From patchwork Tue Nov 8 14:20:22 2022 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Nicolai Stange X-Patchwork-Id: 623049 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 0867FC4332F for ; Tue, 8 Nov 2022 14:20:57 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S233607AbiKHOUx (ORCPT ); Tue, 8 Nov 2022 09:20:53 -0500 Received: from lindbergh.monkeyblade.net ([23.128.96.19]:57184 "EHLO lindbergh.monkeyblade.net" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S234651AbiKHOUt (ORCPT ); Tue, 8 Nov 2022 09:20:49 -0500 Received: from smtp-out1.suse.de (smtp-out1.suse.de [IPv6:2001:67c:2178:6::1c]) by lindbergh.monkeyblade.net (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 72C36862D2; Tue, 8 Nov 2022 06:20:48 -0800 (PST) Received: from imap2.suse-dmz.suse.de (imap2.suse-dmz.suse.de [192.168.254.74]) (using TLSv1.3 with cipher TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 (256/256 bits) key-exchange X25519 server-signature ECDSA (P-521) server-digest SHA512) (No client certificate requested) by smtp-out1.suse.de (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 2D9EC22A9E; Tue, 8 Nov 2022 14:20:47 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=suse.de; s=susede2_rsa; t=1667917247; h=from:from:reply-to:date:date:message-id:message-id:to:to:cc:cc: mime-version:mime-version: content-transfer-encoding:content-transfer-encoding: in-reply-to:in-reply-to:references:references; bh=uG7bkbR8f1ErSbpnIswqV7scwgYtGlwKnO07NfMV1Ro=; b=S2tQIpOsR9mMrPkL1xyeJAXruYNrjsUZ6HF8BLdHGTnO80bnA4iQkodZli0rCTWp17IWc8 G6kffZIEF11rAdTdbELZu1ST4TdSTXfL63M0DMnRrH2pmqypMjsfkU+No7jDGUW6teZcNJ PWzOVo6S0JUb+DhSXB3gdpuJQuSP/vM= DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=ed25519-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=suse.de; s=susede2_ed25519; t=1667917247; h=from:from:reply-to:date:date:message-id:message-id:to:to:cc:cc: mime-version:mime-version: content-transfer-encoding:content-transfer-encoding: in-reply-to:in-reply-to:references:references; bh=uG7bkbR8f1ErSbpnIswqV7scwgYtGlwKnO07NfMV1Ro=; b=KlJyrsTfyiJ5AaM/jlA9pToJSlXsFBVquwdB4l/WR9qI2U1mbUcggpwAbxZgZCNIAzPvsU DmdguqNlPjek2aAQ== Received: from imap2.suse-dmz.suse.de (imap2.suse-dmz.suse.de [192.168.254.74]) (using TLSv1.3 with cipher TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 (256/256 bits) key-exchange X25519 server-signature ECDSA (P-521) server-digest SHA512) (No client certificate requested) by imap2.suse-dmz.suse.de (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 1F98E13398; Tue, 8 Nov 2022 14:20:47 +0000 (UTC) Received: from dovecot-director2.suse.de ([192.168.254.65]) by imap2.suse-dmz.suse.de with ESMTPSA id kBtiB79lamMTKQAAMHmgww (envelope-from ); Tue, 08 Nov 2022 14:20:47 +0000 From: Nicolai Stange To: Herbert Xu , "David S. Miller" Cc: Vladis Dronov , Stephan Mueller , linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, Nicolai Stange Subject: [PATCH 1/4] crypto: xts - restrict key lengths to approved values in FIPS mode Date: Tue, 8 Nov 2022 15:20:22 +0100 Message-Id: <20221108142025.13461-2-nstange@suse.de> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.38.0 In-Reply-To: <20221108142025.13461-1-nstange@suse.de> References: <20221108142025.13461-1-nstange@suse.de> MIME-Version: 1.0 Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org According to FIPS 140-3 IG C.I., only (total) key lengths of either 256 bits or 512 bits are allowed with xts(aes). Make xts_verify_key() to reject anything else in FIPS mode. As xts(aes) is the only approved xts() template instantiation in FIPS mode, the new restriction implemented in xts_verify_key() effectively only applies to this particular construction. Signed-off-by: Nicolai Stange --- include/crypto/xts.h | 7 +++++++ 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+) diff --git a/include/crypto/xts.h b/include/crypto/xts.h index 0f8dba69feb4..a233c1054df2 100644 --- a/include/crypto/xts.h +++ b/include/crypto/xts.h @@ -35,6 +35,13 @@ static inline int xts_verify_key(struct crypto_skcipher *tfm, if (keylen % 2) return -EINVAL; + /* + * In FIPS mode only a combined key length of either 256 or + * 512 bits is allowed, c.f. FIPS 140-3 IG C.I. + */ + if (fips_enabled && keylen != 32 && keylen != 64) + return -EINVAL; + /* ensure that the AES and tweak key are not identical */ if ((fips_enabled || (crypto_skcipher_get_flags(tfm) & CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_FORBID_WEAK_KEYS)) &&