to known plaintext timing attacks on the encryption key. The AES library already attempts to mitigate this to some extent, but given that the counter mode encryption used by GCM operates exclusively on known plaintext by construction (the IV and therefore the initial counter value are known to an attacker), let's take some extra care to mitigate this, by calling the AES library with interrupts disabled. [0] https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/legacy/sp/nistspecialpublication800-38d.pdf Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/c6fb9b25-a4b6-2e4a-2dd1-63adda055a49@amd.com/ Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel Tested-by: Nikunj A Dadhania --- include/crypto/gcm.h | 22 + lib/crypto/Kconfig | 6 + lib/crypto/Makefile | 3 + lib/crypto/aesgcm.c | 720 ++++++++++++++++++++ 4 files changed, 751 insertions(+) diff --git a/include/crypto/gcm.h b/include/crypto/gcm.h index 9d7eff04f224..1155d326cb89 100644 --- a/include/crypto/gcm.h +++ b/include/crypto/gcm.h @@ -3,6 +3,9 @@ #include +#include +#include + #define GCM_AES_IV_SIZE 12 #define GCM_RFC4106_IV_SIZE 8 #define GCM_RFC4543_IV_SIZE 8 @@ -60,4 +63,23 @@ static inline int crypto_ipsec_check_assoclen(unsigned int assoclen) return 0; } + +struct aesgcm_ctx { + be128 ghash_key; + struct crypto_aes_ctx aes_ctx; + unsigned int authsize; +}; + +int aesgcm_expandkey(struct aesgcm_ctx *ctx, const u8 *key, + unsigned int keysize, unsigned int authsize); + +void aesgcm_encrypt(const struct aesgcm_ctx *ctx, u8 *dst, const u8 *src, + int crypt_len, const u8 *assoc, int assoc_len, + const u8 iv[GCM_AES_IV_SIZE], u8 *authtag); + +int __must_check aesgcm_decrypt(const struct aesgcm_ctx *ctx, u8 *dst, + const u8 *src, int crypt_len, const u8 *assoc, + int assoc_len, const u8 iv[GCM_AES_IV_SIZE], + const u8 *authtag); + #endif diff --git a/lib/crypto/Kconfig b/lib/crypto/Kconfig index 2a4b57779fd7..5355a835428f 100644 --- a/lib/crypto/Kconfig +++ b/lib/crypto/Kconfig @@ -11,6 +11,12 @@ config CRYPTO_LIB_AES config CRYPTO_GF128MUL tristate +config CRYPTO_LIB_AESGCM + tristate + select CRYPTO_GF128MUL + select CRYPTO_LIB_AES + select CRYPTO_LIB_UTILS + config CRYPTO_LIB_ARC4 tristate diff --git a/lib/crypto/Makefile b/lib/crypto/Makefile index 60bb566eed78..c5f4502c5e12 100644 --- a/lib/crypto/Makefile +++ b/lib/crypto/Makefile @@ -12,6 +12,9 @@ libaes-y := aes.o obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_GF128MUL) += gf128mul.o +obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_LIB_AESGCM) += libaesgcm.o +libaesgcm-y := aesgcm.o + obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_LIB_ARC4) += libarc4.o libarc4-y := arc4.o diff --git a/lib/crypto/aesgcm.c b/lib/crypto/aesgcm.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..2533692a9563 --- /dev/null +++ b/lib/crypto/aesgcm.c @@ -0,0 +1,720 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 +/* + * Minimal library implementation of GCM + * + * Copyright 2022 Google LLC + */ + +#include + +#include +#include +#include + +#include + +static void aesgcm_encrypt_block(const struct crypto_aes_ctx *ctx, void *dst, + const void *src) +{ + unsigned long flags; + + /* + * In AES-GCM, both the GHASH key derivation and the CTR mode + * encryption operate on known plaintext, making them susceptible to + * timing attacks on the encryption key. The AES library already + * mitigates this risk to some extent by pulling the entire S-box into + * the caches before doing any substitutions, but this strategy is more + * effective when running with interrupts disabled. + */ + local_irq_save(flags); + aes_encrypt(ctx, dst, src); + local_irq_restore(flags); +} + +/** + * aesgcm_expandkey - Expands the AES and GHASH keys for the AES-GCM key + * schedule + * + * @ctx: The data structure that will hold the AES-GCM key schedule + * @key: The AES encryption input key + * @keysize: The length in bytes of the input key + * @authsize: The size in bytes of the GCM authentication tag + * + * Returns: 0 on success, or -EINVAL if @keysize or @authsize contain values + * that are not permitted by the GCM specification. + */ +int aesgcm_expandkey(struct aesgcm_ctx *ctx, const u8 *key, + unsigned int keysize, unsigned int authsize) +{ + u8 kin[AES_BLOCK_SIZE] = {}; + int ret; + + ret = crypto_gcm_check_authsize(authsize) ?: + aes_expandkey(&ctx->aes_ctx, key, keysize); + if (ret) + return ret; + + ctx->authsize = authsize; + aesgcm_encrypt_block(&ctx->aes_ctx, &ctx->ghash_key, kin); + + return 0; +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL(aesgcm_expandkey); + +static void aesgcm_ghash(be128 *ghash, const be128 *key, const void *src, + int len) +{ + while (len > 0) { + crypto_xor((u8 *)ghash, src, min(len, GHASH_BLOCK_SIZE)); + gf128mul_lle(ghash, key); + + src += GHASH_BLOCK_SIZE; + len -= GHASH_BLOCK_SIZE; + } +} + +static void aesgcm_mac(const struct aesgcm_ctx *ctx, const u8 *src, int src_len, + const u8 *assoc, int assoc_len, __be32 *ctr, u8 *authtag) +{ + be128 tail = { cpu_to_be64(assoc_len * 8), cpu_to_be64(src_len * 8) }; + u8 buf[AES_BLOCK_SIZE]; + be128 ghash = {}; + + aesgcm_ghash(&ghash, &ctx->ghash_key, assoc, assoc_len); + aesgcm_ghash(&ghash, &ctx->ghash_key, src, src_len); + aesgcm_ghash(&ghash, &ctx->ghash_key, &tail, sizeof(tail)); + + ctr[3] = cpu_to_be32(1); + aesgcm_encrypt_block(&ctx->aes_ctx, buf, ctr); + crypto_xor_cpy(authtag, buf, (u8 *)&ghash, ctx->authsize); + + memzero_explicit(&ghash, sizeof(ghash)); + memzero_explicit(buf, sizeof(buf)); +} + +static void aesgcm_crypt(const struct aesgcm_ctx *ctx, u8 *dst, const u8 *src, + int len, __be32 *ctr) +{ + u8 buf[AES_BLOCK_SIZE]; + unsigned int n = 2; + + while (len > 0) { + ctr[3] = cpu_to_be32(n++); + aesgcm_encrypt_block(&ctx->aes_ctx, buf, ctr); + crypto_xor_cpy(dst, src, buf, min(len, AES_BLOCK_SIZE)); + + dst += AES_BLOCK_SIZE; + src += AES_BLOCK_SIZE; + len -= AES_BLOCK_SIZE; + } + memzero_explicit(buf, sizeof(buf)); +} + +/** + * aesgcm_encrypt - Perform AES-GCM encryption on a block of data + * + * @ctx: The AES-GCM key schedule + * @dst: Pointer to the ciphertext output buffer + * @src: Pointer the plaintext (may equal @dst for encryption in place) + * @crypt_len: The size in bytes of the plaintext and ciphertext. + * @assoc: Pointer to the associated data, + * @assoc_len: The size in bytes of the associated data + * @iv: The initialization vector (IV) to use for this block of data + * (must be 12 bytes in size as per the GCM spec recommendation) + * @authtag: The address of the buffer in memory where the authentication + * tag should be stored. The buffer is assumed to have space for + * @ctx->authsize bytes. + */ +void aesgcm_encrypt(const struct aesgcm_ctx *ctx, u8 *dst, const u8 *src, + int crypt_len, const u8 *assoc, int assoc_len, + const u8 iv[GCM_AES_IV_SIZE], u8 *authtag) +{ + __be32 ctr[4]; + + memcpy(ctr, iv, GCM_AES_IV_SIZE); + + aesgcm_crypt(ctx, dst, src, crypt_len, ctr); + aesgcm_mac(ctx, dst, crypt_len, assoc, assoc_len, ctr, authtag); +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL(aesgcm_encrypt); + +/** + * aesgcm_decrypt - Perform AES-GCM decryption on a block of data + * + * @ctx: The AES-GCM key schedule + * @dst: Pointer to the plaintext output buffer + * @src: Pointer the ciphertext (may equal @dst for decryption in place) + * @crypt_len: The size in bytes of the plaintext and ciphertext. + * @assoc: Pointer to the associated data, + * @assoc_len: The size in bytes of the associated data + * @iv: The initialization vector (IV) to use for this block of data + * (must be 12 bytes in size as per the GCM spec recommendation) + * @authtag: The address of the buffer in memory where the authentication + * tag is stored. + * + * Returns: 0 on success, or -EBADMSG if the ciphertext failed authentication. + * On failure, no plaintext will be returned. + */ +int __must_check aesgcm_decrypt(const struct aesgcm_ctx *ctx, u8 *dst, + const u8 *src, int crypt_len, const u8 *assoc, + int assoc_len, const u8 iv[GCM_AES_IV_SIZE], + const u8 *authtag) +{ + u8 tagbuf[AES_BLOCK_SIZE]; + __be32 ctr[4]; + + memcpy(ctr, iv, GCM_AES_IV_SIZE); + + aesgcm_mac(ctx, src, crypt_len, assoc, assoc_len, ctr, tagbuf); + if (crypto_memneq(authtag, tagbuf, ctx->authsize)) { + memzero_explicit(tagbuf, sizeof(tagbuf)); + return -EBADMSG; + } + aesgcm_crypt(ctx, dst, src, crypt_len, ctr); + return 0; +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL(aesgcm_decrypt); + +MODULE_DESCRIPTION("Generic AES-GCM library"); +MODULE_AUTHOR("Ard Biesheuvel "); +MODULE_LICENSE("GPL"); + +#ifndef CONFIG_CRYPTO_MANAGER_DISABLE_TESTS + +/* + * Test code below. Vectors taken from crypto/testmgr.h + */ + +static const u8 __initconst ctext0[16] = + "\x58\xe2\xfc\xce\xfa\x7e\x30\x61" + "\x36\x7f\x1d\x57\xa4\xe7\x45\x5a"; + +static const u8 __initconst ptext1[16]; + +static const u8 __initconst ctext1[32] = + "\x03\x88\xda\xce\x60\xb6\xa3\x92" + "\xf3\x28\xc2\xb9\x71\xb2\xfe\x78" + "\xab\x6e\x47\xd4\x2c\xec\x13\xbd" + "\xf5\x3a\x67\xb2\x12\x57\xbd\xdf"; + +static const u8 __initconst ptext2[64] = + "\xd9\x31\x32\x25\xf8\x84\x06\xe5" + "\xa5\x59\x09\xc5\xaf\xf5\x26\x9a" + "\x86\xa7\xa9\x53\x15\x34\xf7\xda" + "\x2e\x4c\x30\x3d\x8a\x31\x8a\x72" + "\x1c\x3c\x0c\x95\x95\x68\x09\x53" + "\x2f\xcf\x0e\x24\x49\xa6\xb5\x25" + "\xb1\x6a\xed\xf5\xaa\x0d\xe6\x57" + "\xba\x63\x7b\x39\x1a\xaf\xd2\x55"; + +static const u8 __initconst ctext2[80] = + "\x42\x83\x1e\xc2\x21\x77\x74\x24" + "\x4b\x72\x21\xb7\x84\xd0\xd4\x9c" + "\xe3\xaa\x21\x2f\x2c\x02\xa4\xe0" + "\x35\xc1\x7e\x23\x29\xac\xa1\x2e" + "\x21\xd5\x14\xb2\x54\x66\x93\x1c" + "\x7d\x8f\x6a\x5a\xac\x84\xaa\x05" + "\x1b\xa3\x0b\x39\x6a\x0a\xac\x97" + "\x3d\x58\xe0\x91\x47\x3f\x59\x85" + "\x4d\x5c\x2a\xf3\x27\xcd\x64\xa6" + "\x2c\xf3\x5a\xbd\x2b\xa6\xfa\xb4"; + +static const u8 __initconst ptext3[60] = + "\xd9\x31\x32\x25\xf8\x84\x06\xe5" + "\xa5\x59\x09\xc5\xaf\xf5\x26\x9a" + "\x86\xa7\xa9\x53\x15\x34\xf7\xda" + "\x2e\x4c\x30\x3d\x8a\x31\x8a\x72" + "\x1c\x3c\x0c\x95\x95\x68\x09\x53" + "\x2f\xcf\x0e\x24\x49\xa6\xb5\x25" + "\xb1\x6a\xed\xf5\xaa\x0d\xe6\x57" + "\xba\x63\x7b\x39"; + +static const u8 __initconst ctext3[76] = + "\x42\x83\x1e\xc2\x21\x77\x74\x24" + "\x4b\x72\x21\xb7\x84\xd0\xd4\x9c" + "\xe3\xaa\x21\x2f\x2c\x02\xa4\xe0" + "\x35\xc1\x7e\x23\x29\xac\xa1\x2e" + "\x21\xd5\x14\xb2\x54\x66\x93\x1c" + "\x7d\x8f\x6a\x5a\xac\x84\xaa\x05" + "\x1b\xa3\x0b\x39\x6a\x0a\xac\x97" + "\x3d\x58\xe0\x91" + "\x5b\xc9\x4f\xbc\x32\x21\xa5\xdb" + "\x94\xfa\xe9\x5a\xe7\x12\x1a\x47"; + +static const u8 __initconst ctext4[16] = + "\xcd\x33\xb2\x8a\xc7\x73\xf7\x4b" + "\xa0\x0e\xd1\xf3\x12\x57\x24\x35"; + +static const u8 __initconst ctext5[32] = + "\x98\xe7\x24\x7c\x07\xf0\xfe\x41" + "\x1c\x26\x7e\x43\x84\xb0\xf6\x00" + "\x2f\xf5\x8d\x80\x03\x39\x27\xab" + "\x8e\xf4\xd4\x58\x75\x14\xf0\xfb"; + +static const u8 __initconst ptext6[64] = + "\xd9\x31\x32\x25\xf8\x84\x06\xe5" + "\xa5\x59\x09\xc5\xaf\xf5\x26\x9a" + "\x86\xa7\xa9\x53\x15\x34\xf7\xda" + "\x2e\x4c\x30\x3d\x8a\x31\x8a\x72" + "\x1c\x3c\x0c\x95\x95\x68\x09\x53" + "\x2f\xcf\x0e\x24\x49\xa6\xb5\x25" + "\xb1\x6a\xed\xf5\xaa\x0d\xe6\x57" + "\xba\x63\x7b\x39\x1a\xaf\xd2\x55"; + +static const u8 __initconst ctext6[80] = + "\x39\x80\xca\x0b\x3c\x00\xe8\x41" + "\xeb\x06\xfa\xc4\x87\x2a\x27\x57" + "\x85\x9e\x1c\xea\xa6\xef\xd9\x84" + "\x62\x85\x93\xb4\x0c\xa1\xe1\x9c" + "\x7d\x77\x3d\x00\xc1\x44\xc5\x25" + "\xac\x61\x9d\x18\xc8\x4a\x3f\x47" + "\x18\xe2\x44\x8b\x2f\xe3\x24\xd9" + "\xcc\xda\x27\x10\xac\xad\xe2\x56" + "\x99\x24\xa7\xc8\x58\x73\x36\xbf" + "\xb1\x18\x02\x4d\xb8\x67\x4a\x14"; + +static const u8 __initconst ctext7[16] = + "\x53\x0f\x8a\xfb\xc7\x45\x36\xb9" + "\xa9\x63\xb4\xf1\xc4\xcb\x73\x8b"; + +static const u8 __initconst ctext8[32] = + "\xce\xa7\x40\x3d\x4d\x60\x6b\x6e" + "\x07\x4e\xc5\xd3\xba\xf3\x9d\x18" + "\xd0\xd1\xc8\xa7\x99\x99\x6b\xf0" + "\x26\x5b\x98\xb5\xd4\x8a\xb9\x19"; + +static const u8 __initconst ptext9[64] = + "\xd9\x31\x32\x25\xf8\x84\x06\xe5" + "\xa5\x59\x09\xc5\xaf\xf5\x26\x9a" + "\x86\xa7\xa9\x53\x15\x34\xf7\xda" + "\x2e\x4c\x30\x3d\x8a\x31\x8a\x72" + "\x1c\x3c\x0c\x95\x95\x68\x09\x53" + "\x2f\xcf\x0e\x24\x49\xa6\xb5\x25" + "\xb1\x6a\xed\xf5\xaa\x0d\xe6\x57" + "\xba\x63\x7b\x39\x1a\xaf\xd2\x55"; + +static const u8 __initconst ctext9[80] = + "\x52\x2d\xc1\xf0\x99\x56\x7d\x07" + "\xf4\x7f\x37\xa3\x2a\x84\x42\x7d" + "\x64\x3a\x8c\xdc\xbf\xe5\xc0\xc9" + "\x75\x98\xa2\xbd\x25\x55\xd1\xaa" + "\x8c\xb0\x8e\x48\x59\x0d\xbb\x3d" + "\xa7\xb0\x8b\x10\x56\x82\x88\x38" + "\xc5\xf6\x1e\x63\x93\xba\x7a\x0a" + "\xbc\xc9\xf6\x62\x89\x80\x15\xad" + "\xb0\x94\xda\xc5\xd9\x34\x71\xbd" + "\xec\x1a\x50\x22\x70\xe3\xcc\x6c"; + +static const u8 __initconst ptext10[60] = + "\xd9\x31\x32\x25\xf8\x84\x06\xe5" + "\xa5\x59\x09\xc5\xaf\xf5\x26\x9a" + "\x86\xa7\xa9\x53\x15\x34\xf7\xda" + "\x2e\x4c\x30\x3d\x8a\x31\x8a\x72" + "\x1c\x3c\x0c\x95\x95\x68\x09\x53" + "\x2f\xcf\x0e\x24\x49\xa6\xb5\x25" + "\xb1\x6a\xed\xf5\xaa\x0d\xe6\x57" + "\xba\x63\x7b\x39"; + +static const u8 __initconst ctext10[76] = + "\x52\x2d\xc1\xf0\x99\x56\x7d\x07" + "\xf4\x7f\x37\xa3\x2a\x84\x42\x7d" + "\x64\x3a\x8c\xdc\xbf\xe5\xc0\xc9" + "\x75\x98\xa2\xbd\x25\x55\xd1\xaa" + "\x8c\xb0\x8e\x48\x59\x0d\xbb\x3d" + "\xa7\xb0\x8b\x10\x56\x82\x88\x38" + "\xc5\xf6\x1e\x63\x93\xba\x7a\x0a" + "\xbc\xc9\xf6\x62" + "\x76\xfc\x6e\xce\x0f\x4e\x17\x68" + "\xcd\xdf\x88\x53\xbb\x2d\x55\x1b"; + +static const u8 __initconst ptext11[60] = + "\xd9\x31\x32\x25\xf8\x84\x06\xe5" + "\xa5\x59\x09\xc5\xaf\xf5\x26\x9a" + "\x86\xa7\xa9\x53\x15\x34\xf7\xda" + "\x2e\x4c\x30\x3d\x8a\x31\x8a\x72" + "\x1c\x3c\x0c\x95\x95\x68\x09\x53" + "\x2f\xcf\x0e\x24\x49\xa6\xb5\x25" + "\xb1\x6a\xed\xf5\xaa\x0d\xe6\x57" + "\xba\x63\x7b\x39"; + +static const u8 __initconst ctext11[76] = + "\x39\x80\xca\x0b\x3c\x00\xe8\x41" + "\xeb\x06\xfa\xc4\x87\x2a\x27\x57" + "\x85\x9e\x1c\xea\xa6\xef\xd9\x84" + "\x62\x85\x93\xb4\x0c\xa1\xe1\x9c" + "\x7d\x77\x3d\x00\xc1\x44\xc5\x25" + "\xac\x61\x9d\x18\xc8\x4a\x3f\x47" + "\x18\xe2\x44\x8b\x2f\xe3\x24\xd9" + "\xcc\xda\x27\x10" + "\x25\x19\x49\x8e\x80\xf1\x47\x8f" + "\x37\xba\x55\xbd\x6d\x27\x61\x8c"; + +static const u8 __initconst ptext12[719] = + "\x42\xc1\xcc\x08\x48\x6f\x41\x3f" + "\x2f\x11\x66\x8b\x2a\x16\xf0\xe0" + "\x58\x83\xf0\xc3\x70\x14\xc0\x5b" + "\x3f\xec\x1d\x25\x3c\x51\xd2\x03" + "\xcf\x59\x74\x1f\xb2\x85\xb4\x07" + "\xc6\x6a\x63\x39\x8a\x5b\xde\xcb" + "\xaf\x08\x44\xbd\x6f\x91\x15\xe1" + "\xf5\x7a\x6e\x18\xbd\xdd\x61\x50" + "\x59\xa9\x97\xab\xbb\x0e\x74\x5c" + "\x00\xa4\x43\x54\x04\x54\x9b\x3b" + "\x77\xec\xfd\x5c\xa6\xe8\x7b\x08" + "\xae\xe6\x10\x3f\x32\x65\xd1\xfc" + "\xa4\x1d\x2c\x31\xfb\x33\x7a\xb3" + "\x35\x23\xf4\x20\x41\xd4\xad\x82" + "\x8b\xa4\xad\x96\x1c\x20\x53\xbe" + "\x0e\xa6\xf4\xdc\x78\x49\x3e\x72" + "\xb1\xa9\xb5\x83\xcb\x08\x54\xb7" + "\xad\x49\x3a\xae\x98\xce\xa6\x66" + "\x10\x30\x90\x8c\x55\x83\xd7\x7c" + "\x8b\xe6\x53\xde\xd2\x6e\x18\x21" + "\x01\x52\xd1\x9f\x9d\xbb\x9c\x73" + "\x57\xcc\x89\x09\x75\x9b\x78\x70" + "\xed\x26\x97\x4d\xb4\xe4\x0c\xa5" + "\xfa\x70\x04\x70\xc6\x96\x1c\x7d" + "\x54\x41\x77\xa8\xe3\xb0\x7e\x96" + "\x82\xd9\xec\xa2\x87\x68\x55\xf9" + "\x8f\x9e\x73\x43\x47\x6a\x08\x36" + "\x93\x67\xa8\x2d\xde\xac\x41\xa9" + "\x5c\x4d\x73\x97\x0f\x70\x68\xfa" + "\x56\x4d\x00\xc2\x3b\x1f\xc8\xb9" + "\x78\x1f\x51\x07\xe3\x9a\x13\x4e" + "\xed\x2b\x2e\xa3\xf7\x44\xb2\xe7" + "\xab\x19\x37\xd9\xba\x76\x5e\xd2" + "\xf2\x53\x15\x17\x4c\x6b\x16\x9f" + "\x02\x66\x49\xca\x7c\x91\x05\xf2" + "\x45\x36\x1e\xf5\x77\xad\x1f\x46" + "\xa8\x13\xfb\x63\xb6\x08\x99\x63" + "\x82\xa2\xed\xb3\xac\xdf\x43\x19" + "\x45\xea\x78\x73\xd9\xb7\x39\x11" + "\xa3\x13\x7c\xf8\x3f\xf7\xad\x81" + "\x48\x2f\xa9\x5c\x5f\xa0\xf0\x79" + "\xa4\x47\x7d\x80\x20\x26\xfd\x63" + "\x0a\xc7\x7e\x6d\x75\x47\xff\x76" + "\x66\x2e\x8a\x6c\x81\x35\xaf\x0b" + "\x2e\x6a\x49\x60\xc1\x10\xe1\xe1" + "\x54\x03\xa4\x09\x0c\x37\x7a\x15" + "\x23\x27\x5b\x8b\x4b\xa5\x64\x97" + "\xae\x4a\x50\x73\x1f\x66\x1c\x5c" + "\x03\x25\x3c\x8d\x48\x58\x71\x34" + "\x0e\xec\x4e\x55\x1a\x03\x6a\xe5" + "\xb6\x19\x2b\x84\x2a\x20\xd1\xea" + "\x80\x6f\x96\x0e\x05\x62\xc7\x78" + "\x87\x79\x60\x38\x46\xb4\x25\x57" + "\x6e\x16\x63\xf8\xad\x6e\xd7\x42" + "\x69\xe1\x88\xef\x6e\xd5\xb4\x9a" + "\x3c\x78\x6c\x3b\xe5\xa0\x1d\x22" + "\x86\x5c\x74\x3a\xeb\x24\x26\xc7" + "\x09\xfc\x91\x96\x47\x87\x4f\x1a" + "\xd6\x6b\x2c\x18\x47\xc0\xb8\x24" + "\xa8\x5a\x4a\x9e\xcb\x03\xe7\x2a" + "\x09\xe6\x4d\x9c\x6d\x86\x60\xf5" + "\x2f\x48\x69\x37\x9f\xf2\xd2\xcb" + "\x0e\x5a\xdd\x6e\x8a\xfb\x6a\xfe" + "\x0b\x63\xde\x87\x42\x79\x8a\x68" + "\x51\x28\x9b\x7a\xeb\xaf\xb8\x2f" + "\x9d\xd1\xc7\x45\x90\x08\xc9\x83" + "\xe9\x83\x84\xcb\x28\x69\x09\x69" + "\xce\x99\x46\x00\x54\xcb\xd8\x38" + "\xf9\x53\x4a\xbf\x31\xce\x57\x15" + "\x33\xfa\x96\x04\x33\x42\xe3\xc0" + "\xb7\x54\x4a\x65\x7a\x7c\x02\xe6" + "\x19\x95\xd0\x0e\x82\x07\x63\xf9" + "\xe1\x2b\x2a\xfc\x55\x92\x52\xc9" + "\xb5\x9f\x23\x28\x60\xe7\x20\x51" + "\x10\xd3\xed\x6d\x9b\xab\xb8\xe2" + "\x5d\x9a\x34\xb3\xbe\x9c\x64\xcb" + "\x78\xc6\x91\x22\x40\x91\x80\xbe" + "\xd7\x78\x5c\x0e\x0a\xdc\x08\xe9" + "\x67\x10\xa4\x83\x98\x79\x23\xe7" + "\x92\xda\xa9\x22\x16\xb1\xe7\x78" + "\xa3\x1c\x6c\x8f\x35\x7c\x4d\x37" + "\x2f\x6e\x0b\x50\x5c\x34\xb9\xf9" + "\xe6\x3d\x91\x0d\x32\x95\xaa\x3d" + "\x48\x11\x06\xbb\x2d\xf2\x63\x88" + "\x3f\x73\x09\xe2\x45\x56\x31\x51" + "\xfa\x5e\x4e\x62\xf7\x90\xf9\xa9" + "\x7d\x7b\x1b\xb1\xc8\x26\x6e\x66" + "\xf6\x90\x9a\x7f\xf2\x57\xcc\x23" + "\x59\xfa\xfa\xaa\x44\x04\x01\xa7" + "\xa4\x78\xdb\x74\x3d\x8b\xb5"; + +static const u8 __initconst ctext12[735] = + "\x84\x0b\xdb\xd5\xb7\xa8\xfe\x20" + "\xbb\xb1\x12\x7f\x41\xea\xb3\xc0" + "\xa2\xb4\x37\x19\x11\x58\xb6\x0b" + "\x4c\x1d\x38\x05\x54\xd1\x16\x73" + "\x8e\x1c\x20\x90\xa2\x9a\xb7\x74" + "\x47\xe6\xd8\xfc\x18\x3a\xb4\xea" + "\xd5\x16\x5a\x2c\x53\x01\x46\xb3" + "\x18\x33\x74\x6c\x50\xf2\xe8\xc0" + "\x73\xda\x60\x22\xeb\xe3\xe5\x9b" + "\x20\x93\x6c\x4b\x37\x99\xb8\x23" + "\x3b\x4e\xac\xe8\x5b\xe8\x0f\xb7" + "\xc3\x8f\xfb\x4a\x37\xd9\x39\x95" + "\x34\xf1\xdb\x8f\x71\xd9\xc7\x0b" + "\x02\xf1\x63\xfc\x9b\xfc\xc5\xab" + "\xb9\x14\x13\x21\xdf\xce\xaa\x88" + "\x44\x30\x1e\xce\x26\x01\x92\xf8" + "\x9f\x00\x4b\x0c\x4b\xf7\x5f\xe0" + "\x89\xca\x94\x66\x11\x21\x97\xca" + "\x3e\x83\x74\x2d\xdb\x4d\x11\xeb" + "\x97\xc2\x14\xff\x9e\x1e\xa0\x6b" + "\x08\xb4\x31\x2b\x85\xc6\x85\x6c" + "\x90\xec\x39\xc0\xec\xb3\xb5\x4e" + "\xf3\x9c\xe7\x83\x3a\x77\x0a\xf4" + "\x56\xfe\xce\x18\x33\x6d\x0b\x2d" + "\x33\xda\xc8\x05\x5c\xb4\x09\x2a" + "\xde\x6b\x52\x98\x01\xef\x36\x3d" + "\xbd\xf9\x8f\xa8\x3e\xaa\xcd\xd1" + "\x01\x2d\x42\x49\xc3\xb6\x84\xbb" + "\x48\x96\xe0\x90\x93\x6c\x48\x64" + "\xd4\xfa\x7f\x93\x2c\xa6\x21\xc8" + "\x7a\x23\x7b\xaa\x20\x56\x12\xae" + "\x16\x9d\x94\x0f\x54\xa1\xec\xca" + "\x51\x4e\xf2\x39\xf4\xf8\x5f\x04" + "\x5a\x0d\xbf\xf5\x83\xa1\x15\xe1" + "\xf5\x3c\xd8\x62\xa3\xed\x47\x89" + "\x85\x4c\xe5\xdb\xac\x9e\x17\x1d" + "\x0c\x09\xe3\x3e\x39\x5b\x4d\x74" + "\x0e\xf5\x34\xee\x70\x11\x4c\xfd" + "\xdb\x34\xb1\xb5\x10\x3f\x73\xb7" + "\xf5\xfa\xed\xb0\x1f\xa5\xcd\x3c" + "\x8d\x35\x83\xd4\x11\x44\x6e\x6c" + "\x5b\xe0\x0e\x69\xa5\x39\xe5\xbb" + "\xa9\x57\x24\x37\xe6\x1f\xdd\xcf" + "\x16\x2a\x13\xf9\x6a\x2d\x90\xa0" + "\x03\x60\x7a\xed\x69\xd5\x00\x8b" + "\x7e\x4f\xcb\xb9\xfa\x91\xb9\x37" + "\xc1\x26\xce\x90\x97\x22\x64\x64" + "\xc1\x72\x43\x1b\xf6\xac\xc1\x54" + "\x8a\x10\x9c\xdd\x8d\xd5\x8e\xb2" + "\xe4\x85\xda\xe0\x20\x5f\xf4\xb4" + "\x15\xb5\xa0\x8d\x12\x74\x49\x23" + "\x3a\xdf\x4a\xd3\xf0\x3b\x89\xeb" + "\xf8\xcc\x62\x7b\xfb\x93\x07\x41" + "\x61\x26\x94\x58\x70\xa6\x3c\xe4" + "\xff\x58\xc4\x13\x3d\xcb\x36\x6b" + "\x32\xe5\xb2\x6d\x03\x74\x6f\x76" + "\x93\x77\xde\x48\xc4\xfa\x30\x4a" + "\xda\x49\x80\x77\x0f\x1c\xbe\x11" + "\xc8\x48\xb1\xe5\xbb\xf2\x8a\xe1" + "\x96\x2f\x9f\xd1\x8e\x8a\x5c\xe2" + "\xf7\xd7\xd8\x54\xf3\x3f\xc4\x91" + "\xb8\xfb\x86\xdc\x46\x24\x91\x60" + "\x6c\x2f\xc9\x41\x37\x51\x49\x54" + "\x09\x81\x21\xf3\x03\x9f\x2b\xe3" + "\x1f\x39\x63\xaf\xf4\xd7\x53\x60" + "\xa7\xc7\x54\xf9\xee\xb1\xb1\x7d" + "\x75\x54\x65\x93\xfe\xb1\x68\x6b" + "\x57\x02\xf9\xbb\x0e\xf9\xf8\xbf" + "\x01\x12\x27\xb4\xfe\xe4\x79\x7a" + "\x40\x5b\x51\x4b\xdf\x38\xec\xb1" + "\x6a\x56\xff\x35\x4d\x42\x33\xaa" + "\x6f\x1b\xe4\xdc\xe0\xdb\x85\x35" + "\x62\x10\xd4\xec\xeb\xc5\x7e\x45" + "\x1c\x6f\x17\xca\x3b\x8e\x2d\x66" + "\x4f\x4b\x36\x56\xcd\x1b\x59\xaa" + "\xd2\x9b\x17\xb9\x58\xdf\x7b\x64" + "\x8a\xff\x3b\x9c\xa6\xb5\x48\x9e" + "\xaa\xe2\x5d\x09\x71\x32\x5f\xb6" + "\x29\xbe\xe7\xc7\x52\x7e\x91\x82" + "\x6b\x6d\x33\xe1\x34\x06\x36\x21" + "\x5e\xbe\x1e\x2f\x3e\xc1\xfb\xea" + "\x49\x2c\xb5\xca\xf7\xb0\x37\xea" + "\x1f\xed\x10\x04\xd9\x48\x0d\x1a" + "\x1c\xfb\xe7\x84\x0e\x83\x53\x74" + "\xc7\x65\xe2\x5c\xe5\xba\x73\x4c" + "\x0e\xe1\xb5\x11\x45\x61\x43\x46" + "\xaa\x25\x8f\xbd\x85\x08\xfa\x4c" + "\x15\xc1\xc0\xd8\xf5\xdc\x16\xbb" + "\x7b\x1d\xe3\x87\x57\xa7\x2a\x1d" + "\x38\x58\x9e\x8a\x43\xdc\x57" + "\xd1\x81\x7d\x2b\xe9\xff\x99\x3a" + "\x4b\x24\x52\x58\x55\xe1\x49\x14"; + +static struct { + const u8 *ptext; + const u8 *ctext; + + u8 key[AES_MAX_KEY_SIZE]; + u8 iv[GCM_AES_IV_SIZE]; + u8 assoc[20]; + + int klen; + int clen; + int plen; + int alen; +} const aesgcm_tv[] __initconst = { + { /* From McGrew & Viega - http://citeseer.ist.psu.edu/656989.html */ + .klen = 16, + .ctext = ctext0, + .clen = sizeof(ctext0), + }, { + .klen = 16, + .ptext = ptext1, + .plen = sizeof(ptext1), + .ctext = ctext1, + .clen = sizeof(ctext1), + }, { + .key = "\xfe\xff\xe9\x92\x86\x65\x73\x1c" + "\x6d\x6a\x8f\x94\x67\x30\x83\x08", + .klen = 16, + .iv = "\xca\xfe\xba\xbe\xfa\xce\xdb\xad" + "\xde\xca\xf8\x88", + .ptext = ptext2, + .plen = sizeof(ptext2), + .ctext = ctext2, + .clen = sizeof(ctext2), + }, { + .key = "\xfe\xff\xe9\x92\x86\x65\x73\x1c" + "\x6d\x6a\x8f\x94\x67\x30\x83\x08", + .klen = 16, + .iv = "\xca\xfe\xba\xbe\xfa\xce\xdb\xad" + "\xde\xca\xf8\x88", + .ptext = ptext3, + .plen = sizeof(ptext3), + .assoc = "\xfe\xed\xfa\xce\xde\xad\xbe\xef" + "\xfe\xed\xfa\xce\xde\xad\xbe\xef" + "\xab\xad\xda\xd2", + .alen = 20, + .ctext = ctext3, + .clen = sizeof(ctext3), + }, { + .klen = 24, + .ctext = ctext4, + .clen = sizeof(ctext4), + }, { + .klen = 24, + .ptext = ptext1, + .plen = sizeof(ptext1), + .ctext = ctext5, + .clen = sizeof(ctext5), + }, { + .key = "\xfe\xff\xe9\x92\x86\x65\x73\x1c" + "\x6d\x6a\x8f\x94\x67\x30\x83\x08" + "\xfe\xff\xe9\x92\x86\x65\x73\x1c", + .klen = 24, + .iv = "\xca\xfe\xba\xbe\xfa\xce\xdb\xad" + "\xde\xca\xf8\x88", + .ptext = ptext6, + .plen = sizeof(ptext6), + .ctext = ctext6, + .clen = sizeof(ctext6), + }, { + .klen = 32, + .ctext = ctext7, + .clen = sizeof(ctext7), + }, { + .klen = 32, + .ptext = ptext1, + .plen = sizeof(ptext1), + .ctext = ctext8, + .clen = sizeof(ctext8), + }, { + .key = "\xfe\xff\xe9\x92\x86\x65\x73\x1c" + "\x6d\x6a\x8f\x94\x67\x30\x83\x08" + "\xfe\xff\xe9\x92\x86\x65\x73\x1c" + "\x6d\x6a\x8f\x94\x67\x30\x83\x08", + .klen = 32, + .iv = "\xca\xfe\xba\xbe\xfa\xce\xdb\xad" + "\xde\xca\xf8\x88", + .ptext = ptext9, + .plen = sizeof(ptext9), + .ctext = ctext9, + .clen = sizeof(ctext9), + }, { + .key = "\xfe\xff\xe9\x92\x86\x65\x73\x1c" + "\x6d\x6a\x8f\x94\x67\x30\x83\x08" + "\xfe\xff\xe9\x92\x86\x65\x73\x1c" + "\x6d\x6a\x8f\x94\x67\x30\x83\x08", + .klen = 32, + .iv = "\xca\xfe\xba\xbe\xfa\xce\xdb\xad" + "\xde\xca\xf8\x88", + .ptext = ptext10, + .plen = sizeof(ptext10), + .assoc = "\xfe\xed\xfa\xce\xde\xad\xbe\xef" + "\xfe\xed\xfa\xce\xde\xad\xbe\xef" + "\xab\xad\xda\xd2", + .alen = 20, + .ctext = ctext10, + .clen = sizeof(ctext10), + }, { + .key = "\xfe\xff\xe9\x92\x86\x65\x73\x1c" + "\x6d\x6a\x8f\x94\x67\x30\x83\x08" + "\xfe\xff\xe9\x92\x86\x65\x73\x1c", + .klen = 24, + .iv = "\xca\xfe\xba\xbe\xfa\xce\xdb\xad" + "\xde\xca\xf8\x88", + .ptext = ptext11, + .plen = sizeof(ptext11), + .assoc = "\xfe\xed\xfa\xce\xde\xad\xbe\xef" + "\xfe\xed\xfa\xce\xde\xad\xbe\xef" + "\xab\xad\xda\xd2", + .alen = 20, + .ctext = ctext11, + .clen = sizeof(ctext11), + }, { + .key = "\x62\x35\xf8\x95\xfc\xa5\xeb\xf6" + "\x0e\x92\x12\x04\xd3\xa1\x3f\x2e" + "\x8b\x32\xcf\xe7\x44\xed\x13\x59" + "\x04\x38\x77\xb0\xb9\xad\xb4\x38", + .klen = 32, + .iv = "\x00\xff\xff\xff\xff\x00\x00\xff" + "\xff\xff\x00\xff", + .ptext = ptext12, + .plen = sizeof(ptext12), + .ctext = ctext12, + .clen = sizeof(ctext12), + } +}; + +static int __init libaesgcm_init(void) +{ + for (int i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(aesgcm_tv); i++) { + u8 tagbuf[AES_BLOCK_SIZE]; + int plen = aesgcm_tv[i].plen; + struct aesgcm_ctx ctx; + u8 buf[sizeof(ptext12)]; + + if (aesgcm_expandkey(&ctx, aesgcm_tv[i].key, aesgcm_tv[i].klen, + aesgcm_tv[i].clen - plen)) { + WARN(1, "aesgcm_expandkey() failed on vector %d\n", i); + return -EINVAL; + } + + if (aesgcm_decrypt(&ctx, buf, aesgcm_tv[i].ctext, plen, + aesgcm_tv[i].assoc, aesgcm_tv[i].alen, + aesgcm_tv[i].iv, aesgcm_tv[i].ctext + plen) + || memcmp(buf, aesgcm_tv[i].ptext, plen)) { + WARN(1, "aesgcm_decrypt() #1 failed on vector %d\n", i); + return -EINVAL; + } + + /* encrypt in place */ + aesgcm_encrypt(&ctx, buf, buf, plen, aesgcm_tv[i].assoc, + aesgcm_tv[i].alen, aesgcm_tv[i].iv, tagbuf); + if (memcmp(buf, aesgcm_tv[i].ctext, plen)) { + WARN(1, "aesgcm_encrypt() failed on vector %d\n", i); + return -EINVAL; + } + + /* decrypt in place */ + if (aesgcm_decrypt(&ctx, buf, buf, plen, aesgcm_tv[i].assoc, + aesgcm_tv[i].alen, aesgcm_tv[i].iv, tagbuf) + || memcmp(buf, aesgcm_tv[i].ptext, plen)) { + WARN(1, "aesgcm_decrypt() #2 failed on vector %d\n", i); + return -EINVAL; + } + } + return 0; +} +module_init(libaesgcm_init); + +static void __exit libaesgcm_exit(void) +{ +} +module_exit(libaesgcm_exit); +#endif