mbox series

[bpf-next,0/2] Add skb_adjust_room() for SK_SKB

Message ID 160109391820.6363.6475038352873960677.stgit@john-Precision-5820-Tower
Headers show
Series Add skb_adjust_room() for SK_SKB | expand

Message

John Fastabend Sept. 26, 2020, 4:26 a.m. UTC
This implements the helper skb_adjust_room() for BPF_SKS_BK_STREAM_VERDICT
programs so we can push/pop headers from the data on recieve. The
obvious use case is to pop TLS headers of kTLS packets.

The first patch implements the helper and the second updates test_sockmap
to use it removing some case handling we had to do earlier to account for
the TLS headers in the kTLS case.

I have a couple more series to flush off my stack then I'll work on
modernizing the test_sockmap tests themselves. It was created before
global data and a few other nice things so its a bit more verbose
than necessary.

Thanks,
John

---

John Fastabend (2):
      bpf, sockmap: add skb_adjust_room to pop bytes off ingress payload
      bpf, sockmap: update selftests to use skb_adjust_room


 net/core/filter.c                                  |   51 ++++++++++++++++++++
 .../selftests/bpf/progs/test_sockmap_kern.h        |   34 ++++++++++---
 tools/testing/selftests/bpf/test_sockmap.c         |   27 ++---------
 3 files changed, 82 insertions(+), 30 deletions(-)

--
Signature

Comments

Daniel Borkmann Sept. 29, 2020, 2:59 p.m. UTC | #1
On 9/26/20 6:27 AM, John Fastabend wrote:
> This implements a new helper skb_adjust_room() so users can push/pop
> extra bytes from a BPF_SK_SKB_STREAM_VERDICT program.
> 
> Some protocols may include headers and other information that we may
> not want to include when doing a redirect from a BPF_SK_SKB_STREAM_VERDICT
> program. One use case is to redirect TLS packets into a receive socket
> that doesn't expect TLS data. In TLS case the first 13B or so contain the
> protocol header. With KTLS the payload is decrypted so we should be able
> to redirect this to a receiving socket, but the receiving socket may not
> be expecting to receive a TLS header and discard the data. Using the
> above helper we can pop the header off and put an appropriate header on
> the payload. This allows for creating a proxy between protocols without
> extra hops through the stack or userspace.
> 
> So in order to fix this case add skb_adjust_room() so users can strip the
> header. After this the user can strip the header and an unmodified receiver
> thread will work correctly when data is redirected into the ingress path
> of a sock.
> 
> Signed-off-by: John Fastabend <john.fastabend@gmail.com>
> ---
>   net/core/filter.c |   51 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
>   1 file changed, 51 insertions(+)
> 
> diff --git a/net/core/filter.c b/net/core/filter.c
> index 4d8dc7a31a78..d232358f1dcd 100644
> --- a/net/core/filter.c
> +++ b/net/core/filter.c
> @@ -76,6 +76,7 @@
>   #include <net/bpf_sk_storage.h>
>   #include <net/transp_v6.h>
>   #include <linux/btf_ids.h>
> +#include <net/tls.h>
>   
>   static const struct bpf_func_proto *
>   bpf_sk_base_func_proto(enum bpf_func_id func_id);
> @@ -3218,6 +3219,53 @@ static u32 __bpf_skb_max_len(const struct sk_buff *skb)
>   			  SKB_MAX_ALLOC;
>   }
>   
> +BPF_CALL_4(sk_skb_adjust_room, struct sk_buff *, skb, s32, len_diff,
> +	   u32, mode, u64, flags)
> +{
> +	unsigned int len_diff_abs = abs(len_diff);

small nit: u32

> +	bool shrink = len_diff < 0;
> +	int ret = 0;
> +
> +	if (unlikely(flags))
> +		return -EINVAL;

Parameter 'mode' is not used here, I guess we need to reject anything non-zero?

Similarly, any interaction wrt bpf_csum_level() that was needed back then for the
bpf_skb_adjust_room()?

> +	if (unlikely(len_diff_abs > 0xfffU))
> +		return -EFAULT;
> +
> +	if (!shrink) {
> +		unsigned int grow = len_diff;

nit: u32 or just directly len_diff?

> +		ret = skb_cow(skb, grow);
> +		if (likely(!ret)) {
> +			__skb_push(skb, len_diff_abs);
> +			memset(skb->data, 0, len_diff_abs);
> +		}
> +	} else {
> +		/* skb_ensure_writable() is not needed here, as we're
> +		 * already working on an uncloned skb.
> +		 */
> +		if (unlikely(!pskb_may_pull(skb, len_diff_abs)))
> +			return -ENOMEM;
> +		__skb_pull(skb, len_diff_abs);
> +	}
> +	bpf_compute_data_end_sk_skb(skb);
> +	if (tls_sw_has_ctx_rx(skb->sk)) {
> +		struct strp_msg *rxm = strp_msg(skb);
> +
> +		rxm->full_len += len_diff;

If skb_cow() failed, we still adjust rxm->full_len?

> +	}
> +	return ret;
> +}
> +
> +static const struct bpf_func_proto sk_skb_adjust_room_proto = {
> +	.func		= sk_skb_adjust_room,
> +	.gpl_only	= false,
> +	.ret_type	= RET_INTEGER,
> +	.arg1_type	= ARG_PTR_TO_CTX,
> +	.arg2_type	= ARG_ANYTHING,
> +	.arg3_type	= ARG_ANYTHING,
> +	.arg4_type	= ARG_ANYTHING,
> +};
> +
>   BPF_CALL_4(bpf_skb_adjust_room, struct sk_buff *, skb, s32, len_diff,
>   	   u32, mode, u64, flags)
>   {
> @@ -6483,6 +6531,7 @@ bool bpf_helper_changes_pkt_data(void *func)
>   	    func == bpf_skb_change_tail ||
>   	    func == sk_skb_change_tail ||
>   	    func == bpf_skb_adjust_room ||
> +	    func == sk_skb_adjust_room ||
>   	    func == bpf_skb_pull_data ||
>   	    func == sk_skb_pull_data ||
>   	    func == bpf_clone_redirect ||
> @@ -6950,6 +6999,8 @@ sk_skb_func_proto(enum bpf_func_id func_id, const struct bpf_prog *prog)
>   		return &sk_skb_change_tail_proto;
>   	case BPF_FUNC_skb_change_head:
>   		return &sk_skb_change_head_proto;
> +	case BPF_FUNC_skb_adjust_room:
> +		return &sk_skb_adjust_room_proto;
>   	case BPF_FUNC_get_socket_cookie:
>   		return &bpf_get_socket_cookie_proto;
>   	case BPF_FUNC_get_socket_uid:
>
John Fastabend Sept. 29, 2020, 3:41 p.m. UTC | #2
Daniel Borkmann wrote:
> On 9/26/20 6:27 AM, John Fastabend wrote:
> > This implements a new helper skb_adjust_room() so users can push/pop
> > extra bytes from a BPF_SK_SKB_STREAM_VERDICT program.
> > 
> > Some protocols may include headers and other information that we may
> > not want to include when doing a redirect from a BPF_SK_SKB_STREAM_VERDICT
> > program. One use case is to redirect TLS packets into a receive socket
> > that doesn't expect TLS data. In TLS case the first 13B or so contain the
> > protocol header. With KTLS the payload is decrypted so we should be able
> > to redirect this to a receiving socket, but the receiving socket may not
> > be expecting to receive a TLS header and discard the data. Using the
> > above helper we can pop the header off and put an appropriate header on
> > the payload. This allows for creating a proxy between protocols without
> > extra hops through the stack or userspace.
> > 
> > So in order to fix this case add skb_adjust_room() so users can strip the
> > header. After this the user can strip the header and an unmodified receiver
> > thread will work correctly when data is redirected into the ingress path
> > of a sock.
> > 
> > Signed-off-by: John Fastabend <john.fastabend@gmail.com>
> > ---
> >   net/core/filter.c |   51 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
> >   1 file changed, 51 insertions(+)
> > 
> > diff --git a/net/core/filter.c b/net/core/filter.c
> > index 4d8dc7a31a78..d232358f1dcd 100644
> > --- a/net/core/filter.c
> > +++ b/net/core/filter.c
> > @@ -76,6 +76,7 @@
> >   #include <net/bpf_sk_storage.h>
> >   #include <net/transp_v6.h>
> >   #include <linux/btf_ids.h>
> > +#include <net/tls.h>
> >   
> >   static const struct bpf_func_proto *
> >   bpf_sk_base_func_proto(enum bpf_func_id func_id);
> > @@ -3218,6 +3219,53 @@ static u32 __bpf_skb_max_len(const struct sk_buff *skb)
> >   			  SKB_MAX_ALLOC;
> >   }
> >   
> > +BPF_CALL_4(sk_skb_adjust_room, struct sk_buff *, skb, s32, len_diff,
> > +	   u32, mode, u64, flags)
> > +{
> > +	unsigned int len_diff_abs = abs(len_diff);
> 
> small nit: u32

Sure.

> 
> > +	bool shrink = len_diff < 0;
> > +	int ret = 0;
> > +
> > +	if (unlikely(flags))
> > +		return -EINVAL;
> 
> Parameter 'mode' is not used here, I guess we need to reject anything non-zero?

Probably its not used.

> 
> Similarly, any interaction wrt bpf_csum_level() that was needed back then for the
> bpf_skb_adjust_room()?

I don't believe so because we are above csum checks at this point.
Either we will put the skb data in the receive_queue for the socket
or redirect it into sendpage.

> 
> > +	if (unlikely(len_diff_abs > 0xfffU))
> > +		return -EFAULT;
> > +
> > +	if (!shrink) {
> > +		unsigned int grow = len_diff;
> 
> nit: u32 or just directly len_diff?

Just use len_diff missed when I cleaned this up.

> 
> > +		ret = skb_cow(skb, grow);
> > +		if (likely(!ret)) {
> > +			__skb_push(skb, len_diff_abs);
> > +			memset(skb->data, 0, len_diff_abs);
> > +		}
> > +	} else {
> > +		/* skb_ensure_writable() is not needed here, as we're
> > +		 * already working on an uncloned skb.
> > +		 */
> > +		if (unlikely(!pskb_may_pull(skb, len_diff_abs)))
> > +			return -ENOMEM;
> > +		__skb_pull(skb, len_diff_abs);
> > +	}
> > +	bpf_compute_data_end_sk_skb(skb);
> > +	if (tls_sw_has_ctx_rx(skb->sk)) {
> > +		struct strp_msg *rxm = strp_msg(skb);
> > +
> > +		rxm->full_len += len_diff;
> 
> If skb_cow() failed, we still adjust rxm->full_len?

Thanks. Will just return above on error like in the else
branch. I'll send a v2 shortly.
Jakub Sitnicki Sept. 30, 2020, 9:55 a.m. UTC | #3
On Sat, Sep 26, 2020 at 06:27 AM CEST, John Fastabend wrote:
> This implements a new helper skb_adjust_room() so users can push/pop
> extra bytes from a BPF_SK_SKB_STREAM_VERDICT program.
>
> Some protocols may include headers and other information that we may
> not want to include when doing a redirect from a BPF_SK_SKB_STREAM_VERDICT
> program. One use case is to redirect TLS packets into a receive socket
> that doesn't expect TLS data. In TLS case the first 13B or so contain the
> protocol header. With KTLS the payload is decrypted so we should be able
> to redirect this to a receiving socket, but the receiving socket may not
> be expecting to receive a TLS header and discard the data. Using the
> above helper we can pop the header off and put an appropriate header on
> the payload. This allows for creating a proxy between protocols without
> extra hops through the stack or userspace.

This is useful stuff. Apart from the TLS use-case, you might want to pop
off proxy headers like PROXY v1/v2 (CC Marek):

  https://www.haproxy.org/download/1.8/doc/proxy-protocol.txt

>
> So in order to fix this case add skb_adjust_room() so users can strip the
> header. After this the user can strip the header and an unmodified receiver
> thread will work correctly when data is redirected into the ingress path
> of a sock.
>
> Signed-off-by: John Fastabend <john.fastabend@gmail.com>
> ---
>  net/core/filter.c |   51 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
>  1 file changed, 51 insertions(+)
>
> diff --git a/net/core/filter.c b/net/core/filter.c
> index 4d8dc7a31a78..d232358f1dcd 100644
> --- a/net/core/filter.c
> +++ b/net/core/filter.c
> @@ -76,6 +76,7 @@
>  #include <net/bpf_sk_storage.h>
>  #include <net/transp_v6.h>
>  #include <linux/btf_ids.h>
> +#include <net/tls.h>
>
>  static const struct bpf_func_proto *
>  bpf_sk_base_func_proto(enum bpf_func_id func_id);
> @@ -3218,6 +3219,53 @@ static u32 __bpf_skb_max_len(const struct sk_buff *skb)
>  			  SKB_MAX_ALLOC;
>  }
>
> +BPF_CALL_4(sk_skb_adjust_room, struct sk_buff *, skb, s32, len_diff,
> +	   u32, mode, u64, flags)
> +{
> +	unsigned int len_diff_abs = abs(len_diff);
> +	bool shrink = len_diff < 0;
> +	int ret = 0;
> +
> +	if (unlikely(flags))
> +		return -EINVAL;
> +	if (unlikely(len_diff_abs > 0xfffU))
> +		return -EFAULT;
> +
> +	if (!shrink) {
> +		unsigned int grow = len_diff;
> +
> +		ret = skb_cow(skb, grow);
> +		if (likely(!ret)) {
> +			__skb_push(skb, len_diff_abs);
> +			memset(skb->data, 0, len_diff_abs);
> +		}
> +	} else {
> +		/* skb_ensure_writable() is not needed here, as we're
> +		 * already working on an uncloned skb.
> +		 */

I'm trying to digest the above comment. What if:

static int __strp_recv(…)
{
        …
	while (eaten < orig_len) {
		/* Always clone since we will consume something */
		skb = skb_clone(orig_skb, GFP_ATOMIC);
                …
		head = strp->skb_head;
		if (!head) {
			head = skb;
                        …
		} else {
                        …
		}
                …
		/* Give skb to upper layer */
		strp->cb.rcv_msg(strp, head); // → sk_psock_init_strp
                …
	}
        …
}

That looks like a code path where we pass a cloned SKB.

> +		if (unlikely(!pskb_may_pull(skb, len_diff_abs)))
> +			return -ENOMEM;
> +		__skb_pull(skb, len_diff_abs);
> +	}
> +	bpf_compute_data_end_sk_skb(skb);
> +	if (tls_sw_has_ctx_rx(skb->sk)) {
> +		struct strp_msg *rxm = strp_msg(skb);
> +
> +		rxm->full_len += len_diff;
> +	}
> +	return ret;
> +}

[...]
John Fastabend Oct. 1, 2020, 1:59 a.m. UTC | #4
Jakub Sitnicki wrote:
> On Sat, Sep 26, 2020 at 06:27 AM CEST, John Fastabend wrote:
> > This implements a new helper skb_adjust_room() so users can push/pop
> > extra bytes from a BPF_SK_SKB_STREAM_VERDICT program.
> >
> > Some protocols may include headers and other information that we may
> > not want to include when doing a redirect from a BPF_SK_SKB_STREAM_VERDICT
> > program. One use case is to redirect TLS packets into a receive socket
> > that doesn't expect TLS data. In TLS case the first 13B or so contain the
> > protocol header. With KTLS the payload is decrypted so we should be able
> > to redirect this to a receiving socket, but the receiving socket may not
> > be expecting to receive a TLS header and discard the data. Using the
> > above helper we can pop the header off and put an appropriate header on
> > the payload. This allows for creating a proxy between protocols without
> > extra hops through the stack or userspace.
> 
> This is useful stuff. Apart from the TLS use-case, you might want to pop
> off proxy headers like PROXY v1/v2 (CC Marek):
> 
>   https://www.haproxy.org/download/1.8/doc/proxy-protocol.txt

Great!

> 
> >
> > So in order to fix this case add skb_adjust_room() so users can strip the
> > header. After this the user can strip the header and an unmodified receiver
> > thread will work correctly when data is redirected into the ingress path
> > of a sock.
> >
> > Signed-off-by: John Fastabend <john.fastabend@gmail.com>
> > ---
> >  net/core/filter.c |   51 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
> >  1 file changed, 51 insertions(+)
> >
> > diff --git a/net/core/filter.c b/net/core/filter.c
> > index 4d8dc7a31a78..d232358f1dcd 100644
> > --- a/net/core/filter.c
> > +++ b/net/core/filter.c
> > @@ -76,6 +76,7 @@
> >  #include <net/bpf_sk_storage.h>
> >  #include <net/transp_v6.h>
> >  #include <linux/btf_ids.h>
> > +#include <net/tls.h>
> >
> >  static const struct bpf_func_proto *
> >  bpf_sk_base_func_proto(enum bpf_func_id func_id);
> > @@ -3218,6 +3219,53 @@ static u32 __bpf_skb_max_len(const struct sk_buff *skb)
> >  			  SKB_MAX_ALLOC;
> >  }
> >
> > +BPF_CALL_4(sk_skb_adjust_room, struct sk_buff *, skb, s32, len_diff,
> > +	   u32, mode, u64, flags)
> > +{
> > +	unsigned int len_diff_abs = abs(len_diff);
> > +	bool shrink = len_diff < 0;
> > +	int ret = 0;
> > +
> > +	if (unlikely(flags))
> > +		return -EINVAL;
> > +	if (unlikely(len_diff_abs > 0xfffU))
> > +		return -EFAULT;
> > +
> > +	if (!shrink) {
> > +		unsigned int grow = len_diff;
> > +
> > +		ret = skb_cow(skb, grow);
> > +		if (likely(!ret)) {
> > +			__skb_push(skb, len_diff_abs);
> > +			memset(skb->data, 0, len_diff_abs);
> > +		}
> > +	} else {
> > +		/* skb_ensure_writable() is not needed here, as we're
> > +		 * already working on an uncloned skb.
> > +		 */
> 
> I'm trying to digest the above comment. What if:

I'll delete the comment its not accurate. We happily write headers
from verdict programs today. Do you have a specific concern or
just noticing I was a bit careless and cut'n'pasted an incorrect
comment around.

> 
> static int __strp_recv(…)
> {
>         …
> 	while (eaten < orig_len) {
> 		/* Always clone since we will consume something */
> 		skb = skb_clone(orig_skb, GFP_ATOMIC);
>                 …
> 		head = strp->skb_head;
> 		if (!head) {
> 			head = skb;
>                         …
> 		} else {
>                         …
> 		}
>                 …
> 		/* Give skb to upper layer */
> 		strp->cb.rcv_msg(strp, head); // → sk_psock_init_strp
>                 …
> 	}
>         …
> }
> 
> That looks like a code path where we pass a cloned SKB.

Right but its there to cover the sk_eat_skb in tcp_read_sock()
otherwise

 sk_eat_skb() -> __kfree_skb() -> skb_release_all()

would go all the way to page_frag_free().

> 
> > +		if (unlikely(!pskb_may_pull(skb, len_diff_abs)))
> > +			return -ENOMEM;
> > +		__skb_pull(skb, len_diff_abs);
> > +	}
> > +	bpf_compute_data_end_sk_skb(skb);
> > +	if (tls_sw_has_ctx_rx(skb->sk)) {
> > +		struct strp_msg *rxm = strp_msg(skb);
> > +
> > +		rxm->full_len += len_diff;
> > +	}
> > +	return ret;
> > +}
> 
> [...]