From patchwork Fri Jul 24 02:57:34 2020 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: David Gibson X-Patchwork-Id: 277511 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-6.8 required=3.0 tests=BAYES_00,DKIM_INVALID, DKIM_SIGNED, HEADER_FROM_DIFFERENT_DOMAINS, MAILING_LIST_MULTI, SPF_HELO_NONE, SPF_PASS, USER_AGENT_GIT autolearn=no autolearn_force=no version=3.4.0 Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 99968C433E0 for ; Fri, 24 Jul 2020 03:01:51 +0000 (UTC) Received: from lists.gnu.org (lists.gnu.org [209.51.188.17]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 64BF920737 for ; Fri, 24 Jul 2020 03:01:51 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: mail.kernel.org; dkim=fail reason="signature verification failed" (1024-bit key) header.d=gibson.dropbear.id.au header.i=@gibson.dropbear.id.au header.b="C5PGevUJ" DMARC-Filter: OpenDMARC Filter v1.3.2 mail.kernel.org 64BF920737 Authentication-Results: mail.kernel.org; dmarc=none (p=none dis=none) header.from=gibson.dropbear.id.au Authentication-Results: mail.kernel.org; spf=pass smtp.mailfrom=qemu-devel-bounces+qemu-devel=archiver.kernel.org@nongnu.org Received: from localhost ([::1]:57206 helo=lists1p.gnu.org) by lists.gnu.org with esmtp (Exim 4.90_1) (envelope-from ) id 1jyny2-0004WD-K1 for qemu-devel@archiver.kernel.org; Thu, 23 Jul 2020 23:01:50 -0400 Received: from eggs.gnu.org ([2001:470:142:3::10]:55424) by lists.gnu.org with esmtps (TLS1.2:ECDHE_RSA_AES_256_GCM_SHA384:256) (Exim 4.90_1) (envelope-from ) id 1jynuM-0007FY-Bc; Thu, 23 Jul 2020 22:58:02 -0400 Received: from bilbo.ozlabs.org ([203.11.71.1]:60169 helo=ozlabs.org) by eggs.gnu.org with esmtps (TLS1.2:ECDHE_RSA_AES_256_GCM_SHA384:256) (Exim 4.90_1) (envelope-from ) id 1jynuJ-00060E-AU; Thu, 23 Jul 2020 22:58:02 -0400 Received: by ozlabs.org (Postfix, from userid 1007) id 4BCYlv1BKjz9sRN; Fri, 24 Jul 2020 12:57:47 +1000 (AEST) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=gibson.dropbear.id.au; s=201602; t=1595559467; bh=g66FwVz1r6nGsK6XJ5UcsyTZuDIgWFh7d1+V/6AC+0I=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:From; b=C5PGevUJgzVOgAIu9G1YJhVIdy5YZzXT+TIXBMNYd8rze8zDPZv1/8gf29OGzcCak ATvVaZzSVokHz9AhNsJE1rtRAYtsBidm6G0Lzm0Tm4MbDJ8y+aiBC7OIzzEzqzEBN8 qbj5gC930eEbwMu5xJee3GuQS/SvIHYplFgh53EY= From: David Gibson To: dgilbert@redhat.com, frankja@linux.ibm.com, pair@us.ibm.com, qemu-devel@nongnu.org, pbonzini@redhat.com, brijesh.singh@amd.com Subject: [for-5.2 v4 00/10] Generalize memory encryption models Date: Fri, 24 Jul 2020 12:57:34 +1000 Message-Id: <20200724025744.69644-1-david@gibson.dropbear.id.au> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.26.2 MIME-Version: 1.0 Received-SPF: pass client-ip=203.11.71.1; envelope-from=dgibson@ozlabs.org; helo=ozlabs.org X-detected-operating-system: by eggs.gnu.org: First seen = 2020/07/23 22:57:48 X-ACL-Warn: Detected OS = Linux 2.2.x-3.x [generic] X-Spam_score_int: -9 X-Spam_score: -1.0 X-Spam_bar: - X-Spam_report: (-1.0 / 5.0 requ) BAYES_00=-1.9, DKIM_SIGNED=0.1, DKIM_VALID=-0.1, DKIM_VALID_AU=-0.1, HEADER_FROM_DIFFERENT_DOMAINS=1, SPF_HELO_PASS=-0.001, SPF_PASS=-0.001, URIBL_BLOCKED=0.001 autolearn=no autolearn_force=no X-Spam_action: no action X-BeenThere: qemu-devel@nongnu.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.23 Precedence: list List-Id: List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , Cc: Thomas Huth , Cornelia Huck , =?utf-8?q?Daniel_P=2E_Berrang=C3=A9?= , ehabkost@redhat.com, kvm@vger.kernel.org, "Michael S. Tsirkin" , David Hildenbrand , mdroth@linux.vnet.ibm.com, pasic@linux.ibm.com, Christian Borntraeger , qemu-s390x@nongnu.org, qemu-ppc@nongnu.org, Richard Henderson , David Gibson Errors-To: qemu-devel-bounces+qemu-devel=archiver.kernel.org@nongnu.org Sender: "Qemu-devel" A number of hardware platforms are implementing mechanisms whereby the hypervisor does not have unfettered access to guest memory, in order to mitigate the security impact of a compromised hypervisor. AMD's SEV implements this with in-cpu memory encryption, and Intel has its own memory encryption mechanism. POWER has an upcoming mechanism to accomplish this in a different way, using a new memory protection level plus a small trusted ultravisor. s390 also has a protected execution environment. The current code (committed or draft) for these features has each platform's version configured entirely differently. That doesn't seem ideal for users, or particularly for management layers. AMD SEV introduces a notionally generic machine option "machine-encryption", but it doesn't actually cover any cases other than SEV. This series is a proposal to at least partially unify configuration for these mechanisms, by renaming and generalizing AMD's "memory-encryption" property. It is replaced by a "host-trust-limitation" property pointing to a platform specific object which configures and manages the specific details. Please apply. Changes since v3: * Rebased * Added first cut at handling of s390 protected virtualization Changes since RFCv2: * Rebased * Removed preliminary SEV cleanups (they've been merged) * Changed name to "host trust limitation" * Added migration blocker to the PEF code (based on SEV's version) Changes since RFCv1: * Rebased * Fixed some errors pointed out by Dave Gilbert David Gibson (10): host trust limitation: Introduce new host trust limitation interface host trust limitation: Handle memory encryption via interface host trust limitation: Move side effect out of machine_set_memory_encryption() host trust limitation: Rework the "memory-encryption" property host trust limitation: Decouple kvm_memcrypt_*() helpers from KVM host trust limitation: Add Error ** to HostTrustLimitation::kvm_init spapr: Add PEF based host trust limitation spapr: PEF: block migration host trust limitation: Alter virtio default properties for protected guests s390: Recognize host-trust-limitation option accel/kvm/kvm-all.c | 40 ++------ accel/kvm/sev-stub.c | 7 +- accel/stubs/kvm-stub.c | 10 -- backends/Makefile.objs | 2 + backends/host-trust-limitation.c | 29 ++++++ hw/core/machine.c | 61 +++++++++-- hw/i386/pc_sysfw.c | 6 +- hw/s390x/pv.c | 61 +++++++++++ include/exec/host-trust-limitation.h | 72 +++++++++++++ include/hw/boards.h | 2 +- include/qemu/typedefs.h | 1 + include/sysemu/kvm.h | 17 --- include/sysemu/sev.h | 4 +- target/i386/sev.c | 148 ++++++++++++--------------- target/ppc/Makefile.objs | 2 +- target/ppc/pef.c | 89 ++++++++++++++++ 16 files changed, 387 insertions(+), 164 deletions(-) create mode 100644 backends/host-trust-limitation.c create mode 100644 include/exec/host-trust-limitation.h create mode 100644 target/ppc/pef.c -- 2.26.2