@@ -841,6 +841,7 @@ struct kvm_sev_snp_launch_start {
};
/* Kept in sync with firmware values for simplicity. */
+#define KVM_SEV_PAGE_TYPE_INVALID 0x0
#define KVM_SEV_SNP_PAGE_TYPE_NORMAL 0x1
#define KVM_SEV_SNP_PAGE_TYPE_ZERO 0x3
#define KVM_SEV_SNP_PAGE_TYPE_UNMEASURED 0x4
@@ -841,6 +841,7 @@ struct kvm_sev_snp_launch_start {
};
/* Kept in sync with firmware values for simplicity. */
+#define KVM_SEV_PAGE_TYPE_INVALID 0x0
#define KVM_SEV_SNP_PAGE_TYPE_NORMAL 0x1
#define KVM_SEV_SNP_PAGE_TYPE_ZERO 0x3
#define KVM_SEV_SNP_PAGE_TYPE_UNMEASURED 0x4
@@ -25,6 +25,10 @@ enum sev_guest_state {
#define SEV_POLICY_NO_DBG (1UL << 0)
#define SEV_POLICY_ES (1UL << 2)
+#define SNP_POLICY_SMT (1ULL << 16)
+#define SNP_POLICY_RSVD_MBO (1ULL << 17)
+#define SNP_POLICY_DBG (1ULL << 19)
+
#define GHCB_MSR_TERM_REQ 0x100
bool is_sev_vm(struct kvm_vm *vm);
@@ -34,13 +38,26 @@ bool is_sev_snp_vm(struct kvm_vm *vm);
void sev_vm_launch(struct kvm_vm *vm, uint32_t policy);
void sev_vm_launch_measure(struct kvm_vm *vm, uint8_t *measurement);
void sev_vm_launch_finish(struct kvm_vm *vm);
+void snp_vm_launch_start(struct kvm_vm *vm, uint64_t policy);
+void snp_vm_launch_update(struct kvm_vm *vm);
+void snp_vm_launch_finish(struct kvm_vm *vm);
struct kvm_vm *vm_sev_create_with_one_vcpu(uint32_t type, void *guest_code,
struct kvm_vcpu **cpu);
-void vm_sev_launch(struct kvm_vm *vm, uint32_t policy, uint8_t *measurement);
+void vm_sev_launch(struct kvm_vm *vm, uint64_t policy, uint8_t *measurement);
kvm_static_assert(SEV_RET_SUCCESS == 0);
+/*
+ * A SEV-SNP VM requires the policy reserved bit to always be set.
+ * The SMT policy bit is also required to be set based on SMT being
+ * available and active on the system.
+ */
+static inline u64 snp_default_policy(void)
+{
+ return SNP_POLICY_RSVD_MBO | (smt_on() ? SNP_POLICY_SMT : 0);
+}
+
/*
* The KVM_MEMORY_ENCRYPT_OP uAPI is utter garbage and takes an "unsigned long"
* instead of a proper struct. The size of the parameter is embedded in the
@@ -74,6 +91,7 @@ kvm_static_assert(SEV_RET_SUCCESS == 0);
void sev_vm_init(struct kvm_vm *vm);
void sev_es_vm_init(struct kvm_vm *vm);
+void snp_vm_init(struct kvm_vm *vm);
static inline void vmgexit(void)
{
@@ -102,4 +120,17 @@ static inline void sev_launch_update_data(struct kvm_vm *vm, vm_paddr_t gpa,
vm_sev_ioctl(vm, KVM_SEV_LAUNCH_UPDATE_DATA, &update_data);
}
+static inline void snp_launch_update_data(struct kvm_vm *vm, vm_paddr_t gpa,
+ uint64_t hva, uint64_t size, uint8_t type)
+{
+ struct kvm_sev_snp_launch_update update_data = {
+ .uaddr = hva,
+ .gfn_start = gpa >> PAGE_SHIFT,
+ .len = size,
+ .type = type,
+ };
+
+ vm_sev_ioctl(vm, KVM_SEV_SNP_LAUNCH_UPDATE, &update_data);
+}
+
#endif /* SELFTEST_KVM_SEV_H */
@@ -31,7 +31,8 @@ bool is_sev_vm(struct kvm_vm *vm)
* and find the first range, but that's correct because the condition
* expression would cause us to quit the loop.
*/
-static void encrypt_region(struct kvm_vm *vm, struct userspace_mem_region *region)
+static void encrypt_region(struct kvm_vm *vm, struct userspace_mem_region *region,
+ uint8_t page_type, bool private)
{
const struct sparsebit *protected_phy_pages = region->protected_phy_pages;
const vm_paddr_t gpa_base = region->region.guest_phys_addr;
@@ -41,13 +42,23 @@ static void encrypt_region(struct kvm_vm *vm, struct userspace_mem_region *regio
if (!sparsebit_any_set(protected_phy_pages))
return;
- sev_register_encrypted_memory(vm, region);
+ if (!is_sev_snp_vm(vm))
+ sev_register_encrypted_memory(vm, region);
sparsebit_for_each_set_range(protected_phy_pages, i, j) {
const uint64_t size = (j - i + 1) * vm->page_size;
const uint64_t offset = (i - lowest_page_in_region) * vm->page_size;
- sev_launch_update_data(vm, gpa_base + offset, size);
+ if (private)
+ vm_mem_set_private(vm, gpa_base + offset, size);
+
+ if (is_sev_snp_vm(vm))
+ snp_launch_update_data(vm, gpa_base + offset,
+ (uint64_t)addr_gpa2hva(vm, gpa_base + offset),
+ size, page_type);
+ else
+ sev_launch_update_data(vm, gpa_base + offset, size);
+
}
}
@@ -77,6 +88,14 @@ void sev_es_vm_init(struct kvm_vm *vm)
}
}
+void snp_vm_init(struct kvm_vm *vm)
+{
+ struct kvm_sev_init init = { 0 };
+
+ TEST_ASSERT_EQ(vm->type, KVM_X86_SNP_VM);
+ vm_sev_ioctl(vm, KVM_SEV_INIT2, &init);
+}
+
void sev_vm_launch(struct kvm_vm *vm, uint32_t policy)
{
struct kvm_sev_launch_start launch_start = {
@@ -93,7 +112,7 @@ void sev_vm_launch(struct kvm_vm *vm, uint32_t policy)
TEST_ASSERT_EQ(status.state, SEV_GUEST_STATE_LAUNCH_UPDATE);
hash_for_each(vm->regions.slot_hash, ctr, region, slot_node)
- encrypt_region(vm, region);
+ encrypt_region(vm, region, KVM_SEV_PAGE_TYPE_INVALID, false);
if (policy & SEV_POLICY_ES)
vm_sev_ioctl(vm, KVM_SEV_LAUNCH_UPDATE_VMSA, NULL);
@@ -129,6 +148,33 @@ void sev_vm_launch_finish(struct kvm_vm *vm)
TEST_ASSERT_EQ(status.state, SEV_GUEST_STATE_RUNNING);
}
+void snp_vm_launch_start(struct kvm_vm *vm, uint64_t policy)
+{
+ struct kvm_sev_snp_launch_start launch_start = {
+ .policy = policy,
+ };
+
+ vm_sev_ioctl(vm, KVM_SEV_SNP_LAUNCH_START, &launch_start);
+}
+
+void snp_vm_launch_update(struct kvm_vm *vm)
+{
+ struct userspace_mem_region *region;
+ int ctr;
+
+ hash_for_each(vm->regions.slot_hash, ctr, region, slot_node)
+ encrypt_region(vm, region, KVM_SEV_SNP_PAGE_TYPE_NORMAL, true);
+
+ vm->arch.is_pt_protected = true;
+}
+
+void snp_vm_launch_finish(struct kvm_vm *vm)
+{
+ struct kvm_sev_snp_launch_finish launch_finish = { 0 };
+
+ vm_sev_ioctl(vm, KVM_SEV_SNP_LAUNCH_FINISH, &launch_finish);
+}
+
struct kvm_vm *vm_sev_create_with_one_vcpu(uint32_t type, void *guest_code,
struct kvm_vcpu **cpu)
{
@@ -145,8 +191,20 @@ struct kvm_vm *vm_sev_create_with_one_vcpu(uint32_t type, void *guest_code,
return vm;
}
-void vm_sev_launch(struct kvm_vm *vm, uint32_t policy, uint8_t *measurement)
+void vm_sev_launch(struct kvm_vm *vm, uint64_t policy, uint8_t *measurement)
{
+ if (is_sev_snp_vm(vm)) {
+ vm_enable_cap(vm, KVM_CAP_EXIT_HYPERCALL, (1 << KVM_HC_MAP_GPA_RANGE));
+
+ snp_vm_launch_start(vm, policy);
+
+ snp_vm_launch_update(vm);
+
+ snp_vm_launch_finish(vm);
+
+ return;
+ }
+
sev_vm_launch(vm, policy);
if (!measurement)
Extend the SEV library to include support for SNP ioctl() wrappers, which aid in launching and interacting with a SEV-SNP guest. Signed-off-by: Pratik R. Sampat <prsampat@amd.com> --- v6..v7: * Remove FW version macros (Sean) * Define a new type KVM_SEV_PAGE_TYPE_INVALID so that encrypt_region called using the SEV path does not have to pass a literal (Sean) * Replace assert() within snp_vm_init() to TEST_ASSERT_EQ() (Sean) * As SNP currently uses privatization and encryption of a region in tandem, remove privatize_region() and include it's functionality within encrypt_region() by adding a parameter (Sean) * Minor cleanup of code braces (Sean) --- arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/kvm.h | 1 + tools/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/kvm.h | 1 + tools/testing/selftests/kvm/include/x86/sev.h | 33 ++++++++- tools/testing/selftests/kvm/lib/x86/sev.c | 68 +++++++++++++++++-- 4 files changed, 97 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)