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[81.169.180.215]) by mx.google.com with ESMTP id x24si4280867eda.255.2018.01.12.04.46.17; Fri, 12 Jan 2018 04:46:18 -0800 (PST) Received-SPF: pass (google.com: best guess record for domain of u-boot-bounces@lists.denx.de designates 81.169.180.215 as permitted sender) client-ip=81.169.180.215; Authentication-Results: mx.google.com; dkim=neutral (body hash did not verify) header.i=@linaro.org header.s=google header.b=HuCBkgTE; spf=pass (google.com: best guess record for domain of u-boot-bounces@lists.denx.de designates 81.169.180.215 as permitted sender) smtp.mailfrom=u-boot-bounces@lists.denx.de; dmarc=fail (p=NONE sp=NONE dis=NONE) header.from=linaro.org Received: by lists.denx.de (Postfix, from userid 105) id D2499C2218A; Fri, 12 Jan 2018 12:41:28 +0000 (UTC) X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on lists.denx.de X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-0.0 required=5.0 tests=RCVD_IN_MSPIKE_H3, RCVD_IN_MSPIKE_WL, T_DKIM_INVALID autolearn=unavailable autolearn_force=no version=3.4.0 Received: from lists.denx.de (localhost [IPv6:::1]) by lists.denx.de (Postfix) with ESMTP id 940A5C22193; Fri, 12 Jan 2018 12:40:44 +0000 (UTC) Received: by lists.denx.de (Postfix, from userid 105) id BC292C220AD; Fri, 12 Jan 2018 12:40:35 +0000 (UTC) Received: from mail-wm0-f65.google.com (mail-wm0-f65.google.com [74.125.82.65]) by lists.denx.de (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 1DE89C221B4 for ; Fri, 12 Jan 2018 12:40:32 +0000 (UTC) Received: by mail-wm0-f65.google.com with SMTP id b141so11924866wme.1 for ; Fri, 12 Jan 2018 04:40:32 -0800 (PST) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=linaro.org; s=google; h=from:to:cc:subject:date:message-id:in-reply-to:references; bh=NOCUakZU8t+N7T8VxDTqhLdZFoegBr2wX3EpOjYPFUE=; b=HuCBkgTELjsKt/ea8cj9j2Tyk8fSO9bzg62AHC7SQWg3gY1siPS8R9SYU9+b0JZbRZ zcbXO4x4R7U4hfvh1guQR0P0ztlc+r8SdOz7vpe1S95HVnAs5akx/GeJHQDkayRW0OAw FhduOTvOCJW2l9B7AdMsXczbuuDgdDsUsCpYw= X-Google-DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=1e100.net; s=20161025; h=x-gm-message-state:from:to:cc:subject:date:message-id:in-reply-to :references; bh=NOCUakZU8t+N7T8VxDTqhLdZFoegBr2wX3EpOjYPFUE=; b=Ce8YHut+6FwwekzLDFionDtrE1JbpKcrOjs9b+JgxsGAGTUT72ElpIG+EFsQAIRp0E k+AMFvM4Wvk7cFzBA5m7bcrkSS5hY6nkqbcgEMdpMyfBEnsIbR1sTokJ8yVUV3a9bRJC uDdjTiHBTo1STzUOXbUY1VeZh4hLG68FSWDHkVZiO/U6/XyUXsKV5ZhQYReL606GEc9v /y/h0Xd9SCOLusIyvnBHuue8bauo0nkdNUa0vAbil8IOOIdsasb6ZNg1aV1094QXtlad vc7WzsEiJgeDIsooOJofCw2I38hKHvukbEHiFrPxUjrNFEnP3kflXLjJRHvtzAIEhNbC rM5A== X-Gm-Message-State: AKwxytdxiGVv6kUzSDeWnej9UVLS3zsL5D6vgHat0GlFUZFBESW1kuBw Bblx3PxzImehdEUmLDmUSMi/R9+ipBY= X-Received: by 10.80.135.205 with SMTP id 13mr6821828edz.253.1515760831369; Fri, 12 Jan 2018 04:40:31 -0800 (PST) Received: from localhost.localdomain ([109.255.42.2]) by smtp.gmail.com with ESMTPSA id w2sm13893585edb.4.2018.01.12.04.40.29 (version=TLS1_2 cipher=ECDHE-RSA-AES128-SHA bits=128/128); Fri, 12 Jan 2018 04:40:30 -0800 (PST) From: Bryan O'Donoghue To: u-boot@lists.denx.de, brenomatheus@gmail.com Date: Fri, 12 Jan 2018 12:40:01 +0000 Message-Id: <1515760819-15116-8-git-send-email-bryan.odonoghue@linaro.org> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.7.4 In-Reply-To: <1515760819-15116-1-git-send-email-bryan.odonoghue@linaro.org> References: <1515760819-15116-1-git-send-email-bryan.odonoghue@linaro.org> Cc: Fabio Estevam Subject: [U-Boot] [PATCH v6 07/25] arm: imx: hab: Fix authenticate_image input parameters X-BeenThere: u-boot@lists.denx.de X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.18 Precedence: list List-Id: U-Boot discussion List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , MIME-Version: 1.0 Errors-To: u-boot-bounces@lists.denx.de Sender: "U-Boot" u-boot command "hab_auth_img" tells a user that it takes - addr - image hex address - offset - hex offset of IVT in the image but in fact the callback hab_auth_img makes to authenticate_image treats the second 'offset' parameter as an image length. Furthermore existing code requires the IVT header to be appended to the end of the image which is not actually a requirement of HABv4. This patch fixes this situation by 1: Adding a new parameter to hab_auth_img - addr : image hex address - length : total length of the image - offset : offset of IVT from addr 2: Updates the existing call into authenticate_image() in arch/arm/mach-imx/spl.c:jump_to_image_no_args() to pass addr, length and IVT offset respectively. This allows then hab_auth_img to actually operate the way it was specified in the help text and should still allow existing code to work. It has the added advantage that the IVT header doesn't have to be appended to an image given to HAB - it can be prepended for example. Note prepending the IVT is what u-boot will do when making an IVT for the BootROM. It should be possible for u-boot properly authenticate images made by mkimage via HAB. This patch is the first step in making that happen subsequent patches will focus on removing hard-coded offsets to the IVT, which again is not mandated to live at the end of a .imx image. Signed-off-by: Bryan O'Donoghue Cc: Stefano Babic Cc: Fabio Estevam Cc: Peng Fan Cc: Albert Aribaud Cc: Sven Ebenfeld Cc: George McCollister Cc: Breno Matheus Lima Tested-by: Breno Lima Reviewed-by: Fabio Estevam --- arch/arm/include/asm/mach-imx/hab.h | 3 +- arch/arm/mach-imx/hab.c | 73 +++++++++++-------------------------- arch/arm/mach-imx/spl.c | 35 +++++++++++++++++- 3 files changed, 57 insertions(+), 54 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/arm/include/asm/mach-imx/hab.h b/arch/arm/include/asm/mach-imx/hab.h index 91dda42..b2a8031 100644 --- a/arch/arm/include/asm/mach-imx/hab.h +++ b/arch/arm/include/asm/mach-imx/hab.h @@ -148,6 +148,7 @@ typedef void hapi_clock_init_t(void); /* ----------- end of HAB API updates ------------*/ -int authenticate_image(uint32_t ddr_start, uint32_t image_size); +int authenticate_image(uint32_t ddr_start, uint32_t image_size, + uint32_t ivt_offset); #endif diff --git a/arch/arm/mach-imx/hab.c b/arch/arm/mach-imx/hab.c index 039a017..2a40d06 100644 --- a/arch/arm/mach-imx/hab.c +++ b/arch/arm/mach-imx/hab.c @@ -78,37 +78,6 @@ (is_soc_type(MXC_SOC_MX7ULP) ? 0x80000000 : \ (is_soc_type(MXC_SOC_MX7) ? 0x2000000 : 0x2)) -/* - * +------------+ 0x0 (DDR_UIMAGE_START) - - * | Header | | - * +------------+ 0x40 | - * | | | - * | | | - * | | | - * | | | - * | Image Data | | - * . | | - * . | > Stuff to be authenticated ----+ - * . | | | - * | | | | - * | | | | - * +------------+ | | - * | | | | - * | Fill Data | | | - * | | | | - * +------------+ Align to ALIGN_SIZE | | - * | IVT | | | - * +------------+ + IVT_SIZE - | - * | | | - * | CSF DATA | <---------------------------------------------------------+ - * | | - * +------------+ - * | | - * | Fill Data | - * | | - * +------------+ + CSF_PAD_SIZE - */ - static bool is_hab_enabled(void); #if !defined(CONFIG_SPL_BUILD) @@ -361,20 +330,22 @@ int do_hab_status(cmd_tbl_t *cmdtp, int flag, int argc, char * const argv[]) static int do_authenticate_image(cmd_tbl_t *cmdtp, int flag, int argc, char * const argv[]) { - ulong addr, ivt_offset; + ulong addr, length, ivt_offset; int rcode = 0; - if (argc < 3) + if (argc < 4) return CMD_RET_USAGE; addr = simple_strtoul(argv[1], NULL, 16); - ivt_offset = simple_strtoul(argv[2], NULL, 16); + length = simple_strtoul(argv[2], NULL, 16); + ivt_offset = simple_strtoul(argv[3], NULL, 16); - rcode = authenticate_image(addr, ivt_offset); + rcode = authenticate_image(addr, length, ivt_offset); if (rcode == 0) rcode = CMD_RET_SUCCESS; else rcode = CMD_RET_FAILURE; + return rcode; } @@ -385,10 +356,11 @@ U_BOOT_CMD( ); U_BOOT_CMD( - hab_auth_img, 3, 0, do_authenticate_image, + hab_auth_img, 4, 0, do_authenticate_image, "authenticate image via HAB", - "addr ivt_offset\n" + "addr length ivt_offset\n" "addr - image hex address\n" + "length - image hex length\n" "ivt_offset - hex offset of IVT in the image" ); @@ -411,11 +383,12 @@ static bool is_hab_enabled(void) return (reg & IS_HAB_ENABLED_BIT) == IS_HAB_ENABLED_BIT; } -int authenticate_image(uint32_t ddr_start, uint32_t image_size) +int authenticate_image(uint32_t ddr_start, uint32_t image_size, + uint32_t ivt_offset) { uint32_t load_addr = 0; size_t bytes; - ptrdiff_t ivt_offset = 0; + uint32_t ivt_addr = 0; int result = 1; ulong start; hab_rvt_authenticate_image_t *hab_rvt_authenticate_image; @@ -441,24 +414,18 @@ int authenticate_image(uint32_t ddr_start, uint32_t image_size) goto hab_caam_clock_disable; } - /* If not already aligned, Align to ALIGN_SIZE */ - ivt_offset = (image_size + ALIGN_SIZE - 1) & - ~(ALIGN_SIZE - 1); - + /* Calculate IVT address header */ + ivt_addr = ddr_start + ivt_offset; start = ddr_start; - bytes = ivt_offset + IVT_SIZE + CSF_PAD_SIZE; + bytes = image_size; #ifdef DEBUG - printf("\nivt_offset = 0x%x, ivt addr = 0x%x\n", - ivt_offset, ddr_start + ivt_offset); + printf("\nivt_offset = 0x%x, ivt addr = 0x%x\n", ivt_offset, ivt_addr); puts("Dumping IVT\n"); - print_buffer(ddr_start + ivt_offset, - (void *)(ddr_start + ivt_offset), - 4, 0x8, 0); + print_buffer(ivt_addr, (void *)(ivt_addr), 4, 0x8, 0); puts("Dumping CSF Header\n"); - print_buffer(ddr_start + ivt_offset + IVT_SIZE, - (void *)(ddr_start + ivt_offset + IVT_SIZE), - 4, 0x10, 0); + print_buffer(ivt_addr + IVT_SIZE, (void *)(ivt_addr + IVT_SIZE), 4, + 0x10, 0); #if !defined(CONFIG_SPL_BUILD) get_hab_status(); @@ -468,6 +435,8 @@ int authenticate_image(uint32_t ddr_start, uint32_t image_size) printf("\tivt_offset = 0x%x\n", ivt_offset); printf("\tstart = 0x%08lx\n", start); printf("\tbytes = 0x%x\n", bytes); +#else + (void)ivt_addr; #endif /* * If the MMU is enabled, we have to notify the ROM diff --git a/arch/arm/mach-imx/spl.c b/arch/arm/mach-imx/spl.c index 6e930b3..e5d0c35 100644 --- a/arch/arm/mach-imx/spl.c +++ b/arch/arm/mach-imx/spl.c @@ -152,9 +152,41 @@ u32 spl_boot_mode(const u32 boot_device) #if defined(CONFIG_SECURE_BOOT) +/* + * +------------+ 0x0 (DDR_UIMAGE_START) - + * | Header | | + * +------------+ 0x40 | + * | | | + * | | | + * | | | + * | | | + * | Image Data | | + * . | | + * . | > Stuff to be authenticated ----+ + * . | | | + * | | | | + * | | | | + * +------------+ | | + * | | | | + * | Fill Data | | | + * | | | | + * +------------+ Align to ALIGN_SIZE | | + * | IVT | | | + * +------------+ + IVT_SIZE - | + * | | | + * | CSF DATA | <---------------------------------------------------------+ + * | | + * +------------+ + * | | + * | Fill Data | + * | | + * +------------+ + CSF_PAD_SIZE + */ + __weak void __noreturn jump_to_image_no_args(struct spl_image_info *spl_image) { typedef void __noreturn (*image_entry_noargs_t)(void); + uint32_t offset; image_entry_noargs_t image_entry = (image_entry_noargs_t)(unsigned long)spl_image->entry_point; @@ -163,8 +195,9 @@ __weak void __noreturn jump_to_image_no_args(struct spl_image_info *spl_image) /* HAB looks for the CSF at the end of the authenticated data therefore, * we need to subtract the size of the CSF from the actual filesize */ + offset = spl_image->size - CONFIG_CSF_SIZE; if (!authenticate_image(spl_image->load_addr, - spl_image->size - CONFIG_CSF_SIZE)) { + offset + IVT_SIZE + CSF_PAD_SIZE, offset)) { image_entry(); } else { puts("spl: ERROR: image authentication unsuccessful\n");