From patchwork Tue Sep 8 15:24:21 2020 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Greg Kroah-Hartman X-Patchwork-Id: 264342 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-12.8 required=3.0 tests=BAYES_00,DKIMWL_WL_HIGH, DKIM_SIGNED, DKIM_VALID, HEADER_FROM_DIFFERENT_DOMAINS, INCLUDES_PATCH, MAILING_LIST_MULTI, SIGNED_OFF_BY, SPF_HELO_NONE, SPF_PASS, URIBL_BLOCKED, USER_AGENT_GIT autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no version=3.4.0 Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id C0003C43461 for ; Tue, 8 Sep 2020 16:11:10 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 73E7F2078B for ; Tue, 8 Sep 2020 16:11:10 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=kernel.org; s=default; t=1599581470; bh=RazqLH9uDWL+hfSipxTzeDHvS/5XJ6j9dFUUdoFDnB8=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References:List-ID:From; b=mTpThCW2F7lKNQ9Q4UkkCtHZdl2PVj82uHjJlMxWEVWsBoAC38fztm5xkAvRV7poJ u01jiQF/0cBM6X+bah6mFh6JGwSn/OohkeoXzSPgaukyykRfMEd+fVmX2nfUqZuZ60 atGHVzLwV2Vo3UljG9P3JPga53ukBT5HHqXXF2kg= Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1731461AbgIHQLI (ORCPT ); Tue, 8 Sep 2020 12:11:08 -0400 Received: from mail.kernel.org ([198.145.29.99]:55394 "EHLO mail.kernel.org" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1731420AbgIHQK3 (ORCPT ); Tue, 8 Sep 2020 12:10:29 -0400 Received: from localhost (83-86-74-64.cable.dynamic.v4.ziggo.nl [83.86.74.64]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 2A7C1247D9; Tue, 8 Sep 2020 15:42:31 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=kernel.org; s=default; t=1599579751; bh=RazqLH9uDWL+hfSipxTzeDHvS/5XJ6j9dFUUdoFDnB8=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References:From; b=Je56071eBScf76zl4Z3elK4MG5rz0gBw52sL6bFdYZQt9lB4lFsg07+1GrA8yzqn7 1Hcot/vbmbQ9/vR+7wwdLqzONzq7MaWu0cy4Ms8s7kuvBkdRsFBW/V6Eu05yGVmDiF B04qbk5WtVen8DIoy6jcUTlVOm0xZ1Pn01EKXDUU= From: Greg Kroah-Hartman To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman , stable@vger.kernel.org, Simon Leiner , Stefano Stabellini , Juergen Gross , Sasha Levin Subject: [PATCH 5.4 020/129] xen/xenbus: Fix granting of vmallocd memory Date: Tue, 8 Sep 2020 17:24:21 +0200 Message-Id: <20200908152230.714475270@linuxfoundation.org> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.28.0 In-Reply-To: <20200908152229.689878733@linuxfoundation.org> References: <20200908152229.689878733@linuxfoundation.org> User-Agent: quilt/0.66 MIME-Version: 1.0 Sender: stable-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: stable@vger.kernel.org From: Simon Leiner [ Upstream commit d742db70033c745e410523e00522ee0cfe2aa416 ] On some architectures (like ARM), virt_to_gfn cannot be used for vmalloc'd memory because of its reliance on virt_to_phys. This patch introduces a check for vmalloc'd addresses and obtains the PFN using vmalloc_to_pfn in that case. Signed-off-by: Simon Leiner Reviewed-by: Stefano Stabellini Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200825093153.35500-1-simon@leiner.me Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- drivers/xen/xenbus/xenbus_client.c | 10 ++++++++-- 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/xen/xenbus/xenbus_client.c b/drivers/xen/xenbus/xenbus_client.c index a38292ef79f6d..f38bdaea0ef11 100644 --- a/drivers/xen/xenbus/xenbus_client.c +++ b/drivers/xen/xenbus/xenbus_client.c @@ -363,8 +363,14 @@ int xenbus_grant_ring(struct xenbus_device *dev, void *vaddr, int i, j; for (i = 0; i < nr_pages; i++) { - err = gnttab_grant_foreign_access(dev->otherend_id, - virt_to_gfn(vaddr), 0); + unsigned long gfn; + + if (is_vmalloc_addr(vaddr)) + gfn = pfn_to_gfn(vmalloc_to_pfn(vaddr)); + else + gfn = virt_to_gfn(vaddr); + + err = gnttab_grant_foreign_access(dev->otherend_id, gfn, 0); if (err < 0) { xenbus_dev_fatal(dev, err, "granting access to ring page");