From patchwork Mon Aug 17 15:13:14 2020 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Greg Kroah-Hartman X-Patchwork-Id: 265968 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-12.8 required=3.0 tests=BAYES_00,DKIMWL_WL_HIGH, DKIM_SIGNED, DKIM_VALID, HEADER_FROM_DIFFERENT_DOMAINS, INCLUDES_PATCH, MAILING_LIST_MULTI, SIGNED_OFF_BY, SPF_HELO_NONE, SPF_PASS, USER_AGENT_GIT autolearn=unavailable autolearn_force=no version=3.4.0 Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id B68A2C433E1 for ; Mon, 17 Aug 2020 19:35:54 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 9A48720674 for ; Mon, 17 Aug 2020 19:35:54 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=kernel.org; s=default; t=1597692954; bh=TPvivIz/oPvaS6bc4/Rp6tbbh1/uQX/iceHJri6MASg=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References:List-ID:From; b=clcN2Mfm4RNId/W5ZgbKswU1bH5i2NAvDppPnu9qrigg7NqylBqwGwUWHApNZHvns bSAWrGFD3I6ne+C+vt/ui4obuA0oXr4OPO63jB0MEd3ezXLFth2c3Kfn2rSvyh82Du LqI1p2gOvHDWa4Wgb+iO7futiA5Jgj8goSCLmaNk= Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1729425AbgHQTfX (ORCPT ); Mon, 17 Aug 2020 15:35:23 -0400 Received: from mail.kernel.org ([198.145.29.99]:48130 "EHLO mail.kernel.org" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1729789AbgHQP32 (ORCPT ); Mon, 17 Aug 2020 11:29:28 -0400 Received: from localhost (83-86-89-107.cable.dynamic.v4.ziggo.nl [83.86.89.107]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id EEFCE23B85; Mon, 17 Aug 2020 15:29:27 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=kernel.org; s=default; t=1597678168; bh=TPvivIz/oPvaS6bc4/Rp6tbbh1/uQX/iceHJri6MASg=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References:From; b=ebRcccuH/xT+emtZE7Yx2Kteecpe7ijdy2uDjYzm+VgRQ7rdx/LjSx3IvDUKdVgav XoyjJU5jUSEJARvhz7gtrrpOlqCd63Q8FC3X2FRn3yoeOsr1gqx1CaKQc013ECI5wp PrPUnJQaXD9RUp9GHX0GDOFCgRIoePGNP8Iljvi0= From: Greg Kroah-Hartman To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman , stable@vger.kernel.org, Tyler Hicks , Mimi Zohar , Sasha Levin Subject: [PATCH 5.8 241/464] ima: Free the entire rule if it fails to parse Date: Mon, 17 Aug 2020 17:13:14 +0200 Message-Id: <20200817143845.340769278@linuxfoundation.org> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.28.0 In-Reply-To: <20200817143833.737102804@linuxfoundation.org> References: <20200817143833.737102804@linuxfoundation.org> User-Agent: quilt/0.66 MIME-Version: 1.0 Sender: stable-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: stable@vger.kernel.org From: Tyler Hicks [ Upstream commit 2bdd737c5687d6dec30e205953146ede8a87dbdd ] Use ima_free_rule() to fix memory leaks of allocated ima_rule_entry members, such as .fsname and .keyrings, when an error is encountered during rule parsing. Set the args_p pointer to NULL after freeing it in the error path of ima_lsm_rule_init() so that it isn't freed twice. This fixes a memory leak seen when loading an rule that contains an additional piece of allocated memory, such as an fsname, followed by an invalid conditional: # echo "measure fsname=tmpfs bad=cond" > /sys/kernel/security/ima/policy -bash: echo: write error: Invalid argument # echo scan > /sys/kernel/debug/kmemleak # cat /sys/kernel/debug/kmemleak unreferenced object 0xffff98e7e4ece6c0 (size 8): comm "bash", pid 672, jiffies 4294791843 (age 21.855s) hex dump (first 8 bytes): 74 6d 70 66 73 00 6b a5 tmpfs.k. backtrace: [<00000000abab7413>] kstrdup+0x2e/0x60 [<00000000f11ede32>] ima_parse_add_rule+0x7d4/0x1020 [<00000000f883dd7a>] ima_write_policy+0xab/0x1d0 [<00000000b17cf753>] vfs_write+0xde/0x1d0 [<00000000b8ddfdea>] ksys_write+0x68/0xe0 [<00000000b8e21e87>] do_syscall_64+0x56/0xa0 [<0000000089ea7b98>] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9 Fixes: f1b08bbcbdaf ("ima: define a new policy condition based on the filesystem name") Fixes: 2b60c0ecedf8 ("IMA: Read keyrings= option from the IMA policy") Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c | 3 ++- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c index 641582230861c..18271920d315d 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c @@ -913,6 +913,7 @@ static int ima_lsm_rule_init(struct ima_rule_entry *entry, if (ima_rules == &ima_default_rules) { kfree(entry->lsm[lsm_rule].args_p); + entry->lsm[lsm_rule].args_p = NULL; result = -EINVAL; } else result = 0; @@ -1404,7 +1405,7 @@ ssize_t ima_parse_add_rule(char *rule) result = ima_parse_rule(p, entry); if (result) { - kfree(entry); + ima_free_rule(entry); integrity_audit_msg(AUDIT_INTEGRITY_STATUS, NULL, NULL, op, "invalid-policy", result, audit_info);