From patchwork Fri Sep 11 12:45:51 2020 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Greg Kroah-Hartman X-Patchwork-Id: 309848 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-12.8 required=3.0 tests=BAYES_00,DKIMWL_WL_HIGH, DKIM_SIGNED, DKIM_VALID, HEADER_FROM_DIFFERENT_DOMAINS, INCLUDES_PATCH, MAILING_LIST_MULTI, SIGNED_OFF_BY, SPF_HELO_NONE, SPF_PASS, URIBL_BLOCKED, USER_AGENT_GIT autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no version=3.4.0 Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 5C6DBC43461 for ; Fri, 11 Sep 2020 12:56:34 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id E889E2222C for ; Fri, 11 Sep 2020 12:56:33 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=kernel.org; s=default; t=1599828994; bh=+FACLGKqlSwMrilGYEKodDj+1GCcMCrZAibjV4DcC8U=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References:List-ID:From; b=HHjI8dQuk+8/NEJNbNMrc5nttsaZjTx3w75+WcEtwth2AD5aTWbdzSPDCnPxpQR7i 0e5Karswz2fSc1f2O2w0WE2LMj61lmGV3NAPQn+yf6+8uJxBIYY7pXnh193WlDb3fs cdpPVQYZk+EwnOxnp4/1dWTHA+EZ7QxASO9W5K88= Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1725949AbgIKM42 (ORCPT ); Fri, 11 Sep 2020 08:56:28 -0400 Received: from mail.kernel.org ([198.145.29.99]:49206 "EHLO mail.kernel.org" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1725980AbgIKMy4 (ORCPT ); Fri, 11 Sep 2020 08:54:56 -0400 Received: from localhost (83-86-74-64.cable.dynamic.v4.ziggo.nl [83.86.74.64]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id AA38F22229; Fri, 11 Sep 2020 12:54:01 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=kernel.org; s=default; t=1599828842; bh=+FACLGKqlSwMrilGYEKodDj+1GCcMCrZAibjV4DcC8U=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References:From; b=BwQl0wOOmtG7L8o82R9Y56Cq5vTqBFV4eyQk/0KYarXUghAiqe6Yxj1o7igqRYjVH RTVVmMJJ3o5P9b+fR9SzLCjz9s/QmFvlptNbG4x3EVz/c58i4X8X6IVZxQS8ovlAMB TO8TM/se3D+T55SKUBFQGc7AwQzvoABnLxor1efI= From: Greg Kroah-Hartman To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman , stable@vger.kernel.org, Simon Leiner , Stefano Stabellini , Juergen Gross , Sasha Levin Subject: [PATCH 4.4 08/62] xen/xenbus: Fix granting of vmallocd memory Date: Fri, 11 Sep 2020 14:45:51 +0200 Message-Id: <20200911122502.815647141@linuxfoundation.org> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.28.0 In-Reply-To: <20200911122502.395450276@linuxfoundation.org> References: <20200911122502.395450276@linuxfoundation.org> User-Agent: quilt/0.66 MIME-Version: 1.0 Sender: stable-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: stable@vger.kernel.org From: Simon Leiner [ Upstream commit d742db70033c745e410523e00522ee0cfe2aa416 ] On some architectures (like ARM), virt_to_gfn cannot be used for vmalloc'd memory because of its reliance on virt_to_phys. This patch introduces a check for vmalloc'd addresses and obtains the PFN using vmalloc_to_pfn in that case. Signed-off-by: Simon Leiner Reviewed-by: Stefano Stabellini Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200825093153.35500-1-simon@leiner.me Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- drivers/xen/xenbus/xenbus_client.c | 10 ++++++++-- 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/xen/xenbus/xenbus_client.c b/drivers/xen/xenbus/xenbus_client.c index df27cefb2fa35..266f446ba331c 100644 --- a/drivers/xen/xenbus/xenbus_client.c +++ b/drivers/xen/xenbus/xenbus_client.c @@ -384,8 +384,14 @@ int xenbus_grant_ring(struct xenbus_device *dev, void *vaddr, int i, j; for (i = 0; i < nr_pages; i++) { - err = gnttab_grant_foreign_access(dev->otherend_id, - virt_to_gfn(vaddr), 0); + unsigned long gfn; + + if (is_vmalloc_addr(vaddr)) + gfn = pfn_to_gfn(vmalloc_to_pfn(vaddr)); + else + gfn = virt_to_gfn(vaddr); + + err = gnttab_grant_foreign_access(dev->otherend_id, gfn, 0); if (err < 0) { xenbus_dev_fatal(dev, err, "granting access to ring page");