From patchwork Tue Mar 17 10:55:14 2020 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Greg Kroah-Hartman X-Patchwork-Id: 229225 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-6.8 required=3.0 tests=DKIMWL_WL_HIGH, DKIM_SIGNED, DKIM_VALID, HEADER_FROM_DIFFERENT_DOMAINS, MAILING_LIST_MULTI, SIGNED_OFF_BY, SPF_HELO_NONE,SPF_PASS,USER_AGENT_GIT autolearn=unavailable autolearn_force=no version=3.4.0 Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 10BA1C2BB1D for ; Tue, 17 Mar 2020 11:19:21 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [209.132.180.67]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id D0FFF2051A for ; Tue, 17 Mar 2020 11:19:20 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=kernel.org; s=default; t=1584443960; bh=5QJOn0BGZeqjo1WWc33zP/NAQjl4vPPkzkv1rjbDqwo=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References:List-ID:From; b=y8mcd40yisrVtms1PWppmovZr9FuHmuStNXgHrFMr4jLU67/+oamTX/R+V3dQ/iQb bqjiF1VEYvIICKbAqa0qjH8CgYLXH+StYV7Rreli3kjVgT2UOS6CF735Zzd8eeP1qP L5hl1mSxYaOuBrB+BA4ZpTtsx6+H52DPUbbiXCn4= Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1727455AbgCQLTQ (ORCPT ); Tue, 17 Mar 2020 07:19:16 -0400 Received: from mail.kernel.org ([198.145.29.99]:44818 "EHLO mail.kernel.org" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1727225AbgCQLEd (ORCPT ); Tue, 17 Mar 2020 07:04:33 -0400 Received: from localhost (83-86-89-107.cable.dynamic.v4.ziggo.nl [83.86.89.107]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 33A3220752; Tue, 17 Mar 2020 11:04:32 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=kernel.org; s=default; t=1584443072; bh=5QJOn0BGZeqjo1WWc33zP/NAQjl4vPPkzkv1rjbDqwo=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References:From; b=1GzjeoH99e4V9h/3ZNhmE+INlH8+qLH9iyXze0x0kSPTz6XuShBNsoti7RWnCrq3/ o2xsI08N77poC9CSr6UrQubLWG1UHe02zTXfX+AvewCmW3T8a/5psTsrny5L5YPy8t cu6f1/IPs9cbKT/BdLD9t8oG5z6TCLaszXJ+80u8= From: Greg Kroah-Hartman To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman , stable@vger.kernel.org, Vladis Dronov , Ard Biesheuvel , Ingo Molnar , Bob Sanders Subject: [PATCH 5.4 087/123] efi: Fix a race and a buffer overflow while reading efivars via sysfs Date: Tue, 17 Mar 2020 11:55:14 +0100 Message-Id: <20200317103316.676814868@linuxfoundation.org> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.25.1 In-Reply-To: <20200317103307.343627747@linuxfoundation.org> References: <20200317103307.343627747@linuxfoundation.org> User-Agent: quilt/0.66 MIME-Version: 1.0 Sender: stable-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: stable@vger.kernel.org From: Vladis Dronov commit 286d3250c9d6437340203fb64938bea344729a0e upstream. There is a race and a buffer overflow corrupting a kernel memory while reading an EFI variable with a size more than 1024 bytes via the older sysfs method. This happens because accessing struct efi_variable in efivar_{attr,size,data}_read() and friends is not protected from a concurrent access leading to a kernel memory corruption and, at best, to a crash. The race scenario is the following: CPU0: CPU1: efivar_attr_read() var->DataSize = 1024; efivar_entry_get(... &var->DataSize) down_interruptible(&efivars_lock) efivar_attr_read() // same EFI var var->DataSize = 1024; efivar_entry_get(... &var->DataSize) down_interruptible(&efivars_lock) virt_efi_get_variable() // returns EFI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL but // var->DataSize is set to a real // var size more than 1024 bytes up(&efivars_lock) virt_efi_get_variable() // called with var->DataSize set // to a real var size, returns // successfully and overwrites // a 1024-bytes kernel buffer up(&efivars_lock) This can be reproduced by concurrent reading of an EFI variable which size is more than 1024 bytes: ts# for cpu in $(seq 0 $(nproc --ignore=1)); do ( taskset -c $cpu \ cat /sys/firmware/efi/vars/KEKDefault*/size & ) ; done Fix this by using a local variable for a var's data buffer size so it does not get overwritten. Fixes: e14ab23dde12b80d ("efivars: efivar_entry API") Reported-by: Bob Sanders and the LTP testsuite Signed-off-by: Vladis Dronov Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar Cc: Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200305084041.24053-2-vdronov@redhat.com Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200308080859.21568-24-ardb@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/firmware/efi/efivars.c | 29 ++++++++++++++++++++--------- 1 file changed, 20 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-) --- a/drivers/firmware/efi/efivars.c +++ b/drivers/firmware/efi/efivars.c @@ -83,13 +83,16 @@ static ssize_t efivar_attr_read(struct efivar_entry *entry, char *buf) { struct efi_variable *var = &entry->var; + unsigned long size = sizeof(var->Data); char *str = buf; + int ret; if (!entry || !buf) return -EINVAL; - var->DataSize = 1024; - if (efivar_entry_get(entry, &var->Attributes, &var->DataSize, var->Data)) + ret = efivar_entry_get(entry, &var->Attributes, &size, var->Data); + var->DataSize = size; + if (ret) return -EIO; if (var->Attributes & EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE) @@ -116,13 +119,16 @@ static ssize_t efivar_size_read(struct efivar_entry *entry, char *buf) { struct efi_variable *var = &entry->var; + unsigned long size = sizeof(var->Data); char *str = buf; + int ret; if (!entry || !buf) return -EINVAL; - var->DataSize = 1024; - if (efivar_entry_get(entry, &var->Attributes, &var->DataSize, var->Data)) + ret = efivar_entry_get(entry, &var->Attributes, &size, var->Data); + var->DataSize = size; + if (ret) return -EIO; str += sprintf(str, "0x%lx\n", var->DataSize); @@ -133,12 +139,15 @@ static ssize_t efivar_data_read(struct efivar_entry *entry, char *buf) { struct efi_variable *var = &entry->var; + unsigned long size = sizeof(var->Data); + int ret; if (!entry || !buf) return -EINVAL; - var->DataSize = 1024; - if (efivar_entry_get(entry, &var->Attributes, &var->DataSize, var->Data)) + ret = efivar_entry_get(entry, &var->Attributes, &size, var->Data); + var->DataSize = size; + if (ret) return -EIO; memcpy(buf, var->Data, var->DataSize); @@ -250,14 +259,16 @@ efivar_show_raw(struct efivar_entry *ent { struct efi_variable *var = &entry->var; struct compat_efi_variable *compat; + unsigned long datasize = sizeof(var->Data); size_t size; + int ret; if (!entry || !buf) return 0; - var->DataSize = 1024; - if (efivar_entry_get(entry, &entry->var.Attributes, - &entry->var.DataSize, entry->var.Data)) + ret = efivar_entry_get(entry, &var->Attributes, &datasize, var->Data); + var->DataSize = datasize; + if (ret) return -EIO; if (in_compat_syscall()) {